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2ABSTRACT
Existing international legal literature recognizes that parties to armed 
conflicts and individual combatants are legally required not only to refrain from  
deliberately attacking non-combatants and civilian objects, but also to take care 
to ensure (to the extent feasible) that such persons are not killed or injured, and 
such objects not destroyed or damaged, by accident or incidentally during 
military operations. This thesis looks at the practical application o f this latter 
principle during a twenty-five year period following the entry into force o f  
Protocol I  Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f  1949. It contends that 
although the rules in this area are not easily susceptible to judicial enforcement, 
they are nevertheless sufficiently flexible and realistic to be capable o f effective 
implementation without detriment to military effectiveness. Examination o f the 
practice o f parties to various conflicts during the period under review suggests 
that i f  and to the extent that belligerents are ready to devote time and resources to 
training, leadership, internal accountability procedures, and to the provision o f 
appropriate military equipment, they can, so long as they are not too impatient for  
quick results, comply with the Protocol I  rules on precaution in attack without the 
need for combatants to take unreasonable risks for the sake o f enemy non- 
combatants. Efforts to enforce the law externally have, however, met with mixed 
results, revealing more about the selectivity o f international justice than about its 
effectiveness as a tool fo r ensuring fair treatment for victims and alleged violators 
o f the rules on precautions in attack. The most potentially effective form o f 
enforcement o f these rules appears set to remain, for the time being at least, the 
influence over belligerents which some third party states and other international 
actors retain, but are perhaps sometimes hesitant to exercise in the interests o f 
promoting respect for the law o f armed conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
During modem armed conflict, non-combatants are sometimes killed or 
injured because of mistakes in target identification by attacking forces or, more 
commonly, as an unintended consequence of attacks on military objectives. 
‘Collateral damage’1 of this latter nature may be foreseen, but considered by the 
attacking force to be acceptable in scale and nature; or unforeseen, for instance on 
account of a freak accident, or a military objective being put to unusual use, 
unknown to the attacking force.
But in contrast to modem international law prohibiting deliberate attacks on 
civilians and civilian objects, which is relatively clear and, now, relatively 
vigorously enforced on the international legal plane, international law determining 
the precise degree of care which parties to a conflict must take to eliminate or 
reduce collateral damage, and to avoid hitting the wrong target altogether by 
mistake, appears at first blush unsatisfactorily imprecise - and virtually impossible 
in practice to enforce.
This thesis examines the implementation and enforcement between 1980 and 
2005 of the obligation under the international law of armed conflict to take 
precautions in attack. It addresses three questions:
■ What does modem international law require of belligerents m terms of 
taking precautions to minimize collateral damage when planning and 
executing attacks?
1 NATO defines ‘collateral damage’ as ‘damage to surrounding resources, either military or non­
military, as the result of actions or strikes directed specifically against enemy forces or military 
facilities’ (US Intelligence Targeting Guide (Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 (1998) (hereinafter 
‘AFP14-210’)). The concept includes death and injury of non-combatants as well as damage to 
buildings etc.
2 The words ‘belligerent’ and ‘combatant’ have technical meanings in international law. For the 
sake of convenience, they are often used in this thesis to mean, respectively, ‘a party engaged in an 
armed conflict’ and ‘a person who takes direct part in combat’, without intending to imply 
anything about the legality of the initial resort to force, the status of the person taking part in 
combat or the ‘statehood’ or otherwise of an entity waging war.
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■ What does the evidence of actual practice during conflicts between 
1980 and 2005 suggest can reasonably be expected of modem 
belligerents (and individual combatants) in terms of taking precautions 
in attack?
■ What may the consequences be on the international plane for 
individuals and states if the law is violated?
The period looked at is interesting on account of developments in the law as 
well as military technology and doctrine. On the legal side, it sees the first 
attempts by states party to the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions to apply this treaty in actual combat. The resultant publicly available 
evidence of state practice in terms of implementing the obligation under the 
international law of armed conflict to take precautions in attack permits an 
examination of this area of ‘applied law’ which would have been difficult, if not 
impossible, until very recently. The period sees major developments in the area of 
international criminal law, notably the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and the emergence of new case law relating to the criminal 
enforcement of the international law of armed conflict from the two ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals set up by the UN Security Council: the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).3 It also sees the beginnings 
(and subsequent development) of a certain amount of cross-fertilization between 
the law of armed conflict and international human rights law. Finally, it sees the 
completion, in 2001, by the International Law Commission of its Articles on the 
Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, enshrining an important 
and in some respects new doctrine for holding states to account for violations of 
international law.
On the military side, technology which became available (to some belligerents 
at least) during this period transformed the way wars could be fought. Satellite
3 Other ad hoc criminal tribunals were established to hear cases of alleged violations of 
international law in Sierra Leone and East Timor. The case law of these tribunals is minimal at 
the time of writing (January 2006).
12
global positioning systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, terminal guidance 
weaponry and computer networks meant enemy territory and assets could be 
remotely mapped and interpreted, and destructive power projected from great 
distances with unprecedented precision. Novel non-lethal weapons offered new 
ways of using military force to disable rather than to kill or destroy. The military 
doctrine and training of many developed states meanwhile had to accommodate 
frequent deployment of the armed forces in ‘military operations other than war’ as 
well as international armed conflicts, typically (in both contexts) within coalitions. 
These experiences exposed servicemen and women to the legal perils of having to 
conduct military operations in situations in which rules of law other than those of 
the law of armed conflict often applied. They also exposed states to the problems 
of participating in military operations with allies with legal obligations, or 
understandings of their legal obligations, rather different from their own.
The obligation under the international law of armed conflict to take 
precautions in attack consists largely of treaty and customary law rules which are 
hortatory rather than justiciable: they encourage good practice, rather than setting 
clear standards of conduct, failure to meet which will be penalized. Their 
language, typically, is subjective. They use words and terms such as ‘feasible’, 
‘all in his power’, ‘all reasonable precautions’, or ‘excessive’. They do not thus 
lend themselves very easily to external judicial enforcement, although egregious 
cases of violation may sometimes have adverse legal consequences for individuals 
or for states. A parallel can perhaps be drawn with the principles underlying the 
law of professional negligence as understood in some common law jurisdictions: 
the rules are not so permissive as to rule out the possibility of legal proceedings 
ever being successfully brought against a person responsible for a mistake or error 
of judgement leading to innocent death or injury; but they accept that people 
acting in good faith and in a professionally competent manner can nonetheless 
sometimes make mistakes (or simply suffer bad luck) with tragic results for which 
they cannot reasonably be held criminally responsible in law.4
4 See e.g. Whitehouse v. Jordan (1980), House of Lords (UK).
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The main value of the hortatory rules lies not in their limited role in helping 
tribunals to prosecute violations of the law of armed conflict, however. It lies in 
the formal confirmation they provide that the law of armed conflict, as currently 
understood, requires considerably more of combatants and commanders than the 
mere avoidance of conduct that is plainly criminal. Their role is to point towards 
the ideal, rather than simply to prohibit the outrageous. Hortatory mles are of 
value not least precisely because it is seldom appropriate for them to be enforced 
judicially from the outside: they are flexible enough to accommodate the fact that 
during armed conflict, combatants operate in conditions of extreme stress, with 
imperfect equipment and intelligence, and will inevitably sometimes make 
mistakes or misjudgements. They also accommodate the fact that in some 
situations where a combatant has to weigh military and humanitarian 
considerations, there simply is no right answer: all that can be expected is that he 
weigh military and humanitarian considerations against each other in good faith.5
For this reason, the longest chapter in this thesis consists of an attempt to 
identify, on the basis of material in the public domain, good practice on the 
modem battlefield in terms of implementing the legal obligation to take 
precautions in attack, without it being implied that failure to take these or 
equivalent precautions could necessarily be properly considered criminal in 
international law. That is not to say states may not choose to use their own 
criminal law for enforcing adherence by their armed forces to certain rules and 
procedures concerning the precautions to be taken in attack; on the contrary, the 
establishment of appropriate procedures for promoting compliance with 
international law, backed up if necessary by criminal sanctions, is an important 
means by which a state implements its international obligations in this area.
When states fail to implement their obligations concerning precautions in 
attack, the question arises of how the mles may be enforced externally. There are 
two ways in which this may be done: prosecution of individuals before
5 ‘The provisions contained in Additional Protocol I are not always as clear and precise as one 
might wish, but it seemed and still seems to be necessary to leave some margin of appreciation to 
those who have to apply the rules. Thus their effectiveness depends to a large extent on the good 
faith of the belligerents and on their wish to conform to the requirements of humanity.’ (Knut 
Dormann in Protecting Civilians in 21st Century Warfare, (Nijmegen, 2001) eds. Mireille Hector 
and Martine Jellema, 99).
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international criminal tribunals; and enforcement action against states taken on the 
international plane within the framework of the law of state responsibility. The 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
Since the object of this thesis is to cover the obligation to take precautions in 
attack, not the separate question of the obligation to avoid deliberate attacks on 
non-combatants and civilian objects, its emphasis is on the conduct and 
procedures of belligerents which have tried in good faith to minimize collateral 
damage, not the conduct of those whose overt purpose has been to kill or 
intimidate non-combatants. The thesis will not, thus, cover armed violence 
during the period under review in which non-combatants were systematically 
attacked on purpose. There is little or no coverage, for this reason, of certain 
major conflicts of this period, such as those occurring in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa and the Sudan.
The rules looked at are those designed to apply to the use of force in armed 
conflict.6 The thesis will not cover regular, peacetime law enforcement or 
counter-terrorism, nor spasmodic acts of violence, though it includes some 
examination of ‘military operations other than war’.7 The law of weaponry is 
considered, but not treaty regimes the primary purpose of which is arms control 
and disarmament, such as those relating to the production and stockpiling of 
weapons of mass destruction, although it should be noted that rules of
6 The ICRC Commentary to the Geneva Conventions defines ‘armed conflict’ as ‘any difference 
arising between States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces’ 
{Commentary on the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949 (Geneva, 1952), ed. Jean Pictet, (Vol 
I), 29 (hereinafter ‘ICRC Commentary (Geneva Conventions)'). The Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) determined an ‘armed conflict’ 
to exist ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State.’ {Prosecutor v. Tadic, (Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence Motion fo r  
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (1995), ICTY para.70 (hereinafter ‘ Tadic (Jurisdiction 
Appeals Decision) ).
7 The term used in US military doctrine ‘to describe the broad range of military operations which 
fall outside the traditional definition of ‘armed conflict” . (See the US manual Operational Law 
2005 (available via the website of the US Center for Law and Military Operations), 57). The UK 
also uses the concept of ‘Operations Other than War’ in its military doctrine (see JWP 3-50 Peace 
Support Operations, (2nd Edition) (available via MoD website), 2-5).
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international law which apply to the use of conventional weapons apply also to
O
the use of nuclear weapons.
This thesis is intended to be historical, focusing on a discrete twenty-five year 
period beginning shortly after the entry into force of Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, when military and legal developments in relation to 
the implementation and enforcement of the obligation to take precautions in attack 
proved particularly interesting. But the thesis also aims to examine the law as it 
stands at the time of writing, and to draw out some of the lessons of military 
practice during this period for at least the short term future.
Structure and methodology
Chapters 1 and 2 look at the origins and substance of the obligation under the 
international law of armed conflict to take precautions in attack, taking into 
consideration relevant international agreements, specialized legal literature, and 
official military manuals.9 Chapters 3 and 4 look at implementation of the law in 
practice between 1980 and 2005. This period includes five international armed 
conflicts in which NATO member states have participated: the Falklands conflict 
of 1982; the 1991 Gulf war; the 1999 Kosovo war; and the campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq which began in 2001 and 2003 respectively. The 
participation of the United Kingdom in all five of these conflicts, and of the 
United States in four of them, has generated a substantial body of well-reported 
state practice in relation to the rules on precautions in attack, on which this thesis 
draws heavily. An effort has been made to include examples of practice of other 
belligerents in other conflicts during this period, but the examples are intended to 
be illustrative only and do not constitute an exhaustive review. Materials relied 
on include first-hand accounts of armed conflict, contemporary media reports, 
expert reports of humanitarian organizations, and parliamentary reports. The 
focus is mainly on what various belligerents do to promote respect, in both letter
8Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons (1996), ICJ 
(hereinafter ‘Nuclear Weapons') paras.85-87.
9 Military manuals are not themselves authoritative sources of law, but often indicate how the 
customary international law of armed conflict is understood by certain states.
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and spirit, for the legal obligation to take precautions in attack, but this part of the 
thesis also looks at where things can go wrong. Chapter 5 examines how 
compliance with the rules is promoted internally. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the 
actual and possible consequences on the international plane of violations of this 
body of law by individuals and states respectively.
All documentary materials relied upon have been found in the public domain. 
Technical information has sometimes been supplied by informal briefings given 
by serving or retired military personnel with direct experience of military 
operations during the period under review.
***
Throughout this thesis the words ‘he’, ‘his’ etc. should be understood where 
appropriate as meaning ‘he or she’, ‘his or her’ etc.
Full references for cases and works cited are given in the table of cases and 
bibliography at the end of the thesis.
Except where indicated specifically to the contrary, number references are for 
page numbers, not paragraph numbers.
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1. SOURCES OF LAW AND LEGAL REGIMES
What is this Hague Conference? Was there a representative o f  Mexico there?
Was there a representative o f the Constitutionalists there? It seems to me a funny 
thing to make rules about war. I t ’s not a game. What is the difference between 
civilized war and any other kind o f war? I f  you and I  are having a fight in a 
cantina we are not going to pull a little book out o f  our pockets and read over the 
rules.
Francisco Villa10
Before the substance of the obligation under the international law of armed 
conflict to take precautions in attack is examined, the question of when and by 
what authority the various rules apply needs to be considered. The rules come 
from several sources, and not all the detailed rules of international law in relation 
to precautions in attack apply to all situations where force may be used.
There is plenty of authoritative writing on sources of international law in 
general.11 And substantial research has been carried out recently on the legal 
regime governing the conduct of hostilities in internal armed conflicts.12 This 
chapter will not attempt to summarize or revisit all this material, though it will 
often rely on it. It will focus instead on the following issues:
■ the implications of the failure of many treaties on the law of armed 
conflict to secure universal (or even near universal) adherence;
■ the effect on treaty rules on precautions in attack of reservations and 
statements of understanding;
10 Quoted in John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (New York, 1969), 142-143.
11 See for instance Ian Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law (5th Edition) (Oxford, 
1998); Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process; International Law and How We Use it (Oxford, 
1998) and Akehurst 's Modern Introduction to International Law (7th Edition) (London, 1997) ed. 
Peter Malanczuk.
12 See Lindsay Moir, The Law o f Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge, 2002); Liesbeth Zegveld, 
Armed Opposition Groups in International Law: The Quest fo r Accountability (Rotterdam, 2000); 
Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use o f  Force by National Liberation Movements 
(Oxford, 1988) and Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 2005), eds. Jean- 
Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck. See also Rein Mullerson, ‘International 
Humanitarian Law in internal conflicts’ (1997), Journal o f  Armed Conflict Law, Sonja Boelaert- 
Suominen, ‘Grave breaches, universal jurisdiction and internal armed conflict: is customary law 
moving towards a uniform enforcement mechanism for all armed conflicts?’ (2000), JCSL; and 
James Stewart, ‘Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: a 
critique of internationalized armed conflict’ (2003), IRRC.
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■ the ‘chilling’ effect on customary law in this area which may be caused 
by premature attempts to codify it by treaty;
■ the extent to which the rules and principles which apply to land 
warfare can be extended to naval warfare and to attacks against 
airborne objects;
■ the degree to which rules of law strictly speaking applicable only to 
international armed conflicts may nonetheless be relevant to internal 
conflicts and may even be acceptable to those taking part in them;
■ the problem of identifying the law applicable to the use of force in 
‘military operations other than war’.
1.1. Sources of law
a) Treaty law
The main international treaties containing rules on precautions to be taken in
attack by states parties during armed conflict are the 1907 Hague Convention IV
11Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and annexed Regulations, 
the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 194914 
and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict15 and its two protocols. There are also several treaties 
restricting or prohibiting altogether the use of certain types of weapon.16 Finally, 
there are treaties intended mainly for application in peacetime which may have
13 Hereinafter ‘Hague Regulations’.
14 Hereinafter ‘Additional Protocol I’.
15 Hereinafter ‘Cultural Convention’.
16 E.g. the 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact 
Mines (hereinafter ‘Hague Convention VIII’); the 1980 UN Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter ‘Conventional Weapons 
Convention’) and its five Protocols; and the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 
(hereinafter ‘Ottawa Convention’).
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implications for the way in which attacks may be carried out by states parties 
during armed conflict, for instance human rights treaties and certain treaties 
designed to protect the environment and natural resources. Some provide 
explicitly for derogations to be made in emergency situations, while making clear 
that certain core provisions must be understood as continuing to subsist even in 
wartime.17 Others imply that they will not apply (or at least, will not apply in full) 
in time of war.18 Where there is no specific mention of the effect on a treaty of a 
state of war or armed conflict, the extent to which it will remain applicable should 
a state party become engaged in armed hostilities will be a moot question.19
Caution is needed, however, in looking to treaties for the law on taking 
precautions in attack. The first problem is that apart from the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, few international treaties on the law of armed conflict have 
even come close to universal adherence.20 Often the states whose names are 
missing from the most numerically impressive lists of states parties are precisely
• . .  . jthose states with the largest and best equipped armed forces. Thus in 
international armed conflicts, separate participants, including those fighting in 
alliances, may have different treaty commitments governing what targets they 
may select and what precautions they must take to minimize collateral damage.
17 See e.g. the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ‘ICCPR’), 
article 4; the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter ‘ECHR’), article 15; and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter ‘ACHR’), article 27.
18 E.g. the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, article 89 of which provides 
that ‘in case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any 
of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals’.
19 On this point, see Christopher Greenwood, ‘Scope and Application of International 
Humanitarian Law’ in The Handbook o f Humanitarian Law o f Armed Conflict (Oxford, 1995), ed. 
Dieter Fleck (hereinafter 'Handbook o f Humanitarian Law ’) (para.201 and commentary);
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (New York, 2000) 243-244; and The Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988) and the Law o f Naval Warfare (Cambridge, 1993), eds. Andrea de Guttry and 
Natalino Ronzitti, (76-79 and notes).
20 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by all UN members except Nauru and 
Niue; Additional Protocol I has 163 states parties and Additional Protocol II has 159; the Ottawa 
Convention has 147 states parties; the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’) has 100 states parties; the Cultural Convention has 114 and its Second 
Protocol, with several detailed provisions on precautions in attack, has 37 (January 2006).
21 For instance, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the US, none of which has ratified 
the Ottawa Convention or the Rome Statute. Additional Protocol I has not been ratified by, inter 
alia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan or the US. The Cultural Convention has not been ratified by 
China, the UK or the US.
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A second problem is the vexed question of reservations. Reservations, which 
can be made by states on signing or ratifying treaties, unless objected to within 
twelve months, modify for the reserving state the provisions to which the
reservation refers. They also modify for other states parties those same
00provisions, to the same extent, in their relations with the reserving state. This 
means a simple reading of a treaty text relating to the law on precautions in attack 
is seldom sufficient to learn the actual legal obligations of states parties. Not only 
can reservations affect the practical impact of a treaty, but ‘statements of 
understanding’, in which a state gives notice of its intention to understand a 
provision of a treaty in a certain way (which may or may not have much in 
common with the plain meaning of the text) can also affect the way the treaty will 
in practice be understood and its rules be implemented.
So treaty law will only take us so far. For an understanding of those 
principles of international law concerning precautions in attack applicable to 
states and individuals involved in international armed conflict irrespective of 
ratifications and reservations, other sources of law must be examined.
b) Customary law
Customary international law applies to all states and, in some circumstances, 
to armed opposition groups.24 As it usually takes the form of general principles 
rather than precise rules, it also has the advantage over treaty law of often being 
flexible enough to accommodate technological developments and different 
physical environments (i.e. land, sea, air or space). Whereas treaties concluded to
22 See the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), articles 19, 20 and 21. Article 
2(d) defines a reservation as ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
State’.
23 Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK 
have all entered reservations or made ‘statements of understanding’ in relation to the provisions of 
Additional Protocol I on precautions in attack.
24 Some writers maintain that some treaties, or provisions thereof, may also apply directly to armed 
opposition groups. (See e.g. Moir, The Law o f Internal Armed Conflict, 52-58 and 96-99).
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regulate new methods and means of warfare tend to date quickly,25 principles of 
customary law are less prone to obsolescence.
The problem with customary law is how to identify it. The traditional two
criteria for identifying principles and rules of customary international law are that
they should reflect widespread state practice, including that of the states ‘specially 
26affected’ (usus), and that this practice should be considered by states to be 
required by law {opinio juris sive necessitatis),27 rather than being simple 
convention or courtesy. But it is not obvious in the context of the law of armed 
conflict which states are those ‘specially affected’ and which states’ views need to 
be considered most relevant where opinio juris is concerned.28 Those who wage 
war most regularly? Those on whose territories wars occur? Those who can form 
a majority in the United Nations? Or the most influential military powers? In 
reality, the customary rules of armed conflict normally recognized by tribunals 
and academic writers tend to reflect, to a large extent, the practice and views of 
the major military powers. It is not for the major military powers alone to dictate 
the law of armed conflict, nor does the rejection of an alleged rule of customary 
international law by a major military power necessarily invalidate it, but if 
customary international law in relation to armed conflict is to be of practical 
protective value, it must necessarily coincide to a substantial degree with what the 
major military powers consider acceptable practice.
25 The 1936 Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London of April 22 1930 (the ‘London Protocol’) prohibiting submarines, as well as 
other warships, from sinking merchant vessels refusing to submit to visit and search procedures 
unless crew, passengers and ship’s papers had first been placed in a place of safety was considered 
obsolete by Germany (by August 1940) and by the US (on entering the war in December 1941) 
(see Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (London, 1995), 360. See also Karl Donitz, 
Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (London, 2000), 58-59). Likewise, the 1907 Hague 
Declaration XIV Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, became in 
effect obsolete that same year, when the Wright brothers offered patents on their newly invented 
aeroplanes to the British Admiralty.
26 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), ICJ, para.73. See also American Law Institute, 
Restatement (Third) o f the Foreign Relations Law o f the US (Washington, 1987), para. 102(2).
27 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para.77. See also Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (1986), ICJ paras.186 and 207. See 
also Higgins, Problems and Process, 18-22, on the role of opinio juris.
28 Sassoli and Bouvier even imply that the traditional criteria for identifying rules of customary 
law may not be appropriate where the law of armed conflict is concerned (Marco Sassoli and 
Antoine Bouvier, Un Droit dans la Guerre? (Geneva, 2003), 140-142).
29 Extensive research with a view to providing authoritative guidance on those rules of the law of 
armed conflict which can be considered customary international law has been conducted by the 
ICRC, responding to a formal request made to the organization by the 26th International
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One way customary law can be clarified is through codification in treaty 
form, if the treaty subsequently secures sufficient acceptance, formally and in 
practice, to meet the opinio juris and usus requirements. The provisions of the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and 
annexed Regulations are considered customary law by virtue of passing both 
tests,30 as are many provisions of Additional Protocol I and of the Cultural 
Convention. But the other side of this coin is that if a putative rule, or set of rules, 
drafted in treaty form fails over time to command the assent of more than a few 
states, this may actually have the ‘chilling’ effect of confirming that the proposed 
rule or rules in question do not constitute customary law. For instance, the failure 
of the 1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare to enter into force can be seen 
with hindsight to have had the opposite effect to that intended by making it
painfully clear that states did not agree that its provisions could and should be
• •  ^1 , , .seen as constituting legally binding rules. There is, in short, always a risk that
new treaties may backfire and instead of confirming the lex lata status of putative
principles of customary law, simply confirm (by failing to attract enough support)
that the so-called principles are, at most, lex ferenda.
c) General principles o f law, judicial decisions and writings ofpublicists
As with international law in general, rules of international law on precautions 
in attack may be inferred from general principles of law recognized in national 
legal systems, and, to some extent, from judicial decisions and the writings of 
publicists.32 However, as with peacetime treaty law, peacetime common law 
principles and civil law rules do not necessarily persist in time of war in such a
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1995. The results are presented in the three 
volume study Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 2005), eds. Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck.
30 ‘These fundamental rules [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations] are to be 
observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because 
they contain intransgressible principles of international law’ Nuclear Weapons, para.79. See also 
Trial o f  the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) (1947) XXII, 
467-497.
31 See W. Hays Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’ (1990), Air Force Law Review.
32 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38.1.
23
way that, in the parody offered by the High Court of Australia in 1940, ‘whether 
the combat be by sea, land or air.. .men go into action accompanied by the law of 
civil negligence, warning them to be mindful of the person and property of 
civilians’.33
1.2. Naval warfare and aerial warfare
a) Naval warfare
The difficulty during naval warfare of identifying vessels and aircraft with 
certainty and the fact that the use of force against a vessel or aircraft tends, 
necessarily, to be an all or nothing affair, mean that detailed targeting rules 
applicable to armed conflict on land can seldom simply be extended to the 
conduct of hostilities at sea, even if the same underlying principles of customary 
law may apply.34 Treaties on the conduct of hostilities have tended, therefore,
• • ,  o reither to exclude naval warfare almost entirely, or to be focussed on it solely. 
This thesis will thus look at the substance and application of the rules on 
precautions in attack applicable to naval warfare separately from those applicable 
to the conduct of hostilities on land.
33 Shaw Savill and Albion Company Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1940), High Court of Australia.
34 See the UK’s Manual on the Law o f Armed Conflict (Oxford, 2004), paras. 13.24-13.32 
(hereinafter ‘UK Manual 2004 ). See also the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Oxford, 1995), ed. Louise Doswald-Beck, (hereinafter ‘San 
Remo Manual *) (especially paras.38-43 and 46) on principles of customary law applicable to naval 
warfare.
35 The Hague Regulations are not intended to cover naval warfare, although articles 25 and 26, 
concerning the bombardment of land-based objects, apply to naval and aerial forces. Likewise, 
the provisions of Additional Protocol I on ‘General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities’ apply 
to attacks from sea and air on land-based objects, but ‘do not otherwise affect the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air’ (article 49.3), although article 
57.4 requires that ‘in the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the 
conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and 
damage to civilian objects.’
36 See for instance the 1907 Hague Conventions VII, VIII, IX and XI.
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b) Aerial bombardment
Similar considerations might be thought to apply to aerial bombardment. 
Though air power can be used tactically in close support of military operations on 
land, historically its major value has been seen in terms of the means it offers of 
attacking strategic targets deep in enemy territory with the object of knocking an 
enemy swiftly out of a war, or compelling him to concede, without the need for 
extended attritive combat in the field or even for ground forces to be deployed at 
all, although the view that strategic air power used in isolation can be sufficient to 
achieve military or even political aims is challenged at least as often as it is 
advanced. The typical targets of long-range strategic air campaigns are 
industrial complexes, fuel supplies, command and control centres, transport 
nodes, communications facilities and occasionally economic and political 
objects. This type of warfare, inevitably putting civilians and civilian assets 
directly in the line of fire, puts the traditional rules of targeting under immense 
strain.39 But unlike naval warfare, aerial bombardment does not have its own 
treaty regime.40 Where aerial bombardment is concerned, the treaty rules which 
apply depend on whether the object being bombarded is on land or at sea.41
37 See e.g. Paul Forage, ‘Bombs for peace: a comparative study of the use of air power in the 
Balkans’ (2002), Armed Forces and Society. See also Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power 
and Coercion in War (New York, 1996). For the opposite view, a seminal article is John 
Warden’s ‘The Enemy as a System’ (1995), Airpower Journal.
38 See for instance the 12 ‘target sets’ chosen for strategic air attack during the Gulf War of 1991, 
quoted in Horace Robertson, ‘The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (1998), US Naval War College International Law Studies.
39 Between the First and Second World Wars, three influential airmen, William Mitchell in the US, 
Giulio Douhet in Italy and Hugh Trenchard in the UK, argued forcefully that air power should be 
used deliberately to put civilians under pressure (see Pape, Bombing to Win, 59-66). Had this 
approach been unequivocally accepted, it would have required either a new legal regime for aerial 
bombardment, or agreement that the traditional rules of armed conflict prohibiting attacks on 
civilians and civilian objects did not apply to this form of warfare.
40 After the First World War, efforts were made to codify the law on aerial warfare, culminating in 
the 1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, where it was proposed that aerial bombardment 
should be limited to certain designated military objects (article 24(2)). The Draft Rules were 
never adopted in treaty form and their provisions were flagrantly disregarded in both the Spanish 
Civil War and the Second World War. (See Heinz Hanke, ‘The 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare’ 
(1993), IRRC for a history of these negotiations).
41 See Additional Protocol I, article 49.3.
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c) Attacks on airborne objects
Apart from some provisions in Additional Protocol I relating to the legal 
protection, in tightly defined circumstances, of medical aircraft, and the general 
requirement for states parties to take ‘all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of 
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects’ during military operations at sea and 
in the air,42 there is no treaty law to dictate specifically the circumstances in which 
airborne objects may or may not be attacked, though as with naval warfare, the 
underlying principles of customary law on the conduct of hostilities, such as the 
principles of distinction and proportionality,43 apply.
1.3. Non-international conflicts
a) Preliminary remarks
Non-intemational armed conflicts are often just as intense as international 
conflicts and fought with similar weaponry. Sometimes participants on all sides 
use traditional military tactics and observe traditional military conventions. But 
few treaties on the law of armed conflict apply in their entirety to non- 
intemational conflicts,44 although the rules enshrined in their provisions may 
sometimes apply to internal conflicts by virtue of customary international law.
b) Treaty law and non-international conflicts
The two treaty texts regarded as the twin pillars of the regime applicable to 
internal conflicts are article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
42 See article 57.4.
43 E.g. the ‘basic rules’ set out in paras.38-43 and 46 of the San Remo Manual See also UK 
Manual 2004, paras. 12.18-12.26.
44 The first comprehensive codification of the laws of war was nevertheless drawn up in the 
context of a civil war (Francis Lieber’s Instructions fo r  the Government o f Armies o f  the US in the 
Field of 1863). Vattel considered on pragmatic grounds that the parties to a civil war should be 
considered as equal subjects of international law (Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens 
(Amsterdam, 1775), Book III, Chapter 18 ‘La Guerre Civile’).
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which applies to armed conflicts ‘not of an international character’ occurring in 
the territory of a state party, and the 1977 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949,45 drafted specifically to apply to internal conflicts 46 These 
texts are of limited usefulness in practice. While the criteria for their application 
are too exigent for their formal applicability often to be acknowledged,47 they are 
too general to be of much service to those seeking evidence of an international 
legal requirement to take certain specific precautions in attack during internal 
conflicts 48 As a military manual published in 2004 observed, the rather general 
provisions of Additional Protocol II have, anyway, ‘to some extent been 
overtaken by the now higher standards of customary law’.49
Additional Protocol I, containing detailed rules in relation to the obligation to 
take precautions in attack, normally applies only to conflicts between states, but 
may in theory apply to wars of self-determination occurring within the territory of 
a state party if certain elaborate criteria are met.50
Several human rights treaties have provisions on the right to life which have 
implications for the conduct of hostilities within the jurisdiction of states parties.51
45 Hereinafter ‘Additional Protocol II’.
46 Other treaties partially or wholly applicable to internal conflicts, though not designed per se to 
regulate them, are the Cultural Convention (see article 19) and its Second Protocol (see article 22), 
Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and (arguably) the 1997 
Ottawa Convention.
47 Few states have been prepared formally to acknowledge the existence on their territory of an 
armed conflict triggering the application of common article 3, although sometimes third states 
have held, in their national courts, such a conflict to exist (see e.g. The Government o f  the Russian 
Federation v. Akhmed Zakaev (2003), Bow Street Magistrates Court (UK)). Additional Protocol II 
has been deemed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to have been applicable to the
1994 conflict in that country (see Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Trial Judgement) (1998), ICTR, 
para.627). It has also been held by bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the UN Commission on Human Rights to be (or to have been) applicable to conflicts in 
El Salvador, the Sudan and Colombia (see Zegveld, Armed Opposition Groups in International 
Law, 162). A notable exception to the unwillingness of states to recognize the existence of an 
armed conflict within their own territory was the finding of the Russian Constitutional Court in
1995 that Additional Protocol II should in principle be considered applicable to the conflict in 
Chechnya (see Paola Gaeta, ‘The armed conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional 
Court’ (1996), EJIL).
48 Common article 3 requires that all persons not taking an active part in hostilities ‘be treated 
humanely’, as does Additional Protocol II (article 4.1). Additional Protocol II prohibits making 
civilians the object of attack (article 13), but contains no provisions on precautions to be taken to 
avoid or minimize collateral damage.
49 UK Manual 2004, para.15.49.2.
50 Article 1.4. See also article 96, paragraphs 2 and 3.
51 See for instance ECHR articles 2 and 15; ICCPR article 6; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, article 4; and ACHR article 4. The ICJ held in Nuclear Weapons that ‘In
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The right to life enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights has been 
construed as obliging states parties, when carrying out attacks within their 
jurisdiction, not to expose innocent third parties to unnecessary danger. It has 
also recently been interpreted as obliging states parties to carry out effective and 
independent official investigations when their agents use lethal force within their 
jurisdiction. The right to life enshrined in the American Convention on Human 
Rights has even been interpreted by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights as allowing it to apply the international law of armed conflict directly to 
the actions of a state party to the Convention engaged in armed confrontation with 
its own citizens.54 Human rights treaty provisions are not of course reciprocal 
where the parties to internal conflicts are concerned. Their rules apply only to 
states and their agents, not to private individuals or non-state actors, although the 
state may be found to be in breach of its obligations if it fails to prevent the latter 
from carrying out acts of violence, or fails to investigate properly when they do 
so.55 Private individuals and non-state actors engaged in an internal conflict will, 
however, be subject in principle to the law of the land, meaning that if captured, 
they risk prosecution simply for participation in hostilities.
One of the problems with treaty rules purporting to govern internal conflicts 
is that such conflicts are almost by definition fought between parties at least one 
of which will not be party to, nor have played a part in negotiating, any treaties at 
all.56 The texts may not even exist in the language spoken by one or more of the 
parties. In such circumstances, to impose treaty rules on the participants might
principle the [ICCPR] right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. 
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely the law applicable in armed conflict... ’ (para.25). The ICJ did 
not, however, expand on what aspects of this law it considered to be applicable in internal as well 
as international armed conflicts.
52 See e.g. Ergi v. Turkey (1998), ECtHR.
53 See McKerr v. UK (2001), ECtHR, paras. 111-112. See also Kay a v. Turkey (1998), ECtHR, 
(particularly paras.41 and 89-90, suggesting a high standard of scene-of-crime and autopsy work is 
normally required of ECHR states parties for compliance with their article 2 obligations).
54 SeeAbella v. Argentina (1997), IACHR, paras.157-171. See also Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘The Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights and international humanitarian law: a comment on the 
Tablada Case’ (1998), IRRC for a critical review of this case.
55 See for instance Shanagan v. UK (2001), ECtHR, paras. 111 and 119. See also Velasquez 
Rodriguez v. Honduras (1988), IACtHR.
56 In 1965 the South Vietnamese FNL, responding to the ICRC’s appeal for respect of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, declared it did not consider itself bound by international treaties signed by 
others, although it would ensure that prisoners and the wounded in its power were treated 
humanely (Michel Veuthey, Guerilla et Droit Humanitaire (Geneva, 1983), 57).
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seem to violate the principle that treaties are binding only on states, and only on
cn
those states which have voluntarily accepted their provisions.
c) Customary law and non-international conflicts
Customary law applicable to internal conflicts has long been a grey area. The 
need for it to be clarified became urgent with the establishment, between 1993 and 
2003, of four new international criminal tribunals with jurisdiction over violations 
of the law applicable to internal armed conflicts: the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993); the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (1994); the International Criminal Court (1998) and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (2002).
The statutes of these tribunals are a useful guide to what the international 
community, or at least, a section of it,58 considered customary law applicable to 
internal conflicts when the statutes were drafted.59 It is clear from the statutes of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone that it was not expected that these tribunals 
would regard more than a selection of the rules applicable to international armed 
conflict as applicable to internal conflict. The statute for the International 
Criminal Court adverts clearly to two distinct legal regimes: that applicable to 
international armed conflicts, the rules of which are set out in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of its article 8.2; and that applicable to internal conflicts, the rules of which are 
set out in paragraphs (c) and (e) of the same article.60
57 See VCLT articles 34-35.
58 The ICC’s Rome Statute was the product of extensive multilateral negotiations involving 
delegations from 160 states. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes were drawn up by the UN Secretary 
General’s office, after consultation with selected states and organizations, and were adopted as 
UNSC Resolutions. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by an 
agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, pursuant to UNSCR 
1315.
59 See articles 3 and 4, ICTR Statute; article 5, ICTY Statute; articles 2,3 and 4, Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and article 8.2 (c) and (e), Rome Statute.
60 The customary law regime applicable to internal conflicts indicated in Rome Statute, article 8.2, 
paragraphs (c) and (e) consists of customary rules enshrined in article 3 common to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and in Additional Protocol II and rules considered by the Statute drafters to 
reflect customary law applicable to internal conflicts.
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The statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) is more flexible. As it does not indicate clearly which rules of law should 
be considered applicable to internal conflicts as well as international ones,61 
decisions on which rules to apply in which situations have been left for the 
tribunal judges to deal with on a case-by-case basis.62
This flexibility has been used by the ICTY to take account of the dynamic 
nature of customary international law applicable to internal armed conflicts, the 
rules of which continue to emerge in line with state practice and the 
pronouncements of governments, national tribunals and international bodies, such 
as the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.63 UN Security 
Council and General Assembly statements have been seen by the ICTY as ‘clearly 
articulating the view that there exists a corpus of general principles and norms on 
internal armed conflict embracing common Article 3, but having a much greater 
scope’,64 with the caveat that it is as yet only ‘the general essence of those rules 
and not the detailed regulations they may contain’, which has become applicable 
to internal conflicts.65
This convergence between the rules applicable to international conflict and 
those applicable to internal conflict is also reflected in the attitude of states. 
Internal conflicts are increasingly being treated in official military manuals, by
61 Article 5 of the Statute applies explicitly to internal conflicts; articles 2 and 3 contain no 
mention of whether and if so to what extent they were intended, when drafted, to apply to internal 
conflict.
62 According to the Commission of Experts established by the UNSC to investigate allegations of 
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, ‘the character and complexity of the armed conflicts 
concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have 
concluded among themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the law applicable in 
international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia’. (Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 780 
(1992) (26.01.93), para.45).
63 Both organs have regularly called on parties to internal conflicts to comply with ‘international 
humanitarian law’ without qualification (see e.g. UNSCRs 788 (Liberia, 1992); 794 and 814 
(Somalia, 1992-1993); 993 (Georgia, 1993); 1214 (Afghanistan, 1998); 1270 (Sierra Leone, 1999); 
1464 (Cote d’Ivoire, 2003); 1556 (Sudan, 2004); and UN General Assembly Resolution 54/182 
(Sudan, 1999). See also UNSG report S/2001/789 (Afghanistan, 2001)).
64 Tadic (Jurisdiction Appeals Decision), para. 116.
65 Ibid., para. 126.
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national tribunals and in legislation as being governed by a large number of the 
same principles and rules as those which govern international armed conflicts.66
Not only are third parties showing a tendency to regard internal conflicts as 
governed by many of the same rules as those applicable to international conflicts, 
but there are many public statements on record made by participants in internal 
conflicts indicating their willingness in principle to apply the rules of international 
armed conflict. The sincerity of these statements is sometimes open to doubt, 
given the conduct of the groups in question, but the number of occasions on which
fflparticipants have sought to pay lip-service to international law is striking. And
66 The military manual for use by the German armed forces states: ‘German soldiers like their 
Allies are required to comply with the rules of international humanitarian law in the conduct of 
military operations in all armed conflicts however such conflicts are characterized’ (Handbook o f  
Humanitarian Law, para.211, emphasis added). In 1994, a Danish court passed judgement on a 
defendant accused of violations in an internal conflict of certain of the ‘grave breaches’ provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions - traditionally considered applicable only in international armed 
conflicts (Prosecution v. Refik Saric, quoted in Tadic (Jurisdiction Appeals Decision), para.83).
See also the UK’s 2001 International Criminal Court Act, which criminalizes the violation in 
internal conflicts of certain rules of the international law of armed conflict going beyond 
Additional Protocol II and common article 3. See also Stewart, ‘Towards a single definition of 
armed conflict in international humanitarian law’. William Abresch takes a more conservative 
view, citing the travaux preparatoires of Additional Protocol II as evidence that states such as 
Canada did not, at least in 1977, consider the detailed rules on the conduct of hostilities enshrined 
in Additional Protocol I as appropriate to the conduct of hostilities in non-intemational conflicts 
and that even to this day ‘humanitarian law leaves the planning and execution of attacks essentially 
unregulated in internal conflicts’ (‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The 
European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya’ (2005), EJIL).
67 The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in April 1958 issued instructions for the strict 
observance of the laws of war and in particular the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
and in June 1960, the provisional Algerian government (GPRA) informed the ICRC officially of 
its decision to accede to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Moir, The Law o f  Internal Armed 
Conflict, 73 and Veuthey, Guerilla, 49). In 1971, a representative of the government of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh, engaged in conflict with the central government of Pakistan, 
gave formal assurances to the ICRC of its readiness to respect the Geneva Conventions (Veuthey, 
Guerilla, 50). The African National Congress informed the ICRC in 1980 of its intention ‘to 
respect and be guided by the general principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts’ 
(George Aldrich, ‘New Life for the Laws of War’ (1981), AJIL). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) publicly announced in February 1988 that they would abide by the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions and its two Protocols (Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: An Assessment 
o f the Human Rights Situation (1993)). In 1988, FMLN rebels in El Salvador made a statement 
undertaking to ‘ensure that its combat methods comply with the provisions of common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II’ (Tadic, (Jurisdiction Appeals Decision), para 
107). The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1992 told the ICRC that it considered itself bound by 
‘the rules of international humanitarian law’ (Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Trial Judgement) (1998), 
ICTR, 627). Through a decree issued on 30.05.03, Aslan Maskhadov, President of Chechnya, was 
reported to have ordered his field commanders ‘to abide strictly by the Geneva Conventions’
(Radio Free Europe report of 18.06.03). Examples of commitments made by states to observe the 
international law of armed conflict in internal conflicts include the order given by the Nigerian 
General Gowon to troops on the governmental side of the Biafran War, prohibiting acts of 
violence against non-combatants and civilian property, (Sassoli and Bouvier, Un Droit dans la 
Guerre, 986.) and the statement of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
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of perhaps even more interest than the routine protestations of commitment to 
‘international law’ made by participants in internal conflicts are their reactions of 
to specific atrocities attributed to them. Claims and denials of responsibility, 
attempts to attribute responsibility (and blame) to their opponents, apologies and 
even silence can all be revealing indicators of what the parties, including armed 
opposition groups, consider the applicable customary rules to be.
d) Ad hoc agreements
There have been several attempts to summarize principles of the international
law of armed conflict considered applicable to all situations of armed violence,
• • • • £ 0  # including internal conflicts and public emergencies of lesser intensity. But this
approach is problematic, not least because the degree of compliance with the rules
of international armed conflict of which participants in internal conflicts are
capable (or which is appropriate) will depend on the specific context, as will the
degree and nature of the danger to which non-combatants are exposed. To have
any chance of providing effective protection for non-combatants during internal
conflicts, rules need to take account inter alia of whether or not aircraft or artillery
are being used and the quality of the knowledge held by parties to the conflict
about territory occupied by their opponents. Paradoxically, advocacy of a set of
standard ‘minimum rules’ may have the effect of holding participants in internal
conflicts to lower standards of care than those which they can reasonably be
expected to meet.
1964, engaged at that time in a civil war, undertaking to respect the Geneva Convention [sic] in the 
expectation that the rebels would do likewise (Tadic (Jurisdiction Appeals Decision), para. 105). 
President Putin of Russia in a media interview given in 1999 stated that in Chechnya Russia was 
‘strictly complying with its obligations concerning the provisions of international law’. (Moir, The 
Law o f Internal Armed Conflict, 128, n. 189). Putin’s statement is vague, but not compatible with a 
view that the conduct of Russian troops in Chechnya was not formally subject to international law.
68 See for instance the Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards of 1990 (revised in
1994), drawn up under the aegis of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which contains formal 
rules and prohibitions, but is not legally binding. (See Asbom Eide, Allan Rosas and Theodor 
Meron, ‘Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts through Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards’ (1995) AJIL, for background to the Declaration and the full text). See also UK Manual 
2004, paras. 15.5-15.33.
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Partly for this reason, parties to internal conflicts, often at the prompting of a 
third party, sometimes enter into ad hoc agreements, specifically adapted to the 
conflict, setting out the rules to be observed.69 An example is the ICRC-brokered 
agreement of 22 May 1992, whereby representatives of the Republic of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, the Serbian Democratic Party and the Croatian Democratic 
Community undertook to observe the provisions of articles 35-42 and 48-58 of 
Additional Protocol I in the conduct of hostilities in Bosnia.70 Such agreements 
need not necessarily be the issue of direct bilateral negotiations; they may be 
‘triangular’ agreements, whereby undertakings to observe certain rules are made 
to a third party, such as the ICRC, by both (or all) sides, rather than directly 
between the parties to the conflict.71 Alternatively, tacit agreements on what 
constitutes acceptable conduct in an internal conflict can emerge through practice, 
either in the form of combatants behaving with restraint in the expectation that 
their opponents will do likewise, or in the more negative form of reprisals for 
violations of the unwritten rules. An example of such a tacit (or at least, 
unpublished) agreement is the ‘July Understandings’ reportedly brokered by the 
United States between the Israel Defence Forces/South Lebanese Army and 
Hezbollah and said to have entered into force in Lebanon in 1993.72 The purpose 
of the agreement appears to have been a bilateral renunciation of attacks on 
civilians -  to be enforced if necessary through retaliation in kind. The ‘July 
Understandings’ system seems to have lasted until 1996, when it broke down 
under the weight of reprisals and counter-reprisals, to be replaced by a new set of 
understandings, which were not much more effective, though may have been 
better than nothing.
69 Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions urges parties to conflicts ‘not of an 
international character’ to ‘endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or 
part of the other provisions of the present Convention’.
0 See Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgement) (2003), ICTY, paras.22-25.
71 See Michel Veuthey, ‘Guerilla Warfare and Humanitarian Law’ (1983), IRRC, for examples of 
seven such agreements.
72 See David Turns, ‘Some reflections on the conflict in Southern Lebanon: the “Qana incident” 
and international humanitarian law’ (2000), JCSL, 200. See also W. Michael Reisman, ‘The 
Lessons of Qana’ (1997), Yale Journal o f  International Law, for details of the 1996 
understandings (382, n.l).
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1.4. ‘Military operations other than war’
a) Preliminary remarks
The term ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW), has no meaning in 
international law, but is used as a doctrinal concept by both the United States and 
the United Kingdom to accommodate the fact that frequently the military 
personnel of these states (and others) are deployed in situations which are not 
quite ‘war’ in the classical sense or ‘armed conflict’ in the legal sense, but are far
H'X • • >indeed from being peaceful. The law of international armed conflict applies in 
full to situations which can be considered objectively to be ‘armed conflicts’, 
irrespective of how the belligerents might wish their military activities to be 
qualified.74 But in certain military operations falling short of full scale armed 
hostilities, rules of law other than those of the law of armed conflict often need to 
be taken into account. These may derive from the national legislation of a state 
which contributes forces to a peace enforcement mission, from the laws of the 
host state, or from branches of international law other than the law of armed 
conflict, such as human rights law, environmental law or the law of the sea. The 
applicable rules will depend on the nature of the operation, and are likely to 
include rules and procedures which form no part of conventional combat training 
or basic military instruction on the law of war. Members of armed forces 
deployed abroad will, however, usually be subject to Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
issued by their national commands and to those criminal and civil laws of their
nc
own state which apply extraterritorially to military personnel. There should not 
therefore be doubt at the level of the individual combatant or commander about 
what rules apply in relation to when and how force may be used in MOOTW, so 
long as the ROE are well drafted and understood.
73 See Operational Law 2005, 57, and Peace Support Operations JWP 3-50 (2nd Edition), 2-5.
74 See article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the ICRC Commentary (Geneva 
Conventions) on this article. See also Tadic (Jurisdiction Appeals Decision), para.70.
75 See/?. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary o f State fo r  Defence (2004), Queen’s Bench Division (UK) for 
details of the domestic legislation which may apply extraterritorially to British troops participating 
in operations other than war overseas (342).
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For some states, compliance with the laws of armed conflict is stated to be a 
matter of policy, no matter how an armed conflict is characterized.76 This is 
unproblematic so long as the situation is, objectively speaking, an armed conflict. 
More awkward are declarations that the law of armed conflict will apply in other 
situations (for instance, a peace support operation where foreign troops play a 
policing, rather than a combat role, or a maritime security operation), since the 
law of armed conflict implicitly confers on members of the armed forces the right 
to use lethal and destructive force in a way which may be quite inappropriate 
outside an armed conflict.
b) Military occupation.
When territory is occupied by a hostile power during an armed conflict, all 
four Geneva Conventions will apply77 plus the Hague Regulations78 and 
customary rules on belligerent occupation. Occupying forces of states party to 
Additional Protocol I will be bound by this treaty throughout the occupation if it 
takes place on the territory of another state party to the Protocol (or of a power
• 7Qwhich accepts and applies its provisions). Occupying forces are bound by the 
Hague Regulations to do all in their power ‘to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, 
the laws in force in the country’.80 International human rights law may also apply 
to some extent to the conduct of occupying forces,81 though it should be recalled 
that during a military occupation, the law of armed conflict not only protects 
civilians in the power of occupying forces, but also gives these forces the right to
76 E.g. Germany (see Handbook o f  Humanitarian Law, para.211 and commentary) and the US (see 
Operational Law 2005, 12).
77 See article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See also article 6, Geneva Convention 
IV on the continued application of this Convention in its entirety for one year after the general 
close of military operations and of certain of its provisions throughout an occupation.
78 Articles 42-56, are considered customary international law, like the rest of the Hague 
Regulations.
79 Article 1.3 and article 96.2. See also article 3.
80 Hague Regulations, article 43. For an interesting analysis of this rule see Conor McCarthy,
‘The paradox of the international law of military occupation: sovereignty and the reformation of 
Iraq’ (2005), JCSL.
81 See Theodor Meron, ‘Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties’ (1995), AJIL.
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take measures unlikely to be considered acceptable in peacetime in a democratic 
society.82
The difficulty with military occupation (as to a certain, but perhaps lesser, 
extent with peace support operations) is that the situation may change from a law 
enforcement situation to a combat situation at very short notice. Likewise, there 
may be combat operations in one part of a country under occupation while 
elsewhere troops are engaged in law enforcement.83 In such an environment, 
laws applicable to international armed conflict and peacetime laws still applicable 
in emergency situations need to be observed in parallel, rather than one legal 
regime replacing the other. This is not (quite) to expect the impossible. But it 
needs to be recognized that during military occupation, although the international 
law of armed conflict continues to apply to the conduct of hostilities, compliance 
with these rules may be insufficient for compliance with international (or even 
national) law where military government and administration, including law 
enforcement, is concerned.84
c) Military aid to the civil power
When members of armed forces are deployed in peacetime in support of the 
civil power, whether in their own country or abroad, the laws of armed conflict do 
not apply, except for a few rules intended to apply in peacetime, including in the 
immediate aftermath of an armed conflict, such as the obligation to disseminate 
knowledge of the Geneva Conventions within the armed forces and rules
82 See e.g. Geneva Convention IV articles 5, 27 and 42.
83 In 1999 a US Marine Corps General introduced into western military literature the concept of 
the ‘three block war’, typical of the situations in which NATO ground forces were increasingly 
being deployed, where, in three adjacent blocks in a built-up area, troops might be engaged in, 
respectively, full scale combat action, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief (Charles Krulak, ‘The 
Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’ (1999), Marines Magazine).
84 See Kenneth Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: a Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict’ (2004), AJIL. See also Adam Roberts, ‘The end of occupation: 
Iraq 2004’ (2005), ICLQ for discussion of how the formal end of an occupation is to be 
determined, and what legal regime should be considered to apply when it is not clear whether or 
not a territory is under foreign military occupation.
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• 85 •concerning use of the emblem and the repatriation of prisoners. In peacetime,
OiT
members of the armed forces are normally ‘citizens in uniform’, subject in 
principle to the same laws as civilians, whether their fellow citizens, or those of 
the country in which they are deployed, though where forces aiding the civil 
authorities in another country are concerned, some form of limited immunity from 
the laws of the receiving state is often negotiated in the form of a ‘Status of Forces 
Agreement’ (‘SOFA’).87 ‘Soft’ international law, such as the United Nations 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
may also need to be taken into account. The UN Basic Principles are not legally 
binding, but have sometimes been relied on for guidance by human rights 
tribunals in cases where questions have arisen about whether reasonable force has 
been used in a situation other than armed conflict.88
Some operations in support of the civil authorities, such as counter-terrorism 
activities or the provision of security for a new administration in the immediate 
aftermath of an armed conflict, may place members of the armed forces in 
dangerous and unpredictable situations. However, unless the situation is so 
intense as to qualify as an armed conflict, peacetime laws on the use of force
OQ
(either those of the host nation or of the sending state) will still normally apply.
A state of emergency may modify a peacetime regime to a certain extent and may 
affect a state’s policy in relation to bringing prosecutions when questions arise of 
whether lethal force has been used lawfully. But ‘combatant rights’ to attack 
military objectives and to use lethal force against enemy combatants not 
necessarily posing an immediate threat accrue to members of the armed forces 
only in time of armed conflict.
85 See Geneva Convention I, articles 44 and 47; Geneva Convention II, article 48; Geneva 
Convention III, articles 118 and 127; Geneva Convention IV, articles 14 and 144.
86 See the approach set out in Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. 1 o f 1975) 
(1977), House of Lords (UK), paras. 136-137. As Lord Lloyd of Berwick said in the House of 
Lords, ‘in a free country there is not and cannot be one law for soldiers and another for citizens’
(.Hansard, 14.07.05, Column 1251).
87 For detailed treatment of the history and typical scope of SOFAs, see The Handbook o f  the Law 
o f Visiting Forces (Oxford, 2001), ed. Deiter Fleck.
88 See e.g. McCann v. UK( 1995), (ECtHR), paras. 138-139.
89 See Mohammed B id  and Skender B id  v. Ministry o f Defence (2004), Queen’s Bench Division 
(UK), where an English court ruled there could be no ‘combat immunity’ when force was not 
being used ‘out of pressing necessity in the wider public interest arising out of combat’, but by 
troops ‘carrying out essentially a policing and peacekeeping function’ (paras. 101-104). See also 
R. v. Clegg (1995), House of Lords (UK).
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d) Peace support operations.
Troops deployed abroad under United Nations authority are normally 
considered automatically immune from host country laws to the extent necessary 
for the fulfilment of the UN mission.90 They remain bound, however, by their 
own state’s international legal obligations concerning the conduct of hostilities. 
Thus if they are engaged in armed conflict with the forces of another state, the 
rules of international armed conflict apply even if they are acting under UN 
authority 91 Whether or not the operation meets this threshold, the general rules of 
the UN Secretary General’s bulletin Observance by United Nations Peacekeeping 
Forces o f International Humanitarian Law, issued in 1999 and binding 
throughout the UN organization, apply.92
If foreign military forces assist in the overall administration of territory under 
UN authority, the applicable rules will normally be set out in a UN Security 
Council Resolution. UNSCRs sometimes themselves create a legal regime in 
miniature applicable to UN forces and civil administrations. These rules may 
sometimes need to be supplemented by further special agreements or the 
application of other rules of international law.
1.5. Conclusions
Although many of the rules in relation to precautions in attack are to be found 
in international treaties, the legal order created by treaties is fragmented. 
Different states have different treaty obligations and even within a treaty regime,
90 See Operational Law 2005, 231.
91 See Handbook o f Humanitarian Law, para.208 and commentary. As the British doctrine 
pamphlet JWP 3-50, Peace Support Operations (2nd Edition) puts it: ‘The existence of a mandate 
and the absence of any form of consent on behalf of the local population does not remove the 
obligations of commanders and service personnel to act responsibly within all aspects of 
international law, such as the law of armed conflict.’ (3-2 (para.304)).
92 See Documents on the Laws o f  War (3rd Edition) (Oxford, 2004) eds. Adam Roberts and Richard 
Guelff, 721-730 for text and prefatory note.
93 See e.g. UNSCRs 940 (Haiti), 1031 (Bosnia) and 1244 (Kosovo)).
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reservations may mean that states parties do not all have the same obligations as 
each other. Although it has been observed that ‘the novelty of a weapon does not 
by itself carry with it a legitimate claim to a change in the existing rules of war’,94 
weapons-specific treaties can quickly become out of date and new treaties cannot 
always be concluded rapidly enough to keep up with developments in military 
technology. Against this background, the rules of customary international law on 
the obligation to take precautions in attack take on vital importance.
Treaty and customary rules on precautions in attack which apply to 
international conflicts seldom apply formally and unquestionably to internal 
conflicts. But evidence suggests that parties to such conflicts are often willing to 
accept in principle not only those rules enshrined in Additional Protocol II and 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, but also many of the more detailed 
and far-reaching rules of Additional Protocol I, even if their observance of these 
rules is spasmodic and self-serving. In internal conflicts it may thus often make 
sense for many of the rules of the international law of armed conflict to be 
advocated, irrespective of their formal applicability. And the parties may in some 
circumstances see it as in their interests to observe them, either in search of the 
rewards of the moral high ground or to avoid the inconvenience of obloquy.
Meanwhile, the law continues to move. There is a growing tendency on the 
part of international bodies, at least, and in particular the ICTY, to regard 
customary rules governing international conflicts as equally applicable to non- 
intemational ones. That said, there remains for the time being an important 
difference between those mles applicable to internal conflict which an 
international tribunal can without controversy apply in a criminal trial (which 
remain quite limited, as the Rome Statute makes clear) and the much broader 
range of rules which can reasonably be advocated in the field as generally 
accepted practice and possibly even as emerging mles of customary international 
law.
94 Oppenheim’s International Law Vol II (7th Edition) (London, 1952), ed. Hersch Lauterpacht, 
469.
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The greatest difficulties in relation to the identification of the applicable rules 
on the precautions to be taken in attack are presented not by internal conflict, but 
by military operations which fall short of full scale armed hostilities, in which 
exquisite attention will need to be paid to the precise nature of the operation in 
order for the applicable law to be correctly identified, and reassessment may 
frequently be necessary. Members of regular armed forces will need to be 
provided not only with appropriate Rules of Engagement for compliance with all 
the relevant provisions of international law in these situations (and, possibly, with 
the law of the host country as well as their own domestic civil and criminal law), 
but also with the relevant equipment and training.
The next chapter looks at the substance of international rules on precautions 
in attack.
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2. THE OBLIGATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK
He who... allows a projectile to fire without knowing exactly who will be hit bears 
perhaps sometimes a heavier responsibility than a one-to-one face-to-face crime.
It's the distance, the sanitisation, that perhaps adds a dimension o f  horror to the 
crime.
Prosecuting Counsel in the case o/Prosecutor v. Jokic.95
Where the substance of the legal requirement to take precautions in attack in 
armed conflict is concerned, there are three major points of difficulty. First, just 
how certain does a belligerent need to be about a potential target, in terms both of 
its nature and the presence or absence of non-combatants, before it can 
legitimately be attacked? Secondly, to what extent does the obligation to avoid 
excessive collateral damage confer a commensurate right to cause collateral 
damage which can reasonably be considered not excessive? Thirdly, to what 
extent may combatants be legally obliged to put their own lives at risk for the sake 
of reducing collateral damage?
Not surprisingly, there can be disparity in the way these issues are 
approached by legal advisers attached to armed forces and ministries of defence 
on the one hand and human rights lawyers and activists on the other. This chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that whereas states party to the 1977 Protocol I Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have voluntarily assumed obligations setting a 
very high standard indeed in terms of the protection of non-combatants from the 
effects of attacks, which cannot necessarily be assumed to bind other belligerents, 
the obligations of customary law do not lag far behind. It also seeks to make clear 
that unlike the rules of human rights law, the rules of the law of armed conflict on 
taking precautions in attack are specifically designed for a context in which 
responsibility for the safety and welfare of the population of a territory is shared 
by the conflicting parties, and, to some extent, non-combatants themselves.
In an effort to keep matters relatively simple, the relevant principles and rules 
are presented thematically. When they are limited in scope to a particular form of
95 Prosecutor v. Jokic (Sentencing Judgement) (2004), ICTY para.39.
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warfare, this is indicated. Where the rules appear not to be universally considered 
by states to represent customary law, this too is indicated.
2.1. Legitimate and illegitimate targets -  the principle of distinction
a) Elements o f law in relation to legitimate and illegitimate targets
The law defining legitimate targets of attack in international armed conflicts 
consists of three interlocking elements:
■ rules to indicate those people who may not normally be lawfully 
attacked and rules to indicate the exceptional circumstances in which 
this legal protection ceases;
■ rules to indicate those buildings, vehicles and other objects which may 
not normally be lawfully attacked and rules to indicate the exceptional 
circumstances in which this legal protection ceases;
■ rules to indicate those people and objects who or which may lawfully 
be the object of attack, unless such an attack would be prohibited by a 
rule in one of the above categories.
Attempts to summarize these rules risk either giving the false impression that 
anyone and anything other than civilians or civilian objects may lawfully be made 
the object of attack or the equally false impression that civilians and typically 
civilian objects, such as schools and places of worship, may never lawfully be 
made the object of attack. In an effort to avoid such over-simplification, this 
section looks first at the principle of legal protection for non-combatants and 
civilian objects. It then looks at the modem concept of the legitimate military 
objective. Finally, it looks at the obligation to verify that an object to be attacked 
is a legitimate target.
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b) The prohibition o f attacks on non-combatants
Customary law prohibits attacks directed at non-combatants.96 Non- 
combatants may be civilians, members of the armed forces no longer able or 
willing to fight (hors de combat) or members of the armed forces whose 
temporary or permanent status denies them a combat role, such as medical or
Q7dedicated religious personnel or parlementaires bearing a flag of truce. But 
although it may be simple enough to say that non-combatants should not be 
deliberately attacked, it is less simple to say how a non-combatant (or combatant) 
is to be recognized in circumstances where a person’s status or intentions may be 
unclear from his appearance.
International law provides no precise guidance on the exact point at which an 
enemy combatant must be considered hors de combat. A wounded enemy 
encountered in the course of an engagement may still be able and willing to carry 
on fighting. An apparently unconscious enemy combatant may be gravely ill and 
incapable of resistance, or may be sleeping, intoxicated or simply shamming. 
The law allows combatants some discretion where borderline cases are concerned
• • • • • Oftin which quick decisions need to be taken in dangerous circumstances. 
Borderline cases, however, cannot detract from the clarity and compelling nature 
of the prohibition on attacking an enemy who is clearly no longer a threat, which 
admits of no exception.
As far as civilians are concerned, a basic principle of customary and treaty 
law is that they may not be targeted unless they take a direct part in hostilities.99
96 The ICJ in 1996 affirmed the establishment of the distinction between combatants and non- 
combatants as one of two cardinal principles constituting the fabric of humanitarian law {Nuclear 
Weapons, para.78). The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, containing explicit prohibitions of 
attacks directed against specific categories of non-combatants, are also considered customary law 
by the ICJ {ibid., paras.79-82).
97 See Additional Protocol I, articles 41.2, 42 and 51; Geneva Convention I, articles 12 and 24; 
Geneva Convention II, articles 12, 27, 28 and 47; Geneva Convention III, article 13. See also 
Hague Regulations, article 32.
98 The US Commanders ’ Handbook on the Law o f Naval Operations (NWP1-14M), recognizing 
that there may be circumstances in which an attempt to surrender may be difficult either to 
communicate or to receive, regards the issue as ‘one of reasonableness’ (para. 11.7).
99 See Additional Protocol I, articles 48 and 51 (paragraphs 2 and 3) which can be considered 
customary rules (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Vol. I), 3). See also US Field Manual FM27-10 (Change No.l (1976), para.40). Civilians need
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It is not legally permissible to attack them deliberately simply because of their 
presence in a particular location, e.g. a military security zone or a zone of active 
military operations. It has been suggested that an individual civilian who takes 
part in hostilities loses his protected civilian status permanently and cannot simply 
reassume it on completion of a military operation,100 and at least one state is on 
record publicly as regarding people considered responsible for hostile acts, but 
who live as civilians when not taking part in hostilities, as legitimate targets of 
attack at any moment under customary international law.101 Such an approach 
would not be admissible for a state party to Additional Protocol I, which provides 
that ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section unless and for  
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’ (emphasis added).102 For a state 
not party to Additional Protocol I, it may not be incontrovertibly unlawful in 
theory, although it carries the risk both that genuinely innocent civilians will be 
killed in error and that combatants will become confused about whether or not 
orders they may receive to kill apparent civilians can lawfully be carried out.
For states party to Additional Protocol I, in case of doubt whether a person is 
a civilian he must be considered to be a civilian.103 Both France and the United 
Kingdom, on ratifying the Protocol, made almost identical statements of 
understanding to the effect that for them this provision would not be understood 
as ‘over-riding a commander’s duty to protect the safety of troops under his 
command or to preserve his military situation in accordance with other provisions 
of the Protocol’. For the United Kingdom, the provision would be understood as
not necessarily be armed to be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities; under customary 
law they may lose their immunity if they commit ‘hostile acts’ such as sabotage (see e.g. FM27-10 
para.81 and also Prosecutor v. Musema (Trial Judgement) (2000), ICTR, para.279). See also R. 
Gehring, ‘Protection of Civilian Inffastructures’(1978), Law and Contemporary Problems, School 
o f Law, Duke University for detailed examination of the extent to which civilians need to be 
involved in hostilities to lose their protected status.
100 Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’. See also Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct o f  Hostilities 
under the Law o f  International Armed Conflict (Cambridge, 2004), 28-29.
101 ‘International law in general and the law of armed conflict in particular recognize that 
individuals who directly take part in hostilities cannot then claim immunity. By initiating and 
participating in armed attack, such individuals have designated themselves as combatants and have 
forfeited such legal protection.. .an individual who becomes a combatant is considered to remain a 
combatant until hostilities come to an end and not merely during that exact instant when the 
individual is carrying out an attack.’ (website of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions: Israel -  the Conflict and Peace ( 05.11.03)).
102 Article 51.3.
103 Article 50.1.
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applicable only in cases of substantial doubt. No other state party objected 
formally to these statements, which can be considered a legitimate interpretation 
of the article.104 The customary law position on cases of doubt is less clear, but in 
parts of the world where it is commonplace for ordinary civilians to carry 
weapons openly the fact of a civilian bearing arms cannot in itself be considered 
sufficient to deprive him of his civilian status and make him a legitimate target for 
attack, though it may put him in grave danger of being targeted by mistake in an 
armed conflict. Nor is a person’s protected status as a civilian under customary 
law affected by his contribution to the war effort. His participation in hostilities 
has to be direct before he can become a legitimate target.105
In some conflicts during the period under review, particularly internal 
conflicts or conflicts with an internal dimension such as those which occurred in 
the Balkans in the 1990s, police officers were heavily armed and took part in 
military operations. There appears to have been seldom any doubt that such 
persons could be considered combatants.106
104 In Korad Kalid Omar c. Soldatpara-commando (1995), Military Court (Belgium), where a 
Belgian peacekeeper faced a court martial after opening fire at night on a suspicious figure near a 
military perimeter fence who turned out to be a civilian child, the court took note of the facts that 
‘.. .la tache qui incombait a 1’accuse au moment des faits etait difficile et dangereuse.. .il a du 
prendre une decision en une fraction de seconde.. .sa propre securite et celle de son unite pouvaient 
dependre de cette decision... .il serait injuste de juger sa conduite cette nuit-la a l’aune d’une 
situation confortable, eloignee dans le temps et dans l’espace du contexte des faits... ’ quoted in 
Sassoli and Bouvier,f/n Droit dans la Guerre?, 1322.
105 See Commentary on the Additional Protocols o f 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions o f  12 
August 1949 (Dordrecht, 1987), eds. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann 
(hereinafter 1ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols) ) , 1942-1945. Although the commentary 
relates to article 51.3 of the Protocol, the requirement for a civilian’s participation in hostilities to 
be direct before he loses his immunity from attack can probably be considered a rule of customary 
law (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol. I), 19- 
24.)
106 Peter Rowe argues that to be legitimate objects of attack in an armed conflict, police officers 
need to be ‘members of a force that has been incorporated into the armed forces of a State, or 
civilians who have taken a direct part in hostilities’ (‘Kosovo 1999: The air campaign -  have the 
provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test?’ (2000), IRRC). Neither treaty law (see 
Geneva Convention III, article 4.A.2 and Additional Protocol I, article 43.3), nor customary law 
applicable to internal armed conflicts seem, on the face of it, to point compellingly to this 
interpretation. Henkaerts and Doswald-Beck offer the seemingly better view that ‘In the absence 
of formal incorporation, the status of such groups will be judged on the facts.. .When [paramilitary 
or armed law enforcement] units take part in hostilities and fulfil the criteria of armed forces, they 
are considered combatants.. .While notification [in accordance with Additional Protocol I, article 
43.3] is not constitutive of the status of the units concerned, it does serve to avoid confusion... ’ 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol. I), 17). More 
problematic is the question of the status in an internal conflict of civilians who have been armed, 
ostensibly for their own protection, by governmental security forces.
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c) Objects legally protected from attack
For non-combatants to be protected against the effects of hostilities with any 
effectiveness, legal protection needs to be conferred on the buildings in which 
they tend to be concentrated and the vehicles in which they tend to travel. Treaty
1A7and customary law is well developed in this area. Treaty and customary law
1 ORprovisions also exist to protect cultural property, objects which if destroyed 
could jeopardize the safety or survival of non-combatants, and the environment.109
Additional Protocol I provides that in case of doubt as to whether an object on 
land normally devoted to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it must be presumed not to be so used.110 The 
customary law status of this rule has been questioned by the United States.111 
However, the US Department of the Army Manual, Operational Law 2005, states 
that ‘presumption of civilian property attaches to objects traditionally associated
107 See Rome Statute article 8.2(b) (ii), (iii) (v), (ix) and article 8.2(e) (ii), (iii), (iv); ICTY Statute 
article 3 (b) (c) and (d); Additional Protocol I, article 52.1; Geneva Convention I, article 19; 
Geneva Convention II, article 22; Geneva Convention IV, article 18; Hague Regulations, article 
25; and 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 
articles 1,4 and 5. The provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations 
protecting certain civilian and medical buildings, vehicles and vessels from attack constitute 
customary law. No state has suggested that the general prohibition on attacks against civilian 
objects contained in Additional Protocol I, article 52.1 is not also a binding principle of customary 
law, but contrary state practice has been commonplace.
108 See Hague Regulations, article 27, the Cultural Convention, and article 53 of Additional 
Protocol I. These provisions can be considered customary law, except for articles 8-11 of the 
Cultural Convention establishing a ‘special protection’ regime for certain objects or buildings.
The Second Protocol to the Cultural Convention, providing a level of protection for cultural 
property similar to that provided for civilians by the 1977 Additional Protocol I, has at the time of 
writing (January 2006) only 37 states parties and cannot be considered customary law.
109 See Additional Protocol I, articles 35.3, 54, 55 and 56. The customary law status of articles 35, 
55 and 56 is contested (see remarks of Michael Matheson in ‘The US Position on the Relation of 
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ 
(1987) in American University Journal o f  International Law and Policy, 424, 427 and 436. See 
also Dinstein The Conduct o f  Hostilities, writing more recently, but sustaining the view that 
articles 35.3, 55 and 56 of Additional Protocol I (and, implicitly, even article 54) still do not 
constitute customary law (93-94, 132, 185)). See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, who 
identify rules of customary law similar, but not identical, to the Protocol’s articles 54, 55 and 56, 
while considering the article 35.3 rule a norm of customary law to which the US is a ‘persistent 
objector’ (Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol. I), 139, 151, 189-193).
110 Additional Protocol I, article 52.3.
111 See Final Report to Congress on the Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War, Appendix O (US 
Department of Defense, 1992), 616 (hereinafter ‘Final Report to Congress ’).
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with civilian use (dwellings, schools etc.),’ citing article 52 of Additional Protocol
119I explicitly as authority.
Where objects at sea and airborne objects are concerned, there is no treaty
law equivalent to this presumption of civilian status, though under treaty and
customary law, medical aircraft may not be attacked if they are recognized as such
1 1 ^and not engaging in acts indicating or giving rise to suspicion of hostility. 
However the customary law requirements that belligerents must at all times 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants,114 and that reasonable 
efforts be made to spare non-combatants from the effects of hostilities,115 can be 
considered to apply to attacks on airborne objects and objects at sea as well as 
those on land.116
The protected status of buildings, vehicles, vessels and aircraft dedicated to 
medical purposes is normally indicated by the display of the emblem of the 
Geneva Conventions (a red cross or crescent on a white background),117 or, in the 
case of Israel, a red Star of David, but does not depend on this. The protected 
status of objects derives from their nature and function, not from the fact of their
112 Operational Law 2005, 23. It has been suggested that if attacking forces would be put in 
immediate danger by failure to prosecute an attack, then the legal requirement for certainty about 
the nature of the target may be lessened. (Anthony Rogers, ‘Zero-casualty warfare’ (2000), IRRC, 
181). According to another writer 4.. .the law of armed conflict’s concept of self-defense would 
have allowed resort to actions in defense of a beleaguered unit -  in terms of weapons used, 
ordnance selected, and intensity of fire -  that might otherwise have been prohibited. But this does 
not mean that commanders could conclude that self-defense gives them a general waiver from 
limitations of the law of war’ (Reisman, ‘The Lessons of Qana’, 387, n.30).
113 Additional Protocol I, articles 24-27, San Remo Manual paras.53-54. These provisions, 
describing rules to which no state has formally objected and which are generally respected in 
practice, can be considered customary law.
14 See Nuclear Weapons, para.78.
115 See e.g. Additional Protocol I, article 57.4 and UNGA Resolution 2444.
116 The San Remo Manual proposes a rule that in case of doubt as to whether a vessel or aircraft 
exempt from attack is being used to make an effective contribution to military action it shall be 
presumed not to be so used (para.58), but it is doubtful whether this provision reflects customary 
law.
117 On 08.12.05, a Third Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions was adopted by a 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva with the object of creating an additional emblem, in the form of 
a red square on a white background, to be known as the red crystal and to enjoy equal status with 
the red cross and the red crescent (‘Additional emblem for the international Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement’, ICRC press release 05/73). The red lion and sun, recognized by the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 as an official emblem and used in Iran before 1979, is no longer in use. 
Contrary to the startling claim of Ingrid Detter (The Law o f War (2nd Edition) (Cambridge, 2000), 
293), the ‘red sun’ of the national flag of Japan is not an alternative emblem of the Geneva 
Conventions, but may lawfully be used to indicate Japanese military assets.
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bearing an emblem. Thus a building used exclusively for the care of the wounded 
or sick has protected status whether or not it bears an emblem (and a vehicle 
bearing an emblem which is being used to transport armed combatants may be 
attacked).
The protected status of hospital ships depends additionally on their having
1 10
been notified to the adverse party at least ten days before employment.
Legal protection for civilian and medical objects is never unqualified. 
Buildings and vehicles such as schools and ambulances lose their protection and 
become legitimate targets for attack if they are used to carry out hostile acts, 
though hospitals, civil defence buildings, hospital ships and ambulances which 
engage in acts harmful to the enemy may only be attacked after due warning to 
desist from such acts has been given and remained unheeded.119 So long as non­
medical civilian buildings are not being used by civilians at the time and are not 
‘historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the
170 • •cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’, it is not normally unlawful to use 
them for military purposes, nor is it unlawful to attack them if it is clear that they 
are being so used.121 The use for hostile purposes of a vehicle or building bearing
177the emblem of the Geneva Conventions, however, is an act of perfidy,
118 Geneva Convention II, article 22.
1,9 See Geneva Convention I, article 21 and Geneva Convention II, article 34. See also Additional 
Protocol I, article 65, which can probably be considered a customary rule, and San Remo Manual 
paras.48 and 49. The US manual Operational Law 2005 states, however, that ‘when receiving 
fire from a hospital, there is no duty to warn before returning fire in self-defense’ (23). So long as 
the notion of ‘self-defense’ is not too broadly construed and the fire returned is proportionate, this 
seems a reasonable interpretation of the rule. But it should be noted that in Galic, the ICTY 
considered artillery fire launched at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces to have 
been evidence of a campaign of deliberate attacks on civilians, despite the fact, recognized by the 
judges and the Prosecution, that enemy mortar fire had originated from the hospital grounds or 
from its vicinity (Galic (Trial Judgement), paras.504-509).
120 See Additional Protocol I, article 53. See also Cultural Convention articles 1 and 4. N.b. the 
Cultural Convention does not prohibit outright the use of cultural property for military purposes 
(see article 4.2), other than objects subject to ‘special protection’ registered with UNESCO and 
marked with the emblem of the Convention (ibid. articles 8-11 and annexed Regulations).
121 An attack on a building being used for military purposes, but also being used by civilians, 
would in many circumstances constitute a violation of Additional Protocol I, article 51.8 in 
unlawful response to a violation of article 51.7. States party to the Second Protocol to the Cultural 
Convention are subject to strict and detailed rules concerning the very limited circumstances in 
which they can attack cultural property or use it for military purposes (see articles 6 and 13).
122 Hague Regulations, article 23(f); Additional Protocol I, articles 37, 38 and 85.3(f).
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designated as a war crime in the Statute of the International Criminal Court if the 
perfidy leads to death or serious injury.
d) The concept o f the legitimate military objective
Many of the rules conferring legal protection from attack on specific 
categories of persons and objects go back a long way, even if respect for them has 
often been patchy.124 But it can be awkward to approach the question of what is a 
legitimate target by trying to say what is not a legitimate target. Legal protection 
from attack is never absolute. The modem approach to the law of targeting is to 
seek to define what is a legitimate military objective and rule out attacks on 
anything which is not.
Early efforts to determine what could be considered a legitimate military 
objective focussed on lists.125 The problem with this approach was not only the 
difficulty of reaching agreement, but also the fact that lists could take no account 
of the role played by circumstances in determining the real military importance of 
an object. An object might be in a category of legitimate military objectives, 
while in reality serving no military purpose, such as a bridge of no tactical
123 Article 8.2(b)(vii).
124 By the time of the first Crusades, the view was widespread among western European knights 
that in principle non-combatants such as priests, merchants, labourers, old men, women and 
children should be spared (for the sake of Christian charity) and prisoners should be spared (for the 
sake of good business), though both principles were routinely violated on all sides once the 
Crusades got underway and during the European wars of the Middle Ages and early modem 
period. (See Steven Runciman, A History o f the Crusades (Cambridge, 1951-1954) (Vols. I-III). 
See also Honor Bonet The Tree o f Battles (Liverpool, 1949) (trans. and ed. G. Coupland); Maurice 
Keen, Chivalry (Yale, 1984) and Laws o f War in the Late Middle Ages (Chatham, 1965); Jonathan 
Sumption, The Hundred Years War (London, 1999) (Vols. I and II); Theodor Meron, Henry’s 
Wars and Shakespeare's Laws (Oxford, 1993); and C. Veronica Wedgwood The Thirty Years War 
(London, 1992)).
125 See for instance the 1907 Hague Convention IX on Naval Bombardment, article 2; the 1954 
Hague Cultural Convention, article 8.1(a); the 1923 Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare, article 
24.2; ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols) para.2002, n.3 (containing the text of the 
proposed annex to the ICRC’s 1956 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the 
Civilian Population in Time of War). See also Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’, on efforts by 
the British Foreign Office at the beginning of the Second World War to draw up a list of legitimate 
military objectives, to which it was hoped Germany could subscribe. For an attempt to produce a 
modern illustrative list of military objectives, see Dinstein, The Conduct o f  Hostilities, 88.
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significance.126 Conversely, an object such as a steeple or minaret, which would 
normally be considered a civilian object, might be a key component of the 
temporary military infrastructure, for instance when being used as an observation 
post for directing artillery or for a sniper.
In 1928, the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Hugh Trenchard, proposed that 
legitimate military objectives for air attack could be defined functionally as:
...any objectives [the destruction of which] will contribute effectively towards the 
destruction of the enemy’s means of resistance and the lowering of his 
determination to fight. 127
This broad definition never attained general acceptance.128 But in contrast to the 
‘list’ approach to military objectives adopted in the 1923 Hague Draft Rules on 
Air Warfare a few years previously, it had the merit of connecting the legitimacy 
of an object as a target to its actual function in relation to the military operations 
of the enemy.
The real breakthrough came with international agreement in the 1970s, in the 
course of negotiations on the text of Additional Protocol I, that legitimate military 
objectives could be defined functionally as objects:
...which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.129
Negotiators agreed that attacks directed at anything else (on land) should be 
considered unlawful. This rule, allowing attacks even on objects normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes if -  and only if -  certain conditions are met, can
1 TOnow be considered part of customary law.
126 Though see Dinstein, who argues that even ‘non-arterial’ bridges not leading directly to the 
front will often be legitimate military objectives (ibid., 92-93).
127 ‘Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff for the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on the War 
Object of an Air Force, 2nd May 1928’ published in Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The 
Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945 (London, 1961) (Vol. IV), 74.
128 See ibid., 76-83 for the distinctly chilly reception given to Trenchard’s proposed doctrine by his 
own military colleagues.
129 Additional Protocol I, article 52.2.
130 The definition is widely used in military manuals, including recent US manuals (See e.g. US 
Field Manual 27-10, Change No.l (para.40.c); Operational Law 2005 Chapter 2, 12; AFP 14-210,
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The definition applies only to objects and not to persons. Where people are 
concerned, it is not enough that they should ‘make an effective contribution to 
military action’ to become legitimate targets. Similarly, medical facilities and 
ambulances do not become legitimate targets simply by virtue of making an 
effective contribution to military action (e.g. by treating wounded soldiers so they 
can be sent back to the field). Only if such facilities are used ‘to commit, outside 
their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy’, may they lose their legal
131protection.
The Additional Protocol I definition appears to rule out altogether attacks on 
objects which do not offer a military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the 
time. It can be argued that under customary law, objects such as enemy military 
aircraft and warships (as well as combatants who are not hors de combat) will 
always be legitimate targets in a conflict, irrespective of what they are doing at the 
time.132 But even if not incontrovertibly unlawful, attacks on enemy troops which 
offer no military advantage would appear not only pointlessly savage, but also out 
of harmony with modem international law on the resort to force, which tends to 
regard armed force as legitimate only to the extent it is necessary to achieve a 
legitimate aim.133
para. A4.2.2; UK Manual 2004, para.5.4.1 and Handbook o f Humanitarian Law, para.442). US 
ambivalence about the Additional Protocol I language can however be seen in Instruction No. 2 of 
the Military Commission Instructions issued by the Department of Defense in 2003, where 
military objectives are defined more loosely as ‘those potential targets during an armed conflict 
which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, effectively contribute to the opposing force’s war- 
fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization would constitute a military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the 
time of the attack’. (For discussion of the significance of the difference between this wording and 
that of article 52 of Protocol I, see Anthony Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (2nd Edition) 
(Manchester, 2004), 81).
131 Geneva Convention I, article 21.
132 See e.g. Handbook o f Humanitarian Law, paras.442-443. See also San Remo Manual, para.65.
133 Since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1946, modem law governing both the resort to force 
and the conduct of hostilities can be seen as requiring that a state should never use force, even 
against a conventional military target in the course of an armed conflict, if it exceeds what is 
required to repel an armed attack or to restore its security. (See e.g. San Remo Manual, para.4). 
During the Napoleonic Wars, the Duke of Wellington reportedly remarked: ‘the killing of a poor 
fellow of a vedette or carrying off a post could not influence the battle and I always when I was 
going to attack sent to tell them to get out of the way’ (quoted in Michael Glover, The Peninsular 
War (London, 2001), 303). Napoleon, similarly, is said to have taken the view that force used 
when not absolutely necessary, even against the enemy, should be regarded as criminal (see 
Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (London, 1980), 49).
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Naval warfare
The Additional Protocol I definition of a legitimate military objective applies 
formally only to attacks against objects on land.134 There are no treaty provisions 
indicating what may be considered a legitimate target at sea, though there are 
several to say what may not. Nor is customary law on this question settled, as 
became clear from the controversy generated by some of the targeting decisions 
taken during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.136
Against this background, international lawyers and naval experts from several 
states held a series of meetings between 1988 and 1994 seeking to pin down the 
current state of the law in relation to armed conflict at sea. The set of proposed 
rules agreed on, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Conflicts at Sea, 137 was acknowledged to be a combination of rules declaratoiy of 
customary international law and proposed new rules which participants thought 
that states might, at some future point, want to consider enshrining in treaty form.
Drafters of the San Remo Manual agreed on the applicability to naval warfare 
of the principle unanimously affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1968 that: ‘Distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in 
the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be 
spared as much as possible’. The question was how distinction could be made 
in practice in a context in which the activities of civilian vessels were often 
critical to the enemy’s military operations, or possibly a direct part of them. The
134 Additional Protocol I, article 49.3.
135 Vessels made exempt from attack or capture by treaty rules are hospital ships and coastal rescue 
vessels (Geneva Convention II, articles 22, 24, 25 and 27), as well as coastal fishing and trading 
vessels and ‘vessels charged with religious, scientific or philanthropic missions’, so long as they 
do not take part in hostilities (1907 Hague Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with 
Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, articles 3 and 4).
136 For instance, attacks by both Iran and Iraq on commercial and neutral shipping. (See de Guttry 
and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War. See UNSCRs 552 and 582 for international condemnation of 
such attacks.)
137 The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, (Oxford,
1995) ed. Louise Doswald-Beck.
138 UNGA Resolution 2444 (XXIII), para. 1(c).
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view prevailed that the Additional Protocol I definition of military objectives as
objects: ‘...which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage’, should be extended to naval warfare, but an additional rule should
indicate in more detail what should be understood by ‘making an effective
1contribution to military action’ in this context. Specific examples are given in 
the Manual of activities considered liable to make enemy merchant vessels 
legitimate military objectives, or even to make neutral merchant ships liable to 
attack.140
In the US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook, 141 military objectives are defined
as:
..combatants and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or 
use, effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining 
capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization 
would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the 
circumstances at the time of the attack....Economic targets of the enemy that 
indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting 
capability may also be attacked. (Emphasis added).142
This approach appears to permit in some circumstances attacks at sea on the 
commercial exports of an enemy, which would almost certainly be unlawful if the 
proposed San Remo Manual rules143 were to be accepted as legally binding in any
144manner.
139 This approach is favoured by the UK and Germany (see UK Manual 2004, paras. 13.40-13.42 
and 13.47 and Handbook o f  Humanitarian Law, paras. 1025-1026 and commentary).
140 See San Remo Manual paras.40, 59, 60 and 67.
141 Commander’s Handbook on the Law o f Naval Operations (NWP1-14M) (see Annotated 
Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law o f Naval Operations (Newport RI, 1999) 
(eds. A. Thomas and James Duncan), containing a full text of the Handbook, with a commentary).
142 Ibid., para.8.1.1.
143 I.e. paras.40, 59, 60 and 67.
144 Some US writers would like to go further still, for instance Richard Grunawalt, who suggests: 
‘the law ought to recognize that neutral shipping that sustains a belligerent’s war-fighting 
capability may be subject to interdiction by whatever platforms and weapons systems are available 
to the other side.’ (‘The Rights of Neutrals and Belligerents’ (1988), Ocean Development and 
International Law). Another US commentator argues that ‘[a]ny standard of military objective in 
a naval context must allow for the possibility that, under certain circumstances, maritime trade will 
be a legitimate object of attack.’ (Francis Russo, ‘Targeting Theory in the Law of Armed Conflict 
at Sea: the Merchant Vessel as Military Objective in the Tanker War’ in The Gulf War o f 1980- 
1988: the Iran-Iraq War in International Legal Perspective (Dordrecht, 1992), eds. Ige Dekker 
and Harry Post, 168). The phrase ‘war-fighting or war-sustaining capability’ caused much debate
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The establishment of naval exclusion zones does not exempt belligerents 
from the obligation, even within such a zone, to direct their attacks only against 
legitimate military objectives and to refrain from attacking objects such as 
properly marked and notified hospital ships.145 The proper function of zones is to 
reinforce, not replace, the principle of distinction, by creating circumstances 
which will make it easier for a naval commander to assess whether or not a vessel 
is hostile. Just as objects which are not military objectives may not be attacked 
within an exclusion zone, objects outside an exclusion zone may be attacked if 
they meet the criteria of a military objective.
Aerial bombardment
An attempt was made between the First and Second World Wars to limit 
legitimate military objectives for aerial bombardment to objects in a short, 
specific list, against which bombardment would need to be ‘directed 
exclusively’.146 This proposed rule, though advocated by an eminent group of 
legal experts and government representatives from the major military powers of 
the day, was never formally adopted in treaty form. State practice on both sides 
during the Second World War subsequently eliminated the possibility of it being 
regarded as a customary rule.
Since Additional Protocol I applies to attacks against objectives on land, its 
definition of a legitimate military objective applies to aerial bombardment of
during the San Remo discussions. Eventually it was decided to adopt verbatim the language of 
Additional Protocol I, article 52.2 for the purpose of defining military objectives at sea, the 
majority of participants in the discussions having felt the phrase ‘war-fighting or war-sustaining 
capability’ could ‘too easily be interpreted to justify unleashing the type of attacks that annihilated 
entire cities during the war.’ (See Robertson, ‘The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law 
of Armed Conflict’. See also Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities, 87).
145 See San Remo Manual, paras.105-106 and Geneva Convention II, article 22. See Christopher 
Michaelsen, ‘Maritime exclusion zones in times of armed conflict at sea: legal controversies still 
unresolved’, (2003), JCSL for a history of naval exclusion zones and a review of their legality.
See also J. A. Roach, ‘The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of the Two Centuries’ (2000), AJIL, 
71-72.
146 1923 Draft Hague Rules of Air Warfare, article 24.2.
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targets on land where states parties are concerned. Some writers and military 
strategists have expressed frustration with the constraints of this definition and a 
less than total conviction that strict adherence to the restrictions it implies is 
required under customary law where aerial bombardment is concerned.147 But 
the definition is widely used in military manuals applicable to aerial 
bombardment, 148 and can safely be considered to constitute the customary law 
definition of a legitimate target on land for aerial bombardment as much as any 
other form of warfare.
Attacks on airborne objects
According to generally recognized principles of customary law, enemy 
military aircraft (unless specifically exempted from attack by prior agreement, for 
instance if transporting negotiators) may be attacked. Attacks against enemy 
missiles and military aerial platforms such as unmanned aircraft are also, 
obviously, permitted.149 The provisions of the San Remo Manual implying that 
attacks are legitimate against aircraft engaged in espionage for the enemy, or those 
which enter areas of military operations and fail to respond to warnings to land or 
change course given by the belligerents, probably reflect customary law.150 But 
there are no treaty rules indicating with precision those airborne objects which 
may be considered legitimate military objectives and in which circumstances.
147 See e.g. Jeanne Meyer, ‘Tearing down the Fa?ade: a Critical Look at the Current Law on 
Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine’ (2001), Air Force Law Review, Parks, 
‘Air War and the Law of War’; and USAF General Michael Short’s comments quoted in the 
House of Commons Defence Committee’s 14th Report, Lessons o f Kosovo (hereinafter ‘Lessons o f  
Kosovo), para.94.
148 See e.g. Operational Law 2005, 12; US Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 of 01.02.98, 147; US Field 
Manual 27-10, Change No.l (para.40.c); Handbook o f Humanitarian Law, para.442; Manuel de 
Droit des Conflits Armes (available via the website of the French Ministry of Defence); and UK 
Manual 2004, para.5.4.1.
149 See Dinstein, The Conduct o f  Hostilities, 108.
150 See e.g. San Remo Manual, paras.40, 62, 63, 65 and 70.
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e) Target verification
Target verification and the doctrine o f double effect
There will sometimes be tension between the strict definition of a military 
objective under modem international law and a belligerent’s desire to select and 
strike targets in a way that seems likely to subdue the enemy with the least 
expenditure of blood and treasure.151 In such situations, belligerents may be 
tempted to launch an attack on a questionable target while claiming the real target 
to have been a conventional military object nearby, on a conventional military 
target of no real significance, hoping to damage or destroy collaterally a more 
interesting but less obviously legitimate subsidiary target, or perhaps on a target 
the nature of which is not known with confidence. In short, it might be 
considered that if it can be plausibly maintained after the event that the primary 
intention of an attack was to strike an incontrovertibly military objective, an 
attack can be launched and subsequently defended as lawful which is intended in 
fact to strike a less obviously legitimate target either instead or as well.
This contorted logic, effectively an abuse of the medieval doctrine of double 
effect,152 may attract those feeling constrained by the strictures of modem 
international law on targeting. But the modem law of targeting does not leave 
much scope for such sophistry.
151 ‘The purpose of war...is the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment 
with the least possible expenditure of men, resources and money.’ {British Manual o f  Military Law 
(Part III) (London, 1958)).
152 ‘Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the 
other is beside the intention. Now, moral acts take their species according to what is intended and 
not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental....’ (Saint Thomas Aquinas - 
On Law, Morality and Politics, eds. William Baumgarth and Richard Regan (Indianapolis, 1988), 
226).
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Treaty and customary law provisions on the obligation to verify the nature o f a 
target
It is not enough under modem international law simply to intend to hit only 
military targets. Belligerents have a legal duty to take care to avoid making 
mistakes. Provisions exist in both treaty and customary law requiring those 
responsible for planning or deciding on attacks to take positive steps to verify the 
nature or status of the object or person they plan to attack before the attack may be 
launched. States party to Additional Protocol I must:
...do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are 
military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is 
not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them.153
This provision needs to be read with the provisions of Additional Protocol I 
prohibiting attacks on people or objects in case of doubt about their status.154 
Clearly the Protocol requires a very high degree of confidence indeed about the 
status or nature of a person or object to be attacked before such an attack by a 
state party may be considered lawful in an international armed conflict.155
It has been claimed that under customary international law, reasonable 
precautions must be taken to verify the nature of a target, but that this requirement 
is not as demanding as the Additional Protocol I requirement to do ‘everything 
feasible’ to verify it is a legitimate military objective.156 But the texts of military
153 Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(a)(i).
154 Ibid., articles 50.1 and 52.3. Parks argued in 1990 that this obligation ‘will not survive the 
harsh realities of combat’ (‘Air War and the Law of War’, 137) and a similar contention was made 
in the US DoD’s Final Report to Congress, 616. But as Dinstein observes, the presumption of 
civilian status is rebuttable: ‘there is no room for doubt once combatants are exposed to direct fire 
from a supposedly civilian object, although ‘[t]he degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the 
emergence of the (rebuttable) presumption is by no means clear’ (The Conduct o f  Hostilities, 91). 
In short, the value of the rule can be accepted without it being necessary to claim it will always be 
easy to apply.
155 The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual sums up the rule well thus: ‘Commanders, 
planners and staff officers will not be held to a standard of perfection in reaching their decisions... 
The test for determining whether the required standard of care has been met is an objective one: 
Did the commander, planner or staff officer do what a reasonable person would have done in the 
circumstances?’ (quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 359).
156 Danielle Infeld in ‘Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in 
Desert Storm: But is a Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral
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manuals suggest that the customary law rule, too, can probably now be understood 
as requiring that ‘everything feasible’ should be done to verify the nature of a 
target before it can legitimately be attacked.157 The customary law position may 
not be crystal-clear, but there is no very convincing case for claiming that states 
party to Additional Protocol I are subject to a significantly higher standard than 
others in terms of taking precautions to verify the nature of potential targets.
Although international law requires a high degree of confidence about the 
nature of a target, what can feasibly (or reasonably) be done to verify the status or 
nature of an object or person to be attacked will inevitably be a subjective
I C O
judgement, where the safety of the attacking force will be one consideration. 
Thus, when long-range attacks are launched (other than in self-defence), the rule 
can perhaps be understood as requiring a degree of certainty about the nature of 
the target which it may not be reasonable always to expect in the context of 
defensive action against fast-moving objects. According to a report prepared for 
the ICTY Prosecutor, ‘the obligation to do everything feasible [to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are military objectives] is high but not absolute.’ 159 
Some indication of what does need to be done is indicated as the report continues: 
‘A military commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to 
collect and evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander 
must also direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify 
targets during operations.’160
Civilian Injury and Damage?’ (1992), George Washington Journal o f International Law and 
Economy.
157 See e.g. US Air Force Pamphlet 110-31 (1976) and AFP 14-210, para.A4.3.1.1. The Additional 
Protocol I rules contained in article 57.2(a) are cited by Sassoli and Bouvier as an example of a 
treaty provision which has ‘assemble, interprets ou precise des principes ou des regies existantes’ 
(Un Droit dans la Guerre? 141).
158 ‘Feasible precautions’ are understood in the context of the modern international law of armed 
conflict to mean ‘those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into 
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.’ 
(See e.g. Amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention, article 3.10)).
159 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia, (hereinafter ‘ICTY Committee Report 
(NATO)') para.29.
160 Ibid. See also Handbook o f Humanitarian Law, commentary at para.457.3 and Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 363-364. See also Leslie 
Green, who infers from Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(b) an obligation for belligerents to 
ensure their intelligence is up to date (The Contemporary Law o f Armed Conflict (2nd Edition), 
(Manchester, 2000), 156, n.234).
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One modem military manual contends that attacking an object on the basis of 
‘mere suspicion’ of its nature, rather than knowledge, may constitute a war crime 
or (in an internal conflict) a crime against humanity.161 This probably goes too 
far. Attacking on the basis of ‘mere suspicion’ might indeed violate the mle 
requiring that objects normally dedicated to civilian purposes should not be
i f\yattacked in case of doubt about the use to which they are being put; but failure 
to establish with certainty the nature of an object (as opposed to making civilians 
the object of attack or wilfully launching an attack in the knowledge that it will 
cause excessive collateral casualties) is not listed as a grave breach of Additional 
Protocol I,163 nor as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.164
Verification o f targets before attacks at sea or on airborne objects
The Additional Protocol I provisions on the requirement to verify the nature 
of an object or person to be attacked concern only attacks on objects on land. As 
far as the conduct of hostilities at sea or in the air is concerned, states party to 
Additional Protocol I are obliged, in broad terms, to ‘take all reasonable 
precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects’.165 
The San Remo Manual indicates there may now be a customary mle requiring that 
those responsible for planning, deciding on or executing an attack should do 
‘everything feasible’ to ensure that attacks at sea or against airborne objects are 
limited to military objects,166 and proposes mles which, though not customary 
law, seem well adapted to reducing to a minimum the risks of civilian aircraft 
being attacked in error during armed conflict, while taking realistic account of the 
difficulties potentially faced by belligerents in assessing the intentions of
161 Handbook o f Humanitarian Law, commentary at para.457.3.
162 Article 52.3, Additional Protocol I. The requirement to do everything feasible to verify the 
nature of an object to be attacked and to refrain from attacks ‘in case of doubt’ does not mean that 
attacks can only be launched when there is total certainty about the nature of the object to be 
attacked. But the degree of confidence legally required is clearly considerably higher than ‘mere 
suspicion’.
163 See article 85.
164 See article 8.2.
165 Additional Protocol I, article 57.4.
166 San Remo Manual, para.46(b).
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unidentified aircraft in zones of military operations.167 The requirement to take at 
least ‘reasonable’ precautions to establish that an object is indeed a military 
objective before it may be attacked can probably be considered a customary rule 
governing attacks at sea and attacks on airborne objects as well as attacks on land- 
based objects.
j)  Discrimination in attack
Additional Protocol I prohibits states parties from launching indiscriminate 
attacks, defined as:
a) those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective;
b) those which employ a method or means of combat which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
c) those which employ a method or means of combat the 
effects of which cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.168
Also prohibited by the Protocol are attacks which are indiscriminate on account of 
treating ‘as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct 
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a 
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects’.169 These rules can be
170considered customary.
In addition to prohibiting (and defining) indiscriminate attacks, the Protocol 
imposes a positive obligation on states parties to take ‘all feasible precautions’ in 
the choice of methods and means of attack with a view to avoiding, or at least
167 Ibid., paras.72-77.
168 Article 51.4
169 Article 51.5 (a).
170 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol I), 37-45.
The ICJ affirmed in Nuclear Weapons that ‘States must never make civilians the object of attack 
and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian 
and military targets.’ (para.78). Dinstein goes further, referring to specific prohibitions ‘spawned’ 
by the rule against indiscriminate attacks, such as ‘to conduct bombing raids at night, in inclement 
weather or from extremely high altitudes -  when visibility is impaired -  in the absence of adequate 
equipment for target identification’ and ‘to fire imprecise missiles against military objectives 
located near or intermingled with, civilian objects’ (118).
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minimizing, collateral damage.171 Faced with a choice between several military 
objectives to obtain a similar military advantage, states party to Additional 
Protocol I must choose that which can be attacked with the least collateral
179damage. These rules set a rather higher standard for discrimination in attack 
than the prohibitive rules cited above.
Indiscriminate weapons
Several treaties limit or prohibit the use of certain weapons, ostensibly on
17^account of their potentially indiscriminate effects, but there are no 
incontrovertibly established customary law rules prohibiting specific weapons on 
the grounds that they are intrinsically indiscriminate.174
Nonetheless, the rule requiring all feasible (or reasonable) precautions to be 
taken in the choice of methods and means with a view to avoiding, or in any event 
minimizing, collateral damage means care must be taken about the choice of 
weapons for particular attacks. This may not mean much for a combatant at the 
sharp end with only limited means at his disposal. An infantryman can only carry 
a certain amount of weight if he is to be capable of any movement at all, let alone 
any kind of speed or agility. He cannot be expected to carry a large number of 
different kinds of weapons and ammunition, so as to be able to use exactly the 
degree of force required by military necessity, but no more, in any situation which
175might arise. But for a senior commander in the armed forces of a sophisticated
171 Article 57.2(a)(ii).
172 Article 57.3.
173 See Hague Convention VIII; Protocols II and III to the Conventional Weapons Convention; and 
the Ottawa Convention.
174 This is largely on account of the inability of states (and even ICJ judges) to agree on any 
specific weapon being inherently indiscriminate. Arguments advanced before the ICJ to the effect 
that even a nuclear weapon could in some circumstances be used in a discriminating fashion (see 
for instance written statements submitted by the UK and the US in June 1995) may have helped 
persuade a majority of the judges that these weapons could not be considered inherently unlawful 
under either customary or treaty law.
175 See Frits Kalshoven, ‘The soldier and his golf clubs’ in Studies and Essays on International 
Humanitarian Law in Honour o f Jean Pictet, ed. Christophe Swinarski (1984). See also 
Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, Lucerne, 1974, 
Report (para.27), quoted in The Banning o f Anti-Personnel Landmines (Cambridge, 2000), eds. 
Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen, 48.
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military power, with precise but expensive weaponry available in principle, this 
provision has significant implications.
Although there may be situations where the only way an attack can lawfully
1 n c
be carried out is with precision-guided weaponry, the rule does not go so far as 
to require belligerents to use the most precise weapons at their disposal whenever
177there is a risk of collateral damage. This is partly because use of state-of-the-art 
high precision weaponry is not always the best way of minimizing collateral 
damage.178 Furthermore, the cost of high precision weapons means belligerents 
will normally only have limited supplies, which they may be unable easily to 
replenish in the course of a campaign: if collateral damage is to be kept to a 
minimum throughout a campaign, precision weaponry may need to be used with 
circumspection.179 That does not mean that it can necessarily be considered 
lawful to use a weapon which will inevitably strike combatants and non- 
combatants alike in a situation where no more discriminating weapon is available 
capable of reaching the target.180 In many circumstances, the attack will just have 
to be postponed or cancelled.
176 Speaking of the NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, the 
then Secretary-General of NATO remarked that in the context, ‘international law and public 
opinion’ required the use of precision weapons (quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol. II), 382). Iraq’s use during the 1991 Gulf war 
of intermediate-range missiles without precision guidance (and with a targeting error range 
reported to have been about 2,000 metres) against urban areas in Israel and Saudi Arabia prompted 
immediate protest by the UK, though in the event, although hundreds of civilians were injured, 
only two civilians were killed directly by these strikes (see BYIL 1991, 60, Lawrence Freedman 
and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order 
(London, 1994), 307. See also Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 105).
177 See Handbook o f  Humanitarian Law, para.447 and commentary. See also Parks, ‘Air War and 
the Law of War’, 54 and Franfoise Hampson, ‘Means and methods of warfare in the conflict in the 
G ulf, in The Gulf War, 1990-1991, in International and English Law, (London, 1993) ed. Peter 
Rowe, 104. See also Australia’s Defence Force Manual, para.834, quoted in Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 376.
178 Sometimes, more sophisticated weapons have greater scope for technical failure, with 
potentially catastrophic results (see Infeld, Precision Weapons, 133. See also Tom Boyle, 
‘Proportionality in Decision Making and Combat Actions’ in Hector and Jellema, Protecting 
Civilians, 36-37).
179 During the 1999 Kosovo war, the British MoD had to initiate procurement action for fresh 
supplies of precision guided missiles in April 1999, as there was ‘a real risk of exhausting stocks 
within a number of weeks.’ (Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol. I), paras. 178 and 182).
180 Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(a).iii. See also Prosecutor v. Martic, (Rule 61 
Proceedings), (1996) ICTY, para.31, (quoted in Sassoli and Bouvier, Un Droit dans la 
Guerre, 1520) and Galic (Trial Judgement), paras.644-648.
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Weapons malfunction and the law
Weapons not subject to specific restrictions or prohibitions may have 
indiscriminate effects caused or exacerbated by malfunction. It has been observed 
that predictable collateral damage caused by weapon malfunction should be taken 
into account in assessments of whether or not attacks would be proportionate.181 
This does not entirely solve the problem: an attack with a weapon liable to have 
indiscriminate effects on account of its tendency to malfunction might still be 
judged proportionate by the attacker. Some writers contend that the key issue is 
whether the intention is to launch an indiscriminate attack.182 In this respect, the 
approach of the San Remo Manual, according to which mines may not be laid at 
sea ‘unless effective neutralisation occurs when they have become detached, or 
control over them is otherwise lost’,183 is interesting, suggesting that certain types 
of weapons should not be used because of their intrinsic tendency to strike civilian 
and military objects without distinction if and when control over them is lost, 
irrespective of whether or not they were intended to strike civilians and 
combatants without distinction. It cannot be stated with certainty at the time of 
writing that there is either a customary or treaty law obligation to abstain 
altogether from weapons known to become indiscriminate when they malfunction, 
even when malfunction of this nature is a virtual certainty. However, if non- 
combatants are killed as a result of weapons malfunction in situations where such 
deaths were easily foreseeable and could feasibly have been avoided by another 
method or means of attack having been adopted, it might in some circumstances 
be arguable that such an attack could be considered tantamount to a wilful attack 
on non-combatants.
181 According to an NGO report, ‘the US Air Force has said that the dud rate [of cluster bomb 
submunitions] must be part of the proportionality determination because unexploded bomblets are 
‘reasonably foreseeable” (Human Rights Watch, Off Target; the Conduct o f  the War and Civilian 
Casualties in Iraq (2003), 115). See also Thomas Herthel, ‘On the Chopping Block: Cluster 
Munitions and the Law ofW ar’ (2001), Air Force Law Review. See also Rogers, Law on the 
Battlefield, 116.
182 E.g. Herthel, ‘On the Chopping Block’.
183 San Remo Manual, para.81.
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Discrimination in attack and force security
As with the obligation to do ‘everything feasible’ to verify the nature of 
potential targets, the obligation to take ‘all feasible precautions’ in the choice of 
methods and means of attack with a view to minimizing non-combatant casualties 
is demanding. But given the way the term ‘feasible precautions’ is understood in 
international law, it is clear that states party to Additional Protocol I are entitled to 
take military considerations, including force security, into account in determining 
what is feasible.184 What the Protocol does not permit is for attacks to be planned 
in a way which takes only military considerations into account, ignoring the
• • 185humanitarian element.
Where belligerents not party to Additional Protocol I are concerned, the 
position is less clear. It has been suggested that it is a general principle of law that 
it is not permissible deliberately to kill an innocent person to save one’s own 
life.186 Where the conduct of hostilities is concerned, this principle seems at least 
as demanding as the Additional Protocol I provisions.
The question of whether or not international law requires combatants to be 
prepared to accept death rather than deliberately kill an innocent person posing no 
threat was studied in depth in a recent case heard by the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), albeit in a case 
not concerning a combat situation.187 The judges were sharply divided and 
international law can hardly be said to be clear on the matter. But a refusal to take 
any risk at all for the sake of protecting civilian life would be doubtfully 
compatible with contemporary international law. According to one writer closely 
connected with the ICTY, if mistakes by an attacking force lead to civilian deaths
184 ‘Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking 
into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations’ (Article 3.10, Amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention). 
See also statements of understanding made on ratification of Additional Protocol I by Belgium, 
Canada, France, Italy and the UK.
185 See comments by Knut Dormann in Hector and Jellema, Protecting Civilians, 100. See also 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millenium’ (1998), 
International Law Studies (Newport, RI, 1998) (eds. Michael Schmitt and Leslie Green), 200-201.
186 See UK Manual 2004, paras.16.42.2-16.42.3.
187 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (Appeals Chamber) (1997), ICTY.
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but it is determined that the attacking force took risks to limit the dangers to 
civilians, then ‘ [e]vidence of assumption of risk may mitigate or even eliminate 
criminal responsibility’, in the event of charges being brought.188 The 
implication is that criminal responsibility for civilian deaths may sometimes be 
imputed to attacking combatants if there is no evidence of any degree of risk 
having been taken for the sake of avoiding such deaths.
The reasonable approach may be to understand the international law of armed 
conflict as requiring that all feasible precautions be taken in the choice of methods 
and means with a view to avoiding or at least minimizing collateral damage, 
irrespective of whether a belligerent is a state party to Additional Protocol I, while 
accepting that taking ‘feasible’ precautions allows force security to be taken into 
account. Obviously combatants must be prepared on occasions to accept some 
degree of personal risk for the sake of carrying out an attack with discrimination. 
But it cannot be said that either customary or treaty law obliges them to sacrifice 
their own lives, or those of the people under their command, for the sake of 
sparing civilians when the latter are intermingled with enemy combatants in a 
zone of active military operations. Beyond a certain point, a combatant’s 
readiness to risk his own life for that of a non-combatant will be a personal matter, 
and no business of lawyers. As a Canadian court observed in 1992, ‘La loi n’a
189pas habituellement pour effet d’eriger l’heroisme en norme’.
2.2. The proportionality principle
a) The concept o f collateral damage — immediate and deferred effects
International law does not protect from attack non-combatants and civilian 
objects present within military objectives or their immediate vicinity, though the 
military objective itself, not the non-combatants or the civilian objects, must be
188 William Fenrick, ‘Attacking the Enemy as a Punishable Offence’ (1997), Duke Journal o f  
Comparative and International Law.
189 Ramirez c. Canada (ministre d e l ’Emploi et de I ’immigration) (1992), Federal Court of Appeal 
(Canada), para.31 quoted in Sassoli and Bouvier, Un Droit dans la Guerre? 1140-1141.
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the true object of the attack.190 What treaty and customary law requires is that 
attacks should not be launched if incidental killing or injuring of non-combatants 
and damage to civilian objects caused by an attack on a military objective is 
expected to be disproportionate in terms of the military advantage anticipated 
from the attack in question.
This does not mean that attacks expected to cause collateral damage not 
considered ‘excessive’ will necessarily be lawful. It is often observed that 
collateral damage is an inevitable by-product of military operations.191 Such 
statements are simply statements of fact; in war, things go wrong. They should 
not be seen as statements of legal principle, conferring upon belligerents the right 
to cause a certain amount of collateral damage, so long as it is not excessive. As 
seen earlier in this chapter, belligerents are legally required to take precautions to 
avoid or at least minimize collateral damage, not just to ensure it will not exceed a 
certain ‘acceptable’ level.
The most obvious form of collateral damage consists of non-combatant 
deaths and injuries caused at the time when a military objective is attacked. 
Further non-combatant deaths and injuries may ensue later from the deferred 
effects of collateral damage caused in particular to facilities for water treatment, 
sewage disposal and power generation, or from accidents involving unexploded 
ordnance. Great hardship can also be caused by the incidental destruction of 
goods, buildings, livestock and crops essential for human survival in contexts 
where there is no hope of compensation and little social welfare or community 
support on which victims can rely. A meaningful assessment of whether 
collateral damage caused by an attack is likely to be disproportionate may need to 
take into account these deferred and cumulative effects of collateral damage as
• 1Q7well as the immediate effects.
190 Additional Protocol I, article 51.2.
191 See e.g. AFP 14-210 - ‘International law does not prohibit attacks against military objectives 
even though they may cause collateral damage since incidental damage is inevitable during armed 
conflict: but this damage should not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated’ 
(para.5.3.3.).
192 See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement) (2000), ICTY, para.526. See also 
Greenpeace International On Impact: Modern Warfare and the Environment: A Case Study o f the 
Gulf War (1991). Christopher Greenwood observes: ‘application of the proportionality test today, 
at least at the strategic level, requires that less immediate damage [of the kind done to Iraq’s
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Attacks on legitimate military objectives sometimes cause incidental damage 
to cultural objects or to the natural environment. The fact that such damage may 
be long-term (in the case of the natural environment, including agricultural crops) 
or irreversible (in the case of cultural objects), needs to be borne in mind.
b) Proportionality in the jus in bello vs proportionality in the jus ad bellum
Under Additional Protocol I, attacks are prohibited which:
...may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.193
This is an effort to clarify and confirm one aspect of what is traditionally known 
in the law of armed conflict as the proportionality principle.194 It reflects, rather 
than resolves, the military commander’s difficulty in weighing humanitarian 
considerations against military ones in the fog of war. 195 Conscious of this 
difficulty, several states on signing the Protocol made clear their understanding
civilian infrastructure during the 1991 Gulf war] must also be taken into account, although the 
difficulty of doing so is apparent’ (‘The Law of Weaponry’), though see also Franfoise Hampson 
for the view that there was in 1991 no legal requirement to take into account the cumulative effect 
of attacks on similar types of target, (‘Means and methods of warfare in the conflict in the G ulf, 
97-100).
193 Articles 51.5(b) and 57.2(a)(iii). This applies, for states parties, to attacks against targets on 
land. A similar provision is proposed in the (non-binding) San Remo Manual to govern attacks 
against targets on sea (see para.46).
194 The requirement for use of force during hostilities to be no more than that needed for the 
successful accomplishment of a task, as opposed to the obligation not to use disproportionate force 
in responding to an act of aggression.
195 Notwithstanding the difficulty of the rule, it seems unlikely that many states would go so far as 
Russia, which recently informed the ICRC with disarming frankness: ‘We are sorry to say that we 
do not know of any occurrence when a party to a conflict complained of the non-respect of the 
principle of proportionality by the parties. In all probability, this principle is in reality opposed by 
a practice based on the assumption that the aim to gain military superiority over the enemy can 
justify any means of warfare, which, in fact, often means the violation of the principle of 
proportionality. In this connection, we can point out that the large-scale military operations of the 
federal troops in Chechnya were at the beginning contrary to the principle of proportionality. In 
the armed forces of the CIS countries there are neither provisions defining the terms of the respect 
of the principle of proportionality nor provisions envisaging prosecution of individuals who violate 
this principle’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol 
II), 314-315).
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that the assessment would need to be made on the basis of information actually 
available to the military commander at the time of his decision.196
According to the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I, anticipated 
collateral damage must be balanced against the anticipated, and relatively 
proximate, military advantage of an attack, not against hoped-for advantages 
likely to materialize only in the long-term.197 This clearly makes sense: little 
would remain of the international law of armed conflict if the proportionality 
articles could be interpreted as permitting the ends of a campaign to be regarded 
as justifying the means used to attain them.
A US Department of Defense report on the 1991 Persian Gulf war 
nevertheless declared: ‘the principle of proportionality...prohibits military action 
in which the negative effects (such as collateral civilian casualties) clearly 
outweigh the military gain. This balancing may be done on a target-by-target 
basis...but also may be weighed in overall terms against campaign objectives'. 
(Emphasis added).198 The report explained that as far as the United States was 
concerned, ‘military advantage’ for the purposes of proportionality did not need to 
be restricted to ‘tactical gains’ but could be ‘linked to the full context of a war 
strategy, in this instance the execution of the Coalition war plan for the liberation 
of Kuwait’.199 The same approach is reflected in the US military manual 
Operational Law 2005 which states in the section on the proportionality principle 
‘ “Military advantage” is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the full 
context of [the] war strategy’.200
This approach is problematic. It seems to confuse the jus in bello 
proportionality principle, requiring that the collateral damage anticipated from an 
attack should not be disproportionate in relation to the military advantage 
anticipated from that attack, with the jus ad bellum proportionality principle, 
according to which a state should not resort to disproportionate military force in
196 Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the UK.
197 See ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols), para.2209. See also para.2218.
198 See Final Report to Congress, 611.
'"Ib id ., 613.
200 Operational Law 2005, 14-15.
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seeking to achieve its aims. As a statement of the jus ad bellum proportionality 
principle, the declaration in the DoD report cited above is valid: before military 
operations against Iraq in 1991 were launched by the Coalition, a calculation 
needed to be made of whether or not the negative side-effects of such a campaign 
(such as collateral damage) could reasonably be seen as proportionate to the 
benefits of success (the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation). However, as 
a statement of the jus in bello principle, it seems doubtfully correct. The more 
orthodox approach to the jus in bello proportionality principle is set out in a 1998 
US Air Force manual which states:
The principle of proportionality must always be followed, which prohibits an 
attack when the expected collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects 
is excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated by the 
attack,201 (Emphasis added).
While there may be disagreement about when ‘an attack’ can be said to start and 
finish in space and time for the purposes of the jus in bello proportionality 
principle, there can be no escaping the fact that ‘attack’ does not mean ‘campaign’ 
or ‘war’.202
The same apparent confusion between the jus in bello proportionality 
principle and the jus ad bellum proportionality principle features in a document 
submitted to the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this document, a 
recent ICTY Tribunal judgement pointing to the need to take into consideration 
the long-term and overall effects of collateral damage for the civilian population 
when making proportionality assessments was used to support the otherwise 
unsupported (and highly questionable) assertion that the overall aims of a
201 AFP 14-210, para.A4.3.
202 See Dinstein The Conduct o f Hostilities, 87, and Hampson, ‘Means and methods of warfare in 
the conflict in the Gulf.
™ Final Report to the Prosecutor [o f the International Criminal Tribunal fo r  the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)] by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (2000).
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campaign can be taken into consideration by commanders when making jus in 
bello proportionality assessments.204
The key to a common position on the jus in bello proportionality principle 
may lie in the statements of understanding made by many states on ratification of
70SAdditional Protocol I to the effect that for the purposes of the proportionality 
rule, ‘attack’ is to be understood as referring to the attack as a whole, not to 
separate parts of it. This makes good sense: without such an interpretation, 
subsidiary attacks launched as feints to distract attention from the main attack 
would be outlawed, yet the interpretation does not go so far as to suggest ‘attack’ 
can be understood as referring to an entire campaign for the purposes of assessing 
proportionality. The interpretation seems consistent with the approach in the 1998 
USAF manual.
c) The obligation to call off attacks expected to cause excessive collateral 
damage
As far as customary law is concerned, reasonable precautions must be taken 
by an attacking belligerent to confirm not only that a selected target on land is in 
fact a legitimate military objective, but also that excessive collateral damage will 
not be caused if it is attacked 206
204 Ibid., para.78 cites ‘..the need for an overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as 
against the goals of the military campaign’. There is no proper support in the report for this novel 
interpretation of the jus in bello proportionality principle. The Committee appears to arrive at it by 
relying on para.526 from Kupreskic (Trial Judgement) suggesting that the overall impact of 
cumulative collateral damage may sometimes need to be anticipated. The Committee’s decision to 
qualify as ‘progressive’ the ordinary meaning of the Kupreskic paragraph, while nonetheless citing 
it as evidence of a need, when making proportionality calculations, to have regard to ‘an overall 
assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign’
(para.52) is puzzling. For detailed criticism of the Committee’s report, see Paolo Benvenuti ‘The 
ICTY Prosecutor and the review of the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’ (2001) and the milder, but still critical, assessment of Michael Bothe in ‘The 
protection of the civilian population and NATO bombing on Yugoslavia: comments on a report to 
the Prosecutor of the ICTY’ (2001), both in EJIL.
205 Australia, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the 
UK.
206 See e.g. FM 27-10 (Change No.l), para.41. See also Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) 
which states: ‘All reasonable precautions must be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilians 
and civilian objects and locations. It is therefore important to obtain accurate intelligence before 
mounting an attack...accordingly, the best possible intelligence is required concerning:
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There is no explicit obligation in Additional Protocol I to do everything 
feasible to verify that an attack on a legitimate target would not cause excessive 
collateral damage. If an object or location is obviously a legitimate military 
objective, it is primarily the responsibility of the defending party to protect non-
907combatants in the vicinity by moving them away. Under the Protocol, only if 
it is expected that an attack will cause excessive damage must it be abstained 
from,208 and only i f  it becomes apparent that a proposed attack would be likely to 
cause collateral damage disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage 
must it be called off.209 Thus although in the framework of the Protocol a 
commander is obliged to take proper care to establish that the object he plans to
910attack is in fact a military objective, must take all feasible precautions in his 
choice of methods and means of attack in order to avoid or minimize collateral 
damage,211 must refrain from deciding to launch any attack which he expects to
•  919 • •  •cause disproportionate damage, and must abort an attack if it comes to his 
notice that it is in fact likely to cause disproportionate collateral damage,213 the 
Protocol does not appear to require him to go to special lengths, e.g. by 
dangerous, behind-the-lines reconnaissance, to check the object to be attacked is 
not being put to unusual use. France, on ratifying the Protocol in 2001, 
submitted a formal interpretative statement to the effect that it would understand 
article 57.2(b) (the obligation to cancel an attack if it becomes apparent that it is 
likely to cause disproportionate collateral damage) as requiring no more than
a. concentrations of civilians;
b. civilians who may be in the vicinity of military objectives;
c. the nature of built-up areas such as towns, communities, shelters, etc.;
d. the existence and nature of important civilian objects and specifically protected objects; 
and
e. the environment’.
UNGA Resolution 2675 (1970), requiring that ‘in the conduct of military operations...all 
necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian populations’ 
(emphasis added), is a less helpful indicator of the exact degree of care which customary law 
requires of parties to a conflict in minimizing collateral damage, but is evidence of a widely held 
view that significant efforts need to be made to ensure attacks on military objectives either avoid 
collateral damage altogether or at least keep it to a minimum. See also Kupreskic (Trial 
Judgement), para.524.
207 Additional Protocol I, article 58(a).
208 Ibid., article 57.2(a)(iii).
209 Ibid., article 57.2(b).
210 Ibid., article 57.2(a)(i).
211 Ibid., article 57.2(a)(ii).
2,2 Ibid., article 57.2(a)(iii).
213 Ibid., article 57.2(b).
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‘diligences normales’ in obtaining the relevant information. The Protocol 
requires, however, in general terms, that ‘in the conduct of military operations, 
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects’.214 So the possible presence of civilians in the vicinity of a legitimate 
military objective must be an object of concern to an attacking belligerent bound 
by Additional Protocol I.
An alternative reading of Additional Protocol I could be that the requirement 
to ‘do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects...and that it is not prohibited by the provisions o f 
this Protocol to attack them’ 215 (emphasis added) entails a requirement to do 
everything feasible to ensure an attack would not cause excessive collateral 
damage. On this interpretation, the Additional Protocol I rule would be 
considerably more demanding than the customary law rule.
Naval and aerial warfare
Where naval and aerial warfare are concerned, the rules are similar. 
Additional Protocol I contains a general mle requiring states parties to take ‘all 
reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian 
objects’ during military operations at sea or in the air,216 and the requirement to 
avoid excessive collateral damage can be considered a customary mle applicable
• 7 1 7to naval warfare and attacks on airborne objects as well as war on land. The 
San Remo Manual proposes that those planning, deciding upon or executing an 
attack at sea should ‘take all feasible measures’ to find out whether objects which 
are not military objectives are in the vicinity of an area of attack and ‘in the light 
of the information available...do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are
710
limited to military objectives.’ The Manual further proposes, in Additional 
Protocol I language, that they should ‘take all feasible precautions in the choice of
214 Ibid., article 57.1.
215 Ibid., article 57.2(a)(i).
216 See article 57.4.
217 San Remo Manual para.46(d). See also UK Manual 2004, paras.5.32, 12.26 and 13.32.
218 San Remo Manual para.46(a) and (b).
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methods and means in order to avoid or minimise collateral casualties or 
damage’.219
d) Proportionality in ‘military operations other than war ’
The obligation to abstain from disproportionate attacks takes on a particular 
difficulty in MOOTW, where, almost by definition, military personnel are 
deployed in dangerous situations to which peacetime law, rather than the law of 
armed conflict, is likely to apply. The proportionality principle in the law of 
armed conflict assumes the legality of using lethal force against a legitimate 
target, while requiring that such force should not cause excessive collateral 
damage; peacetime laws, on the other hand, whether those of the host state, those 
of the sending state being applied extraterritorially to its forces or those of 
international human rights law, normally assume that force will be used only for 
the purposes of keeping law and order, effecting lawful arrest, or self-defence, and 
that for these purposes no more than minimum force will be used 220 The idea of 
a proportionate attack against a legitimate target (other than for the purposes 
above) has no place in peacetime law.221
Forces deployed in peace support operations, maritime security operations 
etc. may thus need to be able to operate in both ‘conflict’ and ‘peacetime’ mode 
for their action to remain effective and lawful. One of the difficulties with this is 
that training and equipment for the one may be poorly compatible with training
219 San Remo Manual para.46(c).
220 ‘ . .though [the common law] permits the use of force to prevent crimes, to preserve the public 
peace and to bring offenders to justice, yet all this is subject to the restriction that the force used is 
necessary; that is that the mischief sought to be prevented could not be prevented by less violent 
means; and that the mischief done by, or which might reasonably be anticipated from, the force 
used is not disproportionate to the injury or mischief which it is intended to prevent’. (Criminal 
Code Bill Commissioners in report C2345 (1879) (quoted in Attorney-General fo r  Northern 
Ireland’s Reference no 1 o f 1975, para. 126)). See also section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 
(Northern Ireland) (1967), subsection 1. See also the 1990 UN Basic Principles on the Use o f  
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provisions 4, 5, 9, 10 and 11.
221 Human rights bodies have occasionally drawn on principles of the law of armed conflict, such 
as the proportionality principle, in their judgements or reports (eg the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights in the case of Abella v. Argentina). However it is questionable whether this 
approach is appropriate in relation to contexts other than those which can be considered, 
objectively speaking, as armed conflicts triggering the application of this body of law.
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999and equipment for the other. Troops deployed in peace support operations have 
often been trained primarily for fast-moving and aggressive combat. They are 
often equipped with nothing but a lethal weapon in situations which do not qualify 
even as internal, let alone international armed conflicts. It can be expected, 
however, that such forces will at least observe the proportionality principle as
• • t • 9 9 1enshrined in the international law of armed conflict.
2.3. Human shields and warnings of attack
a) Human shields and the obligation o f defending parties to protect non- 
combatants
Use of civilians or prisoners of war to shield military objectives and 
operations is prohibited under customary and treaty law.224 Additional Protocol I 
goes further, requiring parties to a conflict with control over the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian property to endeavour ‘to the 
maximum extent feasible’ to remove them from the vicinity of military objectives, 
to protect them from the dangers of military operations and (again ‘to the 
maximum extent feasible’) to avoid locating military objectives within or near
99c
densely populated areas.
The latter provisions represent the ideal situation, rather than the settled and 
widespread practice required for a mle of customary law: unfortunately civilians 
have often been killed in recent conflicts while within the vicinity or even the
222 ‘Modem combat training conditions soldiers to act reflexively to stimuli, such as fire 
commands, enemy contact, or the sudden appearance of a “target” that maximises soldiers’ 
lethality.. . (Peter Kilner, ‘Military Leaders’ Obligations to Justify Killing in War’ (2002), 
Military Review). Combat training aimed at developing speed of reaction in use of firearms may 
make it difficult for soldiers trained this way to adapt to policing roles in which reflexive use of 
lethal force will usually be inappropriate.
223 Forces acting under UN auspices may not launch operations ‘that may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of life among the civilian population or damage to civilian objects that would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. See 1999 UN 
Secretary General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces o f  International 
Humanitarian Law, Section 5.5.
224 See Additional Protocol I, article 51.7, which can be considered a customary rule. See also 
Geneva Convention III, article 23 and Geneva Convention IV, article 28. Under article 8.2(b) xxiii 
of the Rome Statute, the use of human shields is designated a war crime.
225 See Additional Protocol I, article 58.
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confines of military objectives. Although civilians must not be deliberately 
exposed to the dangers of war, there is no evidence for the existence of a 
customary rule requiring them to be evacuated from the vicinity of anything and 
everything which could be perceived as a legitimate military objective. Under 
customary law, the commander of an attacking force must give warning if 
possible to the local authorities before beginning a bombardment, except in cases 
of assault. But if such warnings have been given and are disregarded, an 
attacking force cannot be held to have violated the law if civilians within the 
confines, or the immediate vicinity, of a legitimate military objective are killed, 
unless civilian losses are excessive and could reasonably have been predicted to 
be so,227 or there was a failure to take feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and methods of attack to keep the losses to a minimum. To a certain extent, 
civilians themselves can be seen as having a responsibility to keep clear of 
obvious military objectives. Customary law does, however, require the relevant 
authorities to ensure that civilian hospitals, prisoner of war camps and camps for 
civilian internees, at least, are located a suitable distance from military objectives. 
Customary law also suggests they should be clearly marked so as to be visible 
from the air.228
Though directed primarily at defending parties, the rules above make 
assumptions about an attacker’s conduct. They assume an attacking force will 
operate so that it can take account of emblems or signs visibly displayed on 
buildings and will spare objects displaying certain markings from direct attack, 
unless it is known that the markings are being used abusively. The Additional 
Protocol I rules assume an attacking force will restrict attacks to objects which 
could reasonably be anticipated by the defending state to be military targets. 
Attacking forces need, therefore, to conform to generally accepted views of what 
constitutes a legitimate military objective (or failing that, to give specific 
warnings of impending attacks) for the legal obligations of defending forces under 
Additional Protocol I to be capable of implementation.
226 Hague Regulations, article 26.
227 Additional Protocol I, articles 57.2(a)(iii) and 51.5.(b) and 51.8.
228 Geneva Convention III, article 23; Geneva Convention IV, articles 18 and 83. See also Hague 
Regulations, article 27.
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If an adversary violates the rule against using civilians or other protected 
persons as human shields, a state party to Additional Protocol I must still respect 
the principle of proportionality and take the legally required precautions to
229minimize collateral damage when attacking legitimate military objectives.
Under customary and treaty law, responsibility for protection of the most 
vulnerable members of the civilian population in conflict zones, such as the sick, 
the infirm and the elderly, is shared between the parties to the conflict, who must 
endeavour to conclude local agreements for their removal from besieged or 
encircled areas.
b) Warnings
States are responsible under treaty and customary law for ensuring civilians 
and other protected persons and objects within their jurisdiction are adequately 
protected from the hazards of war.231 Conversely, treaty and customary law 
requires that the commander of an attacking force should do what he can to warn 
the authorities before beginning a bombardment (unless it is an assault or surprise 
attack), so they can make the necessary protective arrangements 232 Additional 
Protocol I requires of states parties that: ‘effective advance warning shall be given 
of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not 
permit.’233 There are similar treaty provisions in relation to cultural property.234
Requirements also exist for warnings to be given in certain specific situations. 
Customary law requires that if hospitals are being used abusively in support of 
military operations, warnings must be given and due time allowed for them to be
229 Additional Protocol I, article 51.8.
230 Geneva Convention IV, article 17.
231 See e.g. Geneva Convention IV articles 14, 17, 18 and 83. See also Additional Protocol I, 
article 58.
232 ‘The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, 
except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities’ Hague Regulations, article 
26. ‘Assault’ in this context should be understood as referring to a surprise attack. (See Rogers, 
Law on the Battlefield, 88).
233 Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(c).
234 See Cultural Convention, article 11.1 and Second Protocol to the Cultural Convention articles 
6(d) and 13.2 (c) (ii).
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235heeded before protection can be deemed to have been lost. There is no ‘unless 
circumstances do not permit’ or ‘where possible’ qualification to this obligation, 
though the rule is understood by one state at least as not undermining the right of 
immediate self-defence without warning if fire is being received from a 
hospital.236 Where civil defence installations and civilian shelters are concerned, 
treaty provisions require, similarly, that due warning should be given and remain 
unheeded before such objects may become the object of attack, even if they are 
being used unlawfully in support of military operations.237 Customary law 
requires that warning be given in relation to mines laid in international waters,
• 238whether in peacetime or wartime.
What constitutes effective warning will vary according to circumstances and 
will be considered in Chapter 4. The phrase ‘unless circumstances do not permit’ 
is understood as an expression of the customary rule that warnings are not 
required in cases where surprise is of the essence. In such cases the normal 
rules on proportionality and discrimination in attack still of course apply.
2.4. Conclusions
Modem international law requires considerably more of those planning and 
executing attacks than that they should abstain from purposefully targeting non- 
combatants or civilian objects. This is particularly so for states party to 
Additional Protocol I, but the rules of customary law are only marginally less 
demanding. The substance of the legal obligation under the international law of 
armed conflict to take precautions in attack, whether during conflict on land, at
235 Geneva Convention I, article 21.
236 The US. (See Operational Law 2005, 23).
237 Additional Protocol I, article 65.
238 See Corfu Channel case (1949), ICJ, 22.
239 See ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols), paras.2222-2225. According to the Handbook 
o f Humanitarian Law ‘a general preference for leaving the enemy in doubt’ is not sufficient 
grounds for dispensing with a warning (para.453 and commentary), though see also B. Carnahan 
‘Linebacker II and Additional Protocol I: the Convergence of Law and Professionalism’ (1982), 
American University Law Review for a broader interpretation of the phrase ‘unless circumstances 
do not permit’. See also Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (100-101).
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sea, or in relation to attacks against airborne objects, can be summarized in the 
following six basic rules:
■ Attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives as defined in 
Additional Protocol I and to combatants who are not hors de combat.
■ At least reasonable precautions must be taken to verify that an object is a 
legitimate military objective before it may be attacked. Where attacks 
against land-based objects are concerned, states party to Additional 
Protocol I must do everything feasible to verify they are legitimate 
military objectives before attacks against them may be launched. To this 
end, they must have a system in place for gathering the necessary 
intelligence for verifying the legitimacy of proposed targets.
■ When a military objective is to be attacked, all feasible precautions must 
be taken to choose methods and means of attack which will avoid or at 
least minimize collateral damage.
■ At least reasonable precautions must be taken before attacks are launched 
on military objectives to check such attacks will not cause disproportionate 
collateral damage on account of the presence of non-combatants in the 
vicinity.
■ An attack must be called off if it becomes clear it cannot be launched 
without causing disproportionate collateral damage.
■ Whenever possible, effective warnings must be given before attacks liable 
to affect the civilian population are launched.
Although a high standard of care is required of attacking forces in terms of 
minimizing the risks of collateral damage, the rules for attacking forces are 
framed in such a way that they cannot effectively protect non-combatants unless 
non-combatants are kept a suitable distance from obvious military objectives, 
heed specific warnings given by belligerents, and ensure that their non-combatant
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status is clearly visible to attacking forces. Failure on the part of non-combatants 
to take these precautions does not legitimize deliberate attacks on them. But it 
will increase the risk of their being killed or injured by mistake in circumstances 
for which the attacking forces cannot reasonably be held responsible. This 
interdependence in the law of armed conflict between rules applicable to attackers 
and those applicable to defenders has practical implications for civilian leaders, 
who have an important role to play in ensuring non-combatants do not harbour 
unrealistic expectations of the degree of precision with which attacks can be 
carried out, and proper provision is made for the protection of the civilian 
population.
Since the 1980s, the gap between customary law and the treaty rules on 
precautions in attack contained in Additional Protocol I appears to have narrowed. 
Part of the reason has been the willingness of certain belligerents not party to 
Additional Protocol I to observe many of the rules enshrined therein as a matter of 
good practice, if not of binding law.240 Part of the reason has been the manner in 
which states party to Additional Protocol I have chosen to interpret their 
obligations. Reservations, or ‘statements of understanding’, made in relation to 
Additional Protocol I rules on precautions in attack by certain states, generally 
members of NATO, have had the effect of making the provisions of that treaty 
less demanding than they might appear on their face. For those who regard the 
Protocol as a vital tool for enhancing the protection of civilians, this ‘watering 
down’ of its key provisions might seem regrettable. But such disappointment is 
probably unwarranted.241 For rules of international law on precautions in attack to 
protect non-combatants effectively, they need to be as widely accepted as 
possible, particularly by the major military powers: putative rules recognized only
240 See e.g. the US practice of reviewing new weapons systems for lawfulness set out in 
Operational Law 2005, 18-20 and US Air Force Instruction 51-402 (Weapons Review) of 
13.05.94.
241 Except in the case of the troubling implied reservations made by France and the UK in respect 
of the provision prohibiting reprisals against civilians. No state party objected formally to the 
UK’s convoluted statement ‘m’ (see Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f  War, 511), nor 
to the similar French statement made in 2001. This fact might appear to weaken the protective 
force of article 51.6 of Additional Protocol I at least as much as the UK and French statements 
themselves. A US commentator has however argued cogently that reservations to article 51.6 
would be incompatible with article 60.5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (See 
Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’. See also Aust, Modem Treaty Law, 238). It is possible 
that other states parties may have refrained from objecting to the British and French statements on 
the grounds that they cannot be construed as valid reservations to article 51.6.
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by a small number of peaceable nations are of little or no protective value. The 
Additional Protocol I rules on precautions in attack as qualified by those 
reservations and statements of understanding which are valid under international 
law have the advantage over the Additional Protocol I mles pur et dur of being 
very close indeed to commonly recognized (and universally applicable) principles 
of customary international law.
Lest it be objected that the mles on precautions in attack as summarized above 
are unrealistically demanding in the context of ‘asymmetrical warfare’ between 
regular and irregular combatants, it is worth considering who stands to gain most 
from a more accommodating approach. The US military writer who suggested 
that the scope of legitimate military targets should be extended to include ‘bank 
accounts, financial institutions, shops, entertainment sites and government 
buildings’,242 may not have reflected sufficiently on the joy that such a relaxation 
of the now commonly accepted mles on targeting would bring to the hearts of 
members of armed groups at the more ragged end of the spectrum. A restrictive 
approach to the question of what is a legitimate military objective and what 
precautions need to be taken to minimize collateral damage creates greater 
problems for the ill-resourced and poorly disciplined fighting force than it does 
for the technologically advanced belligerent with highly trained troops. Thus not 
only do the new mles afford a high degree of legal protection for non-combatants; 
they also have the potential to de-legitimize warfare conducted by belligerents 
(including parties to internal conflicts) unable or unwilling to train and equip their 
forces for effective compliance with the high standards they set. In this respect, 
Additional Protocol I, far from providing an international legal umbrella for any 
armed opposition group or terrorist organization,243 can be seen as having 
precisely the reverse effect.
There is nevertheless a danger in trying to make too much of the argument that 
the dictates of humanity and those of military or political expediency invariably
242 See Meyer, ‘Tearing Down the Fafade’.
243 One of the reasons given for the US decision not to ratify the Protocol. (See letter of 29.01.87 
from US President Ronald Reagan to the US Senate, reprinted in AJIL (1987), 990-912).
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coincide. Sometimes they do not.244 Modem international law of armed conflict 
does not consist uniquely of mles reflecting a happy coincidence of good military 
practice and humanitarian spirit. Sometimes, the mles require that what makes at 
least short term military sense will need to be disregarded in favour of common 
humanity.245 Expectations that this high-minded feature of the new mles would 
lead to them being jettisoned in actual combat have to some extent been belied by 
evidence of the conduct of at least some belligerents and individual combatants in 
conflicts between 1980 and 2005, as will be seen in Chapter 4, which follows after 
a short chapter on the relationship between target selection and strategic aims.
244 See e.g. Robert Graves, Goodbye to All That (London, 1960), 111-112, on practice during the 
First World War of killing wounded enemy soldiers in order to be able to strip them quickly and 
silently of badges indicating the unit to which they belonged - considered vital for intelligence 
purposes, but a war crime under modem international law.
245 See for instance Additional Protocol I, article 41.3, requiring that prisoners captured in unusual 
circumstances should be set free. As Maresca and Maslen put it, ‘.. .the urgent need to improve 
the protection of the civilian population led.. .States, in the 1977 Protocols, to go further and agree 
to take humanitarian factors into account even at the sacrifice of some military advantage’. (The 
Banning o f  Anti-Personnel Landmines, 95).
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3. TARGET SELECTION AND STRATEGIC AIMS
...those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They 
capture the enemy’s cities without assaulting them and overthrow his 
state without protracted operations. Their aim is to take all under 
heaven intact by strategic considerations.
Sun Tzu, The Art o f War, Chapter 3.
Target selection in any given campaign is determined by overall strategic 
aims. At least four broad categories of campaign aim can be identified:
i) interdiction;
ii) occupation/liberation;
iii) coercion;
iv) defence of territory.
Often the aims are combined, for instance when a campaign aims to liberate 
territory and to deny enemy access to it for reinforcement and supply purposes, or 
to put coercive pressure on an enemy by partially occupying his territory. But 
clarity about the primary strategic aim is normally essential for effective target 
selection.246
Target selection can be an elaborate process, involving not only military 
commanders and their staff, but also civilian political leaders and governmental 
legal advisers.247 The likelihood of collateral damage is normally one element 
taken into account during target selection, even by the most disreputable 
belligerents, but is seldom the overriding consideration. Different levels of 
priority are accorded to the avoidance of collateral damage in different campaigns,
246 See Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol. I) para.70, on the difficulties caused for target selection in the 
1999 Kosovo war by confusion about the purpose of the NATO intervention.
247 For description of British procedures for target approval during the Kosovo war, see Tom 
Boyle, ‘Proportionality in Decision Making and Combat Actions’ in Hector and Jellema, 
Protecting Civilians. High-level approval in Washington was required for many US targets 
(Wesley Clark, Waging Modem War (Oxford, 2001), 203 and 226-228). It has been observed that 
the extensive consultation which took place within NATO during the Kosovo war in relation to 
selection of targets for air strikes would not have been practicable in a land campaign (see 
comments by General Streik in Hector and Jellema, Protecting Civilians, 112-113).
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•j a qand at different stages of the same campaign. And in some campaigns, few key 
targets raise major issues of collateral damage, given their nature and location, 
while in others, many, or even most, do so. A certain degree of care for the safety 
of non-combatants can reasonably be expected whatever the nature of a campaign, 
but the extent to which anticipated collateral damage of an attack can be 
considered ‘excessive’ in relation to anticipated military advantage depends 
greatly on the military aim of the attack. The first stage in examining what can 
reasonably be expected of belligerents in terms of taking precautions in attack is 
thus to consider the basic logic underlying the different categories of campaign.
3.1 Interdiction
Interdiction, in military terms, means the denial to an enemy of the use of a 
particular system (such as a communications network), territory (including 
airspace and maritime areas) or even a single object (such as a nuclear reactor). A 
campaign of interdiction is often the first stage of a military operation, even if it 
subsequently develops into a campaign of occupation/liberation or of coercion. 
Targets selected for interdiction purposes tend to be uncontroversial: air defence 
systems, military communication networks, military convoys, contraband (at sea), 
tactically significant bridges and logistical choke points such as road junctions 
through which enemy military traffic needs to pass.249
A problem with interdiction campaigns where collateral damage is concerned 
is that for interdiction to be effective, selected targets will often need to be 
rendered totally inoperable, not just damaged, and the military advantage of an
248 Concern to avoid civilian casualties may diminish as a conflict progresses, as occurred in the 
First World War when Germany decided in 1916 to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare as a 
result of stalemate in the land war (Robert Massie, Castles o f  Steel (London, 2004), 703-704), and 
in the Second World War, when the Allies decided in January 1943 on the area bombing of 
Germany, likewise as a perceived means of breaking the deadlock (Denis Richards, RAF Bomber 
Command in the Second World War: the Hardest Victory (London, 1994), 137-143). See also 
Human Rights Watch, O ff Target: the Conduct o f  the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003), 
59.
249 During the initial phase of the Kosovo war, when the campaign aimed to deny Serb forces the 
possibility of persecuting Albanians in Kosovo, targets selected by NATO were ‘radar sites, air 
defense sector headquarters, electronic warfare and radio intercept sites, missiles storage facilities, 
airfields, microwave relays, regional army and police headquarters’. (Clark, Waging Modern 
War, 208-209).
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attack may be lost entirely if all elements of a system targeted cannot be destroyed 
almost simultaneously.250 Thus in an interdiction campaign, cancelling an attack 
on one part of a system at the last moment, on account of the unexpected presence 
of civilians, or attacking an objective with less than overwhelming force, may 
vitiate the entire operation. In these circumstances, collateral damage from 
individual attacks will sometimes be heavy, without necessarily being unlawful.
3.2 Occupation and liberation of territory
When at least one aim of a campaign is to secure control of territory, targets of 
choice are likely to include troop concentrations and assets such as tanks and 
artillery pieces, particularly those holding or defending locations such as 
beachheads, heights or passes. A campaign of interdiction will sometimes 
continue in parallel, aimed at preventing reinforcements from reaching the front 
and at destroying military communication and surveillance systems. The military 
leadership may be a specific target if it is thought that key leaders cannot easily be 
replaced by others equally committed to continuing the conflict. None of these 
targets is controversial legally, with the exception of military leadership in the 
form of civilian Commanders-in-Chief, civilian ministers of defence with some 
degree of command responsibility, and purely ceremonial military 
commanders.251 There may even be a particular incentive during a campaign of 
liberation or occupation to minimize collateral damage to civilian and dual-use 
objects, in order to reduce the cost and difficulties of post-war reconstruction, 
which often has to be borne largely by the victorious party.
250 As for instance when on 10.06.82 an Israeli air strike put the entire Syrian anti-aircraft system 
out of action within an hour, allowing airspace dominance to be exploited at a time when it was 
totally unexpected (see Edward Luttwak, Strategy: the Logic o f War and Peace (London, 2001), 
202).
251 W. Hays Parks suggests that it is comity, rather than law, that protects civilian Commanders-in- 
Chief from being targeted (‘Executive Order 12333 and Assassination’ (1989), The Army Lawyer), 
though see also Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 46, implying that attacks against purely ceremonial 
Commanders-in-Chief would not be lawful.
252 According to the in-theatre national contingent commander of British forces in Iraq in 2003, ‘In 
this operation we wanted very much to be using minimum force so as to leave the infrastructure of 
Iraq and also the perception of the people of Iraq intact’ (House of Commons Defence Committee, 
Lessons o f  Iraq, (London, 2003), (hereinafter ‘HCDC, Lessons o f  Iraq *) para. 96). There may be 
tactical as well as political reasons for wanting to minimize destruction. Buildings which have
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Nonetheless, collateral damage can be devastating during campaigns for the 
occupation and liberation of territory, particularly if towns become the object or 
the scene of military operations. Nor is there any guarantee that targets selected 
will be limited to the uncontroversial ones mentioned above where the object of a 
campaign is occupation or liberation.
3.3. Coercion
In campaigns in which the object is to coerce an opponent to behave (or to 
refrain from behaving) in a certain way, the requirements of law and of military 
logic may seem to stand in direct opposition. Sometimes this has led to the law 
simply being disregarded, as for instance when in 1998 the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked the Buddhist Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, Sri 
Lanka,253 or when armed militants took several hundred schoolchildren hostage in 
the town of Beslan, North Ossetia (Russia), in 2004.254 Sometimes, those
directing military operations have been more subtle, launching attacks on 
questionably legitimate targets, or failing to take proper care to ensure that only 
genuine military objectives are struck and subsequently claiming that civilians or 
civilian objects were hit by accident, or by rogue elements not under their direct 
control, or acting outside their orders.
The frequency with which the letter and spirit of the law has been violated in 
coercive wars does not mean a coercive war cannot be fought lawfully and 
effectively. The modem definition of a military objective is flexible enough for 
belligerents to be able to select, from among objects meeting the widely accepted 
definition of a military objective, targets which, if struck, will put pressure on an
been reduced to rubble are not only easier to use for defensive purposes, but may also make it 
impossible to use weapons guidance systems relying on image recognition.
253 The attack was a prima facie violation of the customary law prohibition on wilfully attacking 
cultural property. But the bomb damage to the colourful 1940s interior decoration of the Temple 
had the unexpected effect of exposing the vastly more culturally significant 18th century murals 
hidden beneath, to the astonishment and delight of Sri Lankan scholars. (See ‘Attack on Sri 
Lanka’s sacred site’, BBC Online, 25.01.98 and the later report, ‘Rebel attack unveils historic art’, 
BBC Online, 07.02.01)).
254 See ‘What happened in Beslan?’, BBC Online, 17.09.04
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enemy to concede. Furthermore, the total destruction of a selected target or 
targets is often seen as unnecessary in campaigns of coercion, in contrast to 
campaigns of interdiction, occupation/liberation or self-defence, in which attacks 
will seldom make sense unless their target is destroyed or rendered useless. An 
Israeli attack on the electricity infrastructure of Beirut on 14 April 1996, after 
which the commander of the Israeli Air Force warned that the attack had been 
intended as ‘just a hint of what we can do’, is one example of less than 
overwhelming military force being used coercively in order to send a message.256 
Such use of military power may provoke criticism, particularly if the object struck 
is only a questionably legitimate target. But the symbolic use of military power 
for coercive purposes may have less severe consequences for non-combatants than 
attacks aimed at the complete destruction of military objectives, particularly if 
these are dual-use objects (i.e. serve both the military effort and the civilian 
population), or if the attack goes off target.
The real difficulty is how to predict what objects and how many will need to
*ycn
be struck before an enemy will give way. This is as much a task for civilian 
analysts as for military commanders.258 Failure to make this prediction accurately 
can put a belligerent in the invidious position of having to choose between 
continuing the effort to coerce the enemy by selecting targets which are 
increasingly controversial from the legal and political perspective, thus risking 
loss of support both at home and abroad; or in effect giving up 259 There is thus a 
danger that if and when a coercive campaign fails to make the desired impact
255 See e.g. AFP 14-210, in which those selecting targets for attack are encouraged to consider 
‘does the target contribute to the adversary’s capability and will to wage war?’ (Emphasis added), 
(para.5.3).
256 Human Rights Watch, Israel/Lebanon (1997), 6.
257 See Clark, Waging Modern War, 221. See also Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol. I), paras.71-72, 100.
258 ‘[T]o defeat an enemy of any substance by a finite number of high-precision attacks, the inner 
workings of its civil and military institutions must be intimately understood -  and that requires 
cultural insight as much as factual intelligence information’, (Luttwak, Strategy, 200).
259 During the Kosovo war, NATO began to run out of what were considered suitable targets from 
the political, as well as the military perspective at an early stage of the campaign and a split soon 
developed between those arguing for attacks against more politically (and legally) sensitive 
targets, such as television stations and presidential residences, and those arguing for a continued 
campaign against military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo itself. After only ten days, many of 
the targets of value which were sufficiently isolated for the risks of collateral damage to be 
relatively low had already been struck, leading General Clark to conclude that if the campaign 
were to be intensified, the risks of increased numbers of unintended civilian casualties would have 
to be accepted. (Clark, Waging Modern War, 217-218 and 238-241).
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through initial attacks on conventional military objectives located well away from 
population centres, collateral damage may begin to rise exponentially as other
targets are selected in an effort to sustain, or increase, the pressure.260
3.4. Defensive target selection
Where the defence of territory or of assets such as warships or embassies is
concerned, the speed at which attacking aircraft, missiles and even vehicles or 
vessels may travel means there may be little time to establish that an approaching 
object is hostile if effective action in self-defence is to be taken. If an enemy’s 
preparations for attack are detected, a defending belligerent can take measures of 
anticipatory self-defence when attack is imminent; but pre-emptive strikes, aimed 
at destroying or degrading the military assets of a potential enemy before an 
armed attack is actually imminent, are generally regarded as prohibited under 
international law.261 Thus lawful and effective target selection for the sole 
purpose of defence depends largely on good intelligence and surveillance, 
extremely good target verification procedures and very rapid speed of reaction. It 
also requires a careful balancing of the risks, on the one hand, of taking defensive 
action against an object which then proves to have been non-military, against the 
risks, on the other, of not taking defensive action against an object which then 
launches an attack.
***
260 The final stage of the NATO campaign against the FRY was a coercion campaign, which was 
considered more effective in terms of achieving NATO’s overall war aims than the earlier 
interdiction phase, (see e.g. Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol. I), para. 123) but this was at some cost to 
perceptions of legitimacy where target selection was concerned.
261 See e.g. UNSCR 487 (1981), in which the UN Security Council condemned Israel’s attack 
against the Osirik nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 as having been ‘in clear violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct’. See also Yoram Dinstein, War, 
Aggression and Self-Defence (4th Edition) (Cambridge, 2005), 182-187, and Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use o f Force (Oxford, 2000), 111-115.
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4. IMPLEMENTING THE RULES: GOOD PRACTICE
‘How shall I  learn about the law o f arms?' asks the pursuivant. 7  tell you ’, says 
his master, ‘that you will find  it in a book called 'The Tree o f  Battles’ and fo r  this 
reason you must get a clerk’s learning; and you should also follow the wars, fo r  
there you will hear o f the judgements that are delivered from time to time which 
are not all mentioned in ‘The Tree o f Battles’} 61
Between 1980 and 2005, the number of states party to Additional Protocol I 
grew from three to 163. In parallel, the world’s pre-eminent military power of 
the period, the United States, while unwilling to be bound by this treaty, 
nevertheless developed weaponry and surveillance systems allowing attacks to be 
launched from long distances with an unprecedented degree of precision and for 
force to be applied in a way that greatly reduced the risks of damage to the 
surrounding area of the target. Many of the new systems relied on global 
positioning system (GPS) technology, laser guidance, computer networking or 
some combination of the three, possibly including older, radar-based technology 
as well. £Non-lethal’ weapons, designed to repel or incapacitate temporarily 
rather than kill, and non-explosive weapons, designed to put ‘dual-use’ military 
objectives such as power stations temporarily out of action rather than destroy 
them, were also developed and deployed. Other states too, though to a lesser 
extent, acquired and deployed precision-guided weaponry and equipment for 
long-range target identification.
During this period, the new rules and technology were put to the test in several 
international armed conflicts (often involving NATO member states), as well as 
numerous peace support and maritime security operations in which military 
servicemen and women seemed at least as likely to lose their lives as in 
conventional armed conflict. There is at the time of writing enough material in 
the public domain to allow a tentative assessment of the extent to which, in the
262 Quoted in Maurice Keen, The Laws o f War in the Late Middle Ages (Chatham, 1965), 21, citing 
a fifteenth-century heraldic treatise.
263 As Adam Roberts observes, the US, although not party to several treaties relating to the 
conduct of hostilities, ‘takes at least some of these accords more seriously than some States that 
are parties’. (‘The role of humanitarian issues in international politics in the 1990s’ (1999), IRRC).
heat of battle and the dangerous confusion of military operations other than war, 
the new rules and technology can be said to have proved their worth.
This chapter looks at good practice adopted between 1980 and 2005 in relation 
to implementation of the rules on precautions in attack. It also looks at where 
things have gone wrong. The review does not pretend to be comprehensive. But 
by drawing on examples of where effective precautions in attack appear to have 
been taken (or not) in recent conflicts, particularly those in which states party to 
Additional Protocol I have participated or in which the new technology has been 
used, it aims to point to what can reasonably be expected of modem belligerents 
in various circumstances, and to mark up some of the lessons that have been 
learned.
4.1. The obligation to verify that objects to be attacked are military 
objectives
a) Preliminary remarks
Technological developments towards the end of the twentieth century, 
particularly in relation to the use of satellites for locating potential targets and 
guiding weapons towards them, increasingly enabled belligerents to strike targets 
accurately from great distances, given the correct geographical co-ordinates.264 
But the development of weaponry capable of hitting targets with precision from 
long range was not always matched by the development of surveillance systems 
able to provide detailed imagery of potential targets and their surroundings by 
remote means. Technological advances meant that sometimes information on a 
prospective target, including photographs obtained by unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) and geographical co-ordinates obtained from satellites, could be 
assembled so as to give combatants a very clear picture in advance of what a 
potential target looked like, at least from the outside, and where exactly it was
264 See Adam Roberts, ‘The Laws of War and the Gulf Conflict’ (1990), Oxford International 
Review, 52.
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located.265 But remote surveillance technology was seldom if ever able to reveal 
what or who was inside a particular building. Nor was it able to provide detailed 
imagery of potential targets in bad weather.
Some of the worst targeting mistakes made between 1980 and 2005 stemmed 
from unwarranted inferences based on limited evidence being made about the 
nature of potential targets. After the mistaken Iraqi attack on the USS Stark in 
the Persian Gulf in May 1987, the US House Armed Services Committee 
criticized ‘the Iraqi policy of firing at targets that appear on radar without first 
checking them visually’, observing that ‘the surprise is not that an Iraqi missile 
fired at an unintended target, but that [an Iraqi missile] did not fire at an 
unintended target before this’.266 Conversely, mistakes were sometimes avoided 
when rudimentary information about a potential target, for instance radar­
generated imagery, was treated sceptically.
b) Forward observers and human reconnaissance.
The traditional means of verifying and locating military objectives before they 
are attacked has been the use of forward observers or other forms of human 
reconnaissance, land-based or airborne. This allows a high degree of confidence 
about the nature of a potential target to be obtained, but often at the price of 
exposing observers to considerable danger. Good vision-enhancing equipment 
can to some extent reduce the dangers of forward observation while increasing its 
effectiveness.
Forward observers were regularly used by both US and British forces in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001-2003 to direct air and (in the case of Iraq) artillery
265 For instance the ‘basic target graphic’ used by the US Air Force and described in AFP 14-210, 
para. 12.3.3.2.
266 House Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Staff Investigation into the Iraqi Attack on 
the USS Stark, 14 June 1987 (text in de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 152ff). See also 
Sandy Woodward One Hundred Days (London, 1992), 209-210 for examples of problems 
generated by assumptions being made on the basis of radar imagery as the British naval task force 
made its way to the Falkland Islands in 1982.
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267 • •strikes. Military aircraft were equipped with vision-enhancing equipment to 
help aircrew confirm the legitimacy of a target before opening fire.268 Traditional 
‘eyes on’ reconnaissance was combined to good effect with modem technology in 
Afghanistan by the use of special forces on the ground, equipped with GPS and 
laser designators, who were able to observe a potential target, then call in 
appropriate precision attacks. In Iraq in 2003, head-mounted night vision devices 
provided to ‘some soldiers’, at least, were said to have improved the ability of 
British troops to operate effectively in urban environments at night, though 
perhaps tellingly, this was said to be as a result of ‘shared’ situational
269awareness.
An egregious example of an attack in which civilian casualties appear to have 
been a direct result of failure to observe a target before attacking it occurred in 
eastern Serbia on 12 April 1999, when a NATO air strike hit the Grdelica Gorge 
Bridge as a passenger train was crossing it, killing at least ten people. The NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander (Europe) explained subsequently that the pilot 
‘launched his missile from his aircraft that was many miles away, he was not able 
to put his eyes on the bridge, it was a remotely directed attack.’270 Later, in the 
build-up towards military operations in Iraq in 2003, a spokesman for the US 
Department of Defense remarked that in situations where civilians may be present
267 See Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 95 and 100. See also US DoD News Briefing, 05.12.01. 
For description of the use of land-based observers during the Afghan campaign, see Anthony H. 
Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons o f Afghanistan (Washington, 2004), 17 and 36-38 and also 
Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma (London, 2004), 143-144 and 
149. An important US innovation in Iraq in 2003 was the use of mixed-service ‘Anglico’ teams of 
ground-based forward observers, with the ability to identify targets for either tactical or strategic 
attack and to call on the full range of indirect fire available to the US-led coalition (HCDC,
Lessons o f  Iraq, para.91).
268 After the 2003 Iraq war, the British MoD nevertheless observed, ‘The campaign.. .showed that 
coalition aircraft needed to be able to identify and target mobile, camouflaged and underground 
assets and facilities and to achieve discrimination in urban areas. This requires improvements in 
data transfer, tactical reconnaissance and high definition imagery systems to deliver shorter sensor 
to shooter times for time-sensitive and ‘find and destroy’ missions.’ (MoD, Operations in Iraq: 
First Reflections, (London, 2003) (hereinafter ‘MoD, First Reflections'), Chapter 3). HCDC, 
Lessons o f  Iraq, in plainer language, highlighted a need for British military aircraft to have better 
equipment for identifying small targets from medium to high altitude (para. 100).
269 See MoD, Operations in Iraq: Lessons fo r  the Future (London, 2003), (hereinafter ‘MoD, 
Lessons for the Future ’), 23.
270 ICTY Committee Report (NATO), para.59. This explanation can account for the launching of 
the first missile. Facing the greater challenge of accounting for the pilot’s decision to launch a 
second missile at the bridge after he had seen the train, General Clark explained that the pilot 
believed that he had to destroy the bridge and could not see exactly where the train was because of 
the smoke from the first strike.
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in or around military objectives (for instance, if placed there as human shields) ‘it 
requires that we work very carefully with the intelligence community to determine 
what that situation might be at a particular location’. The spokesman implicitly 
acknowledged, however, that aircrew using weapons with autonomous guidance 
systems did not always directly observe their targets before launching weapons, 
relying instead on civilians having heeded warnings to remain clear of military 
facilities.271
When fourteen civilians were killed in July 2002 during an Israeli attack on a 
building in which a leading Hamas militant was present, Israel claimed to have 
been unaware of the presence of the civilians in the building. The attack was 
criticized as ‘heavy-handed’ by US President George W. Bush and was 
condemned by the European Union’s foreign policy spokesman, a spokesman for 
the UN Secretary General, and by the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 272 Nonetheless, similar mistakes resulting from failure to reconnoitre 
targets adequately before striking them were apparently made by US forces in 
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2003. A US air strike on 29 December 2001 
reportedly struck five buildings in the village of Niazi Qalaye in Paktia province, 
two of which were ammunition dumps but three of which were ordinary civilian 
houses, killing between 11 and 120 villagers. And on 6 December 2003, nine 
children and one man, said to have been a civilian, were killed in the village of 
Hutala in an air strike intended for a Taleban official, whom villagers told a 
western journalist had left ten days previously.273
Lack of adequate human reconnaissance at ground level appears to have been 
a contributing factor to two attacks by the US Air Force on wedding parties, one 
in Dehrawad, Afghanistan (Urazgan province) in July 2002, the other in Makr al- 
Deeb in Iraq in May 2004, after celebratory gunfire was mistaken for hostile fire
271 See US DoD ‘Background Briefing on Targeting’ (press briefing, 05.03.03). The British MoD 
report on the Iraq war, by contrast, observed that ‘GPS information on mobile targets provided by 
land forces was sometimes quickly out of date, underlining the need fo r  pilots to reconfirm mobile 
targets by sight before committing to an attack’ (Emphasis added). (MoD, Lessons fo r  the Future, 
30).
272 See Ha ’aretz, 25.07.02.
273 See ‘Pressure grows to stop Afghan bombing’, BBC News Online, 03.01.02 and ‘DNA tests 
hold key to Afghan raid’, BBC News Online, 08.12.03. See also Human Rights Watch, Off 
Target: the Conduct o f  the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003).
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directed at aircraft.274 An additional contributing factor to the errors may have 
been a willingness to allow aircrew discretion to identify and engage targets in 
designated areas, rather than limiting them to attacks on specific, assigned targets 
known to be military objectives, and action in self-defence. The celebratory 
fire incidents also raise the question of the degree to which civilians themselves 
can reasonably be expected to take responsibility for their own safety and to 
refrain from conduct likely to lead to their being mistaken for enemy combatants.
c) Unmanned aerial vehicles
Information for targeting purposes provided by human reconnaissance is not 
only often dangerous to obtain and to transmit, but can be unreliable, for instance 
if provided by people unaware of the relevant facts, as occurred during the 1999 
Kosovo war, when reports given to NATO by the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) about which villages were no longer inhabited by civilians proved 
inaccurate,276 or by people with a personal motive for wanting a particular object
277to be attacked, as seems to have occurred on occasions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can bypass these problems to some extent. 
UAVs were widely used since the beginning of the 1990s, when they first came 
into service, and provided extremely detailed imagery, which, by the end of the 
1990s, could be relayed to distant locations almost instantaneously. During the 
1999 Kosovo war, UAVs gave NATO the ability to obtain detailed information in 
near-real time about potential targets without putting its military personnel at risk.
274 See ‘US to probe Afghan bombing “blunder”’, BBC News Online, 02.07.02 and “‘Wedding 
video” clouds US denials’, BBC News Online, 24.05.04. See also US DoD News Briefing, 
08.07.02.
275 US aircrew operating over Afghanistan in 2001-2002 normally included a forward air controller 
(FAC). Any object positively identified by the FAC as a military target in a predetermined target 
category and within an ‘engagement zone’ could be fired on without further authority being 
required (US DoD News Briefing, 17.10.01). For details of US and Saudi practice of attacking 
‘targets of opportunity’ during the 1991 Gulf war, see Greenpeace International, On Impact, 31.
276 Clark, Waging Modern War, 277.
277 After fourteen civilians were killed by an air strike on a house in Mosul, Iraq in January 2005, a 
local leader speculated that the US could have been given false information in the context of a 
tribal dispute. (See The Times, 10.01.05). For examples of occasions when US forces appear to 
have been misled into attacking civilians by local warlords with scores to settle in Afghanistan, see 
Cordesman, Ongoing Lessons o f  Afghanistan, 64, 125 and 138.
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By the time of the 2003 Iraq war, miniature, portable UAVs were in field service. 
Devices such as the Dragon Eye, weighing about 5.51bs (and launched with a 
rubber band), could be carried by an infantry patrol, to which it could transmit
978real-time imagery of the scene ‘over the hill’ from an altitude of 300-500 feet. 
This second generation of UAVs not only provided combatants in the field with a 
tool allowing them, in the grateful words of a US Marine Corps report, ‘to collect 
against the commander’s priorities, locations and schedule without interference
970from higher headquarters’, but also, in principle, to check on the nature and 
location of a suspected military objective (e.g. a presumed source of artillery fire) 
and on whether it could be attacked without causing disproportionate collateral 
damage.
What UAVs in field service during the period under review could not do was
980to see inside buildings and caves. Furthermore, the 1999 Kosovo war showed 
how over-reliance on UAV imagery not backed up by human reconnaissance on 
the ground could be exploited by an adversary skilled in the techniques of ‘Cover, 
Concealment, Camouflage, Denial and Deception’ (known in Soviet military 
doctrine as ‘maskirovka’). Such techniques were used to good effect by 
Yugoslav forces to deceive NATO pilots: the NATO attacks appear to have had 
some success in constraining the movement of Yugoslav ground forces, but this 
was at the cost of a certain amount of attrition as costly precision weaponry was
• • • 981wasted on bogus targets such as imitation tanks.
On 13 May 1999, a NATO air strike on a military camp near the village of 
Korisa in Kosovo, carried out with laser-guided weapons, killed approximately 
eighty-seven civilians, of whose arrival and presence at the area NATO was
278 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons (Washington, 
2003), 187. In addition to the Dragon Eye itself, the patrol would need to carry a laptop computer 
to receive its transmissions.
279 Ibid. For most of the period under review, UAV imagery of a potential target could be 
transmitted to command centres, but could not be transmitted to an airborne pilot or a platoon 
commander in the field.
280 Some use was however made by US forces in Afghanistan of ground-based robots for 
attempting to gather such information. The Packbot robot, fitted with video cameras and 
rechargeable batteries (and apparently capable of being equipped with a grenade launcher and a 
shotgun as well) was reportedly used to reconnoitre 26 caves (Cordesman, Ongoing Lessons o f 
Afghanistan, 39).
281 See Newsweek, 15.05.03. See also Lessons o f  Kosovo (Vol. I), para. 115.
94
unaware. It was subsequently reported that approximately 600 Albanian civilians 
had been brought to the camp shortly before it was struck, possibly in an attempt 
to shield it. Due to bad weather, however, the camp had not been observed by 
UAV in daylight before the attack. The last minute visual verification made by an 
airborne forward observer and by the lead pilot himself before he launched his 
(night-time) attack was enough to reassure him that the object below was a 
military camp, but not to reveal the presence of the civilians, some at least of 
whom were sleeping in the open by their vehicles, raising the question of whether
989the aircrew involved had suitable night vision equipment.
Though they were expensive during the period under review, and worked only 
in favourable weather, UAVs can be expected to become increasingly capable and 
their production costs to come down, making them play an ever-more prominent 
role in effective (and relatively risk-free) surveillance. Nevertheless, except 
where UAV imagery is very recent, it seems unlikely to be capable of providing 
an entirely adequate substitute for human reconnaissance and forward 
observation.
d) Counter-battery fire systems
By the 1980s, sound-ranging systems and computerized radar systems were 
available capable of tracking the trajectories of incoming artillery or mortar shells
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and returning fire on their calculated source. Such systems could also calculate 
the source of rocket fire, though with less accuracy, given the typically erratic 
trajectories of rockets. Unfortunately, those with counter-battery technology of 
this nature could easily be tricked by an unscrupulous adversary into returning fire
JO A
onto locations the striking of which would cause international outcry. Perhaps
282 For details of the incident, see Clark, Waging Modern War, 299-300; Human Rights Watch, 
Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign', and/C7T Committee Report (NATO), paras.86-89,
283 Sound-ranging systems were used in the 1991 Gulf War by British forces to locate enemy 
artillery and mortar positions (see Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command (London, 1995), 276). 
Israel, in 1996, had at its disposal the computerized radar Hughes TPQ-37 Firefinder system, 
which it had been using since the 1980s (see Reisman, ‘The Lessons of Qana’, 385).
284 A meeting in Sarajevo attended by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) in 1993 was punctuated by outgoing fire from an adjacent 120mm mortar. This was
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partly for this reason, during the 1999 Kosovo war, US lawyers in the Department 
of Defense insisted, to the apparent annoyance of the NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander (Europe), that fire directed at Serb anti-aircraft defences had to be 
observed on the basis of TV or photographic data no more than a few hours old, 
rather than being directed at locations estimated as the source of enemy fire -  or
7oc
‘templated’ as was, apparently, ‘standard Army procedure’.
Counter-battery fire and other systems said to be currently under development 
and designed to return fire automatically on the calculated source of incoming 
artillery or even sniper fire, would appear of limited usefulness to a belligerent 
concerned to avoid inadvertent collateral damage (and of great use to a belligerent 
not itself in possession of the technology, but keen to embarrass an adversary 
using it). Of far greater practical value may be counter-battery systems linked up 
to systems able to provide visual imagery of the calculated source of incoming 
fire with a ‘man in the loop’ to decide whether or not fire should be returned. 
Also of value, in addition to small, portable UAVs like those used in Iraq in 2003 
by the US Marine Corps, may be systems such as the so-called ‘reconnaissance 
round’ reportedly being developed as another means of enabling artillery crew to 
see ‘over the hill’ before opening fire onto a suspected enemy position beyond 
normal visual range.
e) Laser designation
A system for target identification widely used in the 1991 Gulf war, the 1999 
Kosovo war and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001-2003 was 
laser designation. Laser beams were used by forward observers either airborne or 
on the ground to designate targets which had been located and identified visually.
suspected by at least some of those present to be designed to provoke Serb counter-battery fire 
onto the building where the SRSG was widely known to be present.
285 Clark, Waging Modern War, 306.
286 For instance the Gunslinger, a rapid-fire gun, said to be currently under development in the US, 
designed to detect enemy snipers and automatically fire back at them, and the US Navy Phalanx 
system which ‘automatically detects, tracks and engages anti-air warfare threats such as anti-ship 
missiles and aircraft’ (see Sunday Telegraph, 19.09.04 and US Navy Fact File 
http://www.chinfo.naw.mil/navpalib/factfile/weapons/wep-phal.html (visited 26.11.02))
287 See John Edwards, The Geeks o f War (New York, 2005), 67-81.
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The laser beam would reflect off the target in the form of an inverted cone, the 
code of which could be recognized by a suitably programmed bomb or missile 
which, dropped in approximately the right place, could alter its trajectory to travel 
down the cone and strike the designated target.288 The system allowed for several 
successful high precision attacks from high altitude. During the 1991 Gulf war, 
special forces personnel were said to have infiltrated Baghdad while the air 
campaign was underway, in order to act as ‘laser spotters’. At considerable 
personal risk, such spotters probably contributed greatly to the accuracy of aerial 
attacks on targets located in Baghdad and the minimization of collateral damage.
J) Mobile phones
On 21 April 1996, Russian military forces located the exact position of the 
then Chechen leader and military commander, Djokar Dudaev, apparently by 
means of the signal given out by a satellite telephone he was using. Dudaev, 
considered at the time to be the driving force behind Chechen armed resistance to 
Russia, was then killed in what is believed to have been a rocket attack directed at 
the origin of the satellite signal. Although three other militants standing close to 
Dudaev were killed, his wife and son, only 12 metres away, were unhurt.290
Seven years later, the United States proved unable to attain anything like this 
degree of accuracy when a similar technique was apparently used to try to locate
• 291and target individual members of the Iraqi military leadership in 2003. Attacks 
were reportedly directed at the locations from which the personal mobile phones 
of the intended victims were emitting signals. None of the individuals intended as
288 ‘Why bombing can go wrong’, BBC News Online, 16.10.01.
289 Greenpeace International, On Impact, 85.
290 De Waal and Gall, Chechnya, 318-321. See also 
http://www.aeronautics.ru/chechnva/dudavev.htm (visited 14.09.04).
291 A Human Rights Watch report speculates that at least some of the attacks on prominent Iraqi 
leaders relied on mobile telephone intercepts to locate the relevant individuals. (Human Rights 
Watch, O ff Target, 34, 37).
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objects of these attacks was hit, but many civilian casualties were caused when the 
locations where they were thought to be present were struck.292
The problem appears to have been that the mobile phones allegedly being used 
as homing devices by the United States in Iraq in 2003 were capable of giving 
their own location only to within a circle with a radius of 100 metres 293 There is 
little information in the public domain to indicate why the attack on Dudaev was, 
by contrast, quite so precise. The presence of Russian military aircraft in the area 
where Dudaev was killed may have contributed to the Russians’ ability to 
pinpoint the exact source of the satellite phone call.294 Finally, when he was 
struck, Dudaev was making his telephone call in the open, near a vehicle, which 
would have made him a much easier target than if he had been inside a building, 
as the Iraqi leaders targeted by the United States in 2003 often were.
g) Remote imagery and radio intercepts
A US Army/Marine Corps manual for military legal advisers published in 
2000 gives examples of ‘many legitimate ways to identify a target’, including not 
only UAV data, but also a number of radar-based systems and even ‘an 
intercepted enemy transmission that states the grid co-ordinates of enemy unit 
locations’. It suggests that ‘a strict “eyes-on” requirement, while potentially 
appropriate and necessary in some environments and situations, may unduly tie a 
commander’s hands in others’.295 The advice goes on to clarify that information 
such as radar data should only be acted on in the context of ‘reliable situational 
awareness’: it is clearly not a green light for attacks against anything which might
292 Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 6, 22-23. The fact that the intended targets escaped 
altogether suggests they may have become wise to the dangers of emitting on known mobiles and 
consequently to have adopted the practice of never using the same mobile phone for long.
293 Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 24.
294 For discussion of how satellite phones can (sometimes) be used to locate their users with 
precision, see Anick Jesdanum, ‘Satellite Phones in Iraq Could Become Beacons for Bombs’, 
Associated Press 21.03.03, available on
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technologv/satellite phones:030321.html (visited
14.09.04).
295 ‘Rules of Engagement (RoE) Handbook for Judge Advocates’, available via the website of the 
Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), (3-24) (hereinafter ‘RoE Handbookforjudge 
Advocates').
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be a military objective. But the problem with the advice is that it risks 
encouraging attacks against targets which have been only very imperfectly 
identified and about which little is in fact known. While it might be justified in 
some circumstances to launch an attack against a particular location on the basis 
of an intercepted enemy radio message suggesting it to be an artillery position, the 
risk of mistaken attacks against civilian objects would seem high if such a practice 
were adopted regularly.
A system known as Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS), first used by the United States in the 1991 Gulf war, combines satellite 
and radar technology to produce basic imagery of moving objects beyond visual 
range.296 NATO use of this technology during the 1999 Kosovo war, when it had 
no forces on the ground, meant it could obtain some indication, at least, of the 
location of mobile military objectives, such as tanks and military convoys, from a 
distance even in bad weather. What the system could not at this point do was 
produce imagery of sufficient resolution to indicate the exact nature of moving 
vehicles: this could only be surmised from their position and behaviour. It seems 
at least possible that this limitation may have led to targeting errors during the 
Kosovo war.
Only one case of a civilian vehicle being mistakenly targeted by coalition
297aircraft was publicly reported during the 2003 Iraq war.
h) Identification Friend or Foe systems
‘Identification Friend or Foe’ (IFF) systems and procedures are designed to 
reduce the risk of mistaken attacks on friendly forces (‘friendly fire’). The 
frequency of friendly fire accidents caused by failure of IFF systems and 
procedures during the period under review is a reminder of the genuine difficulty 
which even the most sophisticated armed forces can face in identifying targets
296 For details, see ‘Joint STARS Ground Stations’, http://globalsecuritv.org/intell/svstems/istars- 
gsm.htm (visited 14.09.04).
297 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 21.
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accurately. An understanding of some of the problems which have caused 
friendly fire accidents in the past (and those which may cause such accidents in 
the future) may contribute to an understanding of what can reasonably be 
expected of armed forces in terms of avoiding accidental attacks on civilian or 
medical vehicles in, or near, a combat area.
After nine British soldiers were killed and eleven injured in southern Iraq in 
1991 when two British armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were mistakenly fired 
on by US Air Force A-10 jets flying at 9,000 feet (c.3,000 metres), an inquiry 
pointed to some of the problems. Although the fluorescent identification 
markings on the British APCs were visible from 6,000 feet, this was below the 
operating height of the A-lOs, which had passed over the British APCs twice, 
once at 15,000 feet and once at 8,000 feet, and had not seen their markings. The 
pilots claimed they had not been informed that friendly forces were in the area and 
had been given only a description, not a precise grid reference, for their assigned 
target, which was in fact 20 kilometres away. It was recommended after the 
accident that in future, pilots should always be given a latitude and longitude grid 
reference for their assigned target in their mission briefs and that this should 
always be formally acknowledged by the pilots.298 Such a practice, if widely 
adopted, seems likely to reduce not only the risk of friendly fire, but also of 
mistaken attacks on civilian objects.299 The facts of the case as reported suggest 
that civilian authorities in conflict zones would be well advised to ensure, to the 
extent possible, that markings intended to be visible to military aircraft should be 
of sufficient dimensions and luminosity to be visible with the naked eye at 8,000 
feet.300
298 See ‘Friendly fire in the Gulf: Board’s findings’ (statement to the House of Commons by 
Archie Hamilton, Armed Forces Minister, July 1992) (1992), (Army Quarterly Defence Journal).
299 Use of the ‘nine-line brief system has been standard RAF practice for many years. Critical 
information on the location and nature of an assigned target (e.g. latitude and longitude, bearing, 
elevation etc.) is confirmed orally, in a fixed sequence, to the airborne pilot (or navigator), who 
then repeats the information back before attacking the target.
300 Luminosity in daylight can be enhanced by fluorescent tape. The use of thermal tape has been 
shown to be effective in making distinctive markings visible to aircrew using infra-red vision- 
enhancing equipment in night-time or poor weather conditions (Dominique Loye ‘Making the 
distinctive emblem visible to thermal imaging cameras’ (1997), IRRC).
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Some states are said to be developing co-operative IFF systems, which, fitted 
in equipment belonging to friendly forces, would enable these forces to be
-1A 1
automatically recognized as friendly by weapons systems. A danger of such 
technology is that it may make combatants quicker to presume that vehicles, 
vessels and aircraft without this equipment are hostile, when they may be civilian, 
neutral or medical (or even friendly forces with defective transmitter chips or out- 
of-date codes). Making the technology available to selected neutral states and 
international agencies, or installing it on medical vehicles, risks simply 
augmenting the presumption that vehicles, vessels and aircraft without the 
equipment may be safely fired upon, thus increasing the risks for ordinary 
civilians, unless it is made clear to military personnel that there must be some 
other reason for assuming a suspect object or person to be hostile, in addition to 
lack of IFF equipment.
i) Naval exclusion zones
Properly notified and operated naval exclusion zones can be one of the means 
by which armed forces, ‘in the conduct of military operations at sea...take all 
reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian 
objects’.302 Given the relatively loose rules of naval warfare in relation to the 
feigning of civilian status,303 it is not unreasonable for belligerents to make at least 
preliminary inferences about a vessel’s status and intentions on the basis not only 
of its appearance, but also of its location. What they may not do is fire on an
301 See Sunday Telegraph, 17.10.04.
302 Additional Protocol I, article 57.4.
303 The law applicable to conduct of hostilities on land prohibits feigning of civilian status by 
combatants with a view to facilitating military action, qualifying such conduct as perfidious 
(Additional Protocol I, article 37. See also Ex parte Quirin et. al. (US Supreme Court, 1942), 317 
US 1 (1942), where the US Supreme Court considered it a violation of the law of war to penetrate 
enemy lines in civilian dress ‘with hostile purpose’ even if no actual act of hostility was 
perpetrated.) By contrast, customary international law has traditionally recognized as legitimate 
the practice of disguising warships as merchant ships to facilitate approach to enemy vessels, so 
long as the warship reveals its true colours before opening fire (See Robert Tucker, The Law o f  
War and Neutrality at Sea, (Washington, 1957), 139). Resistance to the practice has been 
growing, however, and the San Remo Manual proposes a rule prohibiting a warship ‘at all times 
from actively simulating the status of... [inter alia] passenger vessels carrying civilian passengers’ 
(emphasis added) (San Remo Manual paras. 110-111 and commentary).
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apparently civilian vessel in the absence of good reason to believe it is in fact a 
legitimate military objective.
During the 1982 Falklands conflict, maritime exclusion zones were established 
by both the United Kingdom and Argentina. The British ‘Total Exclusion Zone’ 
(TEZ) consisted of the area within a 200-mile radius emanating from the centre of 
the Falkland Islands.304 The Argentinian exclusion zone was the area within 200 
miles from the Argentinian mainland and 200 miles from the coastline of the 
Falkland Islands. The British zone provoked complaints from the Soviet 
Union.306 However the establishment of the zones, which were well publicized 
and in which neither side operated a policy of firing on sight, did not result in a 
single civilian vessel or aircraft being mistakenly attacked.307 This may have 
been largely due to the fact of civilian shipping and aircraft heeding warnings 
given and staying clear of the zones. It should be noted, however, that British 
naval forces were not in fact authorized under their Rules of Engagement to attack
• • O^R • • •any vessels other than warships m the TEZ. By contrast, maritime exclusion 
zones operated by both Iran and Iraq in the 1980s were in effect unlawful free-fire 
zones in which any ship was liable to be attacked.309
During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, a fishing boat, thought not to have been 
carrying appropriate radio equipment for communication with US naval forces in 
the area, was attacked by a US frigate.310 The risk of accidents with fishing 
vessels in maritime areas where warships are on high alert can be reduced if 
civilian vessels operating near exclusion zones or in areas of military tension are 
equipped with GPS devices, to help them avoid entering exclusion zones through
304 See the letter of 28.04.82 from the British Permanent Representative to the UN to the President 
of the UN Security Council (‘UK Materials on International Law 1982’, BYIL 1982, 542).
305 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 82.
306 Michaelsen, ‘Maritime exclusion zones’, 374.
307 The sinking within the TEZ of the Argentinian ‘fishing boat’ the Narwal, which turned out (as 
had been suspected) to have been a military reconnaissance vessel, (see Woodward, One Hundred 
Days, 191-195) can even be seen as an example of the effectiveness of properly notified maritime 
exclusion zones as a means of helping belligerents to distinguish between civilian and military 
vessels.
308 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 191.
309 See Michaelsen, ‘Maritime exclusion zones’, 375.
310 De Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 13, n.18.
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navigational error, and appropriate radio equipment for communication with 
warships. If a maritime exclusion zone adjoins a coastline, it may also be 
advisable for civilian authorities to provide for the welfare of local fishermen: 
otherwise, economic pressure may lead them to disregard the dangers of fishing in 
the exclusion zone.
j)  Naval security zones
The US Navy adopted a practice at the beginning of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq 
war of establishing ‘security zones’ (sometimes called ‘defensive bubbles’) of five 
nautical miles in any direction of US warships in the Persian Gulf, Strait of 
Hormuz, and the Sea of Oman, including the airspace up to 2,000 feet. Other 
states were informed that any aircraft entering such a zone without having been 
cleared for arrival or departure at a regional airport and without establishing 
contact with US forces could be ‘held at risk by US defensive measures’ -  i.e. 
shot down.312 Later, notice was given that vessels, too, whether surface or 
submarine, coming within five nautical miles of US warships in this area would 
be at risk of ‘defensive measures’ if no prior contact with US forces had been 
made and their intentions were unclear.313 Iran reacted strongly against this 
measure, calling the notice to airmen and mariners (NOTAM) in question ‘a clear 
violation of international law and common practice regarding the freedom of 
flying over high seas’.314
Shortly after a US warship, the Stark, was mistakenly attacked in the Persian 
Gulf by an Iraqi fighter jet in May 1987, a revised NOTAM was issued by the US 
authorities, in which aircraft ‘approaching US naval forces’, were requested to 
establish and maintain radio contact with US forces on one or other of two
3.1 At the time of writing (January 2006), fixed GPS devices designed for civilian maritime use can 
be purchased for approximately £300.
3.2 NOTAM, Notices to Airmen and Marine[r]s for Persian Gulf, Strait o f  Hormuz, Gulf o f  Oman 
and North Arabian Sea, January 1984 (text in de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 137).
313 Automated Notice to Mariner-Selected Broadcast Warnings, for Persian Gulf, Strait o f  Hormuz 
and Gulf o f  Oman, 14 May 1986, ibid., 139.
3,4 Ibid., 34, n.66.
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specified frequencies.315 It was made clear that any aircraft approaching US naval 
forces in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman or Arabian Sea could 
be ‘at risk from defensive measures’ in the event of failure to identify itself and 
clarify its intentions on the specified frequency if it was seen to be ‘operating in a 
threatening manner’. A further NOTAM issued two months later modified the 
guidance, specifying that all aircraft should maintain a listening watch on one or 
other of the designated frequencies, while those ‘approaching within 5nm of US 
naval forces’ should take the initiative in establishing and maintaining radio 
contact.316
In July the following year, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian
' i  1 n
airliner, on a scheduled flight m a commercial airway, which had apparently
failed to respond on either of the international frequencies specified in the revised
NOTAM to requests for identification made by the warship. The airliner had been
at an altitude of 13,500 feet, well above the Vincennes’ ‘defensive bubble’, and
climbing when it was struck. All 290 passengers lost their lives. The facts that
the Vincennes was engaged in hostilities with Iranian vessels at the time of the
incident and its crew believed an Iranian F-14 jet to be nearby strongly suggest it
was feared, in the heat of the moment but not on the basis of very powerful
evidence, that the airliner may have been an Iranian military aircraft coming to 
< 110
assist the Iranian boats. A false alarm that the airliner was descending appears 
to have added to the confusion.319 There is no evidence to suggest that the airliner 
was deliberately attacked in the knowledge it was a civilian aircraft.
315 Revised Notice to Airmen/Notice to Mariners fo r  the Persian G ulf Area, July 1987 (text in ibid., 
140).
316 Notice to Airmen, September 1987, (text in ibid., 141-142).
317 The flight had, however, departed 27 minutes late and was not in the centre of the airway 
(Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagener, The Lessons o f  Modern War II: the Iran-Iraq War 
(London, 1990), 577.)
318 According to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the airliner’s failure to respond to 
US warnings, the facts that it had taken off from an airfield also used by military aircraft and gave 
no definitive radar emissions, the ongoing surface action and the fact that the aircraft was 
proceeding in the direction of the Vincennes meant ‘it was only prudent for Captain Rogers to 
assume that the contact was related to his engagement with the Iranian boats until proven 
otherwise’. Statement by the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, 19 August 1988 (text in de 
Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 206-209).
319 See de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 205-206, 208.
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What went wrong? First, the relevant NOTAM itself, though presumably 
intended to reduce the risks for civilian shipping and aircraft in the Persian Gulf 
area, may have had the reverse effect. The NOTAM failed to indicate what might 
be understood by ‘operating in a threatening manner’, or to indicate the language 
in which radio communication was expected to take place. It may have given 
the overall impression that civilian aircraft flying outside US ‘defensive bubbles’ 
could safely proceed over the Persian Gulf. And the reliance placed by the 
NOTAM on VHF/UHF radio communication between US warships and local
civilian pilots seems not to have been based on much, if any, experience of this
^91system working in practice. In addition, the circumstances in which the 
airliner was shot down suggest serious problems with target verification 
procedures on the warship itself. The report into the incident conducted by the 
US Department of Defense, while clearing the ship’s commander of any 
wrongdoing, gives no indication of the grounds on which the airliner was judged 
to have been demonstrating ‘hostile intent’ and gives no indication of any 
precautions having been taken to verify its nature, other than the abortive efforts 
made by the Vincennes to communicate with the pilot of the aircraft by radio (five 
times on one frequency, four times on the other).322
The incident invites comparison with one which occurred in the south Atlantic 
in 1982 as a British naval force made its way towards the Falkland Islands. 
Believing a nearby aircraft was an Argentinian military reconnaissance plane that 
would reveal the force’s position, rendering it vulnerable to aerial attack, the 
commander of the naval force had obtained authority to attack the aircraft, had 
locked onto it with a naval missile, and was on the point of opening fire. Before 
the word was given, as a final precaution the aircraft’s route was projected onto a 
map. This revealed that the plane was flying in a straight line from Durban to Rio
320 It was stated that illuminating US warships with weapons radar would be ‘viewed with 
suspicion’, but no indication was given of what else, if anything, might be interpreted as ‘operating 
in a threatening manner’. The Navy Procedure fo r  Communicating with Unidentified Aircraft 
1988 (text in de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 142) seems to assume that English would 
be understood by all pilots operating in the region.
321 See de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 154 and 157.
322 Department o f Defense, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing 
o f Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988, 19 August, 1988 (text in ibid., 201). The crew had checked 
the timetable of scheduled flights, but appear not to have made allowance for the possibility of 
delayed departures (Cordesman and Wagener, Lessons o f Modern War (Vol II), 511).
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de Janeiro. Fire was held, and planes sent up to inspect the aircraft reported it 
was a Brazilian civilian airliner. The comparison, though instructive, is not 
entirely fair. Part of the reason for the British commander’s last-minute hesitation 
was the fact that a military reconnaissance plane would not, itself, have been 
capable of launching an attack, while the human and diplomatic cost of a mistaken 
attack on a civilian aircraft would have been catastrophic.323 But it remains a 
useful example of good practice in terms of taking precautions in the context of 
defensive military operations at sea.
4.2. Taking precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack - 
weaponry
a) Preliminary remarks
Once a target has been selected, located and confirmed as a legitimate military 
objective, normally the next stage is to choose the appropriate weapon or 
munition for striking the target so as to achieve the military aim most efficiently 
in compliance with relevant legal requirements. Even belligerents unaware of, or 
unmoved by, their legal obligations will often want to take steps to ensure neither 
ammunition nor goodwill is squandered by ill-considered use of destructive power 
in excess of that needed to achieve a particular military aim. The process of 
selecting the appropriate weapon or munition for the task in hand is known in US 
military doctrine as ‘weaponeering’.324
Obviously in some situations there will be a greater choice of weaponry than 
in others. Where an attack is to be launched from the air or with long-range 
artillery by a sophisticated belligerent, the options are likely to be extensive, 
allowing a relatively detailed decision to be made about the degree of damage to a 
target which will be caused, where and how, as well as how much collateral
323 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 102-104 and 192.
324 AFP 14-210 defines weaponeering as ‘the process of estimating the quantity of a specific type 
[of] weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target 
vulnerability, weapon effects, munition delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of kill, 
weapon reliability etc.’ (para.6.1)
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damage will be caused and to what (barring accidents and unforeseen events).325 
Where an attack is to be launched by poorly supplied front-line infantry, or by a 
very primitive belligerent, the options will naturally be much more limited - for 
instance to a simple choice between a mortar attack and a raid.
b) Line-of-sight weapons
Line-of-sight weapons, whether small arms, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) 
or larger guns mounted on tanks, normally expose the bearer or operator to danger 
whenever they are lined up to fire at a target (assuming the target itself has a 
means of defence).326 They thus discourage hesitation, and the chances of 
targeting mistakes being made with such weapons when combatants and non- 
combatants are closely intermingled in a combat zone are high. During street-to- 
street fighting in built-up areas peopled by combatants and civilians, troops with 
line-of-sight weapons often have to take split-second ‘him or me’ decisions. 
There are no easy answers to the question of how the risks of civilian casualties 
from line-of-sight weapons can be minimized during this kind of combat.327
325 AFP 14-210 encourages the practice of deciding in advance the exact degree of damage 
required (eg ‘mobility kill’, ‘catastrophic kill’, ‘prevent take-off kill’ etc.) and even the exact 
length of time for which an object should be disabled (para.6.5.4). An appendix lists 20 different 
types of warhead fuse, designed to control in different ways the point at which the warhead will 
detonate. The USAF had a system, (the ‘bug-splat program’) for estimating the area likely to be 
affected if a particular weapon was used in a particular way (see US DoD, ‘Background Briefing 
on Targeting’, 05.03.03). Clark, in Waging Modern War, 203-204, gives a commander’s 
perspective of the difficulties of implementing this time-consuming approach in practice in a fast- 
moving situation.
326 This may not be the case if one side has superior long-range optical equipment and long-range 
firepower to match, allowing targets to be identified and fired on before they can pose a threat, as 
was the case with British tank crews in the 1991 Gulf war (see de la Billiere, Storm Command, 
286).
327 According to one military writer, ‘Currently, no military force has a workable doctrine on how 
to fight in built-up terrain without inflicting heavy casualties on the civilian population and 
causing heavy collateral damage’. (Gregory Celestan, ‘Wounded Bear: the Ongoing Russian 
Military Operation in Chechnya’ (1996) Foreign Military Studies Office 
http://fmso.leavenworth.armv.mil/fmsopubs/issues/wounded/wounded.htm (visited 14.09.04). 
Hills, in Future War in Cities, suggests it is unrealistic to expect to avoid urban warfare in future 
conflicts, and that in such warfare, ‘immediate tactical advantage usually accrues to the side with 
less concern for the safety of non-combatants’ (238). Whether the immediate tactical advantage 
that may be gained by ruthlessness in urban combat can be converted to longer term strategic 
success is clearly a different matter.
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One positive aspect of the 1991 Gulf war was the almost total absence of
'1JQ
urban warfare. During the Iraq war of 2003-2004, it was not avoided to quite 
this extent, though it mostly took place after major combat operations had been 
declared over. It has been suggested that between 572 and 616 civilians were 
killed during the battle between US forces/Iraqi governmental forces and Iraqi 
insurgents in the Iraqi city of Fallujah in November 2004. The reason for these 
heavy civilian casualties are not entirely clear, but the fact that regular warnings 
were issued to the civilian population to evacuate the city before the attack was 
launched may have kept the non-combatant death toll lower than it might 
otherwise have been. By contrast, the failure of the Russian authorities to 
evacuate civilians from the city of Grozny, Chechnya, before sending tanks on to 
the streets in January 1995 may have contributed to the large scale loss of life
• • • • ' i ' ) namong the civilian population of the city m the months that followed.
During the US-led military occupation of Iraq from May 2003 to May 2004, it 
was not uncommon for ordinary civilians to keep firearms for their own 
protection.331 To reduce the risk of such people being fired on, occupying forces 
in some of the major cities prohibited civilians from carrying weapons in public, 
or required them to wear orange jackets if authorized by the occupying forces to 
carry arms.332 This did not eliminate mistaken attacks on bona fide civilians,333 
but may have reduced the number of such errors.
328 The desire to avoid the high civilian and combatant casualties typical of urban warfare was, 
according to the US DoD, a factor in deciding against an amphibious assault on Kuwait City 
during the 1991 Gulf war {Final Report to Congress, 612).
329 See website of Iraq Body Count (http://www.iraqbodvcount.net/press/, visited 26.04.05).
330 For background to the dispatch of Russian tanks to Grozny on 31.01.94, see de Waal and Gall, 
Chechnya 1-19, Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone o f  Russian Power (New Haven and 
London, 1999), 108-113, and Celestan, ‘Wounded Bear’. De Waal and Gall suggest about 
27,000 people may have perished in the three-month battle for Grozny at the beginning of 1995 
{Chechnya, 227). Lieven puts the figure much lower, at 5,000 maximum (Chechnya, 107-108).
331 See Amnesty International, Iraq: Killings o f  Civilians in Basra and al-Amara (2004).
332 See ibid., quoting a letter from a British Army representative, dated 04.08.03, stating ‘Although 
all good people are allowed to keep 2 weapons at home and another at their place of work, 
weapons are forbidden on the streets to avoid.. .misunderstandings with the Army and Police’.
333 See ibid.
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c) Land-based artillery and mortars -  the case for an *800 metre rule’
Since the mid-nineteenth century, land-based artillery and mortars have 
normally been used for indirect fire against targets out of the gunners’ visual 
range,334 with shells being directed towards their target by careful calculation of 
the angle and direction of the gun or mortar, taking into account topographical and 
atmospheric conditions, and the weight and charge of the ammunition. Accuracy 
is enhanced when forward observers are used for fire correction, though forward 
observation may sometimes pose practical difficulties, for instance if fire is 
defensive and prior arrangements for target observation have not been made. 
Even when fire is observed and crews are highly trained, targeting with artillery 
and mortar fire using munitions without terminal guidance is a very imperfect 
science, rendering such weapons ill-suited for precision attacks on targets located 
within concentrations of civilians or in close proximity to protected objects.335
It needs to be recalled that trees or other obstacles may deflect shells off- 
course, the cartographic and meteorological information needed for accuracy may 
be unreliable or unavailable, and inexperience on the part of a gun or mortar crew 
may affect the accuracy of their fire. It also needs to be recalled that in hilly 
ground, while mortar fire, with its relatively vertical trajectory, may continue to 
be reasonably accurate if properly aimed, long-range artillery fire aimed 
horizontally (or relatively horizontally) at a target on the crest of a hill will go 
very far off-course indeed (possibly by several kilometres) if it overshoots the 
crest by only a fraction. The less skilled the artillery or mortar crews, the greater 
the margin of error they will need to anticipate: in 1994, a separatist entity 
informed the ICRC that it had ordered its troops not to bombard targets located
334 See Christopher Bellamy, ‘The Russian artillery and the origins of indirect fire’ (1982), Army 
Quarterly.
335 According to a senior instructor at the British Royal School of Artillery (RSA), trained British 
artillery crews would normally expect their fire from medium range (i.e. 10-16km) to be accurate 
to within about 400 metres in any direction, assuming the availability of accurate cartographic, 
meteorological and other relevant data, but if using artillery in the vicinity of friendly forces would 
want to keep a distance of 800 metres between any intended target of their fire and friendly forces 
to be confident of the safety of the latter. Students at the school are taught about the multiple 
factors which may affect the accuracy of their fire, including the Earth’s rotation, atmospheric 
conditions and the effect on the speed (and thus the range) of an artillery shell of the increase in 
the gun’s muzzle temperature as it heats up through repeated use. It is only when all these 
variables (many of which will also apply to mortar fire) have been properly taken into account that 
artillery accuracy to within 400 metres can reasonably be expected.
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within 500 metres of civilian dwellings,336 suggesting (if true) little confidence in 
their ability to land shells on target. Finally, it needs to be recalled that a shell 
landing at a certain distance from its target will, on exploding, have a destructive 
impact extending further still, depending on its ‘spread pattern’.
The degree of accuracy possible with artillery and mortar fire depends on the 
nature of the weapon as well as the terrain and the skill of the crew. Some 
artillery pieces, such as the intermediate-range SCUD missiles used by the Iraqi 
army during the 1991 Gulf war and the Second World War-vintage ‘Katyusha’ 
rockets used by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon against northern Israel in 1996, 
cannot be aimed with much accuracy, whatever the technical competence of the 
crew.338 Others, such as multiple barrel rocket launchers, are designed as area 
weapons, intended to cause destruction over a wide area, rather than to neutralize 
a ‘point’ target, such as an enemy artillery position. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the 2003 Iraq war saw the first use (by the United States) of the 
precision guided SADARM artillery munition, capable in principle of detecting 
and validating targets before homing in on and destroying them.339
A case heard by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
in 2003, in which expert evidence in relation to short-range mortars was heard, 
sheds interesting light on the standards of accuracy to which modem belligerents 
may possibly be held should indiscriminate use of these weapons be alleged in 
judicial proceedings. The Tribunal rejected the argument of the Defence, 
submitted in pre-trial proceedings, that a margin of error of 300-400 metres in any 
direction of a military objective needed to be conceded before it could be said that 
mortar fire was indiscriminate, given the ‘targeting zone’ of these weapons,340
336 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 384.
337 The ‘spread pattern’ or ‘area of effectiveness’ of a unitary shell from a 105mm gun is likely to 
be about 250 metres in any direction, with lethal consequences within about 60 metres. Both 
distances should be doubled for a unitary shell from a 155mm gun.
338 The main reasons for the inaccuracy of the SCUDs and Katyusha rockets are that i) they are 
both normally fired from launchers on the back of a truck, which if wrongly positioned or 
stationed on soft or uneven ground will make all the rockets in the launcher go off target; ii) the 
trajectory of the rockets is strongly affected by atmospheric conditions, as propellants bum faster 
in hot temperature, thus increasing the range.
339 See Cordesman, The Iraq War, 360-361.
340 Prosecutor v. Galic, (Motion for Acquittal) (2002), ICTY, para.30. In Prosecutor v. Strugar, 
(Trial Judgement) (2005), ICTY, a Defence expert witness made the similar claim that ‘firing with
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though it is not clear whether it entirely accepted the Prosecution’s contention that 
the mortar units in question ‘could expect their first shot to be accurate within 50 
metres.,341 It is certainly debatable whether the Trial Chamber was reasonable to 
insist on quite such a high standard of accuracy for mortar fire as it did,342 and the 
ruling on this point was not unanimous.343 But it is interesting that even the 
Defence did not argue that mortar units needed to be permitted a greater margin of 
error than 300-400 metres in any direction.
During Israel’s campaign Operation Grapes o f Wrath against Hezbollah in 
southern Lebanon in 1996, Israeli artillery batteries were reportedly prohibited by 
their standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) from firing on targets within 300 
metres of UN establishments without specific permission from higher authority.344 
The rule is revealing in terms of the degree of accuracy that can be expected of 
medium-range artillery: if it was considered that accuracy to within less than 300 
metres could be generally relied on where competent artillery crews were 
concerned, it seems unlikely that the Israel Defence Forces would have 
countenanced such restrictive ROE.345
mortars.. .at any target which was less than 500 metres from the Old Town would lead to at least 
some of the shells landing in the Old Town’ (para.207).
341 Galic (Trial Judgement), para.338.
342 ‘Evidence in the Trial Record establishes that a target such as Markale market can be hit from a 
great distance with one shot if the area is pre-recorded’ ibid., para.494. See also para.344. It is 
important, however, to distinguish the Circular Error Probable (CEP) of a correctly aligned mortar 
or artillery piece (i.e. the relatively small area within which 50% of its missiles will normally fall, 
once the bearing and elevation have been properly set) from the overall margin for targeting error 
needing to be considered in the context of anticipating collateral damage. The latter is the much 
larger area within which 100% of the missiles can be expected to fall, making realistic allowance 
not only for the elliptical dispersion pattern of shells fired from a weapon in a certain position 
aligned at a certain bearing and elevation (the Probable Error Range), but also for ‘sighting shots’ 
before the correct alignment of the weapon can be established, and at least minor errors being 
made in setting the bearing and elevation of the gun or mortar at various stages.
343 See separate and partially dissenting view of Judge Nieto-Navia, (para.98).
344 Reisman, ‘The Lessons of Qana’, 385. On one occasion, when an Israeli artillery battalion was 
authorized to go outside these ROE to return fire on a Hezbollah rocket position within 300 metres 
of the UNIFIL compound at Qana, 13 shells hit the compound, killing 102 civilians. For further 
details and discussion of the incident, see, in addition to Reisman’s article, Report Dated 1 May, 
1996 o f  the Secretary General's Military Adviser Concerning the Shelling o f the United Nations 
Compound at Qana on 18 April 1996 (UN Doc.S/1996/337 (1996) ( ‘Kappen report’); statement to 
the UN Security Council by Israel’s representative (UN Doc.S/PV.3654, 14); Turns, ‘Some 
Reflections on the conflict in South Lebanon’; Human Rights Watch, Israel/Lebanon (1997) and 
Amnesty International, Israel/Lebanon: Unlawful Killings During Operation ‘Grapes o f  Wrath ’ 
(1996).
345 300 metres corresponds approximately to the distance by which a shell fired by an artillery 
piece from 16 kilometres will go off target if the angle of the gun is 3 mils, out (either through line 
(bearing) or elevation error). (Different armed forces use different calibration systems for
I l l
In Iraq in 2003, British artillery crew operated a policy of not firing on targets 
which had not been recently observed either by eye or by UAV, even where 
counter-battery fire was concerned.346 US artillery crew by contrast reported 
being prepared to use unobserved fire to respond to incoming fire identified by 
radar.347
It is submitted that in the interests of their own safety, civilians in a combat 
zone in which artillery or mortar fire is regularly used should, to the extent 
possible, remain at least 800 metres away from obvious military objectives, given 
the limited accuracy of these weapons and the variety of factors that can cause 
shells without terminal guidance to go off target. It is also submitted that 
combatants using artillery or mortars can reasonably be expected to be accurate, 
normally, to within a range of 400 metres maximum in any direction of a target, to 
use observed fire wherever possible and (except in proportionate self-defence) to 
avoid using artillery or mortar fire against targets within 500 metres of villages or 
other known concentrations of non-combatants.
d) Naval artillery
Artillery used by warships, including submarines, is often designed for attacks 
on objects beyond visual range, the nature and location of which will usually have 
been confirmed by aerial reconnaissance, or forward observers if the target is on 
land. Well-funded navies can equip their warships with GPS technology and 
gyroscopic stabilization equipment to ensure that the pull of the current and 
motion of the waves does not affect the accuracy of artillery fire when warheads 
without terminal guidance are used, although the same factors that need to be 
taken into account by land-based artillery crew, such as weather conditions, will 
need to be considered. Sometimes, ‘over the horizon’ naval missiles may be
measuring angles: the British ‘military circle’ has 6,400 ‘mils.’ (equivalent to 360 degrees); the 
Swedish one has 6,200; the Russian one has 6,000). In the UK, the RSA teaches students to 
anticipate a 3 mils, ‘system error’ whenever a gun is lined up.
346 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 95.
347 Ibid., 94-95.
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equipped with sensors, capable of actively seeking out a target. A danger is that 
use of electronic counter-measures by an enemy warship may deflect such 
missiles, which may then home in on a merchant vessel or hospital ship without 
such defences. Such risks can be reduced (in principle) if naval missiles are 
designed so that projectiles will self-destruct (or can be destroyed remotely) if 
they fail to hit the target.349 Missile design of this nature can perhaps be seen as a 
modem application of the rule in the 1907 Hague Convention VIII prohibiting the 
use of torpedoes ‘which do not become harmless when they have missed their 
mark’.350
During the 1982 Falklands conflict, naval weapons and target identification 
systems proved not entirely free from the hazards of malfunction.351 On no 
occasion does this appear to have caused collateral damage to civilian vessels. 
The existence of the maritime exclusion zones probably played an important role 
in ensuring civilian vessels were not endangered by malfunctioning missiles.
e) Cluster munitions
Cluster munitions consist of a quantity of submunitions packed together and 
launched in the form of a bomb or missile from the air or by artillery. Moments 
before landing, the submunitions separate out over a wide area, or footprint,
348 In the British Royal Navy, officers are trained to assess the consequences of deploying 
particular counter-measures and to avoid using certain systems if merchant ships are in the 
vicinity.
349 The Exocet missiles used by Argentina in the Falklands conflict as an anti-ship weapon could 
not be destroyed or diverted once launched, as was also the case with some of the earlier versions 
of the Tomahawk cruise missile. Later versions of the Tomahawk which were available to some 
belligerents towards the end of the period under review could be destroyed remotely in flight. 
Likewise, the Harpoon missiles made available to the British Royal Navy towards the end of the 
period under review have, according to the manufacturers, been designed to self-destruct when no 
target can be acquired after radar activation ('http://www.designation-svstems.net/dusrm/m-84.html 
(visited 11.01.06).
350 Article 1.3. Dinstein considers this rule to reflect contemporary customary international law 
(The Conduct o f Hostilities, 71).
351 See Woodward, One Hundred Days, 272-273, on the problems encountered when the Sea Dart 
missile system with which British warships were equipped proved unable to function properly 
after essential parts became encrusted with sea-salt.
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sometimes as large as a football field. They are designed to explode either on 
impact, or shortly before or after (or some combination of the three). Their main 
military purpose is to destroy tanks and artillery positions, or attack troop 
concentrations.
The wide ‘spread pattern’ of cluster munitions and their tendency to 
malfunction meant they had a relatively high propensity to cause collateral 
damage during the period under review. One form of malfunction took the form 
of the capsules releasing their submunitions prematurely, as happened over the
i n
city of Nis, southern Serbia, during the 1999 Kosovo war. Another problem 
was that, like unitary munitions, cluster munitions sometimes landed off target for 
reasons outside the control of the attacker. Several civilians were killed in 
Afghanistan in 2002 when cluster bomb units launched by US aircraft hit the 
villages of Qala Shutar, Ainger and Ishaq Suleiman.354 These casualties may have 
been the result of the inappropriate use of an area weapon against villages in 
which civilians and combatants may have been intermingled. They may simply 
have been the result of the bombs falling off target.
Another hazard where cluster munitions were concerned came from the ‘dud’ 
submunitions (of which all cluster munitions used had, typically, at least a small 
percentage) which failed to explode as intended and remained unexploded but
• I C Chighly unstable on the surface, liable to explode when disturbed. During the 
period under review, the bright yellow colouring of some submunition duds could 
make them tempting for children and risk their being mistaken for the standard,
352 See Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 55 and Peter Herby and Anna Nuiten, ‘Explosive 
remnants of war: protecting civilians through an additional protocol to the 1980 Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons’ (2001), IRRC.
353 Fourteen civilians were killed in this accident (Human Rights Watch, Under Orders, 451).
354 See Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the US in 
Afghanistan (2002), Chapter V.
3 5 The RBL 755 Cluster Bomb Unit, widely used during the 1999 Kosovo war, has 147 bomblets 
per unit, 5% of which on average fail to explode immediately due to malfunction (see Lessons o f 
Kosovo (Vol. I), para. 148). Some Cluster Bomb Units have failure rates of up to 40%, with the 
rate tending to the higher end of the spectrum when submunitions land on snow or soft ground (see 
Maresca and Maslen, The Banning o f Anti-Personnel Landmines, 295). See also Human Rights 
Watch, Fatally Flawed, for the malfunction tendencies of cluster bombs used in Afghanistan in 
2001- 2002 .
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yellow plastic-covered US humanitarian aid packages which were also sometimes 
delivered by air.356
In January 2001, the US Department of Defense directed that all submunitions 
produced for cluster weapons in 2005 and beyond should have a dud rate of less 
than 1%,357 though the policy did not preclude the continued procurement and use
■5CO
of cluster munitions with older, less reliable submunitions. Subsequently, new 
cluster munitions were developed with reduced dud rates, improved guidance 
systems or both. In the Iraq war of 2003, the US Air Force used a cluster bomb 
unit (CBU) system in which not only were self-destruct mechanisms built into the 
submunitions, but the CBUs were equipped with infra-red sensors to guide the 
submunitions onto armoured vehicles.359 Another new model, apparently used by 
the US Air Force in 68% of its cluster bomb strikes on Iraq in 2003,360 had a 
guidance system making it more accurate than the CBUs routinely used in 
Afghanistan in 2002. The conflict also saw the first use of the SADARM system 
for the precision guidance of cluster munitions designed to self-destruct if they 
failed to find their target.361 The British Army used a new model of artillery 
submunition with a self-destruct mechanism said to reduce the dud rate of sub- 
munitions to 1-2%. The governments of Norway and Germany in 2005
356 See ‘The cluster bomb controversy’, BBC News Online, 03.04.03. See also Cordesman, 
Ongoing Lessons o f the Afghan Conflict, 68.
357 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 116.
358 See Human Rights Watch, Cluster Munitions Too Costly: Department o f  Defense FY 2005 
Budget Requests Related to Cluster Munitions, (2004), 2. It should be noted, however, that a recent 
procurement request for a variety of CBUs made by the Department of Defense to Congress also 
included a bid for $42.2 million to be spent on ‘retrofitting’ submunitions in 11,400 artillery 
projectiles with self-destruct mechanisms to reduce the dangers posed by duds {ibid., 6, 12).
359 The CBU-105 (see Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 60-61, 111).
360 The CBU 103 (see ibid., 59).
361 Ibid., 84-85, Cordesman, Lessons o f Iraq, 360-361.
362 The L20A1, (Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 85). By 2004, however, efforts were said to be 
still under way in the US to develop submunitions with a completely ‘fail safe’ mechanism to 
prevent them remaining active for extended periods (Cordesman, Ongoing Lessons o f the Afghan 
Conflict, 78). The NGO Landmine Action criticized the UK for taking on trust the manufacturers’ 
estimate for the dud rate of the L20A1 submunitions, rather than gathering and analyzing data 
from the field after these weapons had been used (Landmine Action, Out o f  Balance, November 
2005, 18-20). Given the security situation in Iraq at the time, the implied expectation that the 
exact number of dud submunitions left on the ground in Iraq by British L20Als could and should 
have been established seems unrealistic.
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reported that they would not acquire newly produced submunitions unless the 
estimated dud rate was below 1%.
Not only were the new models of cluster munitions with guidance systems and 
reduced dud rates available by the time of the 2003 Iraq war, but lessons had been 
learned from previous conflicts. The Coalition reportedly dropped relatively few 
cluster munitions by air on or near populated areas,364 and attempts were made to 
limit ground-launched cluster munition attacks against targets located in urban 
areas to night-time,365 and to refrain from launching them against targets within 
500 metres of a building or object on a ‘no-strike list’.
Nevertheless, over a thousand civilians in Iraq were killed or injured by cluster
• "XfiTImunitions in 2003, according to the NGO Human Rights Watch. The number 
of casualties is likely to rise over time, as the duds take their toll. It has been 
suggested that part of the explanation for the apparently high casualty rate from 
cluster munitions was the sheer scale on which they were used by Coalition forces 
overall, which was considerably greater than had been the case in either 
Yugoslavia or Afghanistan, and to some extent negated the effect of the lower dud 
rates of some of the new cluster munitions being used. Another reason appears 
to be that older models of cluster munition with indifferent guidance mechanisms 
and dud rates of up to 16% continued to be used.369
363 Human Rights Watch, States Parties ’ Responses to ‘International Humanitarian Law and 
ERW ’ Questionnaire, (2005).
364 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 58.
365 Ibid., 95.
366 US infantry had a list of 12,700 sites that could not be fired upon, which included schools, 
mosques, hospitals and historic sites {ibid., 92-94). The ‘no-strike list’ did not, however, include 
ordinary residential areas {ibid., 97). According to the RSA, a similar ‘no-strike list’ was operated 
by British forces.
367 Human Rights Watch, Cluster Munitions Too Costly, 1.
368 According to Human Rights Watch, an estimated 1,800,000 submunitions, (with varying dud 
rates), were dropped on Iraqi territory in 2003 by US forces, in addition to 113,190 by British 
forces, compared to 295,000 used by NATO as a whole in Yugoslavia in 1999 and 248,056 used 
by the USAF in Afghanistan in 2002 (Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 104). According to the 
British MoD, British forces delivered 70 RBL 755s and about 2,000 artillery-delivered L20A1 
shells (MoD, First Reflections, 4.9). Assuming a dud rate of 5% for the RBL 755s (with 147 
submunitions per bomb) and 2% for the L20Als, (with 49 submunitions per shell) approximately 
2,500 duds can be expected to have been left in Iraq by weapons used by British forces in 2003, 
compared to the 4,000 -  10,000 estimated to have been left on the ground in Kosovo by British 
forces {Lessons o f  Kosovo (Vol I), para. 148).
369 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 61, 83-84 .
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• • • '370Cluster munitions are not per se unlawful under international law, but the 
older versions of cluster munition with relatively high dud rates and poor levels of 
accuracy are difficult to use lawfully given the foreseeable danger they usually 
pose for civilians, including those nowhere near military objectives (for instance, 
people returning at the end of hostilities to villages and agricultural land 
contaminated by submunition duds). A recent US Army field manual warns 
‘Commanders must...consider the precision error and large submunitions 
dispersion pattern when applying this method of attack [use of Multiple Launch 
Rocket Systems loaded with cluster munitions] due to the high probability of
7^1 •extensive collateral damage’, and a US Air Force background paper warns that 
there are ‘clearly some areas where CBUs normally couldn’t be used (eg 
populated city centers)’.372
Restrictions on the use of cluster munitions, for instance to night-time attacks 
only, may reduce collateral damage to some extent, but do nothing to protect 
civilians from duds and may have military disadvantages. There is thus much to 
be said for belligerents ensuring they have other means at their disposal for 
performing tasks traditionally carried out by cluster munitions, such as attack 
helicopters or anti-tank guided missiles,373 to ensure cluster munitions are not 
used faute de mieux in situations where they are inappropriate.
370 They may, however, be unlawful (or on the point of becoming unlawful) for some states under 
national law. In July 2005, the Belgian senate reportedly passed legislation banning the use of 
cluster munitions, and similar initiatives were said to be being planned by the parliaments of 
France, Germany and Italy (Human Rights Watch, States Parties Responses to 'International 
Humanitarian Law andERW ’ Questionnaire).
371 ‘Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations’, Field 
Manual 6-60, Washington DC, 1996, quoted in Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 97, n.312.
372 US Air Force Bullet Background Paper on International Legal Aspects Concerning the Use of 
Cluster Munitions, quoted in ibid., 62.
373 The UK was said in 2000 to be developing an anti-tank guided missile (the Brimstone), 
expected to be ‘20 times as effective against main battle tanks deploying modem countermeasures 
as the cluster bomb currently in service’ (Lessons o f Kosovo (V ol. I), para. 149). Delays in the 
project meant the system was still not available to UK forces as an alternative to the RBL 755 by 
the time of the 2003 Iraq war, however. It eventually came into service in January 2006 (The 
Times, 04.01.06).
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J) Laser-guided missiles
During the period under review, laser-guided missiles and bombs were 
considered marginally more accurate than cruise missiles guided by GPS,374 but 
their accuracy depended on clear atmospheric conditions. If the laser cone 
identifying the target was broken up by smoke or cloud but the missile was 
launched nonetheless, instead of altering its trajectory on meeting the cone and 
homing in on the target, the missile risked missing the laser-signal and 
consequently exploding on impact anywhere within 15 kilometres.375
Laser-guided munitions contributed to an air campaign of unprecedented 
accuracy during the 1991 Gulf war. But the Coalition’s ability to hit targets with 
precision was not always matched by detailed knowledge of the nature of the 
targets. The worst accident in terms of civilian casualties occurred when, on 13 
February 1991, Coalition forces used laser-guided bombs to attack the al- 
Amariyah/al-Firdus bunker near Baghdad, apparently in the belief it was a 
military command and control facility and unaware of the presence of several 
hundred civilians sheltering overnight. The camouflaged bunker had a roof of 
reinforced concrete, and military trucks had been seen approaching and leaving. 
The mistake appears to have been made in good faith, but to have resulted from 
doubtful inferences being made about the military significance of the bunker on 
the basis of very limited information.376
During the Kosovo war, NATO forces had to cancel or postpone planned 
strikes with laser-guided missiles on numerous occasions due to bad weather.377
374 See Luttwak, Strategy, 204.
375 See Boyle in Hector and Jellema, Protecting Civilians, 37.
376 See Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 327-328 and de la Billiere, Storm Command, 261. 
See also Final Report to Congress, 615-616 and Greenpeace International, On Impact, 88-92. For 
discussion of the legality of the attack, see Hampson, ‘Means and methods of warfare in the 
conflict in the G ulf, 96-97.
377 According to the British Chief of the Defence Staff at the time, ‘On many occasions our pilots 
returned with their bombs because they did not dare drop them through cloud in case they hurt the 
civilians below’ (Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol.II), para.85).
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g) GPS-guided weapons
GPS-guided weapons allow strategic targets to be attacked from long range or 
high altitude with minimal collateral damage. Unlike laser-guided weapons, their 
guidance system functions in poor atmospheric conditions. Yet even more so than 
in the case of laser-guided weapons, given that they tend to be launched from 
beyond visual range, their successful use depends on good, up-to-date targeting 
intelligence which may not always be available.
Missiles or bombs guided at least partly by GPS devices were first used in the 
1991 Gulf war, when Tomahawk cruise missiles were used for several successful 
precision attacks against long-range targets.378 Yet the location and identification 
of appropriate targets proved a challenge: after this conflict, an analyst claimed 
that out of a Coalition list of 800 targets identified for strategic attack by a 
combination of satellite imagery and expert knowledge of Iraq, fifty had been
07Q
misidentified.
The 1999 Kosovo war saw the first systematic use of Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions (JDAMs) -  ordinary munitions onto which a device has been fixed able 
to receive and interpret satellite signals and to guide the munition onto a precise
• * 380location, having been programmed with the relevant geographical co-ordinates. 
Procedures during this conflict for obtaining accurate information about the nature 
and location of targets provisionally selected for attack with GPS-guided weapons 
revealed their shortcomings when on 7 May 1999 USAF aircraft mistakenly 
launched a long-range attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The US 
government explained that three maps of Belgrade dating from 1989, 1996 and 
1997 had been used to locate both the intended target (the Federal Procurement 
and Supply Directorate) and the position of the Chinese Embassy and that none of
lOI
the three maps accurately identified the location of either building.
378 See ‘Tomahawk ® Cruise Missile’, US Navy Fact File
http://www.chinfo.navv.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-toma.html (visited 14.11.04).
379 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 312.
380 For details, see http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/svstems/munitions/idam.htm (visited
14.11.04). For use of JDAMs in Kosovo, see Rebecca Grant, ‘The Redefinition of Strategic 
Airpower’ (2003), Air Force Magazine.
381 ICTY Committee Report (NATO), para.81.
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Furthermore, it appears that although photographic images of the locations 
scheduled for attack were available, they may not have been looked at 
carefully. Problems with the correct identification and location of buildings 
selected for long-range attack with precision weaponry also appear to have
• • • 101occurred in Afghanistan m 2001.
By the 2003 Iraq war, procedures appeared to have improved, and there do not 
appear to have been reports of civilian buildings having been attacked by 
Coalition forces in the mistaken belief that they were part of the military 
infrastructure and legitimate targets. Precision attacks against fixed, pre-planned 
targets enabled much damage to be caused to the Iraqi command and control 
system with apparently little collateral damage.
GPS-guided bombs or missiles which malfunction can go very far off target 
indeed. As one expert put it, ‘When you start looking at Tomahawk land-attack 
missiles and the cruise missiles that are coming into service, you are talking about 
600 kilometres -  ie, you are talking about the wrong country never mind the 
wrong county\ 385 One problem with the system is that the guidance mechanisms, 
which need to be very sensitive to pick up the often very faint satellite signals on 
which they depend, are vulnerable to external jamming, whether accidental or 
deliberate.386 Another is that if GPS satellites become vulnerable to disabling
382 The NATO Supreme Allied Commander (Europe) recognized that ‘at any stage, anyone could 
have contacted someone with very recent experience in Belgrade who might have recognized that 
the building pictured for Target 493 was the new Chinese Embassy’. A review was then 
conducted of the available photographs of all approved targets, ‘to be sure that the photographs 
actually were the targets we were after’. Another remedial measure was the addition of further 
information to the ‘no-strike’ lis t. (Clark, Waging Modern War, 299).
383 For instance, on 16.10.01 a Red Cross warehouse in Afghanistan was bombed by the US Air 
Force, having been misidentified as a military storage facility (US DoD News Briefing, 17.10.01). 
When the warehouse was bombed again later the same month, the accident was described 
enigmatically by a US spokesman as ‘a different kind of mistake’ (American Forces Information 
Service, 29.10.01). One of the problems reportedly faced by US intelligence was that co­
ordinates for air strikes on targets in Afghanistan could only be obtained from old Russian maps, 
from which the co-ordinates would be translated to English maps using pencils and rulers. (The 
Times, 23.11.02).
384 See Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 42 and 50-51, where positive comments are made about 
the care taken by the Coalition to avoid collateral damage when attacking pre-planned targets.
The organization was more critical of the collateral damage caused by attacks on other targets, 
such as individual leaders.
385 Boyle in Hector and Jellema, Protecting Civilians, 37.
386 See J. Ruley, ‘GPS Jamming’ AV Web, 12.02.03
(http://www.avweb.com/news/avionics/182754-l.html, visited 14.09.04). During the Iraq war,
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attack in any form, precision weapons depending on them may become almost
oo,7
useless unless also equipped with alternative guidance systems. Compared to 
other weapons systems, however, GPS-guided missiles proved relatively reliable
• 388during the period under review.
Risks of mistaken attacks on non-military objects with GPS-guided weapons 
can be reduced if belligerents record details of buildings such as hospitals in or 
near to conflict zones, as suggested in the 1998 US Air Force Targeting 
Manual.389 According to a US DoD spokesman, improvements were made after 
the Kosovo war in respect of the maintenance of such databases by the United 
States.390 Civilian authorities in conflict zones and humanitarian organizations 
with fixed assets in a theatre of active military operations need, for their part, to 
be sure that belligerents using GPS-guided weaponry are given accurate co­
ordinates, in the correct format, of buildings such as hospitals for inclusion in 
these databases.
h) Gravity bombs -  the case for a *1000 metre rule *
According to a report referred to in a British parliamentary Defence 
Committee report, no more than 2% of the 10001b gravity bombs dropped during
301the 1999 Kosovo war could be confirmed as hitting their targets. Nevertheless, 
there was sometimes a preference for gravity bomb attacks on targets visually 
identified by pilots, particularly when military objectives were well separated 
from civilian objects. This is understandable in view not only of the cost of
the Coalition managed to locate and destroy all of Iraq’s jamming devices at the start of the war. 
(See Cordesman, Lessons o f the Iraq War).
387 As of 2004, there were no reported cases of anti-satellite weapons used in international conflict, 
although primitive anti-satellite technology had been tested successfully as early as 1985 and ‘a 
spectrum of technologies’ for neutralizing satellite systems was available by 2004 (Michel 
Bourbonniere, ‘Law of armed conflict (LOAC) and the neutralisation of satellites or ius in bello 
satellitis ’ (2004), JCSL).
388 Boyle, in Hector and Jellema, Protecting Civilians, 37.
389 AFP 14-210, para. 12.4.2.
390 US DoD, ‘Background Briefing on Targeting’ (05.03.03).
391 Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol I), para. 145.
392 See Lessons o f Kosovo (V ol I), para. 145 and (V ol. II), para.236. See also Boyle in Hector and 
Jellema, Protecting Civilians, 34. The UK and France were not willing to launch aerial attacks on 
ground forces within 500 metres of a village (Clark, Waging Modem War, 277).
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precision weaponry but also malfunction risks and the need, particularly where 
effective use of GPS-guided weaponry was concerned, for first-rate and up-to-date 
targeting intelligence.
The figure of 2% needs to be understood in context. During the period under 
review, well trained aircrew flying at the appropriate altitude and using bombs 
without terminal guidance would in fact have expected all the weapons dropped in 
a ‘stick’ (i.e. the extended oblong shape into which a payload of gravity bombs 
will normally fall when all are released) over an assigned target to fall within 
approximately 500 metres of the target (the miss error being greater the higher the 
altitude and the less steep the angle). They would not, however, have been able to 
exclude the risk of the bombs landing up to a kilometre off-target in the event of 
freak conditions, or something having gone very badly wrong.393 An attack with a 
single gravity bomb could in normal circumstances have been expected to have 
been accurate to within 100 metres.394 Whether or not it would have been 
possible to confirm the bombs as having hit (let alone destroyed) the target would 
have been another matter.
As with artillery, where air-delivered gravity bombs were concerned, efforts to 
minimize collateral damage needed to take account both of a reasonable margin 
for targeting error and the likely ‘spread pattern’ of the warhead in the specific 
environment. For example, an FAB-250 high explosive aviation bomb weighing
• "lOS250kg, with a horizontal fragment dispersion radius of 1,170 metres, could 
potentially have endangered anyone out in the open within this distance of its 
point of impact if the bomb had been dropped on open ground on a hard surface, 
and fused to detonate on impact. By contrast, an identical bomb dropped on very 
soft ground, or fused to detonate only after having penetrated its target, would 
have had a much smaller horizontal fragment dispersion radius.
393 Informal briefing, Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), Shrivenham, October 
2005.
394 Ibid.
395 Isayeva v. Russia (2005), ECtHR, para.94. The term ‘fragment dispersion radius’ may give a 
misleading impression that fragments from a gravity bomb will spread out in an approximately 
circular fashion, which is far from the case. (The judgment is considered further in Chapter 7).
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There are too many variables for it to make sense to suggest a specific distance 
which should invariably separate targets chosen for attack with gravity bombs 
from concentrations of civilians in conflict areas. As a basic rule of thumb, 
however, in conflicts where gravity bombs are used, practice during the period 
under review suggests it is reasonable to expect that properly trained combat 
aircrew will normally be able to confine their bombs to within 500 metres at most 
of the intended target. However, given that freak accidents can never be excluded 
by even the most careful aircrew, it would seem wise for civilian settlements, 
hospitals and important cultural property to be separated from obvious military 
targets for aerial bombardment by at least a kilometre where possible.
i) Hand grenades
During a military operation conducted in the village of Samashki, Chechnya, 
on 7-8 April 1995 by Russian forces, more than 100 civilians were reported 
killed.397 According to witness statements made to the Russian human rights 
group Memorial, at least some of the casualties were caused by hand grenades 
thrown by Russian troops into rooms or cellars where they knew there were
'J Q O
people. Witnesses informed Memorial that some soldiers had refrained from 
throwing grenades into the cellars when they realized that those sheltering there 
were civilians, while others did not.399 These accounts suggest that among the 
Russian units concerned, good practice in the use of these weapons had come to 
depend substantially on the courage and humanity of the common soldier, rather 
than on proper military planning, training and discipline.
396 A further precaution that can be taken by civilians living or working in conflict zones is to 
cover glass windows with transparent, adhesive plastic sheeting and/or place heavy curtains in 
front, which will normally lead to a lower rate of death or serious injury among the occupants of a 
building in the event of bombs exploding in the vicinity than would otherwise be the case (see 
David Lloyd Roberts, Staying alive: safety and security guidelines fo r  humanitarian volunteers in 
conflict areas (Geneva, 1999), 84-85). Clearly, however, an attacking belligerent cannot assume 
such precautions will have been taken when assessing whether or not a military objective in close 
proximity to a civilian building or hospital can be subjected to aerial bombardment without 
causing excessive collateral damage.
397 See Memorial, Vsyemi Imyeuchshimisya Sredstvami (‘By all available means’), available on 
http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/CHECHEN/SAMASHKI (visited 23.11.04).
398 See ibid., Chapter 9.
399 Ibid., Chapter 8.
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As already noted in the context of discussion of line-of-sight weapons, good 
practice in urban warfare on the part of an attacker consists primarily in every 
effort having been made to evacuate civilians from the area in question before 
street-to-street fighting begins. Even so, it needs to be remembered in the context 
of urban warfare that people invariably get left behind in any evacuation, and if it 
is suspected there may be civilians sheltering in buildings or cellars, they will 
need to be warned to come out (and given time to do so) before the use of hand 
grenades can be considered appropriate. If such situations are anticipated, good 
practice may involve equipping troops with CS/CR hand grenades, which are 
normally non-lethal, but allow the user to subdue temporarily all those in a 
confined space. This may not always be an attractive option, however: in some 
situations, military legal advisers may object to the use of CS/CR grenades on 
account of the prohibition on the use of gas as a weapon of war,400 and the non­
lethality of these weapons cannot be relied on. Another problem is the risk of 
enemy combatants protecting themselves from such weapons with gas masks if 
their use is anticipated. Perhaps the most that can sensibly be said is that the use 
of such weapons should not be ruled out when it may be the only way that an 
attack in an urban context can be carried out in a discriminating fashion.
j)  Non-explosive warheads
The 2003 Iraq war saw the use of various novel, non-explosive weapons 
systems designed to put enemy facilities out of action without destroying them, 
for instance when carbon-fibre bombs were used to incapacitate electrical power 
distribution facilities.401 In Nassiriya, an attack of this nature caused a short 
circuit, sparking an unintended fire which destroyed three transformers. This put 
the town’s power and water supply out of action for a month, although generators 
allowed the hospital to continue providing life-saving treatment. The fact that 
non-explosive weaponry was used may have prevented civilian casualties as well 
as allowing the power distribution facility to be more quickly repaired than would
400 See the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (hereinafter ‘1925 Geneva Protocol’).
401 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 42.
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have been possible had it been destroyed with high explosive.402 This conflict 
also saw the use of an air-delivered non-explosive cluster bomb containing steel 
rods to disable communications antennae on the roof of the Ministry of 
Information in Baghdad 403 This allowed the facility to be disabled without 
causing civilian casualties or collateral damage to neighbouring buildings or even 
to the facility itself, beyond the destruction of the antennae 404 British and US 
aircrew also had the option of using inert 5001b or 10001b ‘concrete bombs’ 
capable of being directed onto a target by laser with a view to destroying it 
without damaging surrounding buildings or endangering passers-by 405
k) Non-lethal weaponry
Several types of ‘non-lethal’ weapons were developed during the period under 
review, designed to incapacitate temporarily or repel or disperse people without 
resort to lethal force. Such weapons relied on irritant or soporific substances, 
such as capsicum spray or sedative gas, non-lethal ammunition, such as rubber 
bullets, taser darts or powerful jets of water, immobilizing substances (which 
either fix the victim to the spot, or make movement impossible by eliminating 
surface friction), intolerable noise, nauseating odour, dazzling beams creating 
temporary or permanent blindness, or electromagnetic waves of increasing 
intensity406 These weapons appear to have been used rarely, if ever, during 
armed conflict between 1980 and 2005, though were sometimes used in 
operations short of armed conflict407 Use of some non-lethal weapons may raise 
legal issues on account of treaty rules prohibiting use of gas or chemical
402 Ibid., 43-45.
403 The CBU-107 {ibid., 112).
404 Ibid., 46.
405 ‘Tornadoes to drop “concrete bombs’” , BBC News Online, 04.04.03. See also Cordesman, The 
Iraq War, 286. The RAF used these weapons in Iraq in 2003, but the MoD’s terse public 
assessment after the event was ‘these often did not create the desired effect’ (MoD, Lessons for the 
Future, 30).
406 See Massimo Annati and Ezio Bonsignore, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons; Possibilities, Programmes, 
Perspectives and Problems’ (2003), Military Technology. See also AFP14-210 (Table 11.1, 89), 
for a list of various disabling mechanisms available to the USAF.
407 Baton rounds were used by SFOR in Bosnia, though some nations were initially reluctant to 
authorize their use and many contributing nations did not have them.
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substances as a weapon of war.408 Others, such as lasers designed for the sole 
purpose of causing permanent blindness, may be banned outright for states party
409to certain treaties.
‘Non-lethal’ is a misnomer: sometimes a weapon that will be ‘non-lethal’ 
against a healthy young adult may kill a child or an elderly person.410 The term is 
used not to describe weapons which never cause death, but weapons not intended 
to cause death. Where it is likely that non-lethal weapons may be used, it is 
important that efforts should be made to keep young children, the elderly and the 
infirm well clear. In situations of high tension, it is likely to be easier (relatively) 
for civilian leaders to ensure that vulnerable people are kept out of danger of ‘non- 
lethal’ weapons than for military personnel to ensure that vulnerable people are 
not affected by them. That said, some categories of vulnerable people (such as 
young teenagers) may be unresponsive to warnings, from whatever quarter, of the 
potential dangers of provoking soldiers equipped with ‘non-lethal’ weaponry.
Use of almost any non-lethal weapons system will need to anticipate 
casualties in need of specialized medical treatment or, if immobilizing agents are 
used, physical liberation. If insufficient provision is made for this, use of ‘non- 
lethal’ weaponry may cause at least as many fatalities as lethal weaponry would 
have done 411
408 See for instance the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.
See also Operational Law 2005, 19-20, for US policy towards the use of non-lethal chemical 
substances for riot control.
409 See Protocol IV to the Conventional Weapons Convention.
410 The alternative term ‘less than lethal’ is hardly less misleading.
411 15% of the hostages being held by Chechen militants in a Moscow theatre reportedly died in 
October 2002 after Russian security forces broke the siege by pumping anaesthetic into the theatre. 
(Financial Times, 05.12.02). It has been claimed that the authorities’ hesitation in providing 
paramedical assistance to those affected by the anaesthetic and in providing doctors treating the 
victims with information about its nature may have contributed to the high death toll (see B. Van 
Damme, ‘Moscow theatre siege: a deadly gamble that nearly paid o ff (2002), The Pharmaceutical 
Journal).
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I) Electronic warfare
Certain enemy systems can be disabled by computer network attacks, airwave 
jamming or electromagnetic pulses. Such attacks may be able to create a desired 
effect with minimum physical injury or destruction and no immediate collateral 
effects. A good example was the use by the United States during the 1999 
Kosovo war of EA-6B Prowler aircraft with electronic jamming capabilities 
(available to no European state) which played a critical role in suppressing enemy 
air defence (without bloodshed).412 There may sometimes be indirect collateral 
effects caused by electronic warfare, for instance if radio jamming aimed at 
confusing enemy aircraft interferes with civilian air traffic control, which will 
need to be anticipated in planning electronic warfare attacks 413
4.3. Taking precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack -  
timing and techniques
a) Timing
British military doctrine states: ‘The law stipulates that the military worth of 
the target needs to be considered in relation to the circumstances at the time. 
Therefore, a commander needs to have an up-to-date assessment o f the 
significance o f a target and the value o f attacking it.' 414 (Emphasis added). A 
recent US Air Force manual observes in similar vein: ‘Because the characteristics 
of all objects and areas are changeable, each target must be routinely monitored to 
ensure that any status related changes are brought to the attention of target 
analysts’.415 As this guidance recognizes, it is not enough for potential targets to 
have been observed at some point before an attack: they need to have been
412 Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol. I), paras. 104-106.
413 See Michael Schmitt, ‘Wired warfare: Computer network attack and ju s in bello ’ (2002), IRRC 
and Brian O’Donnell and James Kraska, ‘Humanitarian law: developing international rules for the 
digital battlefield’ (2003) JCSL for discussion of the legal implications of attacks on computer 
networks.
414 British Defence Doctrine, (JWP 0-01) (available via MoD website). As Hampson observes,
‘the value of the target has to be assessed at the time of the attack’. (‘Means and methods of 
warfare in the conflict in the Gulf, 97).
4,5 AFP 14-210, para.l.7.4.2. See also ROE Handbookfor Judge Advocates, 3-25.
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observed sufficiently recently for confidence that they are still appropriate targets 
at the time of the attack. In the case of many targets, this may mean very recently 
indeed, often at the very last moment before a weapon is launched. Last minute 
observation may often be the only means of establishing that a target is legitimate 
at the time of attack, or that it can be attacked without causing disproportionate 
collateral damage.
During the 1999 Kosovo war, NATO attacks on bridges and factories in 
Serbia often took place at night, causing few or no civilian casualties.416 
Nonetheless, several civilians were killed in attacks on bridges which took place 
either in daytime or during the evening 417 After a daytime attack on a bridge in 
Varvarin, Serbia, on 30 May 1999 killed nine civilians, NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander (Europe) acknowledged that the question as to why the attack had 
taken place during the day rather than at night (asked in the local press by a 
schoolteacher), was a good one and the decision was taken that henceforth bridges 
would be attacked only at night418 Night-time attacks cannot be considered to be 
good practice invariably, however: the reduced likelihood that civilians will be 
present in the vicinity of certain targets during the night needs to be offset against 
the difficulties at night of visually identifying targets and confirming their 
legitimacy for attack at that particular moment.
416 E.g. NATO attacks on the bridge in Novi Sad (4.55am-5.30am, 01.04.99); a factory in Cacak 
(3.17am, 04.04.99); the Pancevo oil refinery (4.29am, 04.04.99); the New Belgrade Heating Plant 
(4.35am, 04.04.99); the Kruskik factory (Valjevo) (2.15am, 17.04.99); and the Ostruznica bridge 
(12.58-4.35am, 29.04.99). (Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign 
(Appendix A) (2000).
41 On 12.04.99, a NATO attack on the Grdelica Klisura Gorge Bridge, near Leskovac in southern 
Serbia, which took place ‘in the evening’ killed between ten and twenty people in a passenger train 
crossing the bridge as it was hit. On 30.04.99, two civilians were killed and fifteen wounded 
when a bridge in Trstenik, central Serbia, was hit by a Precision Guided Munition at 3.15pm; six 
civilians were killed and seven wounded when a bridge in Murino, Montenegro, was hit by a PGM 
at 10.10pm the same day. On 01.05.99 thirty-nine civilians were killed and thirteen injured when 
the bus in which they were travelling was crossing a bridge in the village of Luzane (Kosovo) as it 
was hit by a NATO air strike at 1.40pm. On 30.05.99, a NATO air strike against a bridge in 
Varvarin, Serbia, between 1.00pm and 1.25pm killed nine civilians and injured between twenty- 
eight and forty (ibid.). Three daytime attacks on bridges in, respectively, Nassiriya, Fallujah and 
Samawa, were reported to have killed at least 330 civilians during the 1991 Gulf war. (Human 
Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Deaths During the Air Campaign and 
Violations o f the Laws o f  War (1991), 5).
418 Clark, Waging Modern War, 336.
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It will not always be reasonable to expect combatants to inspect an intended 
target closely moments before an attack is launched, for instance if there are 
compelling military reasons for launching the attack from long-range or high- 
altitude and forward observation is not an option. What can reasonably be 
expected is that consideration will have been given to the likely presence of non- 
combatants in or around a chosen target at particular times. Religious festivals 
and holy days will affect the number of civilians present in or around particular 
shrines or places of worship in the vicinity of military objectives. Markets may 
take place on particular days of the week, sometimes in a town centre, sometimes 
in an out-of-the-way location. Some buildings and objects, such as factories and 
bridges, can reasonably be expected to be relatively free of civilians at night 
whereas residential areas may be less densely populated by day. There will be 
times when even buildings normally free of non-combatants, such as army camps 
and headquarters, will be full of civilian family members or other non- 
combatants, for instance ceremonial occasions, or the immediate aftermath of a 
major engagement, when large numbers of wounded people may be present in 
military establishments other than marked hospitals.
There may sometimes be pressing military reasons for launching an attack at a 
particular moment, for instance if weapons systems are being used which depend 
for accuracy on clear atmospheric conditions, or if large numbers of enemy forces 
are on the move. There may also be good military reasons for synchronizing a 
set of attacks if the intention is to disable a system, rather than to disable or 
destroy an isolated military objective. However, non-military reasons for 
launching attacks at particular moments, for instance a perceived need to keep up 
the pressure of a campaign for political reasons, should not influence commanders 
obliged by law to make the difficult assessment of whether the expected collateral 
damage of an attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated from the attack.419
419 See Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(a)(iii).
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b) Methods o f attack
The altitude issue
In a report submitted to the ICTY Prosecutor in relation to NATO’s conduct 
during the Kosovo war, it was observed that although there was nothing 
necessarily unlawful about the practice of NATO pilots of operating out of range 
of air defences, it would have been difficult for aircrew flying at high speed and 
altitude to distinguish between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy.420 It has 
been suggested nevertheless that during the 1991 Gulf war, aircrew flying well 
above 10,000 feet ‘had the perspective to find and recognize their target, launch 
their weapons with deliberation, and observe if the target was hit’, in contrast to 
those flying ‘fast and low’, who would have been able to see ‘nothing below 
except indistinct terrain flashing past’ and would have been unable to use laser 
guided bombs effectively 421 The NATO Supreme Allied Commander (Europe) 
recorded that although towards the end of April 1999, pilots were authorized to 
descend below 15,000 feet (c. 5,000 metres) if necessary to identify targets on the 
ground, they reported that they were usually more effective when flying at higher 
altitudes and using high-powered binoculars.
In this context, it seems surprising that according to General Clark, the pilots 
responsible for the mistaken attack on the civilian convoy near Djakovica on 15 
April 1999 reportedly ‘viewed their target with the naked eye, rather than 
remotely’, despite being at an altitude of 15,000 feet.423 Part of the explanation 
may be that in practice, cockpit binoculars could be cumbersome to use. Aircrew 
may have been reluctant to take their eyes off the wider picture in order to use
42° iq y y  Committee Report (NA TO), para.69. See also Human Rights Watch, Under Orders, 443.
421 See Luttwak, Strategy (202-203). Luttwak arguably overstates his case: only if dropped at a 
very low altitude indeed would a laser-guided missile be unable acquire its target. Nor did it seem 
to have been the case that aircrew flying at 8,000-12,000 feet were always able to recognize targets 
effectively (see ‘Friendly fire in the Gulf: Board’s findings’ (statement to the House of Commons 
by Archie Hamilton, Armed Forces Minister, July 1992) (1992) (Army Quarterly Defence 
Journal).
422 Clark, Waging Modem War, 278.
423 ICTY Committee Report (NA TO), para.64. See also para.67.
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them, particularly in the case of pilots of single-seater aircraft, such as the FI6s 
which constituted most of the attacking planes on this occasion.424
Vision-enhancing equipment for military aircraft during the period under 
review had limitations. In British aircraft, in-cockpit displays such as the target 
designation equipment used were able to provide magnification of the ground 
below to some extent, but often magnification was digitalized, rather than optical, 
with the result that an enlarged on-screen image, for instance of a vehicle, would 
be no less blurred than the smaller image had been. The image would normally 
have been monochrome, so the colour of a vehicle, which at medium or low 
altitude might have suggested civilian character, would not have been visible at 
high altitude, even if the image was magnified 425
The lesson seems to be that there is no reason why high altitude attacks should 
not constitute acceptable practice in terms of taking precautions, so long as the 
true nature of provisionally selected targets can be confirmed before weapons are 
launched, either by the use of appropriate vision-enhancing equipment capable of 
allowing aircrew to distinguish civilian from military vehicles and to identify 
protective markings on buildings, or by some other suitable means such as 
communication with land-based observers.
Angles o f attack
The direction from which an attack is launched, whether from the air, the sea 
or on land, and the angle at which bombs, missiles and projectiles approach their 
targets are critical for reducing the risk of collateral damage. For these reasons, 
careful selection of the exact direction from which an attack with ground forces, 
or an air-strike or missile attack on a target, will be launched, and detailed 
knowledge of the surrounding area, play a vital role in minimizing collateral
424 Ibid. para. 69.
425 Informal briefing, JSCSC, Shrivenham, October 2005.
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damage.426 The tendency of air delivered gravity bombs to fall in an extended 
oblong shape or ‘stick’, over the target means any collateral damage is likely to 
affect the area in front of or behind the target (in relation to the path of the 
aircraft), rather than to the right or left of it. If loss of guidance signals causes air- 
delivered laser-guided munitions to miss their target, they will usually fall short of
• * 477the target, rather than overshooting it.
c) Force security
Taking ‘feasible precautions’ to minimize collateral damage is widely 
understood to mean taking precautions which are ‘practicable or practically 
possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including
478humanitarian and military considerations.’ A major military consideration in 
relation to any operation will be force security -  the lives of servicemen and 
women, in other words. The degree of personal risk which a combatant is 
expected to take to reduce the risk of causing death or injury to non-combatants 
during an operation is not a matter on which the law can provide hard and fast 
guidance,429 and military practice in this respect has varied widely not only 
during the period under review but throughout history. But military servicemen 
are sometimes the first to express the view that some degree of risk may need to 
be taken for the sake of that degree of discrimination in attack needed for an 
operation to be perceived as competent and legitimate 430
During the 1991 Gulf war, US and British policy was to allow attacks on 
targets which might give rise to collateral damage if planners considered such
426 See US DoD ‘Background Briefing on Targeting’ 05.03.03. See also Australia’s Defence 
Force Manual, quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, (Vol. II), 413. For examples of practice in the 1991 Gulf war and the 2003 Iraq war, see 
Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 103 and Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 17 and 53.
427 Informal briefing, JSCSC, Shrivenham, October 2005.
428 Article 3.10, Amended Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Convention. See also 
statements of understanding made on signature or ratification of Additional Protocol I by Belgium, 
Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.
429 Rogers, ‘Zero-Casualty Warfare’, 177. As a US military spokesman put it to Human Rights 
Watch, ‘There’s no standard that says one US life equals X civilians’ (Human Rights Watch, Off 
Target, 94).
430 See e.g. Chris Norton, ‘Operation Allied Force’ (2002), Royal Air Force Air Power Review.
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attacks would ‘shorten the war or protect coalition lives.’431 Nonetheless, 
preference was apparently given to the minimization of collateral damage over 
force security when Coalition forces decided to deploy special forces to sever the 
fibre optic cables on the three bridges over the Euphrates which had remained 
intact after the other bridges had been destroyed by aerial bombardment432 This 
relatively high risk operation enabled the Coalition to achieve an important 
military advantage without causing the civilian hardship which would have 
ensued from a lower risk operation to destroy all the bridges over the Euphrates 
by aerial bombardment. British military doctrine now recognizes explicitly that 
‘...there may be occasions when a commander will have to accept a higher level 
of risk to his own forces in order to avoid or reduce collateral damage to the 
enemy’s civil population’ 433
A criticism which has been made of the 1999 Kosovo war is that concern to 
avoid NATO casualties and loss of aircraft took undue precedence over other 
considerations, including collateral damage 434 Yet on those occasions where 
attacks resulted in loss of civilian life, although criticisms can be made of 
NATO’s procedures, concern for force security seldom seems in fact to have been 
the main problem (with the possible exception of NATO’s reluctance to 
jeopardize the safety of aircrew by giving advance warnings of attacks) 435 NATO 
demonstrated that it had the means to conduct attacks in a way that both 
minimized collateral damage and exposed its forces to little if any risk -  given a 
willingness to wait for suitable weather.
The issue of force security is sometimes presented starkly as a zero-sum game: 
the more care that is taken to avoid civilian casualties, the more military personnel 
will themselves be put at risk 436 It is not always as black and white as this. For a 
primitive armed force or group, without sophisticated surveillance or optical
431 De la Billiere, Storm Command, 260.
432 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 326.
433 British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01).
434 See e.g. Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia: 'Collateral Damage ’ 
or Unlawful Killings? Violations o f  the Laws o f War by NA TO during Operation Allied Force 
(2000).
435 See ibid (3.4). See also Clark, Waging Modern War, 176-177, 428.
436 See e.g. Reisman, ‘The Lessons of Qana’, 397, and Rogers ‘Zero-casualty warfare’, 175.
133
equipment and with very limited choice of weaponry, there may indeed often be a 
direct trade-off between force security and the minimization of collateral damage 
(although very clumsy attacks in which non-combatants are killed as a result of 
combatants not wishing to expose themselves to danger may actually jeopardize 
force security by provoking revenge attacks and enlistment in enemy ranks). But 
for the more sophisticated (and wealthier) belligerent, technology often offers a 
third way, enabling high quality information about a potential target to be 
obtained in near-real time with no risk to personnel before attacks are launched 
(e.g. by extensive use of UAVs) and enabling attacks to be carried out with 
precision from safe distances. The key word here is ‘often’. It will not always be 
possible to identify a target reliably or observe it properly by remote means, nor 
will it always be possible to strike it with precision from a safe distance.
4.4. The proportionality calculation
For effective ‘proportionality calculations’ to be made, in which humanitarian 
and military considerations in relation to specific, planned attacks are properly 
balanced, procedures and systems for assessing the likely collateral damage of an 
attack need to be established.
During the 1999 Kosovo war, NATO planners considered the construction of 
potential targets,437 as well as the proximity of non-combatants and civilian 
objects, before choosing weapons for particular attacks, and used mathematical 
models to estimate likely collateral damage if particular targets were struck with 
particular weapons 438 By 2003, a computer model was being used by US forces 
to determine the effect which particular warheads could be expected to have on
437 See e.g. Clark, Waging Modem War, 253. AFP 14-210 recommends that the structure of 
targets should be analyzed, in order to determine their vulnerability and select the best point for 
attack (para.6.5.3).
438 NATO used tables to work out how much of a building which was to be attacked would be 
affected by the blast and fragmentation effects of bombs and missiles. It was considered that the 
‘radius of damage’ of particular bombs and missiles could be predicted with considerable 
accuracy. A formula had been developed for estimating the number of people likely to be in a 
particular building. All this information was then pulled together to give an overall estimate for 
the expected collateral damage in relation to specific targets which were to be submitted to the 
political authorities for approval. (Clark, Waging Modem War, 181 and 240-241).
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particular targets.439 Few armed forces had the technology available for this type 
of analysis. However any commander needed to be able to rely on a reasonable 
amount of intelligence about the location of non-combatants in the vicinity to 
make effective proportionality calculations, as was often recognized in military 
manuals.440
Not only did computer graphics for making proportionality calculations 
evolve during the period under review, but institutional procedures for doing so 
became more structured. During the 1991 Gulf war, potential targets assigned to 
the British Royal Air Force (RAF) by Coalition military planners were not 
attacked unless the RAF commander in theatre was satisfied that collateral 
damage likely to be caused would not be disproportionate to the military 
advantage anticipated. 441 By the time of the Kosovo war, the United Kingdom, 
like most other European members of NATO, with the notable exception of 
France, had ratified Additional Protocol I and was thus bound by this treaty ‘to 
refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated’, and also to cancel or suspend an attack in 
the event of it becoming apparent that such an attack would have such a result442 
Where attacks to be carried out with any British involvement were concerned, 
proportionality calculations were often made in London after painstaking 
consideration, involving senior governmental lawyers, of the potential military 
and humanitarian consequences of attacking certain targets, rather than being left 
to the judgement of military commanders.443 Other NATO member states often 
wanted assurance that collateral damage would not exceed certain limits, or would
439 See Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 19. See also the US DoD’s ‘Background Briefing on 
Targeting’, 05.03.03, and Cor desman, The Iraq War, 257.
440 See e.g. passages from Australia’s Defence Force Manual and France’s ‘Law of Armed 
Conflict Summary Note’ quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 363-364. See also commentary at para.457.3 of the Handbook o f  
Humanitarian Law.
441 House of Commons Defence Committee, 10th Report, Preliminary Lessons o f  Operation 
Granby, para.274. See also Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 103 and 105.
442 Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(a)iii and 57.2(b).
443 See Boyle in Hector and Jellema, Protecting Civilians. Peter Rowe’s albeit tentative 
assessment that ‘it might be argued that all the detailed rules so carefully drafted in 1977 were of 
little consequence’ (‘Kosovo 1999: the air campaign’) was written before the elaborate target 
selection procedures in this legally self-conscious campaign had become widely known.
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be avoided altogether, before being prepared to agree to attacks on certain targets 
by NATO forces, whether or not their own assets or territory were to be directly 
involved.444 During the 2003 Iraq war, as far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned, an even wider range of military and governmental departments became 
involved in the process of making proportionality calculations than had been the 
case during the Kosovo war.445 This time, however, ‘significant delegated 
powers’ were given to British commanders in theatre to select targets within 
parameters already set by the political authorities, with the aim of facilitating 
rapid, lawful targeting decisions in relation to ‘time sensitive targets’.446 The US 
procedure for approving targets seems to have been less centralized, though any 
attack expected to put more than 30 civilians at risk required the approval of the 
Secretary of Defense.447
Criticism of proportionality calculations taken during the period under review 
has often focussed on perceived failures to take proper account of the likely long­
term or deferred humanitarian consequences of attacks on particular targets, such 
as power stations, or of using weapons such as cluster munitions.448 It is not 
unreasonable to expect that military planners should give some consideration to 
collateral damage which can be expected to occur as a result of, but some time 
after, an attack.449 An example of this perspective can be found in a US Air Force
444 See Clark, Waging Modern War, 318-319.
445 According to the British MoD report First Reflections, ‘Strong coordination between the MOD, 
the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood and the in-theatre National Contingent 
Command helped ensure coherent target planning (a lesson from previous operations). The 
Department for International Development was also consulted on key humanitarian infrastructure 
issues. The process for approving all targets for UK aircraft, submarine-launched cruise missiles 
or for coalition aircraft using UK facilities was conducted with appropriate political, legal and 
military oversight at all levels. We also influenced the selection and approval of other coalition 
targets’ (para.2.6).
446 MoD, Lessons fo r  the Future, 28. See also HCDC, Lessons o f  Iraq, para.94. It has not, in the 
period under review, been customary for states to publicize the reasons for their decisions not to 
attack certain targets. Adam Roberts observes that the reluctance of planners to reveal such 
information may stem from a desire to avoid giving adversaries ‘a recipe book for not being 
bombed’. (‘Counter-terrorism, armed force and the laws of war’ (2002), Survival).
447 Cordesman, The Iraq War, 275.
448 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths, on the long-term consequences of attacks on 
Iraqi power stations in 1991 by Coalition forces and Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed, on the 
long-term effects of use of cluster bombs in certain contexts.
449 Christopher Greenwood suggests it would be ‘an excessively narrow approach’ to take the view 
that any collateral damage which did not occur during an attack itself could be disregarded, but 
proposes that if long-term collateral damage is to be taken into account during proportionality 
calculations, so should long-term military advantage (‘Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict’ 
(1993), Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Occasional Paper No. 4, 20).
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background paper, which declares that in view of the fact that unexploded 
bomblets from cluster bombs are ‘reasonably foreseeable’, the dud rate must be 
part of the proportionality calculation.450 This type of consideration of the 
predictable long-term humanitarian impact if a particular weapon is used in a 
particular context, certainly conforms to the spirit of the rules on precautions in 
attack.
It might be argued nevertheless that a combatant using cluster munitions can 
never predict fo r  certain the long-term collateral effects of his action, since he 
cannot know whether local civilians will return to farm the land, whether the duds 
will be cleared by the local authorities, or even whether or not they will ever 
actually be disturbed by civilians, and that trying to accommodate anticipated 
deferred effects of the use of cluster munitions into proportionality calculations is 
thus impractical451 However, if the land is fertile, the country densely populated, 
and the national authorities poor, disorganized, indifferent to the welfare of the 
rural population (or possibly all three), and cluster munitions with dud rates of 
between 2% and 16% have been used in large quantities without provision having 
being made by the user for subsequent clearance, it is hard to see how it could 
coherently be anticipated that civilians would not be killed and maimed in the 
ordinary course of events as an incidental result of the use of such weapons. The 
number of such casualties would not be possible to calculate exactly, but as the 
USAF background paper quoted above implies, reasonable estimates can and 
should be made during the proportionality calculation.452
450 US Air Force Bullet Background Paper on International Legal Aspects Concerning the Use of 
Cluster Munitions (quoted in Human Rights Watch, Off Target, 115).
451 Christopher Greenwood has argued that ‘the risks posed by ERW once the immediate aftermath 
of an attack has passed are too remote to capable of assessment at that time’ (i.e. when the 
proportionality test is being applied at the time of the attack). (See written advice provided to the 
Group of Government Experts of States Parties to the Weapons Convention, ‘Legal issues 
regarding explosive remnants of war’, CCW/GGE/XI/WE. 1 /WP.7, 23.05.02).
452 This is also the position of the ICRC which has observed that ‘implementing the rule of 
proportionality during the planning and execution of an attack using cluster munitions must 
include an evaluation of the foreseeable incidental consequences for civilians during the attack 
(immediate death and injury) and consideration of the foreseeable short and long term effects of 
submunitions that become ERW.’ (‘Existing principles and rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable to munitions that may become explosive remnants of war’, CCW/GGE/XI/WG1/WP.7, 
28.07.05).
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4.5. Taking the decision to abort
The law of armed conflict requires an attack to be postponed or cancelled if it 
becomes apparent that the selected target is not a legitimate military objective, or 
if expected collateral damage would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.453 Decisions to abort attacks 
may, however, have adverse consequences for an attacker. Often, the moment for 
an attack will have been chosen with some care; an equally suitable moment may 
not present itself again for some time, or, in a worst case scenario from the 
attacker’s perspective, the entire effect of the attack may be nullified by a last 
minute decision to abort it in part or entirely. Aborting an attack may even leave 
an attacking force, or those it wishes to protect, in imminent danger from the 
object that was to have been neutralized.
During the 1991 Gulf war and the 1999 Kosovo war, British policy was to 
leave the final decision on whether or not an assigned target should be attacked to 
the pilots.454 In 2003 it was reported that Israel allowed pilots the final say on 
whether specific missions directed against Palestinian militants in the occupied 
territories should be carried out or aborted,455 and Iraq has claimed that during the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi pilots who refrained from striking listed targets 
that appeared on observation to be civilian objects were not held responsible for 
this apparent failure to obey orders.456 Australian policy is to allow aircrew 
discretion as to whether or not to attack an assigned target.457
British pilots released their weapons on only 40% of their missions during the 
1999 Kosovo war: on other occasions attacks were aborted, largely as a result of
453 Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(b).
454 See de la Billiere, Storm Command, 260. On practice in Kosovo, see Lessons o f Kosovo, (Vol 
II), para.240.
455 The Week, 27.09.03.
456 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol.II), 397.
457 Australia’s Defence Force Manual gives as an example of a situation in which aircrew would 
be obliged to cancel an attack as follows: ‘.. .an aircrew may be ordered to bomb what the mission 
planner believes to be a command and control centre. If, in the course of the mission, the 
command and control centre is displaying an unbriefed symbol of protection, e.g. a Red Cross 
symbol, then aircrew must refrain from completing their attack. The Red Cross symbol indicates 
the facility is a protected installation and is immune from attack unless intelligence, or higher 
authority, determines that the facility has lost its protected status because the emblem is being 
misused.’ (Quoted in ibid., 393).
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pilots being unable adequately to identify targets or to be certain of hitting them 
because of atmospheric conditions.458 Landing aircraft with bombs or missiles 
still attached was said in 2001 to be standard practice for US pilots unable 
satisfactorily to identify an assigned target and to have been British practice 
during the 1999 Kosovo war 459 But it was not always the safest of manoeuvres to 
execute, for instance where jets needing to return to aircraft carriers were 
concerned. A common practice during the Kosovo war appears to have been for 
pilots to jettison their bombs in the Adriatic if they had not been able to deliver 
them on target -  sometimes a safer solution, but neither cost-effective nor 
environmentally friendly 460 During the 2003 Iraq war, Coalition pilots routinely 
returned to base with their weapons, having been unable to identify assigned 
targets with confidence. On one occasion during the latter conflict, a pilot 
diverted a Maverick guided missile, already launched at a missile-launch trailer 
near a bridge, into the river to avoid hitting a civilian vehicle he saw crossing the 
bridge after he had released the missile 461
The policy of allowing pilots to abort attacks on assigned targets on their own 
authority is clearly good practice. But it requires pilots to be extensively briefed, 
both in relation to the exact nature of the object being attacked and in relation to 
the importance (or otherwise) of it being struck on a particular day or at a 
particular moment. A pilot with authority to abort an attack would need to be 
given detailed information about an assigned target which was an important 
military objective concealed in a building disguised as a civilian facility. 
Likewise, if the assigned target were the only bridge over a river, being rapidly 
approached by enemy forces, the pilot would need to know the importance of 
destroying it within a certain timeframe. Technological developments may in 
due course help reduce some of the costs and dangers of last-minute decisions to 
abort attacks; meanwhile the complexity of decisions which aircrew often have to
458 Lessons o f  Kosovo (Vol. II), annex 2, Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence 
(01.03.00) Q5.
459 See e.g. US Department of Defense news briefing of 11.10.01. See also Lessons o f  Kosovo 
(Vol.II), paras.85 and 240.
460 This practice is referred to obliquely in Lessons o f Kosovo (Vol. II), para.763.
461 Interview with Andrew Brookes, aerospace analyst, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
September 2005.
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take in a very short timeframe before releasing weapons should not be under­
estimated.462
4.6. The obligation to give warnings of attack unless circumstances do not 
permit
a) Situations in which warnings o f attack may be impossible
There are often two practical difficulties with the legal obligation to give 
warnings of attacks likely to affect the civilian population. First, there may not be 
an obvious medium or channel of communication for such warnings. Secondly, 
warnings may be seen as jeopardizing the success of a mission or the security of 
the attacking forces.
There are several examples of the first difficulty having been overcome in the 
period under review. During the Iran-Iraq war, warnings for shipping to stay clear 
of certain areas were broadcast in Farsi on local Iranian radio stations. Although 
hardly an example of good practice, the system worked: the broadcasts were 
picked up by US monitoring services, translated into English and widely 
promulgated 463 During the 1991 Gulf war, general warnings were issued to the 
Iraqi authorities and the civilian population via leaflets and radio broadcasts for 
civilians to stay away from military objectives,464 though according to one non­
governmental report, this was not until some weeks into the war, and was in part a 
reaction to the al-Firdus bunker incident.465 In southern Lebanon in 1996,
462 The New Zealand Manual notes: ‘In practice, it is extremely difficult to stop an attack. The 
obligation does not extend below the level of commanders who have the authority and practical 
possibility to do so; say a commander of a battalion group. The obligation is in any event subject 
to the knowledge principle.. .which means that its application will be rare’ (quoted in Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 395). Sweden’s military 
manual observes: ‘to require an assessment according to the proportionality rule from an 
individual aircraft pilot [after the decision to launch an attack has been taken by a senior 
commander] is probably unrealistic’ (ibid.). This assertion seems too sweeping and to under­
estimate the ability of experienced and well trained pilots (and ground based forward air 
controllers) to react appropriately and rapidly to unexpected situations.
463 See de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 133.
464 W. Hays Parks, ‘The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare’ (1998), Israeli Yearbook on 
Human Rights, 88, n.60.
465 Greenpeace International, On Impact, 131.
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warnings issued by the Israel Defence Forces to local civilians to evacuate their 
villages were broadcast in Arabic on local radio networks and appeared to reach 
their target audience without difficulty.466 A few years later, the United States 
declared it had used leaflets and broadcasts to good effect in Afghanistan in 2001- 
2002 and in Iraq in 2003 to warn civilians to stay clear of ‘military targets’, 
although it did not appear that very specific information had been given about 
what objects might be regarded as military targets 467 US practice during the war 
in Iraq appears to have been to warn civilians to evacuate either certain areas of a 
town (as in the case of Najaf in August 2004) or an entire town (as in the case of 
Fallujah in November 2004) when military action in urban areas was 
anticipated.468
According to a US Air Force manual, the legal requirement to give warnings 
can be met without putting aircrew or the success of their mission at risk by 
keeping warnings general.469 During the Kosovo war, the preferred NATO 
approach appeared to be to seek to maximize the safety of aircrew by refraining 
from giving warnings of forthcoming air strikes.470 In the event, some indications 
of specific targets to be attacked were given, for instance when a forthcoming 
strike on the Serbian Radio and Television (RTS) building in Belgrade was hinted 
at during a Pentagon news briefing. As a warning, this was somewhat oblique, 
but it was believed the Yugoslav authorities had got the message that the RTS 
building was at risk of attack when all international journalists were promptly 
ordered there 471 The Australian Defence Force Manual indicates that advance 
warning may be dispensed with if the proposed action is likely to be ‘seriously 
compromised’ by giving such a warning.472
466 See Amnesty International, Unlawful killings during ‘Grapes o f Wrath ' and Human Rights 
Watch, Israel/Lebanon.
467 US DoD ‘Background Briefing on Targeting’, 05.03.03.
468 The Times, 11.08.04; Sunday Times, 07.11.04.
469 See AFP 14-210, para.A4.3.1.4.
470 See Amnesty International NATO/Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (para.3.4).
471 Clark, Waging Modern War, 252, 265-266.
472 Quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Vol.II), 401.
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b) Warnings for authorities
Warnings for authorities which are very general, or which take the form 
merely of hints, are questionable practice, however, particularly for a force which 
has already effectively suppressed its enemy’s air defences and is thus not at 
serious risk when carrying out air strikes. The more general or oblique the 
warning, the more likely that civilians will be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. Unfortunately, however, specific warnings given to the authorities about 
places liable to be attacked may lead to those same authorities deliberately 
seeking either to protect such places by shielding them with civilians, or to secure 
a propaganda victory by encouraging civilians to remain in or near the target, 
knowing or expecting this will not in fact protect it from attack.
c) Warnings for the civilian population
Such practice on the part of unscrupulous authorities is one good reason for 
giving warnings directly to the civilian population, for instance to remain a certain 
distance from specific military objectives, such as artillery pieces, or possibly to 
evacuate a town or area altogether which may, exceptionally, be the lesser of 
various evils. But it needs to be recalled that certain members of the civilian 
population, such as the severely disabled or bedridden and those looking after 
them, tend to remain behind after evacuations. One way of providing protection 
for those too infirm to be evacuated is by the identification and marking of 
hospital zones, as was done with some success in the town of Jaffna, Sri Lanka, in 
1990.473 The establishment and protection of ‘safety zones’ in conflict areas is 
nonetheless an ambitious undertaking, and the several efforts made in the 1990s 
ranged from the moderately successful (the ‘safe havens’ of northern Iraq) to the 
disastrous (the ‘safe areas’ of Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac and Gorazde in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, designated by the UNSC in 1993).474
473 See Sassoli and Bouvier, Un Droit dans la Guerre? 1305.
474 See Roberts, ‘The role of humanitarian issues in international politics in the 1990s’.
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Given the reluctance, normally, of even able-bodied civilians to abandon 
property unless in imminent peril, vague or premature warnings are unlikely to be 
effective; warnings need to be specific and indicative of imminent danger if they 
are to persuade civilians to leave homes, crops, livestock etc. Another problem 
may be that civilians may not realize that certain objects or locations, the military 
importance of which they may have not appreciated, such as bridges or coastal 
areas, can become military objectives. Attacking belligerents thus need to be 
reasonably clear about those places from which civilians should keep their 
distance. During military operations conducted by Israel in Lebanon in 1982, 1.7 
million leaflets were dropped over Beirut warning civilians to avoid ‘military 
objectives’.475 It is questionable how effective these warnings can have been 
without some indication of what would be considered to be a military objective. 
Obviously an attacking force cannot be expected to give enemy civilians notice of 
the precise hour and location of a planned amphibious landing; but warnings to 
civilians to remain clear during a critical period of objects or locations such as 
coastal areas, major bridges, or railway stations can sometimes be given without 
military advantage or security being compromised.
d) Warnings in relation to booby traps and mines
Some states state explicitly in their military manuals that if booby traps are 
used other than on or in the vicinity of a military objective, warnings must be 
given to the local civilian population, for instance by the posting of signs or 
sentries 476 This guidance is of limited protective value in that it implies that 
warnings of booby traps need not be given when such devices are placed in the 
vicinity of a military objective, notwithstanding the danger to civilians which such 
practice poses. Mines, likewise, are not always unlawful weapons for all states, 
but their lawful use normally requires care to be taken to ensure civilians are
475 Parks, ‘The Protection of Civilians and Air Warfare’, 100.
476 E.g. Australia, Canada and Kenya (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol.11), 1808-1814)
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warned of their location, during and after the end of active hostilities.477 The
military manuals of several states contain provisions to this effect478
e) Warnings for ships and aircraft
When military hostilities begin, belligerents often issue formal notifications 
for mariners and civilian airline companies (NOTAMs), indicating the 
circumstances in which unidentified ships or aircraft in certain areas risk being 
considered hostile by warships 479 An important part of such notifications will 
normally be the indication of radio frequencies to be monitored and guidance on 
procedures for communication in the event of a civilian aircraft (or vessel) 
needing to contact a warship 480
f) Effective warnings
Advance warnings of attacks liable to affect the civilian population must be 
‘effective’.481 They need to be issued in a language which enemy civilians can 
understand, to make requirements of them with which they can realistically be 
expected to comply, and to give them sufficient time to act. If issued orally, they 
need to be audible above whatever ambient noise is present. In some 
circumstances, the line between a warning that is effective enough to make sure 
civilians act on it and an unlawful threat of violence aimed at spreading terror
477 See Amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention, article 3. See also Hague 
Convention VIII, article 3 on the obligation to warn of the presence of naval mines. As Dinstein 
observes, although much has happened since the latter convention was drafted, ‘the core of the 
Hague concept is as valid as ever’ where naval mines are concerned {The Conduct o f Hostilities, 
70-71).
478 E.g. Australia, Belgium, Germany and Kenya. The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook 
states that parties to a conflict should take ‘reasonable measures’ to ensure that civilians ‘are not 
unnecessarily endangered, both during and after the conflict’ by mine warfare, adding (perhaps a 
little too hesitantly) that such measures ‘might’ include warning civilians, using mines that self- 
destruct after a period of time and clearing minefields after the end of hostilities. (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol.II), 1872-1876).
479 For examples of NOTAMs issued during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, see de Guttry and 
Ronzitti The Iran-Iraq War, 37-38 and 137-142.
480 As proposed by para.75 of the San Remo Manual.
481 See Additional Protocol I, article 57.2(c).
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among the civilian population may seem thin. But an attacking force cannot 
reasonably be expected to give such extensive notice of a forthcoming attack that 
not only do civilians have time for an unhurried departure, but the defending 
forces have time to ensure the target becomes unassailable. And a warning 
that does not invoke any fear at all in the civilian population may prove a false 
kindness.
Before military operations were launched in southern Lebanon by Israel and 
the South Lebanese Army (SLA) against Hezbollah in April 1996, warnings were 
broadcast by radio ordering the residents of about 40 towns and villages, 
including the city of Tyre, with a population of approximately 120,000, to leave 
within hours.484 The warnings did not indicate specific localities or objects liable 
to be attacked, or precautions that civilians should take to avoid being mistaken 
for combatants. They simply took the form of an instruction for all civilians in the 
towns and villages concerned to evacuate immediately to the north. Some were 
unable to move because of infirmity and some were unwilling to do so; the fact 
that they remained in southern Lebanon placed them in danger, but in no sense 
made them legitimate targets. Against that background, the circumstances in 
which a number of civilians were killed during military operations suggest that 
undue reliance was placed by Israeli forces on the effectiveness of evacuation
• 40c • . * •warnings alone in protecting civilians. Large numbers of civilians did, 
however, heed the warnings and leave. Though fear and great hardship were 
clearly caused by the warnings, they may have led to lower civilian casualties than
482 See ibid., article 51.2.
483 Several states have made clear in their military manuals their understanding that warnings are 
not required in situations where surprise is of the essence (e.g. Belgium, Canada, Ecuador, South 
Africa, the UK and the US) (See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol.II), 401-404).
484 Human Rights Watch, Israel/Lebanon.
485 Nine members of one family, apparently believing they would be safe if they stayed in their 
home, the walls of which had been specially reinforced, were reportedly killed when their house 
was destroyed by an Israeli helicopter attack. Another family was said to have been killed when 
attempting to leave the village of Mansouri in an ambulance shortly after the expiry of the deadline 
for departure given by the Israeli authorities. (See Human Rights Watch, Israel/Lebanon and 
Amnesty International Israel/Lebanon: unlawful killings during Operation ‘Grapes o f  Wrath ’).
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would have occurred if urban warfare had been conducted in towns and villages in
AQ fL
southern Lebanon where civilians and combatants were intermingled.
Warning shots may sometimes constitute effective warning, though they also 
carry the risk that innocent bystanders may be killed by the descent of the 
bullets.487 Such an accident may have been the cause of death of a small child
400
killed by a bullet in unclear circumstances in Iraq in 2003. Failure to respond 
to a shouted warning or a warning shot cannot reasonably be regarded as evidence 
of hostile intent unless there is some other reason for regarding the person as a 
threat. Nor can failure to respond necessarily be regarded as evidence that a 
building or cellar is empty. In a tragic example of the particular vulnerability of 
disabled people during military operations, a 68-year-old deaf Palestinian, who 
had failed to hear warnings to evacuate the building, was alleged to have been 
killed in 2002 when his house in Gaza was demolished by Israeli forces while he 
was inside it.489
Where a military target is about to be attacked by aerial bombardment and 
there are civilians nearby, effective warning may sometimes take the form of 
military over-flight490
4.7. The duty of constant care
a) Preliminary remarks
The opening paragraph of article 57 of Additional Protocol I provides that:
In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the 
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
486 During the 17-day Operation Grapes o f  Wrath, around 150 civilians were killed, 102 of them in 
a single incident (the shelling of the UN compound at Qana), and 50 militants (Amnesty 
International, Israel/Lebanon: unlawful killings during Operation ‘Grapes o f Wrath ’).
487 ROE sometimes explicitly prohibit the use of warning shots, probably partly for this reason.
488 See Amnesty International, Iraq: Killings o f civilians in Basra and al-Amara.
489 The Times, 04.12.02.
490 ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols), para.2224 refers to such practice during the Second 
World War.
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This rule imposes on states parties, at least, an over-arching obligation to take care 
to avoid collateral damage over and above the obligation to comply with the more 
specific rules on precautions in attack which then follow. Before concluding this 
chapter, two important areas in which it seems reasonable to expect a party to a 
conflict to comply with this general ‘duty of constant care’ will be examined: 
action in relation to mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO); and liaison with 
civilians in the vicinity of military operations.
b) Mines and unexploded ordnance
Uncleared mines and cluster munition duds often account for a significant 
proportion of overall civilian casualties from armed conflict.491 The most serious 
threat for non-combatants usually comes not from mines or munitions being used 
in actual combat, but from those initially used for combat purposes which then 
remain in place (or drifting in sea, sand or soft topsoil) long after the end of active 
military operations 492
There are two approaches to mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance 
which should not be confused: humanitarian de-mining and military de-mining. 
The aim of ‘humanitarian de-mining’ is to make land contaminated by mines or 
UXO permanently usable for normal civilian purposes, such as farming, by the 
comprehensive (or near comprehensive) location and neutralization of mines and 
UXO in a designated area. The work is dangerous and very time-consuming. 
‘Military de-mining’, though also dangerous, is less ambitious and can be done 
more quickly, the aim being, typically, to clear a passage through a piece of 
territory to a standard allowing it to be crossed (possibly on just one occasion and
491 According to the ICRC paper ‘Explosive remnants of war: the lethal legacy of modern armed 
conflict’, approximately 11,000 people in Laos have been killed or injured by explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) since the end of hostilities in that country in 1975, and in Kosovo, nearly 500 
people were killed or injured by ERW in the year after the NATO campaign ended. (See also 
Landmine Action’s report Explosive remnants o f war and mines other than anti-personnel mines: 
global survey 2003-2004 for a recent review of the extent of ERW contamination in the worst- 
affected countries).
492 Abandoned ammunition may also pose a grave threat to the civilian population, but is not dealt 
with here, not being directly related to the obligation to take precautions in attack.
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not necessarily on foot) by a military force without the force being unreasonably 
exposed to danger.
No state appears to have trained or instructed its own armed forces to carry out 
humanitarian de-mining systematically in countries where mines and 
submunitions were used during the period under review.493 In Kosovo, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, UXO was sometimes cleared by military explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) teams in the context of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) 
work,494 but it often remained a danger unless and until cleared by civilian 
organizations,495 or even, in desperation, by local residents themselves.496
The argument that humanitarian clearance work should be performed by 
military personnel of the state or entity responsible for delivering or laying the 
weapons has a certain moral tidiness, but is not a strong one. If de-miners are to 
obtain reliable information about the location of UXO, they need to be able to 
communicate effectively with the local population as well as the parties to the 
conflict and to enjoy the trust of all concerned. If they are to complete the job, 
they need to remain in the area for a long time. Military personnel might in 
principle be able to meet these criteria, given the necessary language training, 
immersion in the local culture and degree of detachment from their parent units, 
but by this point they would have begun to look remarkably like expensive 
versions of civilian de-miners. More powerful is the argument that those 
responsible for delivering or laying UXO and mines should provide adequate
493 The US explicitly stated that it would not use its own military personnel for clearance work 
(Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 36, n.253). British military personnel did some UXO 
clearance work in Iraq in 2003, for both military and humanitarian purposes, although the MoD 
clarified that it regarded humanitarian UXO clearance as a task best carried out by NGOs and 
commercial de-mining companies, not least because of the greater ability of such organizations to 
work closely with local people (see note provided by the MoD for the House of Commons 
Defence Committee, Lessons o f Iraq, (Evidence) 441-442).
494 According to the MoD’s report, Lessons fo r the Future, British military EOD teams in 2003 
had a list of disposal tasks to work through, including the disposal of abandoned Iraqi munitions, 
on which work was expected to be completed by the end of the year. Thereafter, military 
personnel would only be required to clear UXO that affected the ability of Coalition forces to do 
their job (68). Further details of how priorities for clearance work had been set were provided in a 
note to the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC, Lessons o f  Iraq, (Evidence), 441)
495 See Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed, Chapter VII.
496 ‘After a BLU [cluster bomb remnant] killed a child in Takhar [Afghanistan].. .an elderly 
woman began to gather bomblets. “She decided she was an old lady and if anyone should get it, it 
should be her”. .. The woman piled up eighteen bomblets, lit a fire under them and walked away’ 
(ibid., 35).
148
information,497 finance and access to technical equipment to allow for the 
comprehensive humanitarian de-mining of contaminated territory by specialized 
de-mining agencies at the end of hostilities. An unwillingness to do this on the 
part of belligerents which have made extensive use of mines or cluster munitions 
cannot easily be reconciled with claims to be taking constant care to spare the 
civilian population 498
Use of cluster bombs and submunitions over Kosovo in 1999, and over 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001-2003, left these territories severely contaminated by 
UXO. A British MoD report on the Iraq war suggests that procedures for 
estimating the likely location of CBU duds expected to have been left by weapons 
used by British forces and for sharing this information with de-mining agencies 
were improved after the Kosovo war.499 There is also evidence to suggest that in 
Afghanistan during 2001-2002, de-mining agencies were provided with 
information by the US government about the likely location of CBU duds left by 
US forces more systematically than had been the case in the past, though opinions 
appear to vary on how effective this co-operation was in reality.500 Both the 
United States and the United Kingdom provided financial assistance for mine and 
UXO clearance in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, although the British allocation 
of £5 million for UXO clearance work by civilian agencies in Iraq was criticized
497 An interesting article on the legal implications of the continued presence on Libyan territory of 
mines and other explosive remnants from the Second World War suggests that whereas Libya 
could not insist that states which had laid the mines etc. should clear them themselves, 
nevertheless, ‘the states responsible for laying the mines should be considered as being legally 
committed to handing over maps showing the location of planned minefields and whatever 
information that is available about the final placement of the mines’ (Karl Partsch, ‘Remnants of 
War as a Legal Problem in the Light of the Libyan Case’ (1984), AJIL).
498 In 2004, the British House of Commons Defence Committee noted, ‘As the occupying power, 
the coalition has a legal and moral responsibility to provide security for civilians in Iraq, including 
protection from unexploded ordnance (UXO)’ (HCDC, Lessons o f  Iraq, para.427).
499 See MoD, First Reflections, para.4.11. The MoD’s later report, Lessons fo r  the Future, gives 
some details of the support provided by the UK for UXO clearance in Iraq, clarifying that although 
British forces were not always directly involved in the clearance work, care was taken to provide 
civilian agencies with quality information in relation to the likely location of dud submunitions.
500 The Human Rights Watch report Fatally Flawed criticizes the US record in providing 
information and financial support to de-mining NGOs working in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, 
claiming that although information was circulated appearing to indicate the likely location and 
quantity of CBU duds left by US forces it was often inconsistent or inaccurate. The report 
concluded that ‘a shortage of resources and a delay in outside assistance slowed the clearance 
process’ (38). According to Colonel Gary Crowder of the USAF’s Air Combat Command, the US 
by 2003 had ‘the ability basically to track every weapon as it’s released, or reported back to the air 
operations center’, (See Cordesman, Lessons o f the Iraq War, 272). This development may 
improve the quality of information which the US is able to provide in future to de-mining agencies 
about the likely location of CBU duds.
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by a parliamentary report as ‘surprisingly little’ in the context of overall 
expenditure by the United Kingdom on the conflict and post-combat activities in 
Iraq,501 and the $7 million in cash and equipment given by the United States 
government to de-mining NGOs in Afghanistan between October 2001 and June 
2002 did not deflect Human Rights Watch from its conclusion that the resources 
provided by the US for UXO clearance in Afghanistan were inadequate. In 
Iraq, the volatile security situation which persisted long after the end of major 
combat operations is likely to have been the main obstacle to UXO clearance.
There are at the time of writing several legal texts pointing to elements of 
good practice in terms of dealing with the problem of UXO and uncleared mines. 
Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention and its technical annex deals 
with procedures for recording and notifying the location of minefields. Good 
practice in relation to the notification and clearance of naval mines is set out in the 
San Remo Manual.50* The Ottawa Convention obliges each state party to destroy 
anti-personnel mines in all territory ‘under its jurisdiction or control’, to mark 
areas known to be contaminated by anti-personnel mines pending their clearance, 
and, in various ways and to the extent feasible, to assist other states in dealing 
with anti-personnel mines and their consequences.505 Protocol V to the 
Conventional Weapons Convention, concluded in 2003, and its technical annex 
set out procedures to be adopted by states parties to facilitate the location, 
marking and effective clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW)506 at the end 
of a conflict. Through this treaty, states parties undertake to mark and clear ERW 
in territory under their control, the obligation thus extending not only to states 
enjoying sovereignty over the territory in question, but also to occupying 
powers.507 Where UXO on territory not under the control of the state responsible 
for delivering it is concerned, the obligation is to provide assistance, ‘where 
feasible’, ‘to facilitate’ the marking and clearance of such ordnance.508 States
501 See HCDC, Lessons o f Iraq, para.432.
502 Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed, 38-39.
503 Article 7 (original version of the Protocol); articles 9-11 (1996 amended version).
504 Paras.83-84 and 90-91.
505 See Ottawa Convention, articles 5 and 6.
506 This term is used to cover both unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance.
507 Conventional Weapons Convention, Protocol V, Article 3.2.
508 Ibid., article 3.1.
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parties also undertake to adopt procedures for the systematic recording, retention 
and transmission of data in relation to the likely location of submunition duds.509 
The emphasis is thus more on what is practically possible in terms of addressing 
the problem than on holding to account those responsible for creating it. This 
proposed practice should help reduce civilian deaths and injuries from ERW, so 
long as it is adopted in good faith, without words and phrases in the text such as 
‘feasible’ and ‘subject to...legitimate security interests’ being used as escape 
clauses, and so long as it is supported by sufficient funding for the safe, prompt 
and thorough clearance of ERW by de-mining agencies at the end of active 
military operations.510
c) Civilian liaison
Belligerents can be expected to have at least some idea of the location and 
movements of enemy non-combatants, and in the light of this information, to take 
reasonable measures to prevent them being killed or injured in error.511 This is 
not quite the same as taking feasible precautions in the choice of methods and 
means of attack with a view to avoiding or minimizing collateral damage, or 
giving warnings: it may involve participating in arrangements for the evacuation 
of civilians cut off by fighting, dropping leaflets warning the civilian population 
to avoid conduct which may lead to their being mistaken for combatants or 
making efforts to establish the exact location of protected buildings such as 
hospitals. Civilians may need to be told the obvious - to avoid wearing military 
clothing or carrying weapons. During a military occupation, civilians may need
509 Ibid., article 4.
510 Part of the solution may be not just immediate funding for clearance work, but also investment 
in the development and distribution of improved technology. The US, for example, was reported 
to have funded a number of research projects aimed at identifying ways of locating and clearing 
mines and UXO which might be less dangerous and costly, and more reliable, than methods 
deployed by de-mining agencies during the period under review (See Edwards, The Geeks o f War, 
81-83 and 157-158).
5,1 For an interesting discussion of some of the implications for US military doctrine and 
procedures of this relatively new expectation on the part of the international community, see 
Richard Butler, ‘Modem War, Modem Law, and Army Doctrine: Are We in Step for the 21st 
Century?’ (2002), Parameters.
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specific instructions about approaching checkpoints. This does not mean that 
military personnel are entitled to open fire on any civilians not conforming to such 
instructions, but it may reduce the risk of non-combatants mistakenly being 
perceived as hostile.
In its judgment in the case of Isayeva v. Russia, the European Court of Human 
Rights regarded it as evident that in the context of an internal conflict on the 
territory of a state party, ‘when the military considered the deployment of aviation 
equipped with heavy combat weapons within the boundaries of a populated area, 
they also should have considered the dangers that such methods invariably 
entail’.513 The Court’s expectation was that in such a situation, the Russian 
authorities would have taken practical steps for the effective evacuation of 
civilians such as ‘ensuring that they were informed of the attack beforehand, how 
long such an evacuation would take, what routes evacuees were supposed to take, 
what kind of precautions were in place to ensure safety, what steps were to be 
taken to assist the vulnerable and infirm etc.’514
The protection of civilians from the effects of attacks is of course largely the 
responsibility of defending, not attacking, forces. The very notion of a ‘duty of 
care’ towards an enemy population is certainly open to challenge, with the 
important exception of conflicts taking place within the territory of a state, where 
governmental forces clearly have a duty of care towards all their own citizens. 
The above mentioned precautions are examples of good practice which 
nevertheless can be, and sometimes have been, adopted by attacking or occupying 
forces.515
512 Giving evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee, Air Vice Marshall Heath 
described British information operations during the 2003 Iraq war as being intended (among other 
things) ‘to prevent or limit civilian casualties, predominantly through creating an understanding 
with the population that they were not the target group if we moved into conflict and how they 
could remain relatively safe ’ (emphasis added) (HCDC, Lessons o f  Iraq, para.446. See also 
paras.449-450). The Defence Committee concluded ‘[tjhere is clear evidence that leaflet drops 
and radio broadcasts successfully persuaded many Iraqis in Basra to stay indoors’ (para.512).
513 Isayeva v. Russia (2005), ECtHR, para. 189.
514 Ibid.
515 In international conflicts, the language barrier between attacking forces and enemy civilians 
will often be one challenge needing to be overcome before such precautions can be taken very 
effectively. In Iraq in 2003, liaison between British forces and Iraqi civilians was hampered by 
the fact that British forces had only one Arabic-speaking military interpreter for approximately 
every 1,000 troops (HCDC, Lessons o f Iraq, para.414)).
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4.8. Conclusions
Between 1980 and 2005, innovative developments in military technology and 
a growing willingness on the part of belligerents to accept and apply new legal 
rules reduced, to some extent at least, the dangers to non-combatants of military 
operations.516 But accidents still occurred with grim regularity, even during 
conflicts where the parties were technologically advanced nations mindful of their 
legal obligations.
Four systemic problems often contributed to such accidents:
■ failure to accord sufficient priority to traditional ‘eyes on’ reconnaissance 
and intelligence work directed towards target identification and 
verification;
■ unwillingness or inability to invest in or make available military 
equipment specifically designed to minimize collateral damage or to assist 
with target identification;
516 According to what appear to be Iraqi government statistics, 2,278 civilians were killed during 
the 1991 Gulf war (Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 329); Human Rights Watch claim that 
between 489 and 528 civilians were killed during the 1999 NATO air campaign against the FRY 
(Civilian Deaths in the NA TO Air Campaign). According to the NGO Iraq Body Count, nearly 
20,000 civilians were reported to have died in the Iraq war and occupation between March 2003 
and March 2005 (http://www.iraqbodvcount.net/press/ visited 26.04.05). (It needs to be recalled, 
however, that this latter figure is a tally of reported civilian deaths, not an estimate of the true total, 
which is likely to be somewhat higher). By contrast, about 40,000 people, mainly civilians, are 
believed to have perished in one night in a firestorm caused by the bombing of Hamburg in 1943, 
approximately 100,000 people are believed to have been killed in one night by the fire-bombing of 
Tokyo in 1945 and approximately 210,000 to have died in the course of 1945 as a result of the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (see Jonathan Glover, Humanity: a Moral History o f  the 
Twentieth Century (London, 2001), 78, 95 and 99). 100,000 civilians are thought to have been 
killed in the battle for Manila towards the end of the Second World War, mostly as a result of 
cross-fire (Fenrick, ‘Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offence’). The 1950-1953 
Korean war has been estimated to have left nearly two million civilian dead or missing, many as a 
result of fighting for the city of Seoul and aerial bombardment of the northern part of the peninsula 
(see Matthew White, ‘Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century’ 
(http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm (visited 08.11.05), citing Andrew Nahm, Historical 
Dictionary o f  the Republic o f  Korea (1993) and P. de. Haan, ‘50 Years and Counting; the Impact 
of the Korean War on the People of the Peninsula’ (2002), (http://www.calvin- 
edu/news/releases/2001 02/korea.htm , visited 14.12.04). Estimates of civilian deaths in the 
Vietnam war between 1965 and 1973 range from 315,000 to about two million (White, ‘Death 
Tolls’).
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■ conducting military operations in or against built-up areas from which the 
civilian population had not been effectively evacuated;
■ malfunctioning cluster munitions.
Nevertheless, reporting of conflicts in this period shows there are many 
practical ways in which belligerents can and do implement the rules on 
precautions in attack effectively in modem armed conflict, including the relatively 
new and demanding rules of Additional Protocol I. Not all these measures are 
risk-free: effective reconnaissance of urban areas is intrinsically dangerous and 
will remain so unless and until machines are designed capable of seeing inside 
buildings. And not all are cheap: weaponry may have been developed capable of 
great precision at long range, and of putting systems out of action by means less 
destructive than by the use of high explosives, but is expensive.
That said, some of the precautions identified in this chapter, while not 
necessarily legal requirements in any formal sense, can reasonably be expected of 
any armed force or group, whether a sophisticated and well-equipped army 
engaged in a UN-authorized enforcement action, or a cash-strapped guerrilla army 
engaged in an internal conflict. They include the following:
■ Ensuring attacks are not launched unless prospective targets have been 
directly viewed, photographed or videoed immediately or very shortly 
before an attack.
■ Ensuring combatants have the weaponry (or choice of weaponry) and 
vision-enhancing or surveillance equipment they will need in the context 
to be able to identify targets properly and engage them with discriminate 
force.517
517 Miniature UAVs and infra-red night vision goggles are likely to be prohibitively expensive for 
most belligerents; ordinary binoculars, by contrast, had come down in price and weight by the 
1990s.
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■ Ensuring that those responsible for executing attacks have the personal 
authority to abort attacks -  and know when it will be appropriate to do so.
■ Issuing effective warnings before attacks liable to affect the civilian 
population, making sure in particular that warnings are clear, specific and 
comprehensible - and can in practice be acted on.
■ Providing the necessary resources and information for the prompt and 
effective clearance of unexploded ordnance at the end of active hostilities.
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5. INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOR PROMOTING COMPLIANCE
The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces 
which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws and 
customs o f  war on land, annexed to the present Convention.
1907 Hague Convention IV  Respecting the Laws and Customs o f  
War on Land, Article 1.
Until the 1990s, information about distant conflicts tended to be disseminated 
by specialized war correspondents, acting, usually, under strict reporting 
restrictions and with limited access to the scene of military operations. By the end 
of the twentieth century, all this had changed. Access to the internet enabled 
troops on active service abroad to send messages and photographs home 
instantaneously, or distribute information and impressions to a wider audience by 
means of anonymous ‘weblogs’, with minimal censorship being exercised. 
During the Iraq war of 2003, journalists embedded with military units produced 
graphic accounts of the ugly side of urban warfare. In Iraq and elsewhere, others 
without such privileged access to the military could reach victims of conflict and 
broadcast their stories immediately to the audio-visual media by satellite. Human 
rights organizations monitoring armed conflicts proliferated and could sometimes 
conduct their own battle damage assessment exercises allowing them to publicize 
information about the collateral effects of military campaigns.518 In the Balkans, 
peacekeepers and international monitors proved able and willing to gather 
evidence of combatant misconduct, some of which was later drawn on in criminal 
proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia.519
As a result, the conduct of combatants on and around the battlefield became 
exposed to public and legal scrutiny as never before. States (and to some extent, 
non-state actors) thus came under increased pressure to ensure that their internal
518 See e.g. Human Rights Watch’s report, Off Target.
519 See e.g. references to evidence submitted by UNPROFOR and SFOR personnel and UN 
Military Observers in the trial of General Galic, (Galic (Trial Judgement), paras.617, 622-623, 
628-652, 668-675, 679-693 and 697-699).
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procedures for promoting compliance with the law of armed conflict were 
effective and seen to be effective.
This chapter looks at internal procedures adopted by states for promoting 
compliance with the rules on precautions in attack. Like the previous chapter, it 
does not attempt to present a comprehensive review, but rather to draw on 
evidence of good practice in this area in order to try to identify procedures which, 
it is submitted, can reasonably be expected of modem belligerents, including, to 
some extent at least, armed opposition groups. Most of these procedures are 
already standard practice in some armed forces: in many cases, there is no good 
reason why they should not be adopted more widely.
5.1. Domestic legislation
a) Preliminary remarks
For the law of armed conflict to be implemented effectively, states need to 
have domestic legislation giving them power to enforce the rules, including, 
where necessary, by means of criminal sanctions. There are broadly two ways 
this is done: either treaties to which a state is party are automatically considered 
the law of the land and individuals violating their provisions can be prosecuted 
before the national courts without reference to domestic legislation (the monist 
system); or specific implementing legislation is passed to give effect to treaties 
through the domestic law of the state, including by the creation, if necessary, of 
new criminal offences (the dualist system).520
520 For detailed treatment of national implementation of treaties on the law of armed conflict in 
both monist and dualist systems, see David Turns, ‘Aspects of National Implementation of the 
Rome Statute: the United Kingdom and Selected Other States’ in The Permanent International 
Criminal Court (Oxford, 2004) (eds. Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly).
157
b) Monist systems
In monist legal systems, treaties with provisions on the legal obligation to take 
precautions in attack are automatically considered part of domestic law, whether 
or not additional implementing legislation is passed to facilitate enforcement of
9^1such rules. Thus during the court martial in 1993 of a Belgian soldier accused 
of having accidentally, but culpably, caused the death of a Somali citizen, the 
court cited article 57 of Additional Protocol I in a manner which seemed to imply
this provision could if necessary be applied directly, as a matter of Belgian law, to
• • • • • • ^22 an individual facing a criminal charge. In the event, the soldier was acquitted.
But only in a monist system could it have been thinkable to suggest a person
could even in principle be held individually criminally responsible under national
law for violating an international treaty, without the need for any kind of
intermediary domestic legislation.
The problem with this approach is that it fails to distinguish clearly between, 
on the one hand, treaty provisions violation of which is clearly intended to entail 
individual criminal responsibility, and, on the other, hortatory provisions the 
purpose of which is to encourage good practice. Hortatory provisions, often 
couched in open-ended terms such as ‘do everything feasible’, or ‘do all in his 
power’, reflect an important commitment on the part of states accepting such 
provisions to require combatants to do their level best in good faith to conform to 
the spirit of the law over and above taking the necessary steps to avoid criminal 
prosecution. Treaty provisions on precautions in attack fall largely into this 
category. If such provisions are construed as setting an objective standard, failure 
to meet which will result in prosecution, they risk being seen as requiring only 
that the bare minimum be done, rather than being understood in their proper, 
hortatory sense.
521 See e.g. constitutions of the Russian Federation, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. See also 
Vladlen Vereshchetin, ‘New constitutions and the old problem of the relationship between 
international law and national law’ (1996), EJIL.
522 ‘Attendu que meme le droit des conflits armes contient des obligations touchant les precautions 
a prendre afin d’epargner la population pendant les attaques (article 57 du Protocole I du 8 mai 
1977 additionnel aux Conventions de Geneve du 12 aout 1949)’. (Osman Somow Mohammed c. 
Soldat Paracommando, cited in Sassoli and Bouvier, Un Droit dans la Guerre? 1327-1331).
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c) Dualist systems
States with dualist legal systems, by contrast, normally make clear which 
violations of a treaty will constitute crimes for which people may be prosecuted 
under domestic law; in such systems, violations of treaty provisions not indicated 
as crimes under domestic law will not be regarded as such by national tribunals. 
For instance, the United Kingdom’s Geneva Conventions Amendment Act of 
1995 and its International Criminal Court Act of 2001 explicitly indicate those 
violations of the international law of armed conflict which, if committed by 
persons within the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales, will be
• .  59^  • • •considered crimes under domestic law. Likewise, the US War Crimes Act of 
1997 criminalizes violations of specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions and 
Hague Regulations,524 implying other violations may not necessarily be treated as 
criminal offences under US law.
d) Compliance orders issued by commanders
An intermediate approach which can be adopted in either monist or dualist 
systems is for a senior commanding officer to issue a formal order to those under 
his command to comply with the provisions of the international law of armed
e'yc
conflict, or, more specifically, with the provisions of certain named treaties. 
Assuming legislation is in place requiring military personnel to obey all lawful
523 For discussion of war crimes legislation in the UK, see Robert Cryer, ‘Implementation of the 
International Criminal Court Statute in England and Wales’ (2002), ICLQ, 733.
524 See Operational Law 2005, 34.
525 See e.g. Israel’s 1982 ‘Order of the General Staff No. 33.0133: Discipline -  Conduct in 
Accordance with International Conventions to which Israel is a Party ’, quoted in Dov Shefi, ‘The 
Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces: his Functions and Powers’ (1983), Military Law 
and Law o f War Review. See also the USAF’s Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 of 26.04.93. In 
Sweden, eight ‘servicemen’s rules’ on observance of the law of armed conflict have been issued 
by the Commander-in-Chief (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 3183). The ‘Order on the publication of the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols’ issued by the Russian Ministry of Defence requires ‘the implementation of the 
instructions concerning the application of the rules of international humanitarian law by the armed 
forces of the USSR’ which are annexed to the order in the form of Russia’s military manual (ibid., 
3183). See also Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities, 26.
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orders, this approach makes it possible for a wide range of violations of the law of 
armed conflict to be considered criminal offences.
In terms of indicating to members of the armed forces what rules they can be 
prosecuted for violating, and how such rules (and others) can be observed without 
prejudice to military effectiveness or their own personal safety, such orders are of 
limited value.526 Nor will they protect senior commanders from prosecution for 
acquiescence in serious violations of the law of armed conflict: ICTY 
jurisprudence suggests that general orders to comply with the Geneva 
Conventions or with ‘the laws of war’ may have little value as a defence against 
war crimes charges if evidence indicates that notwithstanding such orders, serious 
violations of the law of armed conflict have been committed systematically by the 
subordinates of an accused commander and have gone unpunished.
The device of an over-arching ‘compliance order’ is valuable, however, as a 
means of dispelling the sense of double jeopardy which military personnel may 
feel on receiving a patently illegal order, which it might seem they cannot obey 
without violating international law, nor disobey without violating military law. 
Compliance orders enable those who decide to disregard unlawful orders to 
defend their decisions by citing standing orders from higher authority. This is 
likely to be a more attractive excuse for disobeying a superior order than 
explanations such as, ‘it would have gone against my conscience to do it’ or 
‘they told us at an IHL presentation that sort of thing was illegal’ etc..
526 The order issued by the Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army on 03.10.91 
stating, ‘ YPA [JNA] units have the duty to secure in the area of their operations full and 
unconditional implementation of rules of international law of armed conflicts and suppress 
violations of those rules’ (quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, (Vol II), 3184) was not notably effective in ensuring compliance with 
international law by Yugoslav federal forces and their successors in the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia which followed.
527 See Galic (Trial Judgement), paras.707-708 and 717-719.
528 See Handbook o f  Humanitarian Law, para. 139.
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5.2. Rules of Engagement
a) Preliminary remarks
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are instructions issued to military forces 
indicating the precise circumstances in which they have authority to use force and 
to what extent. ROE, usually confidential for several years at least, normally 
cover three areas:
i) a state’s purpose in deploying its armed forces;
ii) a state’s understanding of its international legal obligations on the 
use of force as they relate to the mission;
iii) a state’s perception of the political constraints on its use of force.
The nature and function of ROE is sometimes misunderstood. They are not simply 
reminders of the rules of the law of armed conflict: a state’s purpose in deploying 
armed forces may dictate that quite another body of law is applicable, for instance 
if they are deployed in peacetime in support of the civil authorities. Likewise, a 
state’s perception of the political constraints within which it has to act and 
concern to avoid antagonizing neutral states or domestic opinion may lead to ROE 
more restrictive than the rules of the international law of armed conflict alone.
ROE are a vital tool in ensuring that armed forces act in conformity with 
international law, with a state’s policy objectives and with all due consideration 
for non-combatants, while retaining the freedom of action necessary for mission 
accomplishment and self-defence. Good, clear ROE, well adapted to the task in 
hand, presented in an intelligible way and properly enforced, reduce the dangers 
for non-combatants in conflict zones without prejudice to the ability of forces 
deployed on a military operation to accomplish their mission and protect 
themselves. Within sophisticated armed forces, much time and attention is paid to 
the drafting and amending of ROE before and during military operations, 
especially air and maritime operations.
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b) ROE and pocket cards
Formal ROE tend to be long, technical, and subject to regular alteration as a 
conflict progresses or new circumstances come to light. The initiative for changes 
may come from the commander on the spot, if he considers ROE insufficiently 
flexible, or from political authorities or the military central command if, for 
example, information suggesting an increased threat level to the forces deployed 
is received. Proposed revisions are sometimes the subject of extensive and
OQprotracted debate.
The ‘pocket cards’ often issued to individual members of the armed forces, 
containing basic rules on the circumstances in which weapons may be used, are 
slightly different. They are not, formally, ROE. They constitute simpler guidance 
on when and how weapons may lawfully be used and serve as memory-joggers in 
relation to the actual ROE, on which briefing and training will normally have been 
provided before deployment, but texts of which are unlikely to have been widely 
distributed.530
c) ROE content
At all levels and in all circumstances, good ROE will make two things 
explicitly clear:
i) non-combatants posing no threat may never be deliberately 
attacked;
529 See de la Billiere, Storm Command, 141 and 175-176 on the lengthy discussions in relation to 
British ROE governing the circumstances in which UK forces in Saudi Arabia and the Persian 
Gulf in 1990 could use their weapons in self-defence before active military operations began in 
January 1991.
530 The pocket card issued to US military personnel serving in Iraq in 2003 is reproduced as 
Appendix E to the Human Rights Watch report O ff Target. The full text of the pocket card 
‘Alpha’ issued to British military personnel deployed in the same conflict, but with rather different 
ROE, is reproduced in R.(Al-Skeini) v. Secretary o f  State fo r  Defence (Divisional Court), para.45.
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ii) necessary and proportionate force, up to and including lethal force, 
may always be used in self-defence.
After Canadian troops taking part in a UN-authorized peace enforcement 
operation in Somalia shot dead (in the back) an unarmed civilian fleeing from the 
compound they were guarding in May 1993, an inquiry identified ambiguous 
ROE as having been at least part of the problem. According to the extant ROE, 
‘an opposing force or terrorist unit commits a hostile act when it attacks or 
otherwise uses armed force against Canadian forces, Canadian citizens, their 
property, Coalition forces, relief personnel, relief materiel, distribution sites, 
convoys and non-combatant civilians, or employs the use of force to preclude or 
impede the mission of Canadian or Coalition forces’.531 This vague guidance 
became highly dangerous after a Canadian politician boasted publicly that the 
ROE allowed Canadian soldiers ‘to shoot first and ask questions later’ and a 
commanding officer, citing this poisonous nonsense, told his soldiers that within 
this framework, ‘deadly force could be used against Somalis found inside 
Canadian compounds or absconding with Canadian kit, whether or not they were 
armed’.532 Had the ROE (and the political and military leadership of the Canadian 
Forces) made clear from the outset that it could never be permissible to shoot 
unarmed civilians posing no threat, the tragedy might never have occurred.
It will sometimes be difficult for combatants to tell the difference in the heat 
of the moment between somebody who is posing a threat (and may be fired upon) 
and somebody who might be posing a threat (who in most situations may not be 
fired upon). ROE, no matter how well drafted, cannot eliminate this difficulty. If 
they make it clear that it is never permissible knowingly to fire on non-combatants 
posing no threat, this will help prevent war crimes, but it will not prevent 
mistakes. Non-combatants, and those with influence over them, need to be 
mindful of this and to be aware of the kinds of gestures, conduct and appearance 
which may be seen as threatening by combatants in conflict zones.
531 Paragraph 7(c) of the ROE, quoted in Dishonoured Legacy: the Lessons o f the Somalia Affair. 
Report o f  the Commission o f  Inquiry into the Deployment o f Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa, 
1997) (hereinafter Somalia Inquiry Report) (Vol. 2), Chapter 22.
532 Ibid.
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Self-defence is a particular problem area. ROE issued for US forces deployed 
in situations other than full-scale armed conflict, eg a peace enforcement mission, 
or deployment in anticipation of a conflict considered likely or imminent, 
normally rely on the concepts of ‘hostile intent’ (or ‘hostile approach’) and 
‘hostile acts’ to indicate when force can be used in self-defence in a particular 
context. Essential to an understanding of the evolution of the US approach 
towards action in self-defence is an appreciation of the impact of two incidents in 
the 1980s: the attack on the US Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters in 
Beirut in 1983 and the 1987 attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf. In the 
former case, it transpired that Marines guarding the building had deliberately kept 
their weapons unloaded as a precaution against accidental or inappropriate use of 
weapons leading to the death or injury of civilians; in the latter case, the 
warship’s commander and crew, not anticipating that Iraqi aircraft might pose a 
threat, had failed to identify and respond to the danger in time.534 The trauma of 
these events undoubtedly shaped the subsequent US approach to both the drafting 
and interpretation of ROE in relation to self-defence. ROE summaries in ‘pocket 
card’ form issued for US servicemen in the 1990s invariably stated emphatically 
at the outset that ROE would never preclude action in self-defence. By 1990, 
US land forces deployed in Saudi Arabia reportedly had ROE allowing them to 
fire in self-defence on aircraft considered to be making a ‘hostile approach’ even 
from about 40 kilometres’ distance; British forces, by contrast, were not permitted 
to open fire on a suspect aircraft until it had locked on with a weapons radar 
system or (at sea) was within a few kilometres of a ship. As it transpired, 
neither approach was put to the test before combat operations began in earnest the 
following year, although the significance of the difference in the ROE of the two 
forces caused anxiety, at least on the British side. In Iraq in 2003-2004, 
differences between the US and the British approach towards use of force in self­
533 See O’ Donnell and Kraska, ‘Humanitarian law: developing international rules for the digital 
battlefield’.
534 See House Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Staff Investigation into the Iraqi 
Attack on the USS Stark, 14 June, 1987, reproduced in de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 
152-158.
535 For numerous examples, see annex C of the RoE Handbook fo rju d g e  Advocates.
536 De la Billiere, Storm Command, 175.
537 Ibid., 140-141 and 175-177.
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defence caused friction on occasions, with British troops sometimes considering 
their US allies too quick to open fire in ambiguous situations.
In situations other than full-scale hostilities, reliance is sometimes placed on 
graduated warnings to individuals not posing an immediate threat, but whose 
conduct or appearance is suspect. (Where an immediate threat is clearly posed, 
use of force in self-defence Will automatically be permitted). For instance, ROE 
for peace-enforcement personnel deployed in Bosnia in 1996 and in Kosovo in 
1999 gave texts in Serbo-Croat (or Serbo-Croat and Albanian) for a verbal 
warning to be given as a first step if possible. Providing texts of warnings in 
the local languages is clearly a sensible precaution. An example of what can go 
wrong if troops fail to communicate an oral warning effectively seems to have 
occurred in June 1999, when an Albanian civilian, riding on the roof of a car and 
engaging in celebratory fire with an automatic rifle, was shot dead by British 
troops. The civilian apparently failed to comply with a warning, shouted in 
English, to ‘put down your weapon’, instead firing the weapon once again into the 
air, and then turning towards the source of the shouting, weapon still in hand.540
d) Enforcement o f ROE
In many armed forces, it is a criminal offence for a serviceman to open fire 
with a weapon in violation of his ROE. Thus a US pilot who, departing from his 
ROE, mistakenly opened fire on Canadian troops in southern Afghanistan in 
2002, believing them to be enemy forces, initially faced the prospect of court 
martial on the criminal charge of manslaughter. In the end he was not court- 
martialled after a recommendation that non-judicial proceedings should be 
brought instead, ‘in the interest of good order and discipline.’541 He was, 
however, found guilty of dereliction of duty for opening fire without having 
properly identified his target as hostile. He was deprived of half his salary for two
538 One British commander reports having instructed his troops to stay well away from US 
installations at night, given the danger of being fired on by ‘jumpy’ US sentries. (Tim Collins, 
Rules o f  Engagement, (London, 2005), 119-120).
539 See Operational Law 2002, Chapter 5, Appendix B.
540 See Mohammed B id  and Skender B id  v. Ministry o f Defence.
541 Shreveport Times, 20.06.03.
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months and prohibited from further flying missions. (The leniency of the penalty 
caused dismay in Canada and at one stage even the pilot himself was unhappy at 
being deprived of the opportunity to present his side of events in full which a 
court martial would have provided.)542 In June 2005, an Israeli court martial 
convicted a soldier of the Israel Defence Forces of manslaughter for having shot 
and killed an unarmed peace activist. The court appeared to accept the soldier’s 
explanation that in aiming for a spot adjacent to the activist’s head, he had not 
intended to kill him, but to warn him off. He was convicted of manslaughter (and 
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment) on the basis of having killed the activist 
by opening fire ‘in complete violation of IDF rules of engagement’.543
During the period under review, some states, such as Italy, appeared to operate 
a policy of launching formal, internal investigations automatically when their 
troops opened fire in situations other than full-scale armed hostilities, irrespective 
of whether or not unlawful conduct was alleged.544 Others showed greater 
reluctance to take the initiative in investigating incidents of the use of lethal force 
by their armed forces in unusual circumstances.545 British practice appeared to lie 
somewhere in the middle, with details of incidents being routinely recorded when 
troops opened fire in situations other than full-scale hostilities, but decisions on 
launching formal investigative, disciplinary or judicial proceedings being left to a 
large extent to the discretion of commanding officers on the spot.546
It is not uncommon for decisions on whether or not to conduct internal 
investigations into the use of lethal force by troops in certain situations to hinge
542 See The Globe and Mail, 20.06.03 and The Times, 05.07.04.
543 See ‘IDF soldier convicted of six charges for the killing of Mr Tom Humdall’, website of the 
Israel Defence Forces,
http://wwwl.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?s1=EN&id=7&docid=41715.EN. (visited 30.06.05). 
See also Daily Telegraph, 12.08.05.
544 After Italian troops exchanged fire with militants in Nassiriya on 06.04.04 and several Iraqi 
civilians were killed, an Italian military prosecutor based in Rome initiated an investigation, said 
to have been required under Italy’s military legal code, notwithstanding assurances given by the 
local commanding officer that the rules of engagement had been followed (see Corriere della 
Sera, 08.04.04).
545 For an extreme example, see Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005), ECtHR. See 
also criticism of Russian investigative procedures in the separate case of Isayeva v. Russia (2005), 
ECtHR, (paras .215-224).
546 See R.(Al-Skeini) v. Secretary o f State fo r  Defence (Divisional Court), 47-49 for details of 
procedures adopted in Iraq by British forces for the investigation of civilian deaths. See also 
Hansard, 07.01.04, Column 139.
166
on whether or not the relevant commanding officer considers that the ROE have 
been violated. Such an approach raises questions. Why should only shootings 
outside the ROE be investigated? Should there be different policies regarding 
investigations according to whether the situation is an international armed 
conflict, a non-international conflict, a military occupation, a counter-insurgency 
operation or a peace-support operation? Is it right that decisions on whether or 
not investigations should be launched should be taken by commanding officers, 
rather than military prosecuting authorities or an entirely independent authority?
In the context of internal procedures for enforcing the rules on precautions in 
attack, ROE are of critical relevance. This is because they delineate, for the 
combatant, the border between state-authorized use of force and private acts of 
violence. In terms of international law, use of force does not become lawful 
simply by virtue of being state-authorized; but in the context of domestic law- 
enforcement, a state cannot coherently prosecute a member of its armed forces for 
opening fire in conformity with ROE issued by that same state’s military 
authorities. The relevance of a commanding officer’s view as to whether or not an 
investigation or prosecution should take place needs to be seen in the same light. 
As the person responsible for his subordinates’ orders, training and understanding 
of their mission, he is the person best placed to know whether or not these orders, 
this training, and the way a mission has been explained can justify (or excuse) a 
subordinate’s use of force on a particular occasion. His input is thus 
indispensable for the fair treatment of a combatant accused of having failed to 
take adequate precautions in attack. There is, however, an obvious risk of 
violations of the law of armed conflict going unchecked if commanding officers 
alone are able to decide whether or not investigations into an alleged violation of 
the law of armed conflict are launched, given the natural desire a commanding 
officer may have to protect his subordinates (or possibly himself) when things go
547wrong.
547 The practice of effectively allowing commanding officers alone to decide on what action, if 
any, to take in the event of suspected misconduct by troops is criticized in the Canadian Somalia 
Inquiry Report of 1997 (Vol. 5, Chapter 40). In the UK, in December 2005, the MoD published 
proposed new legislation according to which where servicemen were alleged to have committed 
certain crimes, including misconduct on operations, murder, manslaughter or war crimes, decisions 
on whether or not to bring charges would be made not by commanding officers, but by a ‘Director 
of Service Prosecutions’, independent of the chain of command (The Times, 02.12.05).
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The greater the extent to which the military criminal justice system is seen as 
capable of providing effective justice for both victims (or their relatives) and 
defendants when serious violations of the rules on precautions in attack are 
alleged, the less likely it will be that such allegations are taken to other judicial 
forums. The Rome Statute makes clear that the International Criminal Court may 
not exercise jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed an offence 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court if a state which has jurisdiction 
over that person (e.g. the state of which he is a national) is able and willing to 
investigate and prosecute the case effectively itself.548 Should the person be 
acquitted after a proper trial, the ne bis in idem principle will protect him from 
further prosecution for the same offence.549 Visibly fair, prompt and effective 
courts martial of military personnel credibly alleged to have committed serious 
violations of the law of armed conflict are thus essential for those states who wish 
to support the work of the International Criminal Court, but not to see their own 
servicemen and women being brought before it.550
Procedures adopted by states for conducting internal investigations into the 
use of lethal force by their armed forces in unusual circumstances, and if 
necessary prosecuting unauthorized use of force, have seldom had any real 
equivalent within armed opposition groups. That is not to say that armed 
opposition groups cannot reasonably be expected to have some kind of system in 
place for investigating allegations of failure on the part of their members to take 
reasonable precautions in attack and for taking appropriate remedial action if the 
allegations turn out to be well-founded and to have had serious consequences.551
548 See Rome Statute articles 1 and 17.
549 Ibid., article 20.
550 Where states parties to the ECHR are concerned, court martial proceedings will need to be 
compatible with article 6 on the right to a fair trial (see Findlay v. UK (1997), ECtHR and Hilaire 
McCoubrey, ‘Due Process and British Courts Martial: a Commentary on the Findlay Case’ (1997), 
Journal o f  Armed Conflict Law).
551 Article 1 of Additional Protocol II requires that ‘dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups’ should be under responsible command for the Protocol to be considered applicable. 
According to article 43 of Additional Protocol I, ‘armed forces’, whose members will be entitled to 
prisoner of war status in a conflict subject to the rules of that treaty, need not necessarily belong to 
an authority recognized by the adverse party, but do need to be ‘subject to an internal disciplinary 
system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict.’
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Nor is it unreasonable to expect that they should at least have procedures for 
requiring ammunition to be accounted for.
e) ROE and legal inter-operability
If states fighting in alliances have significantly different understandings of 
what is a legitimate military objective and what the law requires of them in terms 
of taking precautions in attack - for instance, in relation to the extent to which a 
suspect ‘civilian* should be given the benefit of the doubt in a zone of military 
operations, or in relation to what is an unlawfully indiscriminate weapon -  they 
may have difficulty in working together. Multi-national brigades in which 
participating troops and their officers come from different states with different 
treaty obligations may also face problems. The formulation of multi-national 
ROE may be part of the solution. But multi-national ROE will only be able to 
create a uniform approach if different belligerents have reasonably similar 
understandings of what constitutes an act triggering the right to use deadly force 
in self-defence and what degree of certainty is required about the nature of a target 
before it can be engaged.
The convergence since the 1980s of the rules of customary law on precautions 
in attack with the rules of Additional Protocol I noted in Chapter 2 may have 
reduced legal inter-operability problems within alliances to some extent. The 
treaty regimes of other more recent treaties by which some members of military 
alliances may be bound but not others, such as the Ottawa Convention and the 
Second Protocol to the Hague Cultural Convention, may present new challenges, 
however.
552 See Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War’, 137, for an example of a difficulty which could arise 
if troops from a state not party to Additional Protocol I, hemmed in by enemy troops in residential 
buildings, called in close air support from an ally which was party to the Protocol and 
consequently reluctant to attack buildings resembling civilian objects. The difficulty could 
presumably be overcome if those calling for air support made it clear that the buildings in question 
were being used for hostile purposes and not full of civilians. But they would need to be made 
aware that this degree of detail would need to be given.
553 See Operational Law 2005, 99.
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5.3. The role of the military legal adviser
a) Military legal advisers
Specialized military legal advisers often provide on-the-spot advice for 
military commanders and their civilian superiors on how military aims can be 
accomplished within the framework of international law. States party to 
Additional Protocol I are obliged to make legal advisers available to military 
commanders for this purpose,554 and some states not party to the Protocol do so as 
a matter of good practice.555
Practice in terms of the deployment of military legal advisers varies. US 
practice is for military legal advisers to be deployed in, or relatively close to, 
combat zones and to be attached at all times to middle levels of command as well 
as military headquarters.556 This allows expert advice to be provided instantly at 
various levels, and at different stages of the planning process.557
The more common practice is for military lawyers to be deployed more 
sparingly, with units of military legal advisers being attached to service 
headquarters in capitals, tactical headquarters in theatre and, during a large scale 
deployment, to divisional or brigade-level headquarters, but not deployed with 
front-line forces.558 This allows for less complicated decision-making in theatre.
554 Article 82.
555 E.g. India and Israel and the US. See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 3203-3204. (See also Steven Keeva, ‘Lawyers in the War Room’ 
(1991), ABA Journal and Shefi, The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces’).
556 During the 2003 Iraq war, military lawyers were attached to US brigades as well as divisional 
headquarters (Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 94. See also US DoD ‘Background Briefing on 
Targeting’ (05.03.03)).
557 According to a US DoD report, ‘The willingness of commanders to seek legal advice at every 
stage of operational planning ensured US respect for the law of war throughout Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm’ (.Final Report to Congress, 632). US military legal advisers were also 
said to have been closely involved in tactical decisions in Iraq in 2003 relating to target selection. 
The British approach, reportedly, was to rely on observers rather than lawyers for advice at the 
tactical level on whether particular targets should be engaged at particular moments (Human 
Rights Watch, O ff Target, 95).
558 British practice is for legal advice to be made available through separate legal branches for the 
different services, normally (in the Army) at divisional level {UK Manual 2004, para. 16.5, n.16 ). 
An MoD report states that during the 2003 Iraq war, not only were legal specialists working in the
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But it requires that middle-ranking and senior commanders without a legal adviser 
at their immediate disposal should have a sufficient mastery of the basics of 
international law to enable them to take legally sound decisions when there is 
insufficient time to obtain legal advice.559
b) Military manuals
Military manuals are normally designed primarily to serve as handbooks for 
military legal advisers, although well written, jargon-free manuals that are easy to 
use for reference and in which practical examples are given, may appeal to a 
wider readership. They are a valuable tool in promoting compliance with some of 
the more technical procedures connected to the rules on precautions in attack, 
such as the steps that need to be taken by an attacking force if cultural property is 
being used by an enemy in support of military operations. Manuals can also play 
a useful role in dispelling some of the myths about the law of armed conflict.
c) Weapons review and defence procurement
If there is a risk that innovations in military technology would fall foul of rules 
of international law, or might be likely to contribute to, rather than help avoid, 
collateral damage, (as for instance in the case of counter-battery systems designed 
to fire back automatically on a calculated source of fire), this needs to be spotted 
at an early stage, so the system can be appropriately adapted -  or, in an extreme 
case, investment in its development terminated altogether. Conversely, if states 
make clear the importance they attach to being able to carry out military 
operations in a discriminating manner, this will provide an incentive to defence 
industry research and development departments to develop weapons and target
Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood, but Service lawyers were deployed in theatre to 
advise commanders on the spot (MoD, First Reflections, Chapter 6).
559 The Australian Defence Force Manual remarks, ‘As appropriate, legal advisers should be 
available to assist commanders in ensuring compliance. In contrast, an aircraft pilot, a company 
commander or a commander of a RAN vessel may not have this direct access; consequently, it is 
essential that they have a sound knowledge and understanding of LOAC issues’, (quoted in 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 3197).
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identification systems to accommodate this demand. During the period under 
review, the United States in particular appears to have appreciated the importance 
of considering collateral damage issues at the stage when new weapons and target 
intelligence systems are being designed and developed.560
Several states have procedures for ensuring legal advice is sought at various 
key stages of the development of new methods and means of warfare.561 For 
states party to Additional Protocol I this is a legal obligation.562 Obviously such 
reviews are easier if the system in question is being developed by a domestic 
manufacturer or research institution than if it is being developed abroad, in which 
case the state may have to wait until the system is virtually on the market before 
deciding whether and if so how it can lawfully be used.
5.4. Training for compliance
a) Preliminary remarks
There are two different forms of training which are equally important for 
effective compliance with the rules of international law in relation to precautions 
in attack: basic formal instruction on the law of armed conflict, normally provided 
in some form to most if not all members of an armed force; and practical 
training on performing specific military tasks with due consideration for the law 
of armed conflict and pre-deployment training on specific Rules of Engagement.
560 See Department of Defense, Report to Congress on International Policies and Procedures 
Regarding the Protection of Natural and Cultural Resources During Times of War, 19.01.93, 
quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol.II), 
381. See also Cordesman, Ongoing Lessons o f the Afghan Conflict, 66-68.
561 See Justin McClelland, ‘The review of weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I’(2003), IRRC. See also Isabelle Daoust et. al., ‘New wars, new weapons? The 
obligation of states to assess the legality of means and methods of warfare’ (2002), IRRC. See 
also Operational Law 2005, 18-20, and US Air Force Instruction 51-402 (Weapons Review) of 
13.05.94.
562 See article 36.
563 The obligation to provide instruction to members of the armed forces on the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions is enshrined in the conventions themselves (see Geneva Convention I, article 
47, Geneva Convention II, article 48, Geneva Convention III, article 127 and Geneva Convention 
IV, article 144). It can be considered a rule of customary law.
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b) Instruction on the law o f armed conflict
A good approach to formal instruction on the law of armed conflict is to 
establish a basic introductory course for all military personnel, lasting no more 
than half a day and aimed at inculcating probably no more than ten or eleven basic 
rules which can reasonably be expected to become ingrained, in due course, in the 
mind of every member of the armed forces, and which will be promoted as an 
integral part of the ethos of his profession.564 The success of the training will 
depend at least as much on the attitude of officers, particularly senior ones, 
towards knowledge of and respect for the law of armed conflict as it will on the 
quality of the instruction from a technical perspective.565 Sometimes, the rules 
introduced in this kind of training are distributed widely in written form, for 
instance on the back pages of first aid pocket books as an aide memoire.566 Short 
videos showing battlefield scenarios raising law of armed conflict issues are a 
valuable tool for this kind of introductory instruction. Dubbed as necessary into 
other languages (and distributed with tact), such materials can help spread good 
practice internationally, particularly among armed forces without the resources for 
sophisticated law of armed conflict training programmes of their own.567 There is 
seldom any good reason why this kind of instruction should not also be provided 
by armed opposition groups to their members.
564 See Charles Garraway ‘Training: the whys and wherefores’ (2002), Social Research for a 
description of this type of approach. See also Franfoise Hampson, ‘Fighting by the rules: 
instructing the armed forces in humanitarian law’ (1989), IRRC. In 1993 a Directive was issued to 
the US Air Force by the Secretary of the Air Force requiring that ‘Once each year, all commanders 
make sure their people are trained in the principles and rules of LOAC needed to carry out their 
duties and responsibilities. At a minimum it will include training required by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and the Hague Convention IV 1907, including 
annexes.’ (Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 of 26.04.93).
565 Garraway, ‘Training: the whys and wherefores’. See also Daniel Munoz-Rojaz and Jean- 
Jacques Fresard, ‘The roots of behaviour in war: understanding and preventing IHL violations’ 
(2004), IRRC.
566 Reference to several such publications and training materials is made in Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 3211-3245. See also 
British Army manual D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (1981), Annex A, for a good example 
of a written aide memoire for soldiers.
567 Such materials vary in quality. In January 2005, a British training video was submitted to a 
court martial in support of arguments that training on the law of armed conflict provided to 
soldiers had been inadequate. (The Times, 20.01.05).
568 An agreement concluded in 1992 between parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
provided that: ‘The parties undertake to spread knowledge of and promote respect for the
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Basic instruction of this nature is supplemented in many armed forces by more 
advanced teaching of the law of armed conflict aimed at equipping those with 
command responsibility with the legal knowledge they will need.569 Such courses 
are not designed to turn commanders into legal experts, but to give them enough 
familiarity with the law of armed conflict to be able to take the basic principles 
into account almost instinctively when making decisions, while knowing where to 
find the more detailed rules if necessary. This kind of training is also likely to 
enable commanders to defend themselves and those under their command against 
unfair or uninformed allegations of violation of the rules. Given the military 
value of keeping the time between the identification of a potential target and the 
launching of an attack against it as short as possible, there is something to be said 
from the military perspective for commanders (including junior ones) having 
sufficient training to be able to make legally sound judgements on the spot about 
whether and if so how certain targets may lawfully be attacked.
c) Practical training on taking precautions
Many states routinely conduct combat training exercises in which complicated 
scenarios are simulated where legal considerations have to be taken into account. 
Such exercises can include scenarios where quick decisions need to be taken 
about whether or not a person is a combatant in an environment where combatants 
are not always in uniform; where a choice is available between various methods 
and means for attacking or destroying a military objective; where armed 
adversaries are using civilian or cultural property for cover; where difficult
principles and rules of international humanitarian law and the terms of the present agreement, 
especially among combatants. This shall be done in particular:
by providing appropriate instruction on the rules of international humanitarian law to all
units under their command, control or political influence;
by facilitating the dissemination of ICRC appeals urging respect for international
humanitarian law;
by distributing ICRC publications. ’
(Quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol. II), 
3209-3210)
569 A good example of a practically oriented 12-module course of this nature for officers, with 
guidance for instructors, is David Lloyd Roberts’ ‘The Law of Armed Conflict: Teaching File for 
Instructors’, issued by the ICRC and in use in several countries.
174
proportionality calculations need to be made; where protected buildings, such as 
hospitals, are being used perfidiously in support of military operations; where 
unarmed civilians behave aggressively etc.
Pre-deployment training on ROE is taken with great seriousness by many 
armed forces. British practice is to send soldiers on intensive pre-deployment 
courses, covering specific-to-theatre tactics and requirements, including ROE. 
These courses generally last up to three weeks and run at different levels, but all 
include both theory and practice, often in highly realistic settings and scenarios. 
US naval forces deployed in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s received regular 
training on ROE, particularly in relation to the correct recognition of ‘hostile 
intent’ and ‘hostile acts’.570 Sometimes immense efforts are made to simulate as 
accurately as possible in ROE training exercises the kinds of situation in which 
troops are likely to find themselves.571 The training facilities for such exercises 
are likely to be beyond the budget of many armed forces, however.572 Less costly 
training techniques include variants of the type of relatively low-budget exercise 
used by the British Army in which participants are required simply to imagine the 
presence of some particular element which needs to be taken into account.573 A 
US Army/Marine Corps manual, published in 2000 and available online, contains 
plentiful examples of techniques which can be used to help inculcate ROE 
effectively during low budget training courses, including mnemonics and 
situational ‘vignettes’. Some of the vignettes are designed for ROE-specific 
training; others are suitable for more general law of armed conflict training and 
could be used as training aids by any armed force.574
570 See de Guttry and Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 156-157.
571 ‘Zussman village’ at the US Army centre at Fort Knox, Kentucky, attempts to recreate realistic 
situations for training purposes using civilians, the sounds of planes, tanks and gunfire, and even 
the smell of sewage and decomposing bodies, though total verisimilitude is apparently hampered 
to some extent by environmental, health and safety regulations. (Hills, Future War in Cities,
257). It was reported in 2000 that a French urban training facility was being established at 
Sisonne (Rupert Pengelley, ‘French Army in profile: hollow force to hard core’ (2000), Jane’s 
International Defence Review).
572 The Fort Knox centre cost $15million and has annual operating costs of $800,000 (Hills,
Future War in Cities, 257). 100 million euro were said to be being invested over five years in the 
French establishment at Sisonne (Pengelley, ‘French army in profile’).
573 The paradigm being ‘Tactical Exercises Without Troops’ (TEWTs) for NCOs.
574 See RoE Handbook forjudge Advocates, Appendix E. The scenarios are well presented, but 
the ‘model answers’ to the vignettes sometimes questionable. One, describing a scenario where a 
US military convoy in a peace support operation meets an armed local man who tries to prevent 
the convoy from proceeding, explains, in the model answer, the degree of force which may be used
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The importance of this kind of training was recognized in the 1997 report of a 
Canadian Commission of Inquiry, which recommended inter alia that ‘the Chief 
of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that no unit be declared 
operationally ready unless all its members have received sufficient and 
appropriate training on mission-specific rules of engagement and steps have been 
taken to establish that the rules of engagement are fully understood’. It was 
specifically recommended, furthermore, that such training should be ‘scenario- 
based and integrated into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or 
briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism for 
confirming that instructions have been fully understood’ For ROE-specific 
training to be possible, however, ROE need to be finalized in good time.
Such training is nonetheless of little value if ROE are allowed to fall into 
contempt or be undermined by contrary instructions from officers once troops are 
in an actual combat situation. The US-based NGO Human Rights Watch reported 
being informed by junior US soldiers serving in Iraq in 2003 that they had been 
told by their superiors during the advance to Baghdad from 5-7 April of that year 
to ‘assume that all targets were hostile’, rather than to obtain positive 
identification. By contrast, their pocket card rules stated ‘Positive identification 
(PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the 
proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next higher 
commander for decision’.576 Poorly drafted (and unrealistic) pocket book 
language of this nature is not helpful for the soldier on the spot and comments 
made regularly to journalists by individual US servicemen stationed in Iraq 
suggest formal ROE were not held in great respect nor enforced with much 
vigour.577 The result appears to have been a complete collapse of the ROE system 
in some situations, with US troops openly admitting in interviews with the
to overpower him. Asking him why he is trying, single-handed, to delay a US military convoy is 
not included in the list of steps to be taken.
575 Somalia Inquiry Report, Vol. 2, Chapter 21.
576 Human Rights Watch, O ff Target, 99-100.
577 See The Times, 15.04.04; Daily Telegraph, 26.04.04; and The Economist, 01.01.05.
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international media to firing on unarmed civilians thought to be in some way 
connected with insurgents.
There is some evidence to suggest that among both Russian troops serving in 
Chechnya in 1995 and US troops serving in Iraq in 2003, a counter-culture in 
conflict with both military professionalism and with the stated political objectives 
of their governments was allowed to develop unchecked. That young servicemen 
should display a degree of bravado in front of journalists or other civilians is only 
to be expected. But in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, an officer could sensibly have 
suggested that bandanas with the slogan ‘bom to kill* should have been removed 
before Russian troops (said to be in Chechnya to ‘restore constitutional order’) 
began giving interviews to the eminent human rights group Memorial519 
Likewise, in Iraq in 2003, it might have been wise for an officer to have had a 
quiet word with the US marine wearing a helmet emblazoned with the slogan ‘kill 
‘em all’, at least before he was captured on film by a photographer from The 
Guardian.5*0
5.5. Conclusions
It is submitted that internal procedures for promoting and enforcing rules of 
international law in relation to precautions in attack which it will usually be 
reasonable to expect of states include the following:
■ when troops are deployed abroad, the publication of a formal order from 
the senior commander in theatre concerning compliance with the law of 
armed conflict;
■ carefully drafted ROE, focussing in particular on what is to be understood 
by ‘self-defence’ and ‘hors de combat’;
578 See The Economist, 01.01.05.
579 See Memorial’s report Vsyemi Imyeushchimisya Sredstvami, Chapter 8.
580 See front page of The Guardian Weekly, 03.04.03- 09.04.03.
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■ the distribution of pocket cards, summarizing the main points of the ROE 
for all troops deployed on active service and issued with weapons;
■ practical, pre-deployment training on ROE for all weapon-bearing troops;
■ the provision of a basic introduction to the law of armed conflict for all 
military personnel, plus dissemination of the basic rules in suitable written 
form, and regular testing on the subject;
■ the provision of a relatively advanced (but short) course on the law of 
armed conflict for commanders;
■ establishment of procedures for ensuring that allegations of violations of 
the rules reach military legal advisers, independent of the chain of 
command, at a relatively early stage;
■ an effective and credible court martial system.
Procedures which can reasonably be expected of armed opposition groups will 
depend greatly on the context, but are likely to include, as a bare minimum:
■ as above, a basic introduction to the law of armed conflict for all weapons 
bearers;
■ a procedure for conducting investigations into alleged violations of the 
basic rules on precautions in attack and for taking the necessary action 
when allegations prove well-founded;
■ a system whereby weapons bearers have to account to commanders for 
ammunition used.
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6. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS 
OF THE OBLIGATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK
...if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a 
person loses his life, he is not guilty o f  that person’s death, whereas, i f  he be 
occupied with something unlawful or even with something lawful but without due 
care, he does not escape being guilty o f murder i f  his action results in someone’s 
death.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia //-//,
Question 64, Eighth Article.
On 31 January 2005, Pavle Strugar, a former lieutenant-general of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), was sentenced by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to eight years’ imprisonment, having 
been found guilty of attacks on civilians and destruction or wilful damage done to 
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, 
historic monuments and works of art and science, in violation of the laws of 
war.581 The Tribunal found that Strugar had failed to take the ‘necessary and 
reasonable measures’582 to prevent or to punish unlawful attacks on civilians and 
protected property by forces under his command during a military operation in 
December 1991, in which the Old Town of Dubrovnik was extensively damaged 
by artillery fire. In March 2004, Miodrag Jokic, Strugar’s immediate subordinate, 
was sentenced by the ICTY to seven years’ imprisonment for his part in the same 
operation.583 Four months previously, in December 2003, Stanislav Galic, a 
former major-general in the Bosnian-Serb army, was sentenced by the ICTY to 
twenty years’ imprisonment for implementing a deliberate campaign of terror 
against the civilian population of Sarajevo during the two-year long siege of that
C O A
city by forces under his command.
581 Prosecutor v. Strugar (Trial Judgement) (2005), ICTY.
582 See ICTY Statute, article 7(3).
583 Prosecutor v. Jokic (Sentencing Judgement) (2004), ICTY.
584 Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgement) (2003), ICTY.
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A novel feature of Galic, Jokic and Strugar from the perspective of 
international criminal law is that unlike defendants in most previous war crimes 
trials before international tribunals, the defendants in these cases were not 
convicted for crimes committed against persons directly within their power (or 
that of forces under their command), but for the killing of non-combatants and the 
destruction of protected property from a distance in the context of conventional 
military engagements.585 Though the distance involved in these cases was no 
more than a few kilometres, this element complicated the task of the Trial 
Chambers in assessing whether, and if so to what degree, the killing of civilians 
and (in Jokic and Strugar) the destruction of cultural property which formed the 
basis of the indictments was intentional. A related interesting feature of these 
cases is that the Trial Chambers concerned inferred the necessary mens rea for 
criminal conviction to a major extent from the precise way in which two standard 
military operations had been conducted and controlled: the sustained siege of a 
defended town, and the capture from enemy troops of a tactically important, 
fortified hill.
It seems opportune in the light of this jurisprudence to examine whether there 
might now be circumstances in which failure to take the legally required 
precautions in attack could lead to criminal conviction on the international legal 
plane in the event of an international criminal tribunal being able to take 
jurisdiction over the alleged offender. This chapter looks first at some general 
principles of criminal law concerning the relationship between intent and crime, 
and at the particular conceptual difficulties which ‘combat crimes’ pose against 
this background. It then looks at the special form of criminal liability in 
international criminal law which has emerged from the doctrine of command 
responsibility. Finally, it considers the implications of the judgements in Galic,
585 In US v. Wilhelm List et. al. (1948) (Military Tribunal, Nuremberg), convictions for wanton 
destruction of property and unlawful killing of civilians related to the deliberate burning (at close 
range) of civilian houses and the killing of civilians as reprisal measures in occupied territory. 
Likewise in Kordic and Cerkez, although the ICTY initially convicted the defendants for attacks 
against civilians and civilian property using artillery, as well as for the deliberate burning of 
civilian houses and killing of civilians at close range, on appeal the convictions relating to artillery 
attacks were overturned (see Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez (Appeal Judgement) (2004), ICTY, 
paras.421, 472, 477,487, 525-526, 535, 554, 557-558, 562, 563, 566, 568, 570, 574-575, 580, 586 
and 589).
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Jokic and Strugar for military commanders in the event of these cases being 
considered persuasive precedents by other courts.
The chapter focuses on the potential criminal liability on the international 
plane of individuals for failure to take the precautions in attack required by 
international law, whether in international armed conflicts or internal conflicts.586 
It does not consider their potential civil liability under the municipal law of 
certain states for harm caused by such conduct.587
6.1. Crime, intention and combat
a) Crime, mens rea, and degrees o f intention
The legal maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea may not go back to
coo
Roman times, but it goes back a long way and exercises a powerful influence 
on both common and civil law criminal justice systems. It reflects the traditional 
view that normally a person should not be convicted of a criminal offence unless 
it can be shown not only that he has caused or contributed to a harmful act 
prohibited by law (actus reus), but that he has done so with the necessary degree 
of mental guilt (mens rea) in relation to the act in question to warrant the 
punishment and stigma which normally follow criminal conviction. The principle
586 The principle that individuals may be held criminally responsible under international law for 
certain violations of the law of armed conflict during internal conflicts is now enshrined in the ICC 
Statute as well as ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence. It is also reflected in the domestic criminal 
codes of several states (for details of the latter, and relevant national jurisprudence, see Thomas 
Graditzky, ‘Individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in non-international armed conflicts’ (1998), IRRC).
587 In theory, failure to take the legally required precautions in attack might lead to civil 
proceedings before a competent domestic court instead or as well as criminal proceedings on the 
domestic or international plane. US courts might in principle be able to hear such cases, by virtue 
of the US Alien Tort Claims Statute of 1999 (28 USC 1350), giving US district courts ‘original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the US’. In English law, although traditionally enemy aliens resident in 
enemy territory have been unable to bring proceedings before an English court if a state of war 
existed at the material time between the UK and the state of the plaintiff, it was established in a 
case heard in July 2005 that civil suits could be brought before English courts by ‘enemy aliens’ if 
relations between the UK and the state of the plaintiff at the material time did not amount to ‘a 
state of war in the technical sense’ (Ahmed Amin v. Brown (2005), Chancery Division (UK)).
588 Albin Eser, ‘Mental Elements -  Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law’, in International criminal 
law: a commentary on the Rome Statute fo r  an International Criminal Court (Oxford, 2001), eds. 
Antonio Cassese et.al., 890.
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is an important bulwark against the savagery of purely retaliatory justice. That 
said, both common and civil law systems recognize, at least to some extent, the 
notion of criminal responsibility without the need for a defendant to be shown to 
have had mens rea. And where crimes for which mens rea on the part of a 
defendant does need to be shown are concerned, the nature of the mental element 
needing to be demonstrated can vary considerably.
Common law systems and mens rea.
In criminal trials in common law systems, conviction for serious crimes is 
seldom possible unless it is found that a defendant’s conduct was voluntary, and 
he either consciously intended the actus reus or acted recklessly, not intending the 
actus reus, but acting with culpable indifference to the likelihood of it occurring,
cog
with no justification for taking the risk. It is not usually necessary that a 
defendant should have known he was committing a crime,590 nor that he should 
have desired the outcome of the actus reus, for instance if he acted not in pursuit 
of a particular outcome, but to avoid some kind of unpleasantness.
In the United States, recklessness is normally considered to involve a 
conscious decision to take an unjustifiable risk.591 English criminal law, by 
contrast, distinguishes between two forms of recklessness: acting in the 
knowledge that a harmful result is likely to ensue and going ahead anyway 
(‘Cunningham’, or ‘advertent’ recklessness); and acting in a way that is in fact 
likely to produce the harmful result, yet without having given any thought at all to 
the consequences (‘Caldwell’ or ‘Lawrence’ recklessness). What is excluded 
altogether from the common law concept of recklessness is acting in the mistaken
589 For an overview of the role of mens rea in English criminal law, see Smith and Hogan: 
Criminal Law (10th Edition) (London, 2003), ed. J. C. Smith, Chapter 5 (Hereinafter ‘Smith and 
Hoganr). For a US perspective, see George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts o f Criminal Law (New 
York, 1998).
590 Smith and Hogan, 97-101.
591 Fletcher, Basic Concepts, 115-116.
592 Smith and Hogan, 77-84.
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belief that one’s actions will not cause the harmful act in question nor be likely to
CQl
do so, even if this mistaken belief is unreasonable.
Although the normal requirement for criminal conviction in common law 
systems is a finding of mens rea in the form of either intention or recklessness, a 
finding of negligence may be sufficient to ground a conviction for certain crimes. 
‘Crimes of negligence’ in common law systems tend to relate to conduct which, 
though normally attributable to incompetence or inattentiveness rather than malice 
or recklessness, can cause such harm that criminalization irrespective of intent is 
considered by lawmakers to be both justified and necessary.594 They include so- 
called crimes of strict liability, normally set out by statute, and also the crime of 
manslaughter or negligent homicide, for which a person may be convicted on the 
basis of a finding of gross negligence.595 In some common law jurisdictions, such 
as New Zealand, an approach has developed in relation to some crimes whereby 
once the actus reus has been proved, criminal responsibility can be presumed 
without the need for mens rea to be demonstrated, unless the person to whom the 
harmful act is attributed can rebut the presumption that he may properly be held 
responsible for it by showing that there were reasonable grounds for his failure to 
be aware of or to foresee the relevant facts.596 This approach, also envisaged in 
relation to certain statutory crimes in other common law jurisdictions,597 has been 
described as a kind of ‘half-way house’ between crimes requiring mens rea and
CQO
crimes of strict liability. ‘Crimes of negligence’ are the exception, however, 
and common law systems remain antipathetic to the notion of serious crime 
without mens rea in the traditional sense.599
593 See e.g. R. v. Lamb (1967), Queen’s Bench Division (UK). See also Smith and Hogan, 108.
594 Examples in English law are a number of motoring crimes and various crimes related to food 
safety and environmental pollution.
595 For details on the mens rea requirement for the crime of manslaughter in English law, see Smith 
and Hogan, 385-387.
596 Smith and Hogan, 136-137.
597 See e.g. the UK’s 1968 Trade Description Act.
598 Smith and Hogan, 136-137.
599 See Smith and Hogan, 488, referring to the House of Lords ruling in B (a minor) v. DPP. See 
also Fletcher, Basic Concepts, 116.
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Civil law systems and mens rea
Civil law systems, like common law systems, normally require demonstration 
of mens rea for serious criminal convictions. But the conceptual approach is 
slightly different. Rather than subdividing degrees of intention into three broad 
categories of intent, recklessness and negligence, civil law draws on five 
concepts: dolus directus (first degree); dolus directus (second degree); dolus 
eventualis; conscious negligence; and unconscious negligence.600
Dolus directus (first degree) is the state of mind of the person who 
intentionally causes harm he has both foreseen and desired. Dolus directus 
(second degree) is the state of mind of the person who intentionally causes harm 
he has foreseen, but not desired in itself, or at least which it was not his primary 
intention to cause. Dolus eventualis is the state of mind of the person who causes 
harm he understood to have been likely (though not certain) to ensue from his 
action and accepted, though did not desire. Conscious negligence is the state of 
mind of the person who knowingly acts dangerously, causing harm he nonetheless 
neither foresaw nor desired. Unconscious negligence is the state of mind of the 
perpetrator of a harmful act who acts dangerously, and thereby causes harm, but 
without having been aware of the dangerousness of his conduct on account of a 
failure to give proper consideration to its possible consequences.601
Dolus directus in the first degree will clearly pass the mens rea test. Dolus 
directus in the second degree may or may not do so, depending probably on the 
extent to which the primary intention is seen as sufficiently meritorious to excuse 
the secondary intention. Dolus eventualis, likewise, though it may sometimes be 
considered a form of mens rea,602 may in some circumstances fail the mens rea 
test. An example of dolus eventualis falling short of mens rea would be the state 
of mind of a person administering cardio-pulmonary resuscitation to a casualty in 
the knowledge that the force being used to keep the heart pumping might well 
fracture a rib.
600 See Eser, ‘Mental Elements’, 905-908.
601 Ibid.
602 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Appeal Judgement) (2004), ICTY, para.39.
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Although conscious negligence is sometimes described as the civil law 
equivalent of the common law notion of recklessness, it is not quite the same. 
Unlike the person acting with Cunningham recklessness (or with dolus 
eventualis), who knows harm is likely to ensue from his actions, and unlike the 
person acting with Caldwell recklessness, who has given no consideration at all to 
the consequences of his action, the person acting with conscious negligence will 
have considered the consequences of his behaviour but may have concluded 
optimistically that while his conduct was dangerous, harm was not in fact likely to 
ensue. Conscious negligence thus represents a combination of indifference and 
poor judgement, straddling the boundary between the common law concepts of 
recklessness and negligence. Whether or not this state of mind will pass the mens 
rea test is likely to depend on whether indifference or poor judgement is 
perceived to have been the dominant cause of the harm. Unconscious negligence 
is seldom likely to pass the mens rea test where serious crime is concerned.
International criminal law and mens rea
Though mens rea is approached slightly differently by common law and civil 
law systems, it is normally considered important in both systems that the state of 
mind of a criminal defendant in relation to the wrongful act in question at the 
relevant time should be determined with care before a verdict is reached. In both 
systems a spectrum of degrees of intention is recognized, with malicious intent at 
one end, total involuntariness at the other end, and several shades of grey in 
between. In any particular case, the location on this spectrum of the mental 
element necessary for criminal conviction will depend on the nature of the crime 
and of the criminal justice system.
So it is with international criminal law. Where war crimes are concerned, 
international treaties often indicate that a certain state of mind is required for an
603 As Eser implies in ‘Mental Elements’, (906).
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act to entail criminal responsibility.604 Normally the requisite mental element is 
intent or wilfulness, but there are acts which will qualify as criminal violations of 
the law if committed with a degree of mental responsibility which may be 
considered either a little less culpable than intent or rather more so.605 Some acts 
which are crimes if committed wilfully become crimes of greater gravity if 
committed with a particular purpose.606
During negotiations on the text of the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), it was decided to include a provision 
requiring the demonstration of the requisite ‘mental element’ before any 
conviction.607 It is noteworthy that the term ‘mental element’ was preferred over 
the term 'mens rea This may reflect the fact that in relation to many war crimes, 
the mental element necessary for conviction by the ICC is more demanding than 
mens rea in the traditional sense,608 while in some circumstances, a person may be 
held criminally responsible for crimes which he knew or should have known 
about, but in relation to which he personally had no mens rea at all.609
It was also decided that the provision on the mental element of crimes would 
not cover the concept of recklessness, on the grounds that as the term was not 
used in the Statute’s catalogue of crimes, this was unnecessary.610 The reluctance 
of states to give the ICC express jurisdiction to find criminal responsibility for 
war crimes on the grounds of recklessness is understandable. But the fact that the 
concept is not mentioned in the Rome Statute does not mean it has been banished 
altogether from international criminal law. The ICRC Commentary to Additional 
Protocol I indicates that for the purposes of its ‘grave breaches’ provision, the
604 See e.g. Additional Protocol I, article 85 (paras.3 and 4), ICTY Statute, article 2(a), (c) and (f) 
and articles 8.2 and 30 of the Rome Statute.
605 See Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 898-900.
606 E.g. the crime of genocide (see 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, article II, ICTR Statute, article 2.2 and Rome Statute, article 6) and the crime 
of causing terror (see Galic,(Trial Judgement), para. 136). For further discussion of ‘specific 
intent’ crimes, see Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 900-902.
607 See article 30. See also Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 890.
608 See Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 946.
609 See Rome Statute, article 28. Whether this article will in fact be interpreted as allowing 
convictions without mens rea in the traditional sense remains to be seen.
610 Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 932. See also Roger Clark, ‘The mental element in international 
criminal law: the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences’ 
(2001), Criminal Law Forum, 314-315.
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term ‘wilfully’ should be understood as encompassing the concepts of wrongful 
intent and recklessness, though defines the latter somewhat loosely as ‘the attitude 
of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the 
possibility [sic] of it happening’.611 Sometimes citing this passage of the 
Commentary,612 the ICTY has not shied away from the practice of considering 
recklessness as a form of intent. According to the Trial Chamber in Strugar.
It is now settled that the mens rea [for the crimes of wilful killing and murder] is not 
confined to cases where the accused has a direct intent to kill or to cause serious 
bodily harm, but also extends to cases where the accused has what is often referred 
to as an indirect intent...
.. .to prove murder, it must be established that death resulted from an act or omission 
of the accused, committed with the intent either to kill or, in the absence of such a 
specific intent, in the knowledge that death is a probable consequence of the act or 
omission. 613
According to a report prepared by members of the Office of the Prosecutor, where 
the crimes of attacks not directed at military objectives and attacks which cause 
disproportionate collateral damage are concerned, ‘the mens rea for the offence is 
intention or recklessness, not simple negligence’.614
The Tribunal’s approach to the concept of recklessness has nonetheless been 
cautious. The Appeals Chamber has clarified that criminal responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law will not be engaged by ‘the 
knowledge of any kind of risk’ and that attacks which cause collateral damage as 
a result of bad military judgement are not necessarily crimes.615 While accepting 
the position of the ICRC Commentary that recklessness should be seen as a form 
of wilfulness for the purposes of establishing the necessary mens rea for 
conviction for some serious violations of international humanitarian law, the
611 ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols), para.3474. Nonetheless, some violations of the 
Protocol, notably launching indiscriminate attacks, will only be ‘grave breaches’ if committed with 
knowledge that excessive collateral damage will result; mere recklessness will not suffice. (ICRC 
Commentary, 3479). See also Galic (Trial Judgement) para.59.
612 E.g. in Galic (Trial Judgement), para.54 and Prosecutor v. Delalic et. al. (Trial Judgement) 
(1998), ICTY, para.437.
613 Paras.235-236.
614 ICTY Committee Report (NATO), para.28. See also paras.62 and 70.
615 Blaskic (Appeal Judgement), paras.41 and 463.
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Tribunal has generally chosen to be guided by common law jurisprudence, rather 
the Commentary, in relation to what recklessness means.616
The ICC can be expected to be more cautious still about the circumstances in 
which recklessness may be seen as an adequate form of mens rea for conviction 
for war crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. Article 30 of 
the Rome Statute indicates that normally conviction will only be possible where 
war crimes are committed with ‘intent and knowledge’. The Statute indicates 
that intent does not have to be direct to constitute the necessary mens rea: article 
30.2(b) provides that the necessary mental element may exist if a person does not 
mean to cause a particular outcome, but is ‘aware that it will occur in the ordinary 
course of events’. This can be seen as a direct reflection of the civil law notion of 
dolus directus (second degree), but does not accommodate the concept of 
recklessness in its entirety.617 As seen above, dolus directus (second degree) is 
conceptually distinguishable both from the common law notion of advertent 
recklessness and the civil law notion of dolus eventualis. It is further removed 
still from the concepts of ‘Caldwell recklessness’ and conscious negligence.
It may, however, prove difficult in practice for the Court to distinguish 
evidence that a person believed a certain outcome (such as avoidable or excessive 
non-combatant casualties) would occur in the ordinary course of events from
* £ 1 Qevidence that a person simply believed such an outcome was likely. (The 
former state of mind would be sufficient mens rea for most of the crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction; the latter would not). What seems beyond doubt is that 
the Statute will prevent the Court from convicting in circumstances where it is 
clear that a defendant considered a certain outcome possible, but not likely. It 
would also appear to be difficult under the terms of the Statute (if not impossible) 
for the Court to convict a defendant of a war crime were it to appear that neither
616 See e.g. Blaskic (Appeal Judgement), paras.34-39.
617 See Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 915-916. See also Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger 
“ Unless otherwise provided’: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the mental element of crimes 
under international criminal law’ (2005), Journal o f  International Criminal Justice.
618 Robert Cryer suggests the Rome Statute deliberately departs from customary law in setting a 
new standard for the degree of conscious and culpable acquiescence in a crime needed for criminal 
conviction by the ICC. (See ‘General Principles of Liability in International Criminal Law’, in 
McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly, The Permanent International Criminal Court).
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he, nor (if the defendant is being tried on account of the conduct of his 
subordinates) the direct perpetrator gave any thought at all to the possible 
consequences of his actions.
b) Mens rea and *combat crimes’
\
There is nothing controversial about the notion that combatants have no 
automatic entitlement, by virtue of their profession, to use the force at their 
disposal as they please without fear of prosecution. But while the notion that a 
combatant should face prosecution if he robs an enemy civilian for personal gain 
or in revenge kills a defenceless prisoner of war is unlikely to provoke serious 
dissent, unease is often expressed publicly as well as privately when combatants 
face the prospect of prosecution for ‘unlawful killing’ or ‘wanton destruction’ 
carried out ostensibly in the line of duty and patently not for personal gain or 
gratification, particularly if this leads to trial in civilian courts.619
In earlier times, it might have been plausible to argue that by and large 
criminal law did not apply to combatants in the heat of battle. The argument was 
that combat, by its very nature, consisted of acts normally considered criminal, 
thus rendering absurd the idea of prosecution for combat activity. That position is 
no longer tenable. War crimes trials after the Second World War and ICTY 
jurisprudence have shown that combatants can be held to account by criminal 
tribunals for unlawful acts of violence committed not only in the margins of an 
armed conflict, but while actively engaged with enemy forces.620 The creation of 
the ICC, with its wide-ranging jurisdiction, raises the prospect that such trials may 
become more common.
Though the case law in this area is in its infancy, it is clear already that a 
difficulty with prosecuting ‘combat crime’ is how to identify and demonstrate the
619 See e.g. the record of the debate in the House of Lords on 14.07.05 on the question of war 
crimes prosecutions of British troops serving in Iraq (Hansard, 14.07.05, Column 1220).
620 See e.g. US v Wilhelm List et. al. (Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1948), Kordic and Cerkez, 
(Appeal Judgement) , Blaskic (Appeal Judgement) , Galic (Trial Judgement) , Jokic (Sentencing 
Judgement) and Strugar (Trial Judgement).
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necessary mental element for a finding of guilt in relation to a crime alleged to 
have been committed in the heat of battle. The difficulty can be broken down 
into three elements: fractured responsibility; reflexive action; and double-effect 
decisions. The point of raising these difficulties is not to suggest that ‘combat 
crimes’ cannot or should not be prosecuted, but to underline the need for extreme 
caution and considerable specialized expertise if judgements in this area are to 
command respect.
Institutional decision-making and the fracturing o f responsibility
When a person is unlawfully killed in peacetime, responsibility can usually be 
restricted if not to one person alone, to a small and finite group of persons 
considered to have ordered, perpetrated or assisted in the killing and whose guilt 
can be determined individually in terms of each person’s contribution to the crime 
and degree of culpable intent. This is seldom so when non-combatants are 
unlawfully killed on the battlefield. If, in the course of an attack on combatants 
sheltering in an enemy village, a soldier throws a grenade into a room containing 
no-one but unarmed civilians and kills them, it could plausibly be considered, for 
instance by a local coroner, that the civilians had been unlawfully killed. But if it 
came to bringing a prosecution, whether on the national or international plane, the 
number of people who might be considered at least partially responsible, in 
addition to the soldier himself, might run into the hundreds as consideration came 
to be given to the orders, training, equipment, information, possibly even the
ft) 1 • •drugs, given to the soldier, the manner in which the operation was planned, and 
the precautions taken or not taken before the attack on the village was launched. 
In such a situation not only is responsibility for the deaths of the civilians 
scattered amongst a vast quantity of people, but it may also be that not a single 
one, including the soldier who threw the grenade, actually wanted or intended the
621 Misuse of powerful analgesic drugs issued to Russian troops for first aid purposes was said to 
have contributed to the ill-discipline shown by those who took part in an operation in the Chechen 
village of Samashki in 1995 which left more than 100 civilians dead (see Memorial, Vsyemi 
Imyeushchimisya Sredstvami). Likewise, after the mistaken attack on Canadian troops near 
Kandahar by a US pilot in 2002, concerns were expressed in the media that amphetamines 
officially distributed to US combat pilots may have contributed to the error ( “ Friendly fire’ pilots 
took ‘go’ pills’, BBC Online, 15.01.03).
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civilians to be killed. Many of the same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to 
the unlawful destruction in combat of protected property.
Reflexive action and mens rea
In combat situations, the deaths of non-combatants and destruction of 
protected property will often be the result of decisions taken in the heat of the 
moment, on the basis of inadequate information, by people under extreme stress. 
The cognitive concepts on which criminal convictions in peacetime often rely, 
such as ‘malice aforethought’, or ‘intent permanently to deprive’, might seem to 
belong to another, more leisurely world. That is not to say it is impossible for a 
combatant in these circumstances to take a decision based on sheer malice. But 
often those in combat situations will be acting reflexively, rather than reflectively, 
and on the basis of fast and aggressive reflexes deliberately developed by the 
military organization to which they belong.
Specifically, modem combat troops may have been trained to open fire 
instinctively, within a split second, in response to certain visual stimuli. After a 
post-Second World War study found that a large proportion of US combat troops 
had never actually fired their weapons throughout the war, even in situations of 
mortal danger, efforts were made by the US military to develop training 
techniques that would reduce the proportion of ‘non-firers’ among the infantry, 
for instance by the use of ‘pop-up’ targets, which soldiers would be rewarded for 
shooting at as soon as they appeared.622 Modem technology has made such 
training more sophisticated, but the objective usually remains the same: to 
encourage prompt and effective use of lethal force on the battlefield and 
discourage hesitation - the result sometimes being that highly trained troops ‘kill
f/)*!
without taking the conscious decision to do so’.
622 See Kilner ‘Military Leaders’ Obligation to Justify Killing in War’, citing S. L. A. Marshall 
Men Against Fire: the Problem o f Battle Command in Future War (New York, 1961).
623 Kilner, ‘Military Leaders’ Obligation to Justify Killing in War’.
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Combatants themselves would probably be the first to object to the idea that 
on the battlefield they cannot, because of their training, properly be considered 
moral agents and should be treated by the criminal law as if they were robots. It 
seems unlikely that a combatant charged with unlawful killing or destruction on 
the battlefield would consider a defence of automatism or that if he did, that such 
a defence would succeed. But it would seem contrary to natural justice for the 
influence of automatic reflexive responses and battle stress on combatants to be 
disregarded entirely in consideration of the mens rea aspect of an unlawful act of 
violence on the battlefield. Whereas it would seldom if ever be appropriate for 
such considerations to form the basis for an acquittal or a decision not to 
prosecute, they may be relevant as mitigating factors at the stage of sentencing in 
the event of a guilty verdict.624 Unlawful acts of violence regularly committed as 
a result of reflexive action or battle stress may also point to systemic failures 
within the unit to which the offenders belong. In such a case, the military 
organization in question might be the more appropriate object of legal 
proceedings than the individual combatants directly responsible for the acts.
Double effect decisions
In the Einsatzgruppen judgment, rendered by a US Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg in 1948, the judges reasoned:
A city is bombed for tactical purposes: communications are to be destroyed, 
railroads wrecked, ammunition plants demolished, factories razed all for the 
purpose of impeding the military. In these operations, it inevitably happens that 
non-military persons are killed. This is an incident, a grave incident to be sure, but 
an unavoidable corollary of hostile battle action. The civilians are not 
individualized. The bomb falls, it is aimed at the railroad yards, houses along the 
tracks are hit and many of their occupants killed. But that is entirely different, 
both in fact and in law, from an armed force marching up to these same railroad 
tracks, entering those houses abutting thereon, dragging out the men, women and 
children and shooting them’.625
624 Unlike common law systems, international criminal law recognizes no crime o f ‘manslaughter’: 
killing is either lawful or unlawful. The culpability of an unlawful killing will normally be 
considered at the sentencing stage (in the event of a guilty verdict), but is not considered to affect 
the nature of the crime.
625 US v. Ohlendorf et. al. (Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1948).
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This rather crude approach to the relationship between intent and criminal 
responsibility was presumably formulated more with an eye to countering any 
suggestions that the bombardment of German cities by the Allies should be 
considered as a war crime than with an eye to describing universally 
acknowledged principles of criminal law. There was nothing new in 1948 about 
the notion that criminal responsibility might in some circumstances accrue to a 
person causing the death of another by failing to take sufficient care while 
engaged in a lawful activity. It has in the meantime become an established 
principle of treaty and customary law that causing collateral damage in the course 
of an attack on a military objective, if such damage is excessive in relation to the
ffl f\concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack, is unlawful,
f/yn
and may in some circumstances engage criminal responsibility.
A consequence of this is that a combatant may now, in principle, be 
prosecuted for causing ‘excessive’ collateral damage in the course of an attack if a 
case can be made that the collateral damage was clearly excessive in relation to 
the anticipated military advantage and known by the attacker to be so.628 In 
parallel, a novel defence has become available which may be termed the defence 
of ‘excusable collateral damage’. It may take two forms: first, the defendant 
claims he did not intend or anticipate that any non-combatants at all would be 
killed or injured or any protected property damaged; secondly, he claims that 
although he had anticipated collateral damage as possible, probable, or even 
inevitable, he had considered it would not be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.629
In the event of a person accused before a competent tribunal of unlawful 
attacks on protected persons or property relying on such a defence, the tribunal 
would probably not wish to convict without satisfying itself that the attacker had 
in fact anticipated excessive collateral damage, given the normal requirement in 
serious criminal trials for mens rea of some kind to be established. Direct
626 Additional Protocol I, article 51.5(b) and 57.2(a).iii.
627 Ibid., article 85.3, Rome Statute, article 8.2(b)(iv).
628 See Rome Statute article 8.2(b)(iv).
629 The defence was advanced before the ICTY in Galic and also in Strugar, in both of which cases 
it received short shrift since the Trial Chambers were unconvinced by the evidence that the attacks 
in question had in fact been aimed at military objectives.
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evidence of the requisite mental attitude is unlikely to be forthcoming, however: it 
is more likely that the mental element needed to establish the crime will need to 
be inferred from circumstantial evidence. In its simplest form, such evidence 
might be the extent and location of collateral damage, with a tribunal choosing to 
conclude that to a lesser or greater degree, what had been hit was what had been 
targeted. Less crudely, the evidence might take the form of indications that a 
relatively indiscriminate means of attack had been decided upon for no good 
reason, or that an attack had been knowingly planned for a time when non- 
combatants would be present, with no proper military justification for such 
timing. If the defendant were shown to have foreseen and accepted the prospect 
of collateral damage which, though not obviously excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, could nonetheless easily have 
been avoided, there seems no reason why a tribunal should not consider this too as 
evidence of mens rea sufficient for criminal conviction for intentionally directing 
attacks against protected persons or objects. As the civil law concept of dolus 
directus (second degree) recognizes, harm can be considered to have been 
intentionally caused if it was foreseen and accepted by the perpetrator as an 
inevitable consequence of his conduct, even if causing it was not his primary 
intention. Whether or not dolus directus (second degree) will qualify as mens rea 
for a war crimes conviction in such a situation is likely to depend heavily on the 
circumstances of the case.
630 According to the ‘Elements of Crimes’ annex to the Rome Statute, intent and knowledge ‘can 
be inferred from the relevant facts and circumstances’ (ICC Statute, Elements of Crimes, General 
Introduction, para.4). Eser warns, ‘it appears questionable whether conclusions from the objective 
commission of a crime to the presence of the relevant mental element can be drawn as easily as 
suggested by the Preparatory Commission’s Elements in allowing that the “existence of intent and 
knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances”. If at all, such an inference 
would be feasible as a procedural device, but not in terms of substantive substitute for intent’
(Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 903).
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6.2. Command responsibility and criminal liability for negligence in 
combat
a) Historical antecedents o f the command responsibility doctrine
It is a well-established principle of international criminal law that a military 
commander may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by his 
subordinates if it can be shown that he ordered, participated in, instigated or 
otherwise aided or abetted such crimes.631 More broadly, a commander is 
responsible under international law for ensuring the proper conduct of those under 
his command; this latter duty of commanders has been established by long- 
standing custom and is reflected in international treaties.
These two respects in which a commander may be said to be responsible for
the acts of his subordinates are logically distinct. But a third, hybrid form of
responsibility exists in the form of the doctrine peculiar to the law of armed
conflict, according to which a commander or superior may be held criminally
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates, even if he was not, strictly
speaking, a participant in or accessory to the crimes, if it can be demonstrated that
he knew or had reason to know of such crimes and failed in his duty to prevent or
• • •punish them. It is this form of criminal responsibility, effectively a form of 
criminal liability for negligence,634 which can be considered command 
responsibility proper for the purposes of international criminal law, as opposed to
631 See US v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al (1948) Military Tribunal, Nuremberg; ICTY Statute, article 
7(1); ICTR Statute, article 6(1); and Rome Statute, article 25.
632 See Hague Regulations, article 1 and Additional Protocol I, article 87.
633 See e.g. Additional Protocol I, article 86.
634 On this point see Eser, ‘Mental elements’, 903. However an ICTR Appeals Chamber has 
warned of the danger of ‘confusion of thought’ if command responsibility is referred to as a form 
of responsibility for negligence, since for the criminal responsibility of a commander to be 
incurred for the conduct of his subordinates, he should have either deliberately failed to discharge 
his duties as a superior, or ‘culpably’ (sic) or ‘wilfully’ disregarded them (Prosecutor v. 
Bagilishema (Appeals Judgement) (2002), ICTR, paras.34-37, echoed in Blaskic (Appeal 
Judgement), 63). The disjunction of ‘culpably’ and ‘wilfully’ begs the question of what form of 
mens rea is envisaged by the Tribunals for command responsibility: what is probably meant is not 
that command responsibility may never be considered a form of liability for negligence, but that 
(commensurate with the approach to mens rea of many municipal criminal law systems) only 
gross negligence should entail the criminal responsibility of a commander for criminal conduct of 
his subordinates in which he was not a direct participant.
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the criminal responsibility which a commander, like anyone else, will incur if 
found to have been an accessory to crime.
International criminal law seems unclear about whether, for a commander or 
superior to be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by his 
subordinates, it needs to be shown that he knew (or had reason to know) of their 
activities, or whether it is sufficient for it to be argued successfully that in his 
position he should have known of such activities. The confusion can be traced to 
the post-Second World War trial of the Japanese general Tomoyuki Yamashita. It 
was in this judgment, rendered not by a judicial body but by a US Military 
Commission drawn from occupying forces in Manila, that the modem doctrine of 
command responsibility first emerged.636
Yamashita, who between October 1944 and September 1945 had commanded 
Japanese forces in the Philippines responsible for widespread atrocities in the 
archipelago as US forces closed in, was found guilty by the Commission of 
‘permitting’ the atrocities and sentenced to death. The judgment implies that the 
Commission considered circumstantial evidence had shown that Yamashita either 
knew of the crimes being committed by his subordinates, or wilfully remained 
ignorant of them, and that he failed to do what it was in his power to do to prevent 
the crimes. It was not, thus, a finding of strict liability. This reasoning was 
enough to satisfy a US Supreme Court majority, which (in spite of two powerful 
dissenting judgments) confirmed the judgment and sentence.
The Commission’s judgment did not, however, make clear whether the legal 
principle followed had been that a commander could be held criminally 
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates which he should have
635 On the evolution and implications of the doctrine of command responsibility see W. Hays 
Parks, ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’ (1973), Military Law Review, Greenwood, 
‘Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict’; Leslie Green, ‘Command Responsibility in 
International Humanitarian Law’ (1995), Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems', 
Howard Levie, ‘Command Responsibility’ (1998), Journal o f Legal Studies', and Kai Ambos, 
‘Superior Responsibility’ in International criminal law: a commentary on the Rome Statute fo r  an 
International Criminal Court (Oxford, 2001) eds. Antonio Cassese et.al.. See also Cryer, ‘General 
Principles of Liability in International Criminal Law’.
636 Trial o f  General Tomoyuki Yamashita, (1945) US Military Commission, Manila, and (1946) 
Supreme Court of the US.
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known about (and if so, whether this meant a positive obligation to obtain 
knowledge, or simply an obligation to take note of readily available information), 
or only for crimes which he did know about. One writer suggests that the 
principle which can be abstracted from the Yamashita judgment is that a 
commander may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by his 
subordinates which he knew or should have known about and which he failed to
f \ X ltake the feasible steps to prevent or punish. A contemporary review of the 
judgment prepared by a staff judge advocate before judgment and sentence were 
confirmed takes the more nuanced view that Yamashita’s conviction was founded 
on the basis that the evidence had shown that Yamashita either ‘knew or had the 
means to know of the commission of atrocities by members and units of his
/TOO
command’ (emphasis added). On this interpretation, Yamashita had either 
known what was happening or had been wilfully blind to readily available 
information: there could be no question of him having been convicted on the basis 
of simple negligence or incompetence, let alone strict liability. But the 
imprecision of the Commission’s judgment, and the Supreme Court’s inability or 
unwillingness to clarify the mens rea reasoning behind it, left it open to the far- 
reaching construction, by both critics and supporters alike, that commanders may 
be convicted for serious war crimes which they should have known about, given 
their position, but did not.
In striking contrast to the briskness with which Yamashita was convicted and 
sentenced was the treatment by US Military Tribunals at Nuremberg a few years 
later of senior military commanders of the Wehrmacht. In the trials of Field 
Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb and other members of the German High Command 
and of General Wilhelm List and other senior German officers who had held field 
commands in south-east Europe, scrupulous care was taken to ensure that each 
defendant was convicted and sentenced not merely on the basis of evidence of 
crimes committed by his subordinates, but on the basis of detailed evidence in
637 Levie, ‘Command Responsibility’, 10.
638 Parks, ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’, 31-32.
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relation to the extent of his own knowledge and actual powers, and the degree of 
his direct involvement or conscious acquiescence in specific crimes.639
Subsequent war crimes trials of military commanders before national tribunals 
have tended to prefer the von Leeb and List approach, requiring a commander’s 
knowledge of subordinates’ crimes (or clear wilful blindness towards such crimes) 
to be demonstrated for conviction to be possible, over the ‘knew or should have 
known’ approach associated with the Yamashita judgment.640 Though this 
caution has been criticized,641 the argument that it conflicts with customary 
international law on command responsibility is unconvincing. During 
negotiations on the text of the command responsibility article of Additional 
Protocol I, wording submitted by the Netherlands according to which 
commanders would be considered criminally responsible for crimes of their 
subordinates about which they ‘knew or should have known’ was rejected.642 
The wording finally agreed upon (‘knew or had information which should have 
enabled them to conclude’ (‘leur permettant de cone lure’)),643 owes more to Von 
Leeb and List than to Yamashita and can be seen to reflect widespread resistance 
to any appearance of the criminalization of simple negligence.
639 US v. Wilhelm von Leeb et. al. (1948), US Military Tribunal V, Nuremberg, 543-544. US v. 
Wilhelm List et. al. (1948), US Military Tribunal V, Nuremberg, 1261, 1286.
640 See Michael Smidt, ‘Yamashita, Medina and Beyond: Command Responsibility in 
Contemporary Military Operations’ (2000), Military Law Review.
641 Ibid. Smidt argues that the Yamashita ‘knew or should have known’ standard for command 
responsibility now represents customary law and not the more cautious standard which has usually 
been preferred by US courts martial (eg that of Captain Ernest Medina in 1971), according to 
which actual knowledge by a superior of a subordinate’s crimes needs to be shown for that 
superior to incur criminal responsibility.
642 See Parks, ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’, 95, who observes that the ‘knew or 
should have known’ standard was that favoured in war crimes trials conducted in the Soviet Union 
after the Second World War.
643 The fact that the original French text, unlike the ambiguous English version, contains no 
equivalent of the word ‘should’ provides support for the argument that the article was not intended 
to impose on commanders criminal liability for negligence beyond the gross negligence of 
ignoring relevant information in their possession.
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b) Command responsibility and the ad hoc tribunals
Against this background, it comes as some surprise to see Yamashita being 
cited with approval in two recent ICTY cases.644 Nonetheless, the command 
responsibility doctrine set out in the ICTY and ICTR statutes in fact comes closer 
to the reasoning in von Leeb and List. According to article 7(3) of the ICTY 
Statute:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility i f  
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts 
or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. (Emphasis 
added).
The ICTR Statute contains an almost identical provision (article 6(3)).
The requirement for it to be established that the superior ‘knew or had reason 
to know’ of the crimes in question and failed to take the ‘necessary and reasonable 
measures’ to prevent them or to punish the perpetrators provides an important 
safeguard against the conviction of a commander with no knowledge or 
information at his immediate disposal about the misdeeds of his subordinates, or 
with no means of preventing them, while making it impossible for a commander 
to place himself beyond the reach of the law by deliberately keeping himself 
ignorant of his subordinates’ actions. The jurisprudence has clarified that the 
‘knew or had reason to know’ standard means a superior may be held criminally 
responsible for the acts of his subordinates only if it is shown either that he had 
actual knowledge of these acts, or that specific information was available to him 
which would have provided notice that offences had been or were likely to be 
committed by his subordinates.645
644 See Hadjihasanovic (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to 
Command Responsibility) (2003), ICTY, para.23 and Strugar (Trial Judgement), n.1099 in support 
of para.376. See also Smidt, who considers ‘ Yamashita is the rule in both [ad hoc] tribunals’
(206).
645 See Delalic et. al (Trial Judgement), paras.379-393 and Delalic et. al.(Appeal Judgement), 
paras.230-240. See also Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez (Trial Judgement) (2001), ICTY 
para.437 and Blaskic (Appeal Judgement), paras.62 and 405-406.
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Difficulties with this approach arise, however, in cases where protected 
persons or objects are harmed in the course of active military operations. It is one 
thing to hold a commander criminally responsible for failure to prevent or punish 
an attack against protected persons or objects where it is shown not only that the 
commander knew an attack was taking place, but also that he knew civilians or 
protected property were being, or had been, deliberately targeted. It is quite 
another matter for a tribunal to convict a commander for failure to prevent or 
punish unlawful violence on the part of his subordinates when there are grounds 
for doubting his knowledge or ability to know that unlawful violence was 
occurring (or had occurred) in the context of a conventional attack on a military 
objective. Part of the problem is that in the course of a military engagement, the 
lawfulness of an artillery volley or a burst of gunfire depends not on what is in 
fact hit, but on what is aimed at and why -  about which a tribunal may speculate 
and make inferences, but which often only the direct perpetrator of the attack will 
know for certain.
The command responsibility doctrine of the ad hoc Tribunals does not require 
a commander’s failure to act to be shown to have caused or contributed 
significantly to the commission of the crimes in question for him to be found 
criminally responsible.646 Whereas a commander’s negligence in failing to 
control his subordinates has to be serious before criminal liability may be 
incurred,647 it does not have to amount, in effect, to aiding and abetting the 
crime;648 criminal responsibility may be incurred in some circumstances simply
646 See Delalic et. al. (Trial Judgement) para.398. Gunael Mettraux criticizes the ICTY approach 
for inconsistency with both precedent and legal literature on the relevance of causation.
(International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford, 2005), 309-310).
647 The ICRC Commentary (Additional Protocols) suggests that for command responsibility to be 
incurred, negligence must be so serious ‘as to amount to malicious intent’ (see para.3541). There 
is nothing in the ICTY jurisprudence, however, to suggest the Tribunal considers that malice on 
the part of a commander need be demonstrated for command responsibility to be engaged (see e.g. 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Appeal Judgement) (2000), ICTY, para. 178 and also Strugar (Trial 
Judgement)).
648 If it did amount to aiding and abetting, the commander could be found responsible for the crime 
under article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute (ICTR Statute article 6(1)). In Blaskic (Appeal 
Judgement), the Appeals Chamber gave much consideration to the mens rea on the part of a 
commander which could be considered to engage his criminal responsibility under article 7(1) for 
crimes committed by his subordinates. The fact that the Chamber considered that the defendant 
had not possessed the necessary mens rea for a finding of 7(1) responsibility as opposed to 7(3) 
responsibility to be justified on any of the counts on which he had been convicted contributed to a 
substantial reduction of his sentence (see paras.27-42).
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for failure to prevent or punish crimes committed by subordinates.649 This 
doctrine clearly gives commanders an incentive to avoid turning a blind or 
indulgent eye when subordinates appear to have violated the law of armed 
conflict, but creates the risk that unscrupulous commanders may unreasonably 
make scapegoats of their subordinates when operations miscarry.
c) Command responsibility and the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute of the ICC sets out the doctrine of command responsibility 
to be followed by the International Criminal Court in great detail. Two forms of 
command responsibility are described: that of a military commander and that of a 
civilian superior. (The criminal responsibility which commanders, like anyone 
else, will incur if found somehow to have participated directly in crimes is dealt 
with in a separate Statute article.)650
The formal recognition that civilians can exercise military command is 
consistent with ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence;651 the designation of separate 
forms of command responsibility for military personnel and civilians respectively 
is an innovation, a significant feature of which is the introduction of an apparently 
new standard of care which military commanders are expected to meet in 
preventing their subordinates from committing serious violations of the law of 
armed conflict. Article 28 (a) of the Statute provides:
A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and
649 However, in Prosecutor v. Hadjihasanovic (Interlocutory Appeal on Command Responsibility) 
(2003), ICTY, an ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified, by majority decision, that a superior may only 
be held responsible for crimes committed by subordinates when he was the superior of those 
subordinates at the material time. He cannot be convicted for failing to punish crimes committed 
by his subordinates prior to his having become their superior. (See further Christopher 
Greenwood, ‘Command responsibility and the Hadjihasanovic decision’ (2004), Journal o f  
International Criminal Justice.). It was further clarified by an Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac, 
that ‘where superior responsibility is concerned, an accused is not charged with the crimes of his 
subordinates but with his failure to carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control’ (Prosecutor 
v. Krnojelac, (Appeal Judgement) (2003), ICTY, para. 171).
650 Article 25.
651 See Delalic et. al. (Trial and Appeal Judgements), Kordic and Cerkez (Trial and Appeal 
Judgements) and Akayesu (Trial and Appeal Judgements).
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control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly over such forces, where:
i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes: and
ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution. (Emphasis added).
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals’ doctrine, the ICC doctrine appears to impose on 
commanders a positive duty to acquire a certain level of knowledge about their 
subordinates’ activities, on pain of being held criminally responsible for crimes of 
which they were in fact ignorant, but about which they ‘should have known’.
This might appear to be creating criminal liability not just for ‘gross negligence’
or ‘wilful blindness’ on the part of a commander whose subordinates commit war 
crimes, but for simple negligence.
It is questionable whether the ICC command responsibility doctrine is 
intended to be this progressive. The ‘should have known’ standard needs to be 
read in context as ‘owing to the circumstances at the time should have known’. 
What a commander ‘should have known’ depends not on the professional 
standards to be expected of a person of his rank, but on the information actually at 
his potential disposal in the circumstances. Any criminal responsibility on his 
part for war crimes committed by his subordinates will thus derive not from 
incompetent supervision, but from what can be seen as culpable indifference on 
his part to the crimes. It cannot be assumed, however, that it will always be easy 
for judges to discern the difference between a commander who is merely 
incompetent and one who is culpably indifferent to the consequences of his failure 
to exercise effective command.
Article 28 of the Rome Statute needs to be read in conjunction with article 30, 
requiring the relevant mental element for crimes described in the Statute to be 
shown to have been present before a person may be convicted. There is no strict 
liability for crimes under the Statute. A commander may in some circumstances 
be convicted by the ICC for a crime he did not intend (or perhaps even know
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about); but it will need to be shown at the very least that in view of the 
circumstances, he should have known of the crime. It will also need to be shown 
that the direct perpetrator of the crime had the necessary state of mind (normally 
wilfulness) to render the act criminal under the terms of the Statute.
In contrast to the command responsibility doctrine of the ad hoc Tribunals, the 
ICC command responsibility doctrine allows commanders to be held criminally 
responsible for crimes committed by subordinates only when it is shown either 
that they participated in these crimes, or that the crimes of their subordinates were 
the result of their own failure to exercise proper control. A causal connection 
between the commander’s acts or omissions and the crimes in question is required 
before he may be convicted for them.
6.3. Criminal responsibility and failure to take precautions in attack -  the 
ICTY case law
a) Preliminary remarks
Although the criminal law systems of many states can accommodate the 
notion of criminal responsibility for negligence to some degree, the concept of 
crimes of negligence does not appear to have passed into international criminal 
law, except to the limited extent that it can be seen in the command responsibility 
doctrine. Recent ICTY judgements in the cases of Galic, Jokic and Strugar 
suggest, however, that although it will normally be inappropriate to regard failure
652 Canada’s war crimes legislation avoids this departure from the traditional mens rea requirement 
by creating a separate offence of ‘breach of responsibility by a military commander’ (Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, ss 6-7). Thus a commander who culpably fails to 
prevent or punish crimes committed by his subordinates in which he was not a direct participant 
may be convicted of the offence of failing to exercise proper command, but not of the actual 
crimes committed by his subordinates (Turns, ‘National Implementation of the Rome Statute’,
360).
653 See article 28. Robert Cryer, having noted that states are readier to be legally adventurous 
when creating ‘safe’ tribunals which will not normally have jurisdiction over their own nationals 
than when creating ‘unsafe’ tribunals where there is a greater risk of this occurring, sees this 
element of article 28 as an example of where the Statute resiles from customary international law. 
(‘The boundaries of liability in international criminal law or ‘selectivity by stealth” (2001), JCSL). 
However the decision of the Rome Conference not to endorse the command responsibility doctrine 
of the ad hoc Tribunals in its entirety seems strong evidence in itself that the doctrine lacks 
adequate opinio juris to qualify as customary law.
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to take precautions in attack as in itself criminal, such failure may legitimately be 
submitted as evidence in support of arguments that a person had the necessary 
mens rea, in the form of intention or recklessness, to establish the existence of the 
crime of wilful attacks on protected persons or property. These three judgements 
are not altogether persuasive and it remains to be seen to what extent they will be 
confirmed on appeal.654 They will in any event have little formal authority as 
precedents: the ICC is not bound to follow ICTY jurisprudence and the ICTY 
does not have many further new cases to hear.655 But they may be turned to for 
guidance by parties involved in future cases where commanders are accused of 
unlawful attacks on civilians or protected property in the course of military 
operations and thus merit careful examination.
b) The siege o f Sarajevo -  the Galic case
Stanislav Galic, who with the rank of major-general commanded Bosnian- 
Serb forces besieging Sarajevo between 1992 and 1994, was convicted by an 
ICTY Trial Chamber in December 2003 for acts of violence aimed at spreading 
terror amongst the civilian population of Sarajevo, murder, and inhumane acts, on 
account of the civilian casualties caused by shelling and sniping attacks by forces 
under his command over a period of 23 months. The indictment included a 
schedule of 26 separate shelling and sniping incidents, which the Prosecution 
argued to have been criminal, and in relation to which it submitted evidence. The 
Prosecution claimed these incidents pointed to a deliberate campaign of terror 
waged against the civilian population of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1994 which 
extended further than these incidents alone, but of which the incidents could serve 
as indicative evidence. By majority decision, Galic was found guilty of having 
ordered and condoned unlawful shelling and sniping attacks against civilians, with 
the aim of spreading terror among the population.656
654 At the time of writing (January 2006), Jokic’s appeal against his sentence has been dismissed 
(see ICTY press release of 30.08.05), but appeals lodged by both Strugar and Galic have yet to be 
determined.
655 UNSCRs 1503 and 1534 call on the ICTY and the ICTR to complete all trial activities at first 
instance by the end of 2008 and to complete all work in 2010.
656 Judge Nieto-Navia dissented partially from the judgement on various grounds.
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Galic was convicted not for his own or his subordinates’ failure to take due 
care in the conduct of military operations, but for the wilful killing of civilians in 
the context of a campaign aimed deliberately at terrorizing the civilian population. 
The Trial Chamber’s finding that the killings had been wilful was based largely 
(though not wholly) on circumstantial evidence.657 This evidence included the use 
by forces under Galic’s command of relatively indiscriminate weapons in an
zro
environment where civilians and combatants were intermingled, and the fact 
that civilians killed or injured by Bosnian-Serb snipers had often been engaged in 
typically civilian activities.659 In several of the scheduled sniping incidents, the 
Trial Chamber found that the civilians in question had been killed by forces under 
Galic’s command not necessarily with direct intent, but ‘in reckless disregard of 
the possibility that he/she was a civilian’.660 (The Trial Chamber explicitly 
records its view that for the purposes of the crime of ‘wilfully’ launching attacks 
on civilians, the notion of ‘wilfulness’ should be understood as incorporating the 
notion of ‘recklessness’).661
An incident accepted by the Trial Chamber as evidence of a campaign of 
deliberate attacks on the civilian population was that in which a large number of 
those watching or participating in a football match on the outskirts of Sarajevo
cf /y
were killed and injured by shells apparently fired from Bosman-Serb positions. 
Defence arguments that there were legitimate military objectives in the vicinity, 
and the football match had been hit by accident, were rejected. A reason the Trial 
Chamber gave for not accepting these arguments was that the two shells which hit
657 Some direct evidence of Galic’s intent that civilians should be killed was submitted by the 
Prosecution (see Galic (Trial Judgement) paras.681 and 726-729). This may have played a role in 
convincing the Trial Chamber that the killings of civilians in Sarajevo were not accidental, but it 
seems unlikely this evidence alone would have been considered sufficient for a conviction.
658 The judgement cites evidence that the use not only of Multiple Barrelled Rocket Launchers but 
also of mortars against urban targets would be inappropriate, whether or not the actual targets were 
military, given the spread pattern of these weapons and the consequent near certainty of civilian 
houses being hit (paras.644-648). In a 1996 ‘Rule 61’ decision, an ICTY Trial Chamber took the 
view that use of a certain type of weapon (Orkan Multiple Barrelled Rocket Launchers) against 
central Zagreb, given the characteristics of this weapon, in itself indicated that civilians and not 
any military objective had been the object of the attack (Martic, (Rule 61 Proceedings, Trial 
Chamber), para.31, quoted in Sassoli and Bouvier, Un Droit dans la Guerre? 1520).
659 Galic (Trial Judgement) paras.355, 360, 366,419 and 429.
660 Ibid., paras.523 and 543 See also paras.317, 331-345, 355,410 and 429.
661 Ibid., para.54. See also Kordic and Cerkez (Trial Judgement), para.346 and Prosecutor v. 
Naletilic and Martinovic (Trial Judgement) (2003), ICTY, para.579 on recklessness as mens rea 
for the crime of ‘wanton destruction’.
662 Galic (Trial Judgement) paras.372-388.
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the football pitch car park, killing and injuring civilians, had been fired in quick 
succession, the second landing no closer to the alleged military objective in the 
vicinity than the first had done. The Chamber was not taking the view that the 
failure of the Bosnian-Serb mortar crews to correct their fire (which could only 
have been done if it was being observed) was criminal; rather, the Bosnian Serbs’ 
failure to correct their fire appears to have helped persuade a majority of the 
Chamber that they had intended to hit the civilians.664
The Trial Chamber was persuaded it was reasonable to expect a high degree of 
accuracy from the Bosnian-Serb mortar crews,665 possibly to within 50 metres,666 
and rejected the contention of the Defence that where mortar fire was concerned, a 
margin of error of 300-400 metres in any direction needed to be allowed.667 This 
encouraged a presumption that what had been hit by mortar fire was what had 
been aimed at - or was extremely close to what had been aimed at. Consequently, 
the Chamber’s main concern in relation to the scheduled shelling incidents was to 
evaluate the ballistics evidence in relation to the likely origin of the mortar fire, to 
which task much of the judgement is devoted. In some instances, the existence 
of what could be considered legitimate military targets within the area where the 
shells fell was acknowledged in the judgement, but given the degree of accuracy 
which the Chamber had assumed (questionably) to be possible for the Bosnian- 
Serb forces, was considered of no great relevance.669
One implication of Galic is that for the crime of wilful attacks on civilians, 
recklessness on the part of an attacker in relation to whether a target was civilian 
or military may be inferred from circumstances, and if so inferred, may be 
considered sufficient mens rea to establish the existence of the crime. The case 
also suggests that a certain standard of accuracy can reasonably be expected from 
mortar crew, which if not met (and if civilians are killed as a result), may be seen
663 Ibid., paras.382-383. See also para.409.
664 For the minority opinion on this incident, see Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion o f  
Judge Nieto-Navia, paras.63-65.
665 Galic (Trial Judgement) para.494.
666 This Prosecution assessment is cited without criticism in the judgement (ibid. para.338)
667 See Galic (Decision on the Motion fo r the Entry o f Acquittal o f  the Accused Stanislav Galic), 
para.30.
668 See Galic (Trial Judgement) paras.403-409 and 438-496.
669 See ibid., paras.331-345 (in particular para.344) and 372-388.
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as probative evidence of intent to kill civilians. Finally, the case sets a precedent 
for the conviction of a commander for the wilful killing of civilians on the basis 
not of direct evidence of orders having been given for such killings, but on the 
basis of orders for a campaign directed against civilians having been inferred from 
evidence of the circumstances in which civilians were killed during a military 
operation. It is important to stress, however, that like General Yamashita, 
General Galic was convicted not on the basis of strict liability for civilian deaths 
caused by those under his command. He was convicted on the basis of a judicial 
assessment that the evidence was sufficient for it to be inferred not only that he 
had tolerated the killing of civilians in Sarajevo, without taking steps to prevent or 
punish wilful attacks against them, but that he must have ordered a campaign 
directed at least in part against the civilian population of that city.
c) The Dubrovnik cases -  Jokic and Strugar
Background
The Jokic and Strugar cases arose pursuant to one of the earliest military 
engagements of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia - the abortive attempt in 
December 1991 by Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces under the command of 
the two defendants to dislodge Croatian forces from a hill overlooking Dubrovnik, 
in the course of which the Old Town of Dubrovnik was extensively damaged by 
artillery and mortar fire.
The hill in question, Mount Srdj, rises 412 metres above the sea, from which it 
is about-two kilometres inland. To the south-west, it dominates Dubrovnik and its 
Old Town; to the north-east, it faces the hills of southern Herzegovina. In 1991, 
the hill, topped by a fort and a communications tower, was defended by a small 
group of Croatian forces, supported by light artillery and mortar units based in the 
city of Dubrovnik, in which a Croatian paramilitary brigade was also stationed.670 
JNA artillery and infantry units were placed in the hills behind Mount Srdj, to the
670 Strugar (Trial Judgement), paras.22, 71 and 196.
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671 • • •north, and to the south-east at Zarkovica, a location approximately two 
kilometres along the ridge to the east of Mount Srdj, with a clear line of sight to 
the Old Town and Mount Srdj.672 JNA naval forces blockading Dubrovnik meant 
the encirclement was almost complete.673
The assault on Mount Srdj began at around 5am on 6 December 1991, when 
two JNA infantry platoons, each accompanied by a T55 tank, advanced towards 
the hill from two separate directions. As they approached Mount Srdj at around 
6am, JNA artillery and mortar fire from inland was directed at the lower 
fortifications on the hill. The JNA infantry then came under mortar fire from the 
direction of Dubrovnik and small arms fire from Croatian forces on Mount Srdj 
itself. When the JNA infantry reached the fortress at Srdj, the Croatian forces 
retreated into underground tunnels, while continuing to fight back with grenades, 
and the JNA troops came under heavy mortar fire from the Croatian side.674 They
f.nc
requested artillery support to neutralize the source of the firing. JNA mortar 
and artillery fire continued throughout the day, causing much damage to the city, 
including the Old Town, recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site and as such, 
meant to be demilitarized and immune from military operations. The JNA 
troops were eventually driven off the hill, under cover of continued JNA mortar 
fire. Intermittent fire from both sides continued until approximately 4.30pm.677 
By the end of the day, fifty-two buildings in the Old Town had been damaged or 
destroyed in the fighting.678 Two civilians in the Old Town had been killed and 
two seriously injured. In the wider Dubrovnik area, several more civilians had 
been killed and injured, and several more buildings damaged or destroyed. Of the 
forty JNA troops who had attempted to storm the fort, five had been killed and 
seven injured.679
671 Ibid., para.91.
672 Ibid., para. 126.
673 Ibid., para.43.
61 * Ibid., para. 124.
675 Ibid., paras. 121-125.
676 Ibid., para.21.
677 Ibid., para. 110.
678 See ibid., Annex I for details.
679 Ibid., para. 118.
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As a result of this operation, Admiral Miodrag Jokic, in command of the naval
and land forces in the Dubrovnik area at the time, and Lieutenant-Colonel-General
• 680 Pavle Strugar, Jokic’s immediate superior, were both indicted by the ICTY.
Jokic, who had initially pleaded not guilty to the sixteen counts set out in his
indictment, changed his plea after agreement with the Prosecution and pleaded
• • 681 guilty to the six counts of a revised indictment, namely, murder, cruel
treatment, unlawful attack on civilians, devastation not justified by military
necessity, unlawful attack on civilian objects and destruction or wilful damage
done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science.682
Contradictory evidence was submitted at Strugar’s trial about the level at 
which the attack was planned. There is, however, nothing controversial legally 
about the decision to attempt to capture the fort, making the question of who took 
the decision to go ahead with the assault on 6 December 1991 of limited 
relevance.683 The key questions, rather, were whether or not protected people and 
property were wilfully attacked or disproportionate force wilfully used in the 
course of the assault; and if so, the extent to which the defendants could be held 
criminally responsible for such crimes.
The implications o f Jokic’s guilty plea
In the case of Jokic, the ICTY was spared the trouble and expense of having to 
hear evidence in relation to these questions as a result of Jokic’s guilty plea. The
680 Two more junior commanders were also indicted as a result of the shelling of Dubrovnik, but 
at the time of writing (January 2006) their cases have not come to trial.
681 In international criminal law, ‘the actus reus of murder is the taking of the lives of persons 
taking no active part in hostilities in an internal armed conflict. The requisite mens rea is the 
intention to kill or to inflict serious injury, in reckless disregard of human life’ (Kriangsak 
Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law,(Oxford, 2001)). See also Delalic et. al. (Trial 
Judgement), paras.422 and 437-439, Kordic and Cerkez (Trial Judgement), paras.230-236, and 
Strugar (Trial Judgement), 235-236.
682 Jokic (Sentencing Judgement), paras.5-11.
683 The judgement dwells extensively on the state of ceasefire negotiations (Strugar (Trial 
Judgement), paras.51-55, 73-84). However, irrespective of the intentions of either or both parties 
to agree a ceasefire in early December, or at least to demilitarize Dubrovnik and declare it a 
neutral zone, there was no effective ceasefire in place on 6 December 1991 and Dubrovnik had not 
been demilitarized (ibid., paras.73, 81, 83).
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evidence was thus not litigated until Strugar’s trial. Since the essence of Strugar’s 
defence was that the events which had given rise to the charges had not been 
crimes, but legitimate military actions, Strugar’s defence team faced the awkward 
task of seeking to persuade a Trial Chamber that crimes to which a previous 
defendant had pleaded guilty had not in fact occurred. It remained open in 
principle to the Trial Chamber in Strugar’s case to acquit the defendant on the 
basis that the elements of the crimes alleged had not been proven (and had it done 
so, Jokic’s appeal against his sentence would presumably have been urgently 
accelerated), but the wisdom of the Chamber in accepting Jokic’s guilty plea in 
the circumstances seems questionable.
Jokic affirmed that he had agreed to plead guilty freely and voluntarily and 
that his decision to accept criminal responsibility for what had occurred had been 
‘informed, competent and voluntary’.684 It was, however, almost unprecedented 
for a military commander to be convicted of murder as a result of civilians being 
killed by artillery fire from forces under his command in the course of a military 
engagement. The one precedent which had been established (Kordic and Cerkez) 
was under appeal and in due course (December 2004, nine months after Jokic had 
been sentenced) the Appeals Chamber overturned many of the defendants’ 
convictions, particularly those relating to civilian deaths caused by artillery,685 
declaring ‘artillery shelling, including mortar fire of various calibres, is as such 
typical of a military attack but is not telling as to what the target of the attack
fJQf.
is’. Those convictions that were upheld related to the killing of civilians or the 
burning of civilian houses at what was clearly, or could reasonably have been 
considered to have been, close range, in circumstances where there were no real 
questions about the intentionality of the attacks.687 While Jokic’s remorse for 
what had happened on 6 December 1991 may have been sincere, there seems 
reason to doubt that he was in fact in a position to know that these events had
684 Jokic (Sentencing Judgement), para.9.
685 Kordic and Cerkez (Appeal Judgement), paras.430-56, 466, 471, 497, 503, 518, 523.
686 Ibid., para.438. See also para.433
687 Ibid., paras.421, 472, 477,487, 525-526, 535, 554, 557-558, 562, 563, 566, 568, 570, 574-575, 
580,586 and 589.
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been crimes and crimes for which he could properly be held responsible under
/TOO
international criminal law.
The establishment o f the actus reus
In Strugar, when the question of whether or not the actions of the JNA forces 
on 6 December 1991 could properly be considered crimes came to be litigated, the 
Trial Chamber concluded that the only reasonable explanation of the civilian 
casualties and the damage caused to the Old Town was that the Old Town had 
been deliberately targeted by the JNA. The testimony of JNA officers in relation 
to what they had seen and been aiming at was dismissed as implausible and self- 
serving;689 expert evidence on ballistics given on behalf of the Defence was 
rejected, being considered to have been based on unwarranted factual 
assumptions;690 evidence of a Croatian officer in relation to the actual location of 
artillery assets in and around Dubrovnik was accepted;691 and much was made of 
a remark reportedly made on the day of the attack by Strugar to an international 
observer to the effect that Dubrovnik was being attacked as a response to attacks
f\ Q9on JNA forces by Croatian paramilitaries in Herzegovina. Strugar was found 
guilty of the same crimes as those for which Jokic had been convicted. Unlike 
Jokic, he was not found guilty of having aided and abetted the crimes, but was 
convicted on the basis of his command responsibility for them.
There is much that is unconvincing about these findings. First, there is 
nothing in the judgement to indicate that proper account was taken of the scope
688 The willingness of the ICTY to accept Jokic’s guilty plea can be compared to the refusal by a 
US Court Martial President to accept the guilty plea of a US military defendant accused of the 
mistreatment of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison, on the grounds that he was not convinced 
that the defendant, who had entered her plea as the result of a plea bargain, in fact believed herself 
to be guilty {The Times, 05.05.05).
689 Strugar (Trial Judgement), paras.185-188 and 190-193.
690 Ibid., para.208.
691 Ibid., paras.189, 196-197 and 205. Critically, the Trial Chamber was willing to accept the 
evidence of the Croatian commander in charge of mortar and artillery assets in Dubrovnik that 
none of the Croatian ‘Flying Charlies’ (mortars or small artillery pieces carried in vehicles) (see 
para. 68) were used in the vicinity of the Old Town on 6 December 1991 (para. 205).
692 Ibid., paras. 159 and 161-169.
693 I.e. he was found guilty pursuant to article 7(3) but not article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, (see 
ibid., paras.478 and 480).
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for collateral damage when artillery and mortar fire are exchanged in hilly terrain. 
The possibility cannot be excluded that mortar fire aimed at the fort on the top of 
Mount Srdj from certain JNA positions may have overshot and hit the Old 
Town.694 Although this was something the JNA should have considered in 
planning the attack on Mount Srdj,695 the danger which using Mount Srdj for 
military purposes posed to the Old Town should also have been bome in mind by 
the Croatian side.696 It should certainly have been bome in mind by the Trial 
Chamber in determining whether the evidence showed beyond reasonable doubt 
that the Old Town had been deliberately targeted. Secondly, a former Croatian 
military officer, giving evidence for the Prosecution, admitted that the Croatian 
side had had four artillery or mortar positions within 400 metres of the Old Town
ZJQ7
(two of them within 150 metres). Had JNA mortar or artillery units believed 
their comrades on Srdj were imperilled by enemy weaponry at any of these 
locations and targeted them, the Old Town would have been unlikely to have 
escaped unscathed, without any crime having been committed, unless JNA fire 
had been wilfully disproportionate. The judgement recalls that Defence evidence
* • £QOdid not refer to these particular locations as JNA targets. But this does not 
indicate beyond reasonable doubt that fourteen years earlier, in the chaos of battle, 
Croatian weapons at these locations had not in fact been identified and targeted by 
the JNA.
Against this background, the Trial Chamber seems to have held unreasonably 
high expectations in relation to the degree of accuracy possible with mortar and 
artillery fire. Even at the best of times, there are numerous factors which can 
affect the accuracy of this type of fire, such as wind speed and direction, muzzle
694 The Old Town would have been well within the range of the JNA’s 82mm mortars at Strincjera 
(see ibid. para.91) Strincijera lies to the northwest of Srdj at about 2 kilometres from the Old 
Town (42:39:36N;18:06:16E http://new.mapplanet.com/mp/mp/places/HRy03/2685244 , visited 
05.11.05) (The Old Town lies south-east of Srdj).
695 The Trial Chamber records its view, however, that notwithstanding the substantial provision 
made for artillery support, the plans made for the capture of Mount Srdj on 06.12.91 were not 
shown to have been inappropriate {Strugar (Trial Judgement), para.341).
696 See Cultural Convention, article 4.1, which prohibits the use of the ‘immediate surroundings’ of 
cultural property for ‘purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event 
of armed conflict’. Attackers, for their part, are obliged to refrain ‘from any act of hostility 
directed against such property’ (emphasis added) {ibid.). Both these obligations may be waived in 
case of military necessity {ibid., article 4.2). These provisions can be considered customary law 
applicable in internal as well as international conflicts.
697 See Strugar (Trial Judgement), para. 196.
698 See Strugar (Trial Judgement), para.211.
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temperature, marginally inaccurate establishment of one’s own location or that of 
a target due to the ‘stretching’ effect of maps onto which the spherical surface of 
the Earth has been projected, mistakes in trigonometrical calculation etc. The 
practice of using observed fire may improve accuracy, but only for so long as a 
target remains in the same place. When mortar and artillery is being used 
reactively in an attempt to suppress enemy fire, and when targets move frequently 
only to reappear in new locations,699 inaccuracy will inevitably be compounded. 
The remark in the judgement that ‘the Chamber is not able to accept [the Defence 
expert witness’s] opinion that targeting a position less than 500 metres from the 
Old Town walls could result in mortar shells landing in the Old Town on 6 
December 1991’700 thus seems questionable. And the assertion that ‘if properly 
directed, the JNA mortars should have been able to make an impact on the
701relatively few Croatian firing positions’, (without, it is implied, hitting civilians 
or civilian buildings by accident) suggests a serious misunderstanding of what 
even well trained mortar crew can achieve in terms of establishing the location of 
incoming fire and returning effective fire onto its source promptly and accurately.
Finally, it seems possible that the Trial Chamber may have at least partly 
misconstrued Strugar’s alleged remark to an international observer on the day of 
the attack on Mount Srdj, linking events around Dubrovnik with attacks on JNA 
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the context of the overarching directive issued 
by the JNA General Staff in September 1991,702 the remark (assuming it was in 
fact made) makes sense: the JNA would not have been able to conduct a counter­
offensive against paramilitaries in Herzegovina unless it could secure its rear in 
the Dubrovnik area.703 Rather than being a frank admission of a pointless act of
699 A western journalist testified orally to the Trial Chamber that Croatian forces in Dubrovnik 
used the tactic of firing from mortars or small cannons carried on lorries, which would be quickly 
and quietly moved away after firing to avoid detection (see Transcripts, 601 and 627). See also 
Strugar (Trial Judgement), para.68
700 Ibid., para.211.
701 Ibid., para.138. See also para.139.
702 The directive gave instructions for the deployment of forces with the objective ‘to cut off the 
Adriatic highway at several points... to seal off Dubrovnik, Cilipi Airport and Prelavka from the 
land and sea, and to prevent enemy forces from manoeuvring; then, providing support from the 
direction of Ploce, to engage in destroying and disarming the surrounded enemy forces, and to be 
in a state o f  readiness fo r  further offensive operations in western Herzegovina ’ (emphasis added). 
Strugar (Trial Judgement), para.31.
703 Not only did Croatian forces on Mount Srdj pose a threat to JNA forces in the immediate 
vicinity, but oral evidence was given to the Trial Chamber suggesting Dubrovnik was at the time
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revenge against the residents of Dubrovnik for the actions of paramilitaries in 
Herzegovina, Strugar’s remark may perhaps have been simply an attempt to 
explain to his interlocutor (himself a military officer) the rationale of the operation 
to take Mount Srdj and its tactical importance for the JNA at that moment.704
The Trial Chamber’s decision to regard the evidence of the testifying JNA 
officers in relation to what their mortar and artillery fire had been aimed at as 
implausible is obviously one it was entitled to take. But its rejection of specific 
JNA claims to have been aiming at Croatian artillery and mortar positions within 
and in the vicinity of the Old Town,705 and broader assessment that the damage to 
the Old Town could not be explained by JNA efforts to suppress Croatian artillery 
and mortar fire during the battle for Srdj,706 imply that at a time when their 
comrades were in mortal peril from artillery and mortar units in the Dubrovnik 
area, the JNA chose to target civilians and civilian objects in the Old Town 
instead of the actual or presumed source of Croatian fire. This would have been 
strange conduct even for the most callous of war criminals. More convincing 
might have been a finding that collateral damage caused by JNA artillery and 
mortar fire was excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage anticipated
707by the attack, and was foreseen by the JNA to have been excessive. But the 
Trial Chamber explicitly rejected this option in favour of the finding that the 
civilian population and monuments of the Old Town of Dubrovnik had been 
deliberately targeted. There was consequently no detailed discussion in the 
judgement of whether, and if so on what basis, the events of 6 December 1991
an important point of entry for ammunition intended for Croatian paramilitaries, which the JNA 
naval blockade was proving only partially successful in intercepting (see Transcripts, 585-586).
704 The Trial Chamber made some attempt to interpret the alleged remark in a manner relatively 
favourable to the defendant (see ibid. paras. 166-167), but appeared nevertheless to regard the 
remark as at best evidence pointing to Strugar having given an order that was unjustifiably 
reckless in the circumstances.
705 Ibid., paras. 185, 187 and 188.
706 Ibid., para.214.
707 Even a finding of this nature would have been questionable. Far from overwhelming force 
having been used in the attempt to take Srdj, the attack seems to have gone off at half-cock. 
According to oral evidence given to the Trial Chamber, the infantry assaulting Srdj used AGF 
(tear-gas) grenades in an unsuccessful attempt to flush out Croatian forces from the tunnels 
beneath the fortress (Transcripts, 7915). They were not in the event supported by the JNA’s heavy 
artillery, which had the whole of Dubrovnik its sights (Strugar (Trial Judgement), para. 137).
They retreated from Srdj without having achieved their objective, yet having had five of their 
number killed and seven wounded {ibid., paras. 117-118). These circumstances fail to compel the 
conclusion that the force used by the JNA, which had led to the deaths of two civilians and the 
destruction of six buildings in the Old Town, had been disproportionate.
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could be held to have been a case of an intentionally disproportionate attack on a 
military objective.708
The establishment o f the mens rea
It was not necessary for the conviction of Jokic or Strugar for the Prosecution 
to establish that either defendant personally had mens rea in relation to the crimes 
in question; what did, however, need to be established was that the crimes in 
question were committed with mens rea on the part of one or more of their 
subordinates.709 The judgement implies, in several places, that Captain 
Kovacevic, the local JNA battalion commander responsible for co-ordinating the 
assault on Mount Srdj (and, according to some accounts, the officer who had 
initially proposed the attack) had the requisite mens rea J 10 It is also implied 
more broadly that mens rea on the part of the attacking units could be inferred 
from the extent of the destruction caused to the Old Town and the unpersuasive 
nature (in the Trial Chamber’s assessment) of the explanations given by the 
Defence as to what could have caused this destruction, other than deliberate firing 
on the Old Town for no plausible military reason.711
Command responsibility for failure to prevent the crimes
The orders issued by both Jokic and Strugar a few weeks before the 6 
December 1991 attack to the effect that the Old Town was not to be targeted 
proved insufficient to save either commander from conviction for what were
708 Ibid., paras.214 and 281.
709 This can be inferred from the ICTY doctrine on command responsibility coupled with its 
jurisprudence in relation to the requisite mens rea for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law coming within its subject matter jurisdiction. (See Blaskic (Trial Judgement), 
paras. 180, 185 and 217, Kordic and Cerkez (Trial Judgement), paras.236 and 328, Galic (Trial 
Judgement), para.54. See also Prosecutor v. Krstic (Trial Judgement) (2001), ICTY, para.495.
710 This is never stated explicitly, but the fact that the Trial Chamber considered Kovacevic to have 
been responsible for a serious crime can be inferred from the fact that his being promoted, rather 
than punished, shortly after the events in question appears to have been considered relevant to the 
criminal responsibility of both Jokic and Strugar for the shelling of the Old Town (Strugar (Trial 
Judgement), paras.413, 436-437 and 441-442).
711 Ibid., paras.195, 214 and 329.
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717deemed to be unlawful deliberate attacks on the Old Town by their forces. The 
Trial Chamber considered that in the circumstances, Strugar ought to have issued 
a fresh, express order prohibiting the shelling of the Old Town at the time of the
711order to attack Mount Srdj. It appears to have taken the further view that once 
JNA shells had begun to land on the Old Town, the legally correct course of 
action for Strugar would have been to have obtained an immediate report from the 
field about what was going on, and then to have ordered the cancellation of all 
JNA artillery fire and the withdrawal of the infantry troops already on Mount 
Srdj.714 Such intervention would have needed to have been effective: the fact that 
Jokic did prevent some at least of the JNA’s artillery from being used on 6 
December was not enough to save him from conviction for the murder of the two 
civilians in the Old Town killed in the battle, though it appears to have led to a 
belief among his own troops that his intervention had contributed to the failure of
ni c
the attempt to take Mount Srdj and to their own casualties.
Command responsibility for failure to punish the crimes
Jokic and Strugar were convicted not only on the basis of their actions and 
omissions during the day of 6 December, but on the grounds of their failure 
subsequently to take steps to punish what in the view of the Trial Chamber had 
been criminal acts. The Trial Chamber in Strugar considered the investigation 
into events of 6 December 1991 launched by Jokic immediately afterwards to 
have been inadequate. It was not impressed by the disciplinary action taken, nor 
with the promotion soon afterwards of Captain Kovacevic from Captain to
712 Orders from the JNA General Staff issued on 16.10.91 prohibited attacks on cultural property. 
Jokic’s order of 11.11.91 explicitly prohibited attacks on the Old Town of Dubrovnik except in 
cases of lethal fire coming from the Old Town, stating further that troops could only return fire on 
the Old Town in an extreme situation if they had come under fire that inflicted heavy losses. 
Strugar’s order of 18.11.91 required units ‘not to open fire on the Old Town of Dubrovnik and to 
retreat units exposed to enemy fire to cover.’ {Ibid., paras.61 and 74).
7,3 Ibid., para.421.
714 Ibid., paras.396, 405, 414, 423, 424 and 427. The Trial Chamber seems to have thought it 
would have been no harder for the JNA infantry on Mount Srdj to have withdrawn back down the 
hill, protecting themselves from enemy fire to their rear, than to have continued the advance 
(para.427).
715 Ibid., paras.137 and 425. See also Transcripts, 7378 and 7422.
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Captain (First Class), which it understood to have been approved of by Strugar.
It concluded that both Jokic and Strugar had failed in their duty to punish serious 
crimes and could therefore be held criminally responsible for them.
Whereas Jokic was found responsible (on the basis of his own guilty plea) for 
having aided and abetted the crimes in question, Strugar’s conviction for the 
crimes rested solely on the Trial Chamber’s findings that he failed to prevent or to 
punish them. The disconcerting implication is that Strugar’s conviction for war 
crimes rests ultimately on nothing more than his failure on 6 December 1991 to 
order Captain Kovacevic to cease all artillery and mortar fire and to withdraw his 
men from Mount Srdj (irrespective of the losses on the JNA side this would have 
been likely to cause) the moment he heard that shells were falling on the Old 
Town, coupled with his subsequent failure to punish Captain Kovacevic for 
having allowed the fire which damaged the Old Town - presumably dismissing, as 
did the Trial Chamber, his officers’ accounts of what had prompted them to fire at 
or near to the Old Town.
6.4. Conclusions
Under international criminal law, failure to take the legally required 
precautions in attack should not in itself engage criminal responsibility, unless it 
can be shown to have been tantamount to a deliberate attack on the civilian 
population or civilian objects. Failure to take precautions in attack may, however, 
sometimes be seen as probative evidence of the crime of wilfully attacking 
protected persons or objects or launching an unlawfully indiscriminate attack.
In armed conflict, there will inevitably be occasions where mistaken attacks 
on protected objects or accidental killing of non-combatants will be perceived or 
portrayed as deliberate or at least reckless. Where combatants and commanders
716 Strugar (Trial Judgement),para.441. The promotion does not seem to have been an exceptional 
one. Kovacevic was, in autumn 1991, acting commanding officer of a battalion of 700 men. 
According to oral evidence given to the Trial Chamber, the decision to promote him had been 
taken in November 1991, in recognition of his successful capture of the other forts above 
Dubrovnik, and was not connected to the December events (Transcripts, 7354 and 7438-7439).
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who are nationals of states parties to the ICC Statute are concerned, there is a
• * * 717chance this may now lead to criminal proceedings on the international plane. 
Since the ICC’s mens rea approach owes a certain amount to both civil and 
common law traditions, common law states perhaps need to be mindful that 
criminal responsibility may be engaged in the eyes of the ICC not only when the 
perpetrator meant protected people or objects to be hit {dolus directus (first 
degree)) but also where he knew this would ‘occur in the ordinary course of 
events’ {dolus directus (second degree)).
In this context, the ability of combatants and commanders to point to specific 
precautions taken to minimize collateral damage may come to play a critical role 
in enabling them to rebut allegations of deliberately or recklessly causing non- 
combatant deaths. It will also be increasingly important for commanders to be 
able to rely on the willingness and ability of their political leaders to ensure they 
have whatever equipment is necessary to enable them to identify and engage 
military targets in a way that will not expose them unduly to the risk of 
prosecution, and that they are given the time and manpower to be able to make 
sure that troops and junior officers are properly trained before deployment.
Criminal tribunals, for their part, need to proceed cautiously in this area. Too 
ready a willingness to accept arguments of military defendants that killings of 
non-combatants and destruction of civilian and cultural property were only 
accidents, or were proportionate collateral damage, may have the pernicious 
effects not only of bringing the tribunals into contempt, but more seriously, 
appearing to legitimize carelessness on the battlefield and encouraging the victims 
of culpably clumsy attacks to seek retribution outside the judicial framework. 
Conversely, obiter dicta suggesting misunderstanding on the part of judges 
hearing war crimes trials of the degree of control and accuracy that is possible on 
the battlefield may equally bring tribunals into disrepute and discourage co­
operation. Ideally, judges of international criminal tribunals would have at their 
disposal, perhaps on an amicus curiae basis, military advisers with relevant
717 The ICC’s ‘complementarity principle’ means that such proceedings could not, however, take 
place if a state with jurisdiction chose to investigate and if necessary prosecute the case effectively 
(see Rome Statute articles 1 and 17).
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combat experience and practical knowledge of what could reasonably have been 
expected in the relevant context. Such people could give impartial expert advice 
to the judges in cases where rulings need to be made on whether deaths and injury 
of protected persons and destruction and damage of protected property may be 
considered beyond reasonable doubt to have been wilfully caused during military 
operations.
Sometimes, however, the difficulty is that even if it may be clear that the law 
of armed conflict has been violated, mens rea cannot fairly be attributed to any 
one individual, or even to a manageable group of individuals, the violation being a 
consequence of systemic failings within a large and complex military 
organization, and possibly extending beyond that organization. It is not being 
suggested that the law cannot be enforced in cases where it is not possible to 
demonstrate beyond all reasonable doubt that non-combatant casualties or damage 
to civilian objects were intended by an identifiable individual or individuals. 
Rather, what is suggested is that where non-combatant casualties appear to have 
been caused as a result of negligence or systemic failings rather than individual 
malice or recklessness, procedures for dealing with state responsibility may prove 
a more effective and appropriate means of enforcing the law than individual 
criminal prosecution. This type of enforcement is the subject of the next and final 
chapter.
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7. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE 
OBLIGATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK
A belligerent party which violates the provisions o f the said Regulations shall, 
i f  the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible fo r  
all acts committed by persons forming part o f its armed forces.
1907 Hague Convention IV  Respecting the Laws and Customs o f  
War on Land, Article 3.
In 1946, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal declared:
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.718
The first part of the statement is true; the second at least debatable. Crimes, 
including those designated by international law, such as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, are indeed committed by individuals, not abstract entities, and 
the unhappy concept of ‘state crime’ has probably been effectively put out of its 
misery by the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility of 
2001.719 By contrast, it is states, not individuals, that become parties to 
international treaties, and are responsible for complying with their obligations 
thereby undertaken and the legal consequences if they fail to do so. It is states 
that have traditionally been the subjects of customary international law, entitled to 
its protection and bound by its rules, with individuals normally being subject not 
to international law (at least, not directly), but to the municipal law of the state in 
whose territory they find themselves. Provisions of international law designating 
certain acts and omissions as crimes constitute only a small part of the corpus of
718 Trial o f  the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, (Nuremberg, 
1947), (Vol I), 218-224.
719 See James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, (Cambridge, 2002), 16-20 and 242-248. For an earlier 
critique of the concept o f ‘state crime’, see Geoff Gilbert ,‘The criminal responsibility of states’ 
(1990), ICLQ. Alain Pellet’s article ‘Can a state commit a crime? Definitely, Yes! ’ (1999), EJIL 
is not quite as wedded to the idea of state ‘crime’ as the title suggests, the writer’s point being that 
whatever form of words is used, it needs to be made clear that some violations of international law 
by states require a more concerted and vigorous reaction by the international community than 
others.
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international law in general and only a small part of the corpus of international 
law relating to armed conflict more specifically; more common are provisions 
conferring rights or obligations on states without any implications for individual 
criminal responsibility in the event of these provisions being violated. Thus not 
only can the provisions of international law be enforced by means other than the
720punishment of individuals who commit crimes, but frequently they must.
This chapter addresses the following questions:
■ In what circumstances, and by what means, may states be held responsible 
for violations of the obligation under international law to take precautions 
in attack?
■ What may the legal consequences be for states of such violations?
■ Why is it important that states, as opposed to individuals, should be held 
accountable for violations of the rules on precautions in attack?
■ What value, if any, do the principles of state responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts have for violations of the rules on 
precautions in attack by armed opposition groups in the course of internal 
conflicts?
720 The London Agreement establishing the post-Second World War International Military 
Tribunals may have confirmed the principle that individuals may be held criminally responsible by 
the international community for deeds recognized as crimes under international law (see the 1945 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
article 6) but the activity of these Tribunals is better regarded as the exception than the rule in 
terms of enforcing international law.
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7.1. State responsibility and individual responsibility
a) The International Law Commission’s Articles o f2001
Having long been one of the more protean areas of international law, the law 
of state responsibility in 2001 received persuasive, if not definitive, clarification 
in the form of the final version of the International Law Commission’s Articles on
791 * •State Responsibility. The Articles represent the culmination of the work of the
• 799 • •Commission over several decades. They were drafted by a prestigious group of 
international lawyers and their commendation by unanimous vote of the United
79^Nations General Assembly reflects their widespread acceptability. But the text 
is not a treaty. Nor is it a summary of universally acknowledged principles of 
customary law, although the International Law Commission’s commentary to the 
Articles724 often indicates those principles which can properly be considered to 
constitute customary law and on what basis. The status of the Articles as a legal 
text is thus uncertain. Nonetheless, they are the most authoritative guide 
available to the current state of international law on state responsibility.
The Articles proceed from the deceptively simple starting point that:
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility 
of that State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission:
a) is attributable to the State under international law; and
b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.725
To some extent, the significance of the Articles lies in what they omit. No place 
is given to the concept of ‘state crime’. No place is given to the concept of
721 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility.
112 Ibid., 1-60.
723 See UNGA Resolution A/RES/56/83, adopted unanimously by UNGA in plenary on 12.12.01, 
where the General Assembly welcomes the ILC’s adoption of the Articles and attached 
commentary, takes note of the Articles, and commends them to the attention of Governments 
‘without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action’.
724 I.e. the Crawford commentary.
725 Articles 1 and 2.
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blameworthiness. An internationally wrongful act, according to the Articles, is 
neither more nor less than a breach by a state of one of its international 
obligations. And in the event of such a breach, the state must, according to the 
Articles, cease the breach, give assurances of non-repetition as appropriate and 
make full reparation to the victim state or states in the form of restitution,
* * 726compensation, satisfaction or some combination of the three.
An important consequence of this refreshingly minimalist approach is that 
state responsibility is considered equally engaged by any violation by a state of its 
international obligations, whatever the source or nature of the obligation and 
without the need for fault to be demonstrated, so long as responsibility is properly 
attributed.727 The nature of the obligation in question may affect the standing of
778other states to invoke the responsibility of the offending state. And if an
77Qobligation which is a peremptory norm of international law is violated in a 
gross and systematic fashion, the Articles suggest that the responsibility of other
• • I'K C istates to take, or refrain from, certain actions will be engaged. But the 
wrongfulness of the act, and the obligation of the offending state to make 
appropriate reparation, lies purely in the fact that it is a breach of an international
726 Articles 30, 31 and 34. The requirement for the responsible state to make full reparation to the 
injured state can be considered a principle of customary international law; by contrast, the 
principle that the responsible state has a separate obligation to cease the violation and give 
assurances of non-repetition is a more progressive interpretation of the law. (See Diane Shelton, 
‘Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility’ (2002), AJIL).
727 See Crawford, 81-85. See also Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Reparation for violations of 
international humanitarian law’ (2003), IRRC. Some acts or omissions will only be violations of 
international law if committed with some degree of intention or fault. But whether or not 
intention or fault needs to be demonstrated depends on the specific nature of the primary 
obligation. It is not a necessary element of a finding of state responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act.
728 According to the Articles, if an obligation is owed to a group of states, or to the international 
community as a whole, a state other than the injured state will have standing to invoke 
responsibility, but not otherwise (see Crawford, 276-280). In its judgment in the case of 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase (1970), the ICJ gave as 
examples of erga omnes obligations of this nature obligations deriving from ‘the outlawing of acts 
of aggression and of genocide as also from the principles and rules concerning basic rights of the 
human person including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’ (para. 34).
729 A peremptory norm of international law, or jus cogens, is defined in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties as ‘a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’ (article 53).
730 Articles on State Responsibility, article 41. This article is a progressive interpretation of the 
law (Shelton, ‘Righting Wrongs’).
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obligation binding upon that state, in the absence of circumstances precluding
*7*5 1
wrongfulness.
b) Implications for states of individual prosecutions for war crimes
The terms of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and of Additional Protocol I of 
1977 specify that states party to these treaties bear responsibility for all acts of 
members of their armed forces.732 A state’s responsibility for the acts of 
members of its armed forces can also be considered a principle of customary 
international law. The ILC Articles enshnne the broader principle that:
the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of 
the State.734
The responsibility states bear for the acts of members of their armed forces is 
separate from the criminal responsibility which individuals may bear for war 
crimes. Thus if an individual combatant acts contrary to a provision of the 
international law of armed conflict, an internationally wrongful act will have 
occurred, which will be attributable to the state in whose armed forces he serves 
irrespective of any judicial, disciplinary or civil proceedings he personally may 
face. The state may in some circumstances be obliged to prosecute the alleged
731 Articles on State Responsibility, articles 20-25.
732 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, article 3; 
Additional Protocol I, article 91.
733 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol I), 530- 
532. The rule is not absolute, however: states are not responsible in international law for purely 
private misdeeds of members of their armed forces, such as an assault committed by a soldier on 
leave attending a football match in another country. See also Articles on State Responsibility, 
article 7. (For some of the case law, see Crawford, 99, 106-109 and Brownlie, Principles o f  Public 
International Law, 452-455). Marco Sassoli appears by contrast to regard all acts of members of a 
state’s armed forces as attributable to the state by virtue of article 91 of Additional Protocol I and 
article 3 of the Hague Convention (‘State responsibility for violations of international 
humanitarian law’ (2002), IRRC at 405-406).
734 Article 4.
735 See Gunael Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 277, citing Prosecutor 
v. Furundzija, Trial Judgement (1998), ICTY, para. 142, although it should be noted that the 
paragraph cited refers specifically to the crime of torture, not more generally to violations of 
international law by individuals.
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n 'lc
offender (or hand him over to another state for prosecution), to surrender him 
for prosecution to an international tribunal,737 or to choose between these three 
courses of action. But prosecution at the domestic or international level of the 
alleged perpetrator of a violation of the law of armed conflict will not itself annul 
the state’s own responsibility for the breach of its obligations which has occurred, 
nor remove its obligation to make full reparation to the victim state, including, as 
appropriate, by means of financial compensation, and (according to the Articles) 
to give assurances of non-repetition, if circumstances require. Likewise, a 
finding that a state has breached its international obligations through the actions 
of its armed forces does not necessarily mean a crime has been committed by the
n'lQ
individuals concerned.
c) Accountability for violations o f the law o f armed conflict which are not 
war crimes
The obligation under international law to take precautions in attack is a 
principle of great importance for the protection of non-combatants in armed 
conflict, as are the specific rules which derive from the general principle. But 
seldom could a violation of the rules on precautions in attack be said, strictly 
speaking, to be a war crime, as seen in the previous chapter, unless it were of such 
an egregious nature as to constitute, in effect, a wilful attack on protected persons 
or objects.739 Thus while states may be held to account for such violations within 
the framework of the law of state responsibility, mechanisms for the prosecution 
of individuals for war crimes are of limited usefulness in enforcing the rules on 
precautions in attack. Before moving on to consider the means by which states
736 See Geneva Convention I, article 50; Geneva Convention II, article 50; Geneva Convention III, 
article 129; Geneva Convention IV, article 146. See also Second Protocol to the Cultural 
Convention, article 17.1.
737 See ICTY Statute, article 9; ICTR Statute, article 8; and ICC Statute articles 89 and 90 (see also 
articles 17 and 20).
738 See e.g. McCann v. UK( 1995), ECtHR.
739 David Turns disagrees (‘National Implementation of the Rome Statute’, 385), arguing that not 
only ‘grave breaches’ of article 57 of Additional Protocol I, but also ordinary violations thereof 
would be war crimes. Violations of article 57 are not, however, war crimes recognized in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, apart from the crime of intentionally launching an 
indiscriminate attack in the knowledge that disproportionate collateral damage will be caused 
(article 8.2(b)(iv) -  which would also be a grave breach of Additional Protocol I (see article 
85.3(b))
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may be held accountable for violations of the rules on precautions in attack, a few 
remarks on the difference between violations of the law of armed conflict and war 
crimes may be in order.
For the purposes of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, war 
crimes are defined in its Statute as grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and other ‘serious violations’ of the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflict (international and non-intemational), which are then specifically 
listed, and, as clarified later in the Statute, must normally be committed with 
‘intent and knowledge’ to engage the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator.740 
Thus all war crimes are violations of the international law of armed conflict, but 
not all violations of the international law of armed conflict are war crimes.741 A 
prisoner of war who is not an officer and who fails to salute an officer of the 
Detaining Power violates article 39 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, but 
does not thereby become a war criminal. Nor does a war crime have to be tried 
before an international tribunal: on the contrary, all but the most primitive states 
can reasonably be expected to be willing and able to prosecute war crimes 
committed within their jurisdictions effectively without the need for proceedings 
on the international judicial plane. But if a crime being tried before a domestic 
tribunal is one which would not come under the subject matter jurisdiction of an 
international criminal tribunal (e.g. the crime of providing succour to the enemy),
740 Rome Statute, articles 8.2 and 30. For a discussion of the various ways in which the term ‘war 
crime’ has tended to be used in practice, which avoids attempting to define the term, see Peter 
Rowe, ‘War Crimes’ in McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly, The Permanent International Criminal 
Court. Mettraux suggests a ‘war crime’ may be defined as ‘a serious violation of the laws or 
customs of war which entails individual criminal responsibility under international law’
(International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 29).
741 ‘A finding to the effect that a given norm is binding upon a state -  qua custom or treaty law -  
does not entail that its breach may also engage the criminal liability of the individual who 
committed the act, let alone that it may have that effect under customary international law’.
(Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, (Trial Judgement) (2002), ICTY, n.545). International treaties such as 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I of 1977 and the 1999 Second Protocol to the 
1954 Cultural Convention, require states parties to criminalize certain violations of these treaties, 
and the statutes of international criminal tribunals normally indicate specifically those violations of 
the law of armed conflict which will be considered ‘war crimes’ for the purposes of the tribunal in 
question. There is nothing to prevent a state from criminalizing other violations of the law of 
armed conflict if it so chooses (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law(\fo\ II), 371 for examples, including, interestingly, the criminalization under 
Irish law of violations of article 57.2(a) (i)). It would be unusual, however, to describe minor 
violations of the international law of armed conflict as ‘war crimes’.
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the propriety of describing it as a ‘war crime’ is questionable.742 Nor even can it 
be claimed that war crimes are necessarily more harmful than other violations of 
the law of armed conflict: the destruction or seizure of an item of enemy property, 
no matter how insignificant, is a war crime if it cannot be said to have been 
‘imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’;743 by contrast, causing the 
deaths of hundreds of civilians by a surprise attack on a military objective 
conducted with massive firepower and without any warning, despite 
circumstances having been such that a warning could feasibly have been given, 
might not be considered by the ICC to be a war crime within its jurisdiction, 
given the terms of its statute. It would, however, probably be widely considered a 
violation of the law of armed conflict.744
d) Joint state responsibility
Article 16 of the ILC Articles provides that:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.
The Commentary to the Articles makes clear that this provision applies only to 
situations in which the conduct in question would be unlawful both for the 
assisting and the assisted state.745
742 States often criminalize conduct in wartime which harms the state’s interests, but does not 
violate the international law of armed conflict, for instance spying, or disobeying lawful orders. 
Such crimes, for which captured enemy nationals as well as a state’s own nationals may 
sometimes be liable to prosecution, are not war crimes.
743 See ICC Statute, article 8.2 (b) (xiii).
744 See Hague Regulations, article 26 and Additional Protocol I, article 57 (c). The rule may be 
considered part of customary international law (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (Vol. I), 62).
745 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, 149-151.
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7.2. Legal consequences of violations of the rules on precautions in attack
It is a well-established principle of international law that a state responsible 
for a breach of its international obligations must make lull reparation for any harm 
resulting from the breach.746 The ILC’s Articles set out in detail the legal 
consequences of state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act, namely: 
the obligation to terminate the breach and, as appropriate, to take steps to ensure 
non-repetition; the obligation where possible to restore the situation created by the 
breach to the status quo ante\ and the obligation to pay compensation or provide 
satisfaction (for instance in the form of an apology) if restitution of the status quo
747ante is impossible.
a) Cessation and non-repetition
According to the ILC’s Articles:
The state responsible for [an] internationally wrongful act is under an obligation:
(a) to cease that act if it is continuing;
(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if 
circumstances so require.748
There will be few circumstances in which it will be realistic to expect that a state 
can be prevailed upon to terminate an ongoing breach of the rules on precautions 
in attack. A situation in which a state could, technically, be obliged to terminate 
an ongoing breach of the rules might be if, during a military engagement, 
automatic counter-battery fire were being used against military targets located in a 
densely populated residential area from which non-combatants had not been 
evacuated. But it would take an unusually adventurous and eloquent legal expert 
to convey this message effectively to an artillery commander in the heat of the 
moment.
746 See Factory at Chorzow (Merits) (1927), PCIJ. See also Articles on State Responsibility, 
article 31 and commentary.
747 Ibid., articles 30-37.
748 Ibid., article 30.
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Of much greater relevance for the protection of non-combatants in conflict 
zones is the (qualified) obligation to offer assurances and guarantees of non­
repetition after an internationally wrongful act has occurred, set out in clause (b) 
of article 30 of the ILC’s Articles, quoted above. The rider ‘if circumstances so 
require’ means the obligation is not absolute - it would be absurd if it were - but 
need not be taken to mean that it is up to the state responsible for the wrongful act 
to decide whether or not circumstances require it to give assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition, any more than the adjective ‘appropriate’ need be 
taken to mean that the offending state alone is the proper judge of what action 
needs to be taken.749
Measures to ensure non-repetition of a violation of the rules on precautions in 
attack which can feasibly be taken will depend on the nature both of the violation 
and of the military context. It also needs to be recalled that in the aftermath of an 
accident attributable to a failure to take effective precautions, not all the measures 
which a state may decide to take to ensure non-repetition will be such that they 
can be publicly announced. A mistaken attack on a civilian person or object as a 
result of failure to take proper precautions might lead a state to revise the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) for its forces in that area of operations, but it would not be 
reasonable to expect it to make the revised ROE public, or even to announce that 
more restrictive ROE had been issued, given the danger to which military 
personnel would be exposed if precise details of circumstances in which they were 
permitted to use force (and to what extent) were widely known.
During the period under review, there were occasions where states took 
measures to try to ensure non-repetition of targeting mistakes. In May 1999, after 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed by the US Air Force during the 
NATO campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the attack was 
immediately acknowledged by the United States to have been a targeting error and
749 See ibid., commentary to article 30. See also LaGrand (Merits) (2001), ICJ.
750 A French Army KFOR officer stationed in Mitrovica, Kosovo, reminded a journalist that if 
antagonists in a riot know for certain that security forces will only use tear gas initially, ‘then you 
are in trouble’ (Pengelley, ‘French Army in Profile’).
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751an internal enquiry was launched to establish what had gone wrong. There was 
no public acknowledgement or determination that a violation of the law of armed 
conflict had occurred nor acceptance of any form of legal liability. But nor was 
there any attempt on the part of the US authorities to deny that its forces had been 
responsible for an attack on a building that was not a legitimate military objective, 
or to argue that all feasible precautions had in fact been taken to ensure the target 
of this attack was a military objective. On the contrary, once its internal enquiry 
was complete, the United States publicly acknowledged mistakes that had been 
made by its officials, and indicated the concrete steps it would take to ensure non­
repetition of such errors. These steps included the publication of new, updated city 
maps ‘detailing locations of diplomatic sites and other “no-strike” facilities in and 
around Belgrade’, the updating of databases, with ‘new priority’ being placed on 
this task and the strengthening of internal procedures for selecting and identifying 
targets.752 In a sign that these measures were intended to protect not only foreign 
embassies from being targeted in error in future, but also other buildings subject 
to legal protection, the communication affirmed that the US government would 
from that moment on ‘seek direct contact with other governments and interested 
organizations and persons to obtain their assistance in identifying and locating 
facilities of interest or concern’.753
Similarly, shortly after a malfunctioning cluster bomb unit launched from a 
US aircraft dispersed in the air prematurely and killed several civilians in the 
southern Serbian city of Nis, the United States issued a directive to restrict the 
future use by US forces of cluster munitions in the campaign.754 Again, there was 
no acknowledgement or authoritative determination that use of air delivered 
cluster bombs in the context had been a violation of the rules on precautions in 
attack. But the US government’s decision to impose new restrictions on their use 
after this accident was an implicit recognition of the need (and of the scope) for 
greater care to be taken when using these weapons.
751 See message of 06.07.99 from US Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering to the Chinese 
authorities, published in ‘Contemporary Practice of the US’ (ed. Sean Murphy) (2000), AJIL, 128- 
131.
752 Ibid., 129.
753 Ibid.
754 See Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign -  the Crisis in Kosovo.
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Some armed forces have formal ‘lessons learned’ procedures to minimize the 
chances of mistakes made during military operations being repeated.755 Such 
institutional readiness to learn from mistakes helps states to provide appropriate 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in the event of accidents during armed 
conflicts attributable to factors such as targeting error, inappropriate tactics or 
timing, or weapons malfunction.
b) Compensation
The ILC Articles affirm that a state responsible for an internationally wrongful 
act must pay compensation to the injured state for the damage caused thereby,
ncfi
insofar as the damage is not made good by restitution. Thus in the event of a 
state harming non-combatants or civilian property in another state as a result of 
failure to comply with its international obligations concerning precautions in 
attack, it must pay compensation. Under international law it is normally the 
injured state, not the individual victim, that has standing to claim compensation 
(the exception being the framework of international human rights law, which 
often gives individuals standing to claim compensation directly from a state). 
Nevertheless, states providing compensation to other states for harm caused to 
their nationals have sometimes been able to secure formal agreement that the 
beneficiary state will distribute the money to the individual victims and will 
provide evidence to indicate it has done so.757 The UN Compensation
755 See for example the ‘lessons learned’ analysis of US military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo 
(available via the website of the US Army’s Center for Law and Military Operations). In the UK, 
all those directly involved in a military operation in theatre or elsewhere are required subsequently 
to submit ‘frank reports’, via the chain of command, on their experiences, indicating where things 
worked well, but also where improvements should be made (MoD, Lessons fo r  the Future).
756 Article 36. Where harm is caused as a result of a failure to take all feasible or reasonable 
precautions in attack, restitution is unlikely to be possible, so this form of reparation is not 
considered here.
757 See e.g. Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the US and China, in 
which the US agreed to pay $4.5 million to China, to be given to the relatives of those killed and to 
those injured in the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and in which China undertook to 
provide the US with details of the names, addresses, ID card numbers and bank account details of 
those destined to receive compensation, plus a written acknowledgement from each recipient. 
(‘Contemporary Practice of the US’, (ed. Sean Murphy) (2000), AJIL, 130-131). After the 
shooting down of the Iranian airliner Iran Air 655, a settlement was eventually reached between 
the US and Iran whereby Iran would drop its claim filed with the ICJ and the US would pay the 
relatives of each victim $300,000 for wage earning victims or $150,000 for non-wage earning 
victims, with no money being paid to the Government of Iran (see statement by US President
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Commission, examined further below, is an important exception to this general 
practice of providing compensation to states rather than individuals.
c) Satisfaction
Insofar as injury caused by an internationally wrongful act cannot be made 
good by restitution or compensation, the responsible state must give satisfaction 
for the injury.758 Such satisfaction will typically consist of an apology, but in the 
event of a case being heard by a tribunal, the tribunal may decide that its own
ncq
public finding against the state can be considered appropriate satisfaction.
The notion of satisfaction has an old-fashioned ring to it. But it is not an 
insignificant element of the means by which a state makes reparation for a wrong 
done. If the wrong consists of the killing in armed conflict of non-combatants as 
a result of a state’s failure to take proper care, the willingness of the responsible 
state to acknowledge its fault and offer an apology is likely to be at least as 
important to a victim’s family as financial compensation. For this reason, ad hoc 
procedures, according to which a certain amount of cash is handed out to the 
families of non-combatants killed in error by a state’s armed forces, with 
condolences, but no formal admission of fault, may perhaps be seen as better than 
nothing, but may be regarded by the families (and possibly by their government)
* • • • 1fsiC\as an inadequate response in some situations.
Clinton to the US Congress of 16 May, 1996, (http://clinton6.nara.gov, visited 23.06.05)). In 
both cases, the US formally denied any legal liability for these accidents. (See de Guttry and 
Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War, 225-231 and ‘Contemporary Practice of the US’, (ed. Sean Murphy) 
(2000), AJIL, 131).
758 Article 37.
759 See e.g. Corfu Channel (Merits) (1949), ICJ, 35.
760 For instance, during the military occupation of Iraq by a US-led coalition and after the military 
occupation formally came to an end, Coalition forces regularly offered ex gratia payments to non- 
combatants who had been injured or whose property had been damaged, or to the families of non- 
combatants who had been killed, as a result of their actions. Sometimes, the terms of the offer 
would state that it should be seen as a ‘donation’, not compensation. (See e.g. Amnesty 
International, Iraq: Killings o f  civilians in Basra and al- ‘Amara).
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d) Redress for states and redress for individuals
Normally, individual victims of a state’s breach of its obligation to take 
precautions in attack will not have standing to claim redress directly from that
7 6 1state in international law. If the victims were at the material time within the 
jurisdiction of the state responsible for the violation, they may possibly have 
standing to seek redress under international human rights law. But victims of 
violations of the law of armed conflict committed in an international conflict will 
usually be able to obtain redress only if their cause is taken up successfully by 
their own state, and compensation thereby obtained is then distributed to them.
This means, paradoxically, that individuals injured by a breach of international 
law may have less chance of receiving compensation when there are friendly 
relations between the responsible state and the injured state than when there is 
tension between the two. In the latter case, the injured state is likely to press for 
maximum financial compensation as the price of an out-of-court settlement and 
the responsible state is likely to insist on being able to verify that the money 
reaches the individual victims. In the former case, the injured state may consider 
that its good relations with the responsible state are too important to be put at risk 
by public protest or the threat of legal proceedings. In theory, it may be open to 
the individual victim to bring proceedings against his own government in the 
domestic courts for failure properly to represent his interests, but there are few 
grounds for regarding such proceedings as likely to succeed.
761 Frits Kalshoven has observed that the travaux preparatoires of the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
indicate that its article 3 was originally intended to confer standing on individuals to make claims 
against states, though subsequently state practice came to favour the settlement of compensation 
claims on a state-to-state basis (insofar as there was to be any such settlement at all) (‘State 
responsibility for warlike acts of the armed forces’ (1991), ICLQ).
762 In R. (Abassi and Juma) v. Secretary o f State fo r  the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Secretary o f State fo r  the Home Department (2002), Queen’s Bench Division (UK), the plaintiffs, 
one of whom was being detained by the US authorities in Guantanamo Bay, failed to convince the 
Court that the British government was under an obligation to make representations on the principal 
plaintiffs behalf to the government of the US. Had they succeeded, this would have had far- 
reaching implications for the freedom of governments to conduct foreign relations at their 
discretion.
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7.3. Judicial enforcement of state responsibility
a) The International Court of Justice
In the event of a dispute between two or more states over whether or not a 
state has breached its international obligations in relation to the requirement to 
take precautions in attack, and if so, what the legal consequences are, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) may in some circumstances have jurisdiction. 
For the ICJ to have jurisdiction in a contentious case, the states concerned need 
either to have referred the case to the ICJ, to be bound by a treaty in relation to
* HfSKwhich the ICJ has explicitly been given jurisdiction, or to have made a 
declaration that they recognize the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory ipso facto 
in relation to certain matters and with respect to another state accepting the same 
obligation.764 They will need either to be party to the ICJ Statute, or to have been 
granted access to the Court by the UN Security Council. The ICJ’s jurisdiction 
in contentious cases thus depends on some form of explicit or implicit consent to 
this jurisdiction having been given by the contending parties at some point.766 
Should one of the states concerned not wish the case to be referred to the ICJ and 
not have made a declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, the 
ICJ might nevertheless have jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion on the issues 
at stake, if requested to do so by a body with standing to make the request.767 
The ICJ thus may, in some circumstances, be able to give a ruling or an opinion in 
a case where one state alleges failure on the part of another to comply with its
763 ICJ Statute, article 36.1.
764 ICJ Statute, article 36.2. States may declare under article 36.2 that they accept the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction as compulsory ipso facto  subject to certain reservations. In such cases, the ICJ will 
decline jurisdiction if it considers such a reservation has been validly invoked (see Case 
Concerning the Aerial incident o f  10 August 1999 (2000), ICJ). The ICJ may decline jurisdiction 
to avoid passing judgment on the conduct of a state not party to the dispute, but is not prevented 
from adjudicating where its judgment might affect the legal interests of other states (see Certain 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (1992), ICJ).
765 ICJ Statute, article 35. All UN members are ipso facto states parties to the ICJ Statute (see UN 
Charter, article 93).
766 ‘...there is no obligation in general international law to settle disputes and procedures for 
settlement by formal and legal procedures rest on the consent of the parties’ (Brownlie, Principles 
o f Public International Law, 703). States which have made declarations accepting the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction in principle may, and in practice often do, object to ICJ jurisdiction in 
specific cases. The ICJ is the ultimate arbiter of its own ability to take jurisdiction (see ICJ 
Statute, article 36.6).
767 See The Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (2004), ICJ, paras. 14-42.
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obligations under the international law of armed conflict to take precautions in 
attack, though in practice, no such cases have yet been brought.
b) The European Court o f  Human Rights
The ECHR and international armed conflict
Where a state party to the ECHR is alleged to have killed or injured non- 
combatants by failing to take reasonable precautions in an international armed 
conflict occurring outside its own territory, the question may arise of whether 
such conduct could be considered a violation of the ECHR. There are two 
strands to this question: first, whether the ECHR should be considered to apply to 
international armed conflicts; and secondly, to what extent it can be considered 
applicable to the extraterritorial conduct of states.
None of the ECHR states parties participating in military operations (including 
full-scale armed hostilities) in the Gulf, Bosnia and Yugoslavia during the period 
under review derogated from the Convention at the outset of such operations. 
This could be seen as a sign of a widely held view amongst states parties that the 
Convention was never intended to apply to the conduct of extraterritorial military 
operations. Perhaps more realistically, it could be seen as a sign that immediately 
before a major military operation, states normally have more pressing concerns 
than the task of conducting a comprehensive review of all their treaty obligations, 
with a view to notifying depositaries and other states parties that in view of the 
situation, their abilities to fulfil certain treaty commitments may be temporarily 
hampered. The fact that article 15 of the Convention provides for derogation 
from the Convention ‘in time of war or other public emergency’ would seem to 
suggest that the Convention was drafted on the understanding that it would 
continue to apply in wartime to the conduct of states towards those within their 
jurisdiction, except to the extent that derogations had been submitted.
768 See Bankovic et. al. v. Belgium et. al. (2001) ECtHR, para.62. According to Abresch, writing 
in 2005, ‘no derogation to [ECHR] Article 2 ‘in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war’ has ever been made’ (‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, 745).
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The question of the extraterritorial application of the Convention was put to 
the test in 2001 in the case of Bankovic et. al. v. Belgium et. al.. In this case, the 
applicants, all Yugoslav nationals, sought to bring proceedings against those 
NATO states which were party to the Convention, alleging that NATO’s attack on 
the RTS television broadcasting station in Belgrade in 1999 had violated article 2 
of the ECHR (on the right to life). Although the application related to conduct 
during armed hostilities, the central issue was extraterritorial conduct, not the 
applicability of the Convention to armed conflict. The unanimous judgment of a 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determined the 
application inadmissible. The Court took the view that Article 1 of the 
Convention, requiring states parties to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms...of the Convention’ should be considered to reflect an 
‘essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being 
exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of 
each case’. Nevertheless, in a more recent judgment, the ECtHR expressed the 
rather different view that notwithstanding Bankovic, ‘the Convention cannot be 
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention 
on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own
77 0  * •territory’. This latter dictum begs the question of the circumstances in which it 
is possible for the ECHR to be violated by a state party on the territory of another 
state, but the gist is clear enough. The most that can be said at present is that 
ECHR jurisprudence on the circumstances in which the Convention may be
• • 771considered applicable to the extraterritorial conduct of states is unsettled.
169 Ibid., para.61.
770 Issa et. al. v. Turkey (2004), ECtHR.
771 For detailed discussion of ECHR case law on the extraterritorial applicability of the 
Convention, including Bankovic, Issa and the authorities on which both cases rely, see the 
Divisional Court’s judgment in R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary o f  State fo r  Defence and the December 
2005 Court of Appeal judgment The latter judgment, while confirming the decision of the lower 
court, considers in greater detail the emerging jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to the 
extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR, making extensive use of the two concepts of ‘State 
Agent Authority’ and ‘Effective Control of an Area’, either of which, once established, might, in 
the view of the Court of Appeal, be considered sufficient to trigger the extraterritorial applicability 
of the Convention. The reasoning is in harmony with that of the UN Human Rights Committee in 
its General Comment 31 on the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR and that of the Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights in the case of Coard et.al. v. US (1999), IACHR, on the 
extent of the obligation of states parties to the ACHR to apply that Convention outside their own 
territories (para.37). For a contrasting view, see Michael Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights 
Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation’ (2005), AJIL.
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The ECHR and internal conflict
By contrast, if an ECHR state party kills or injures non-combatants by failing 
to take reasonable precautions for their safety during a military operation on its 
own territory, the victims or their families will normally, in principle, be able to 
bring a case against the state in question before the ECtHR. Four recent cases of 
particular interest in this respect are Gulec v. Turkey (1998), Ergi v. Turkey 
(1998), Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005) and Isayeva v. Russia 
(2005).
The Turkish cases - Gulec v. Turkey and Ergi v. Turkey
In both Gulec v. Turkey and Ergi v. Turkey, Turkey was found to have 
violated article 2 of the Convention through failing to take sufficient care for the 
safety of unarmed civilians during violent confrontations involving Turkish 
security forces, in which relatives of the applicants had been killed (and failing, 
subsequently, to conduct satisfactory investigations into the killings). In neither 
case did the Court find that the victims had been intentionally killed by the 
security forces.
In Gulec v. Turkey, a teenager was killed, apparently by a ricocheting bullet 
after Turkish security forces had sought to disperse a violent crowd of several 
thousand people by firing rounds onto the ground from a machine gun mounted
7 77onto an armoured vehicle. The Court accepted that the demonstration was ‘far
77^from peaceful’ and that the use of force in such a case ‘may be justified’ so 
long as a balance is struck ‘between the aim pursued and the means employed to 
achieve it’.774 The Court also acknowledged, with implied approval, the 
assessment of the European Commission on Human Rights that the security forces
772 Gulec v. Turkey (1998), ECtHR, paras.68 and 70.
773 Ibid., para.70.
11 * Ibid., para.71.
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775had not used the weapon to kill demonstrators intentionally. What the Court 
found unacceptable was the fact that the security forces sent to deal with the 
situation did not appear to have at their disposal appropriate non-lethal
77ftweaponry. Thus the essence of the violation lay not in the decision to use 
force, nor in the conduct of those on the scene, but in the inadequate way these 
troops had been equipped.
In Ergi v. Turkey, Turkey was found to have taken insufficient precautions to 
protect the lives of civilians during an exchange of fire with an armed opposition 
group (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK)) which took place near a village in 
the south-east of Turkey and in which the applicant’s sister was killed. The Court 
did not accept the applicant’s submission that the death of his sister could be 
directly attributed to the Turkish security forces, considering the evidence on this 
point inconclusive.777 Rather, it was Turkey’s inability to satisfy the Court that it
770
had done all it could to avoid or minimize civilian casualties, and also Turkey’s 
failure properly to investigate the death of the applicant’s sister, which led the 
Court to hold Turkey responsible for a violation of article 2,779 irrespective of 
whether the fatal bullet had been fired by the Turkish security forces or the 
PKK.780
There was no explicit reference to the law of armed conflict in the Ergi 
judgment. Nor was there any determination that the violent unrest in the south­
eastern part of Turkey which formed the background to the case should, for legal 
purposes, have been qualified as an armed conflict. Interestingly, however, the 
judgment declared that for the purposes of this case, the responsibility of the state
775 Ibid., paras.68 and 70.
776 Ibid., para.71.
777 Ergi v. Turkey (1998), ECtHR, paras.77-78.
778 For instance, it appeared that Turkish forces had organized an ambush without knowing the 
distance of the village from the place chosen for the ambush, and had placed themselves in a 
position which put the villagers at considerable risk of cross-fire. No information had been 
provided by the Turkish Government about any steps or precautions to protect the civilians from 
being caught by the cross-fire. According to the Court, ‘In the light of the failure of the 
authorities.. .to adduce direct evidence on the planning and conduct of the ambush operation, the 
Court.. .finds that it can reasonably be inferred that insufficient precautions had been taken to 
protect the lives of the civilian population’ (para.81).
79 The failure to investigate the killing adequately was held by the Court to be a violation of both 
article 2 (the right to life) and article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR.
780 Ergi v. Turkey, para.86.
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could be considered engaged where ‘[agents of the state]... fail to take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation mounted 
against an opposing group with a view to avoiding and, in any event, to
no i
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life’. This is an almost verbatim citation 
of article 57.2(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I, although the judgment neither 
acknowledged this source, nor explained why it was drawn upon. The Court’s 
choice of the same phraseology as that of the Protocol can hardly have been a co­
incidence and suggests it consciously took the view that a certain rule of the law 
of armed conflict found in Additional Protocol I should have been applied by 
Turkey during a security operation in its own territory.
It was unfortunate that the judgment shed no light on why the Court chose to 
use this language.782 Rules of the law of armed conflict often cut two ways, 
seeking, on the one hand, to protect non-combatants from unnecessary harm 
during armed conflict, while at the same time recognizing that once an armed 
conflict has broken out, belligerents have the right to use military force against 
certain objectives and persons and that non-combatants may sometimes be harmed 
by such attacks without any unlawful act necessarily having occurred. The rule 
which slips into the Ergi judgment is no exception: the obligation to ‘take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods.. .with a view to avoiding 
and, in any event, to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life’ (emphasis added), 
while requiring belligerents to conduct hostilities with due regard for the safety of 
non-combatants, nonetheless accepts that in armed conflict, civilians occasionally 
get killed by accident. This rule, though of great importance for the protection of 
non-combatants during armed conflict, does not reflect the normal obligations of a 
state towards its citizens in peacetime, when a rather higher standard of care may 
reasonably be expected.
781 Ibid., para.79.
782 Abresch observes that use of the vocabulary of the law of armed conflict in ECtHR judgments 
‘has been taken as evidence that the ECtHR applies humanitarian law principles and concepts 
when dealing with cases arising out of armed conflicts, that it applies, sub silentio, humanitarian 
law as a lex specialis (‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, 746).
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The Russian cases - Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva. v. Russia and Isayeva v. 
Russia
The degree of care which states party to the ECHR are required to take for the 
protection of non-combatants during military operations in their own territory 
received further clarification in two judgments rendered in 2005 relating to the 
conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya. In Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazayeva v. 
Russia, Russia was found to have breached its obligations under the Convention 
and its First Protocol when a convoy of civilians trying to flee conflict in 
Chechnya was struck by rockets fired from two Russian military aircraft. 
Survivors testified that they had heard on the local radio that a ‘humanitarian 
corridor’ would open on 29 October 1999, allowing people to travel from Grozny 
into Ingushetia along the Rostov-Baku highway via a military checkpoint on the 
border between Chechnya and Ingushetia.783 On arrival at the checkpoint, they 
had eventually been turned back by Russian troops, who were initially uncertain 
as to whether or not civilians could be allowed through that day.784 On the return 
journey to Grozny, the convoy came under fire from Russian military aircraft.785 
Twelve air-to-ground S-24 missiles were fired, killing at least sixteen civilians 
and injuring a further eleven.786 No evidence was submitted by Russia in relation 
to any militants having been killed or injured in the attack, other than the 
testimony of the pilots to the effect that they believed they had destroyed a truck
• • 787of militants. The case was brought before the Court by a mother whose 
children had been killed in the attack and who had herself been injured, as well as 
others who had been injured or who had lost personal possessions in the attack.
The applicants made three legal submissions in relation to the attack:
i) it constituted an intentional violation of the right to life, since the 
authorities should have known of the presence of the civilian convoy 
on the road when the attack took place and there was evidence to
783 Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005), ECtHR, para. 13.
784 Ibid., paras. 15-17.
785 Ibid., paras. 18-30.
786 See ibid., paras.69 and 88.
787 Ibid., para.28.
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suggest the pilots had observed the convoy before launching their 
missiles;
ii) the degree of force used was ‘manifestly disproportionate to whatever 
aim the military were trying to achieve’;
iii) the bombardment was an indiscriminate attack on civilians which
H O O
could not be justified under international humanitarian law.
A Human Rights Watch report submitted by the applicants contended that certain 
provisions of the law of armed conflict applicable to the situation had been
n o q
violated. The Russian government maintained the two military planes had 
come under fire from a truck of Chechen militants, and had taken lawful action in 
their own defence and that of the local population, being unaware there were 
civilian vehicles in the vicinity which might be endangered.790
In finding in favour of the applicants, the Court rejected the Russian 
contention that the pilots were unaware of the presence of the convoy when they
• * 701opened fire, considering this version of events unsupported by the evidence. 
The Court did not, however, explicitly take a position on whether or not the attack 
had been launched intentionally at the convoy in the knowledge of its civilian 
status. Nor did it take the view that Russian use in Chechnya of military aviation 
with heavy combat weapons would necessarily have been disproportionate, given 
the prevailing situation in the republic.792 It did not even state that the 
bombardment had been an indiscriminate attack. The Court’s finding that Russia 
had violated its obligations under the Convention and its First Protocol was based 
instead on its view that even if Russian forces had been pursuing a legitimate aim 
in launching the missiles, Russia had failed to take the ‘requisite care’ for the lives
788 Ibid., paras. 155-157.
789 Ibid., para. 102.
790 Ibid., paras.28, 30, 81 and 160.
791 Ibid., para. 192.
792 Ibid., para. 178.
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7QTof the civilian population in the planning and execution of this attack. This 
assessment was based on the following elements of the evidence:
i) the troops manning the checkpoint from which the convoy had been 
turned back had not alerted the local air controller (who had authorized 
the pilots to open fire) to the presence on the Rostov-Baku highway of 
a large number of civilian vehicles;794
ii) although it was routine practice for Russian military aircraft to carry 
forward air controllers, this precaution was dispensed with on the day 
in question, apparently because there were no federal forces in the
• • • • 70Svicinity who could be endangered by air strikes;
iii) twelve missiles with an impact radius in excess of 300 metres had been
70 ftlaunched at a stretch of road filled with vehicles;
The Court appeared to regard the obligation of states party to the Convention to 
take a high degree of care for the protection of non-combatants during military 
operations to be a self-standing duty under the Convention, independent of any 
obligation deriving from the law of armed conflict which might or might not be 
binding on them in the circumstances.
The Court based its judgment ultimately on facts which were either common 
ground or derived from evidence submitted by the respondent Government. It 
refrained from drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence about the 
intentions of those responsible for the attack, and declined to pronounce on the 
applicability to the situation of certain rules of the law of armed conflict. This 
restraint was wise. Had the Court accepted the applicants’ legal submissions 
regarding the intentionality of the attack, or had it formally based its findings on a 
preference for the applicants’ evidence over that of the respondent Government, 
not only would the fairness of the judgment have been open to question within
793 Ibid., para. 199.
794 Ibid., para. 187.
795 Ibid., paras.80, 188 and 189.
796 Ibid., para. 195.
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Russia and possibly elsewhere, but its value as a precedent for the judicial 
enforcement of the rules on precautions in attack would have been much 
diminished. As it was, the judgment established that in certain circumstances a 
state can be held to account by the ECtHR for failure to take reasonable 
precautions in attack during military operations within its own jurisdiction, 
irrespective of any criminal intent on the part of the perpetrators and irrespective 
of whether or not certain rules of the law of armed conflict can be said formally to 
apply. The fact that the Court chose to focus on what had gone wrong 
procedurally, rather than on the presence or absence of criminal intent on the part 
of the pilots, makes the judgment of particular practical value as a precedent, not 
least because it pointed to certain specific precautions (such as the use of forward 
air controllers for attacks in areas where civilians are present) which can 
reasonably be expected when air power is used -  and failure to take which may, in 
certain circumstances, while not necessarily constituting a war crime, nonetheless 
have legal consequences for states if it leads to non-combatant casualties.
In the separate case of Isayeva v. Russia, the Court concluded that article 2 of 
the ECHR was violated when the applicant’s son and three young nieces were 
killed in circumstances which, in the view of the Court, amounted to a failure on 
the part of Russian federal forces to take the requisite degree of care for the safety 
of non-combatants. A group of several hundred armed Chechen fighters had 
entered a village of about 25,000 people during the early morning of 4 February
n(\n  <7q o
2000. The village was subsequently attacked with artillery and aircraft, 
leading to the deaths of at least 46 civilians as well as substantial numbers of 
federal troops and Chechen fighters.799 According to evidence submitted by the 
Russian government, a safe passage out of the village was offered to the residents, 
information in relation to which was given to the head of the village 
administration and broadcast from a mobile unit as well as a helicopter equipped
797 Isayeva v. Russia, (2005), ECtHR, paras. 15, 16. See also para.23.
798 Ibid., paras. 17 and 26. According to the applicant, the attack began early in the morning of 4 
February, i.e. soon after the arrival of the rebel fighters and before the residents had made any 
attempt to leave the village; according to the Russian government, it was launched only once the 
residents had left, except for some who remained because the fighters would not allow them to 
leave.
799 Ibid., paras.26 and 33. According to information submitted by the Russian government, 53 
federal troops and 180 rebel fighters were also killed (para.27).
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with loudspeakers.800 Evidence was submitted by the applicant which suggested 
that although a helicopter equipped with loudspeakers was seen by the villagers, 
the warnings to leave the village were broadcast only after the bombardment had 
already been underway for several hours, and were inaudible above the ambient 
noise.801 The applicant and her relatives, having nonetheless learned of the 
existence of a ‘safe passage’, joined a bus full of people trying to flee along this 
route. Her relatives died from shrapnel injuries when the vehicles in which they 
were travelling were attacked by forces apparently unaware of any ‘safe passage’ 
having been designated.
As in Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazayeva v. Russia, there was no finding that the 
death of the applicant’s relatives had been caused intentionally and the Court 
again affirmed that Russian forces were pursuing a legitimate aim in using force
qai t t t
in the overall circumstances. The use of military aviation and artillery was not 
seen as in itself unjustified, given the situation.804 What rendered the action 
unlawful was the failure of the Russian authorities to take the requisite care for the 
lives of civilians in the planning and execution of a military operation.805 The 
Court implied that if the attack on the village had occurred after an effective 
evacuation of the villagers had been organized by Russian forces, giving a 
realistic amount of time for people to get out and making proper provision for the 
evacuation of the infirm, no violation would have been found. The efforts which 
had been made by federal forces to evacuate civilians were noted, but judged to 
have been inadequate, with particular criticism of the failure of Russian forces to 
take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of those fleeing the village via the 
‘safe passage’ or to co-ordinate announcements of the ‘safe exit’ for civilians with 
the military planning and execution of the operation.806
800 Ibid., paras.25 and 72.
801 Ibid., paras.52 and 193.
802 Ibid., paras. 17-18, 31 and 90.
803 Ibid., para.200.
** Ibid., para. 180.
805 Ibid., paras.200-201. Earlier, the Court reaffirmed the reasoning of Ergi v. Turkey that when 
unarmed civilians are killed in a military operation, the responsibility of a State may be engaged if 
agents of the state involved in the operation ‘fail to take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to 
avoiding and, in any event, minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life’ (para. 176).
806 Ibid., paras. 189 and 219.
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c) Other human rights tribunals
No other human rights treaty has an enforcement mechanism quite as 
powerful as that of the ECHR. It might be argued that non-combatant deaths 
which can be attributed to a state’s failure to take reasonable precautions in attack 
should be considered a violation not only of the right to life as enshrined in the 
ECHR, but also of the right to life as enshrined in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the
807African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In practice, however, the 
relative weakness of the specific enforcement mechanisms for these treaties 
means it is unlikely that any state not party to the ECHR would ever face the 
prospect of being obliged by an international human rights tribunal to pay 
compensation to individuals injured as a result of a failure to take precautions in 
attack. Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area may influence 
other international or even domestic tribunals faced with cases where harm is 
alleged to have been caused to individuals unlawfully on account of a state’s 
failure to take reasonable precautions for the safety of non-combatants during a 
military operation.
d) Claims commissions
Sometimes, ad hoc claims commissions are established to settle questions of 
reparation for violations of international law in the context of specific situations. 
The mandates of claims commissions, and thus the extent to which they can be 
considered judicial or administrative bodies, can vary greatly.
An example of a largely administrative claims commission is the United 
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established by a series of UN 
Security Council Resolutions to provide financial compensation to individual and
807 See ICCPR article 6; ACHR, article 4; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 
4.
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• • 808corporate victims of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1991. Iraq’s 
liability for loss and damages as a result of its invasion and occupation of Kuwait 
was established by the UN Security Council before the UNCC came into 
existence. 809 Its task was thus the provision of equitable compensation to 
victims of a violation of the jus ad bellum by Iraq which had already been 
determined by the Security Council, not to adjudicate on alleged violations of the 
jus in bello,810 The UN Secretary General clarified at the outset that the UNCC 
was to be chiefly a fact-finding, not a judicial body.811
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC), established pursuant to 
article 5 of the Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000 between the two states, 
is a rather different and legally more interesting kind of body, despite its restricted 
territorial reach. The mandate of this Commission is:
To decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one 
Government against the other and by nationals (including both natural and juridical 
persons) of one party against the Government of the other party or entities owned or 
controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of 
the Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation 
of Hostilities Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian 
law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international 
law.812
The EECC is an adversarial forum, where allegations may be made of unlawful 
conduct by either of the two states subject to the EECC’s arbitration, with the 
latter’s task being to adjudicate such claims and decide on liability. EECC 
members are international lawyers, and the claims brought so far have been 
prepared with the involvement on both sides of leading international experts on 
the law of state responsibility. Notwithstanding the relative obscurity of the 
conflict to which the claims relate, the EECC’s decisions are thus of considerable 
general interest.
808 See UNSCR 692. Further Security Council Resolutions were passed to establish the 
modalities for the allocation of funds to the Commission out of Iraqi oil revenue (see UNSCRs 
705, 986 and 1483).
809 See UNSCR 687.
810 See David Caron and Brian Morris T he UN Compensation Commission: practical justice, not 
retribution’ (2002), EJIL.
811 UN report S/22559 of 02.05.91.
812 See website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
246
Of particular interest in relation to the question of state responsibility for 
failure to take precautions in attack is the EECC’s Partial Award, Central Front 
(Ethiopia’s Claim 2) of 28 April 2004.813 In making this award, the EECC
determined that Eritrea, having failed to take the legally required precautions 
during an attack on a military objective,814 was liable for the deaths, wounds and 
physical damage to civilians and civilian objects in Ethiopian territory which had
oi c
been caused thereby. The EECC accepted that the attack in question had been 
intended for an airfield that was unquestionably a military objective. But it 
considered that Eritrea had failed to take all feasible precautions to prevent two 
out of four of the attacking planes from mistaking their target and dropping cluster 
bombs in the vicinity of a school and a civilian neighbourhood, causing death and 
injury as a result.816 Eritrea was thus held to have committed an internationally 
wrongful act and, consequently, to be liable to pay compensation.
e) Alien suits in domestic courts
Where a state whose nationals have been injured by another state’s failure to 
comply with its obligations is unable or unwilling to seek redress from the 
responsible state, it may be possible for the individual victims or their relatives to 
seek redress through civil proceedings in the domestic courts of the responsible 
state.817 This may, sometimes, be a means by which redress may be obtained
813 See ibid. for the text of this Award.
814 The EECC’s policy of considering not only the provisions of the Geneva Conventions but also 
those of Additional Protocol I as applicable law in relation to the conflict, (except in the event of a 
provision being specifically objected to by one or other of the states concerned) is a pragmatic 
approach, adopted in the interest of the expeditious settlement of claims (unattributable statement, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs Conference on Customary International Humanitarian law, 
18-19 April, 2005). See also section V.B of the EECC’s Award in this case.
815 Ibid. para.V.D.9
*]6 Ibid. paras.rV.J.101-113.
817 In 2003, relatives of Yugoslav civilians killed in the NATO air strike against Vavarin Bridge in 
Serbia in 1999 brought civil proceedings for damages against the German government in a state 
court in Bonn, not on the grounds that German planes had participated in the attack (they had not), 
but on the grounds of Germany’s participation in the alliance responsible for an attack which they 
argued was illegal (‘Serbs sue Germany over bridge attack’, BBC Online, 15.10.03). The claim 
was rejected at first instance and on appeal. Significantly, however, the Higher Regional Court of 
Cologne ruled that under German law, an individual could, in principle, claim compensation for a 
wrongful act committed by governmental authorities, whether in time of war or peace. The appeal 
was rejected on the basis that in this particular instance, on the facts, no wrongful act could be 
attributed to the governmental authorities of Germany (judgment of 28.07.05 summarized in
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from a state organ for a violation of international law. But it cannot be considered 
a means of holding a state formally to account for an internationally wrongful act. 
In the event of such proceedings succeeding, it would be a case of a state’s 
judiciary ruling against a branch of the executive in favour of an individual or 
individuals within the context of that state’s municipal law -  the domestic 
enforcement of the state’s own administrative law, in short, not a finding of state 
responsibility under international law.
7.4. Non-judicial enforcement of state responsibility
Although there are several judicial forums in which states may in principle be 
held to account for failing to comply with their legal obligations in relation to 
precautions in attack, states often have strong political and diplomatic incentives 
to make amends in a way that avoids judicial proceedings. In at least two cases 
during the period under review where states have suffered injury as a result of 
another state’s apparent failure to take precautions in attack, reparation was made 
without any formal adjudication: after the shooting down of an Iranian civil 
airliner by the USS Vincennes in 1988, and after of the bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy by the US Air Force in 1999, compensation was agreed as a result of
• • • 81 ftnegotiation between the states concerned, with no direct judicial involvement.
When harm is caused as a result of a state’s failure to take proper precautions 
in attack, and the state is initially unwilling to offer compensation to the victims 
or indicate what steps it will take to prevent the same thing happening again, third 
party pressure from other states may be at least as effective as judicial proceedings
English in Bofaxe, No. 295E of 02.09.05, published by the Institute for International Law of Peace 
and Humanitarian Law of the Ruhr-University, Bochum). By contrast, in Italy, when a claim was 
brought by a group of Serbian nationals, seeking to establish the responsibility of the Italian state 
for the deaths of their relatives in the NATO air strike against the RTS television station in 
Belgrade in 1999, the Court of Cassation ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim as it 
related to the conduct of international relations, which was a sovereign activity (President o f the 
Council o f  Ministers v. Markovic and Others (2002), Court of Cassation (Italy). For a critical 
analysis of this case, see Micaela Frulli ‘When are states liable towards individuals for serious 
violations of humanitarian law? The Markovic case’ (2003), Journal o f  International Criminal 
Justice). See also Mohammed B id  and Skender B id  v. Ministry o f  Defence.
818 See ‘Contemporary Practice of the US’ (2000), (ed. Sean Murphy), AJIL, 130-131 and US 
President Clinton’s statement to the US Congress of 16.05.96, 0ittp://clinton6.nara.gov, visited 
23.06.05).
248
in inducing the responsible state to make reparation. The obligation states parties 
to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I assume to ‘respect and to 
ensure respect’ for these treaties819 can be construed as an obligation on third 
party states to use their influence to promote compliance by other states. This 
interpretation finds authoritative support in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on The 
Legal Consequence o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory in which the Court declared ‘it follows from that provision [article 1 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention] that every State party to that Convention, whether 
or not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the
QA 1
requirements of the instruments in question are complied with’. Article 89 of 
Additional Protocol I furthermore provides (vaguely) that in case of serious 
violations of the Protocol or of the Geneva Conventions, states parties must ‘act, 
jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity 
with the United Nations Charter’. Article 90 of the Protocol provides for the 
establishment of an ‘International Fact Finding Commission’ to investigate the 
facts of alleged serious violations of the Protocol or of the Geneva Conventions, 
and to ‘facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect 
for the Conventions and this Protocol’. Unfortunately, though the Commission 
was eventually set up in 1992-1993, it was on no occasion made use of as a means 
of holding states to account during the period under review.
There are a number of ways third party influence can be exercised. Where 
violations of the law of armed conflict by a state’s armed forces are routine or 
particularly obnoxious, confidential representations can be made by heads of 
diplomatic missions to their host governments, objecting to such conduct and 
warning of its potential political cost. States with armed forces known and 
respected for their professionalism can, by means of military attaches in 
diplomatic missions or military advisers seconded to military training
8,9 See first article of all five treaties.
820 See Sassoli, ‘State Responsibility’, 421-422, and Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes and Luigi 
Condorelli, ‘Common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: protecting collective 
interests’ (2000), IRRC.
821 Para. 158.
822 See Adam Roberts, ‘The role of humanitarian issues in international politics in the 1990s’ and 
Luigi Condorelli, ‘La Commission intemationale humanitaire d’etablissement des faits: un outil 
obsolete ou un moyen utile de mise en oeuvre du droit international humanitaire?’ (2001), IRRC.
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establishments in other countries, provide advice to host governments in relation 
to good practice. Defence sales and military training programmes can be made 
conditional, to some extent at least, on the recipient state’s willingness to observe
• • 823proper standards of care in the conduct of military operations.
International organizations do not have the same formal, legal duty as states to 
ensure the law of armed conflict is respected. Members of UN peace support 
operations and other international missions are often, however, at least as well 
placed to exercise influence on the parties to a conflict to comply with their 
obligations under the law of armed conflict as are diplomats and may have better 
access to non-state actors. The regular demarches made by members of 
UNPROFOR and other international actors to parties to the conflict in Bosnia 
protesting at apparent violations of the law of armed conflict are an example of 
how this influence can be exercised. Questions might be raised about the 
effectiveness of this kind of action; but insofar as such scepticism is well-founded, 
it is an argument for more such pressure, not less. 825 It should also be recalled 
that the presence of either diplomatic representatives or representatives of 
international organizations in conflict zones in which the law is being regularly 
violated risks being seen by the local authorities as endorsement of such conduct 
if such people fail to demur.
7.5. Responsibility for violations of the law of armed conflict by armed 
opposition groups
So far, the responsibility which parties to a conflict, as opposed to individual 
combatants, may bear for violations of the law of armed conflict has been 
considered in this chapter in terms of the responsibility of states, not armed 
opposition groups. There is a reason for this. It is a necessary feature of the 
international legal order that the quid pro quo of the exercise of sovereignty by
823 See also Sassoli, ‘State Responsibility’, 430-431.
824 See Galic (Trial Judgement), paras. 667-675.
825 See Munoz-Rojaz and Fresard, ‘The roots of behaviour in war: understanding and preventing 
IHL violations’ for analysis of the relative effectiveness of various ways of seeking by non­
judicial means to influence combatants to comply with the law of armed conflict.
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states is accountability for compliance with international law. State
responsibility for violations of the law of armed conflict cannot be seen as simply 
a form of collective or corporate responsibility, where an organized group, rather 
than an individual, needs to be penalized for a wrongful act or omission. That is 
not to say that there will be no adverse consequences for armed opposition groups 
which act in violation of international law; it is simply to say that they cannot, 
normally, be held to account under the law of state responsibility by international 
tribunals.
Armed opposition groups may, nevertheless, be held formally to account for 
their actions under the law of state responsibility if and when they come to 
power.827 Furthermore, the chances of such groups sustaining sufficient support 
to be able to come to power (or of being internationally accepted in the event of 
their becoming the de facto government) may be jeopardized by a record of 
conducting hostilities in total disregard of the safety and welfare of non- 
combatants.828
Meanwhile, non-judicial enforcement of the rules, for instance by the effective 
exercise of influence by third parties, arguably has as much chance of influencing 
armed opposition groups as it does of influencing states -  and possibly more, 
given the relative dependence of armed opposition groups on outside assistance
oig
and popular support compared to their governmental opponents.
826 ‘Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e. to excluding the activities of 
other States; for it serves to divide between nations the space upon which human activities are 
employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum of protection of which international 
law is the guardian’. (Arbitral Award in the Palmas case, 1928).
827 See Articles on State Responsibility, article 10 and commentary.
828 Leaders of such groups sometimes recognize the public relations value of claiming to be taking 
steps for protection of non-combatants, as for instance in 1989 when the Chief of Staff of the 
FMLN in El Salvador publicly admitted that ‘numerous civilians had fallen victim to its actions 
and accordingly [it had] recommended to its officers and combatants measures to avoid these 
occurrences in the future’ (quoted in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Vol II), 3187, citing IACHR Annual Report 1988-1989, Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 Doc. 10, (18.09.89), Chapter IV (El Salvador), 166).
829 See Sassoli, ‘State Responsibility’, 411: ‘Violations of IHL by [insurrectional movements] 
entail their international legal responsibility; this is of particular importance with regard to the 
corresponding rights and duties of third States in the event of such violations’. See also Max 
Glaser, Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors (London, 2005) on the variables 
likely to affect the receptivity of armed non-state actors to arguments in favour of compliance with 
international law.
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7.6. Conclusions
Judicial practice during the period under review suggests that only rarely will 
allegations that a state has failed to comply with its international obligations 
concerning precautions in attack result in the merits of such claims being heard by 
an international tribunal. Nevertheless, such failure may have adverse 
consequences, both financially and politically, even in the context of an internal 
conflict.
Where internal conflicts are concerned, holding states to account before 
international tribunals such as the ECtHR is almost by definition an asymmetric 
means of enforcing compliance. But the non-judicial means by which external 
actors can exert political, moral and economic pressure on belligerents, including 
armed opposition groups, to comply with the rules on precautions on attack are 
usually as relevant to internal conflicts as to international ones. The importance 
of these non-judicial enforcement measures, whatever the nature of the military 
operation, should not be under-estimated, just as the importance of judicial 
enforcement should not be over-estimated. Compensation can be paid, 
satisfaction given and measures instituted to ensure non-repetition of 
internationally wrongful acts without any need for judicial involvement. Ideally, 
this should be the norm, with international tribunals being called upon to 
pronounce only in cases where the legal issues are complex and require expert 
judicial appraisal.
The element of the law of state responsibility, as represented by the ILC’s 
Articles, requiring states found responsible for violating their obligations to cease 
doing so and to give assurances of non-repetition potentially has great protective 
value for non-combatants in conflict zones. And the rule requiring states 
responsible for internationally wrongful acts to make full reparation to the victim 
state(s) holds out greater promise of meaningful redress for the individual victims 
of violations of the law armed conflict than does the successful prosecution of
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individuals. Where effective enforcement on the international plane of the 
obligation under international law to take precautions in attack is concerned, there 
is much to be said for looking less to international criminal law, and more to the 
modem law of state responsibility as set out in the ILC’s Articles.
iekit
830 War crimes trials have not traditionally led to compensation for the victims. Article 75 of the 
ICC Statute seeks to remedy this by providing for the possibility of reparations for war crimes’ 
victims by means either of an order directly against a convicted person, or through a Trust Fund 
established for this purpose. The effectiveness of this mechanism remains to be seen.
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CONCLUSION
We shall utterly fa il to understand the true character o f  the law o f war unless we 
realize that its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the literal sense o f the 
word, namely to protect or mitigate suffering, and, in some cases, to rescue life 
from the savagery o f battle and passion.
Sir Hersch Lauterpachf31
Some of the rules of the law of armed conflict have an ancient pedigree, such 
as that prohibiting the use of poison as a weapon of war, recognized by the ancient 
Greeks and Romans.832 But the willingness and ability of belligerents to protect 
the civilian population of the enemy (as opposed to certain categories of enemy 
civilian) from the effects of hostilities is relatively modem. It was not until the 
last quartile of the twentieth century that international opinion finally coalesced 
around the view that direct attacks against enemy civilians in their own country 
were not acts of war, but crimes. It was during the same period that new 
international rules took shape requiring states not only to criminalize deliberate 
attacks on civilians and non-combatants in wartime, but also to take a 
considerable degree of care during the conduct of hostilities to avoid causing non- 
combatant casualties or damage to civilian objects by accident or incidentally. 
The question thus arose, were the new rules capable of implementation on the 
modem battlefield and in wars against opponents not necessarily inhibited by the 
same scruples - or was signing up to them an indulgence which only those states 
not expecting ever to have to wage war in earnest could permit themselves?
It is submitted that in the light of legal developments and of practice during 
conflicts between 1980 and 2005, the following mles now not only represent 
customary law binding on all parties to armed conflicts, but can also be observed 
in practice on the modem battlefield without detriment to military effectiveness:
■ Military objectives are those objectives which by their purpose, function, 
location or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
831 ‘The problem of the revision of the law of war’ (1952), BYIL 1952.
832 See Coleman Phillipson, International Law and Custom o f Ancient Greece and Rome, (London, 
1911) (Vol.II), 204, 208 and 231.
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partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances 
ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. Nothing else may 
be attacked deliberately by whatever means. (This rule does not preclude 
the legitimacy of proportionate action in self-defence).
■ Belligerents must do everything feasible to verify the nature of a 
prospective target. (‘Feasible’ means what is practicable or practically 
possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including 
humanitarian and military considerations). If targets cannot be identified 
with confidence as military objectives, they should not be attacked.
■ Belligerents must take all feasible precautions in the choice of methods 
and means of attack with a view to eliminating or minimizing collateral 
damage. Combatants are not obliged by law to disregard their own safety 
in the interests of protecting civilian life, but are required to be prepared to 
take some risks for the sake of carrying out an attack with discrimination.
■ Attacks may not be launched which are expected to cause collateral 
damage clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated from the attack. For the purposes of assessing 
whether an attack would be disproportionate, ‘attack’ means an attack as a 
whole, not just an isolated part of it. It does not, however, mean 
‘campaign’.
■ In advance of attacks liable to affect the civilian population, attacking 
forces must, where possible, give effective warnings to civilians to stay 
away from places of danger. The warnings need to be clear and specific 
and to allow sufficient time to be acted on. They can only be dispensed 
with in exceptional circumstances where they are clearly impractical and 
there is an immediate need for defensive action or where surprise is 
essential to the success of an attack.
■ Those with authority over the civilian population, and civilians 
themselves, bear responsibility for ensuring non-combatants remain at a
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relatively safe distance from objects in a conflict zone which clearly meet 
the above definition of a military objective. Civilian leaders have a 
particular responsibility to ensure that the most vulnerable members of the 
civilian population are adequately protected from the dangers of military 
operations.
These rules have implications not only for the conduct of attacking forces, but 
also for non-combatants themselves. Though the demands made of belligerents 
by modem international law are considerable, there is a limit to what can 
reasonably be expected of an attacking force, given the number of things that can 
go wrong in armed conflict, and the safety of civilians in conflict zones will not be 
promoted by encouraging them to expect to be able to continue going about their 
lives and business exactly as normal while hostilities take place with clinical 
precision around them.
Few if any of the examples of good practice identified in Chapters 4 and 5 
could be said to be in themselves legal requirements. But while the law cannot 
insist on military training being carried out in a certain way, warnings being given 
in a particular form, or on specific procedures being adopted for the observation 
of targets, there are good military and political reasons for states (and armed 
opposition groups) to identify, adopt, promote and enforce, at their discretion, 
good practice with respect to precautions in attack. Not only will this pay 
dividends in terms of winning hearts and minds during a military campaign; it will 
also help sustain domestic and international support for legitimate military 
operations, as well as promoting and sustaining the professional self-respect of 
those military personnel engaged in them.833 In the case of a state party to the 
ECHR, it will reduce the risk of adverse rulings in Strasbourg. Systematic failure 
on the part of individuals or states to comply with commonly recognized rules on 
targeting and precautions in attack may not often lead to judicial proceedings on 
the international plane, but may provoke retaliation in kind, leading to bitter 
cycles of reprisal and counter-reprisal, in which sight of the initial political aims
833 According to modem British defence doctrine ‘The combination of war-fighting skills and 
humanity may seem paradoxical. However, a vitally important part of motivation is the belief in 
what one is doing: the measured application of force requires discipline and a finely tuned sense of 
moral purpose’ (JWP 0-01 (2nd Edition), iii).
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of the resort to military force becomes lost and the prospects of reconciliation 
recede ever further away.
This thesis has attempted to pin down some of the practical steps that can be 
taken (and advocated) by combatants and civilian leaders at various levels with a 
view to reducing the rate of non-combatant death and injury caused 
unintentionally, but nonetheless avoidably, in modem a^med conflicts. It has 
looked at the possible consequences on the international plane for individuals and 
for states of failure to take reasonable precautions in attack during armed conflict. 
Limited access to material, time constraint and the need to keep the thesis a 
manageable size have precluded a comprehensive review of practice worldwide in 
terms of taking precautions in attack, though it is hoped that the practice drawn on 
has been sufficient to illustrate some best practice which may remain relevant to 
the conduct of hostilities in both international and internal conflict for some years 
to come, at least. Further research could reveal more evidence of how the 
obligation to take precautions in attack has been implemented and enforced in 
recent conflicts in different parts of the world. There is also much more that could 
be said about the implications of the obligation under international law to take 
precautions in attack for research and development in the defence industry and for 
defence procurement. Finally, systematic collection and analysis of mortality data 
relating to international armed conflicts during the period under review and during 
an appropriate ‘recall’ period (1940-1975, for instance) might be able to give a 
more scientific indication than has been possible in this thesis of the extent to 
which the new rules on the conduct of hostilities drawn up in 1977, and the efforts 
of belligerents to apply them in practice, may truly have served, in the words of 
Lauterpacht cited at the beginning of this chapter, ‘to protect or mitigate suffering 
and.. .rescue life from the savagery of battle and passion.’
834 For an accessible introduction to the techniques of collecting and interpreting mortality data in 
abnormal situations, see Francesco Checchi and Les Roberts, Interpreting and using mortality data 
in humanitarian emergencies: a primer fo r  non-epidemiologists (London, 2005).
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TABLE OF TREATIES, STATUTES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL CODES*
1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field (Lieber Code) (reprinted in Schindler and Toman, The Laws o f 
Armed Conflict (2nd Edition)).
1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and annexed Regulations (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on 
the Laws o f War (3rd Edition)).
1907 Hague Convention VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into 
War-Ships (reprinted in Schindler and Toman, The Laws o f Armed 
Conflict (2nd Edition))
1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Contact Mines (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws 
o f War (3rd Edition)).
1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time 
of War (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War 
(3rd Edition)).
1907 Hague Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with regard to the 
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (reprinted in Schindler and 
Toman, The Laws o f Armed Conflict (2nd Edition)).
1907 Hague Declaration XIV Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons (reprinted in Schindler and Toman, The Laws o f  
Armed Conflict (2nd Edition)).
*Full texts o f  treaties on the law o f armed conflict referred to in the thesis can additionally be
found via the ICRC’s international humanitarian law database ('http://www.icrc.org/ihl) together
with up-to-date lists o f  states parties and texts o f reservations and statements o f understandings
made by states parties on signature or ratification.
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1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, 
Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd Edition)).
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 
(reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd 
Edition)).
1936 London Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set 
Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930 (reprinted in 
Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd Edition)).
1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (15 UNTS, 295)
1945 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (reprinted in Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law (4th 
Edition)).
1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the London 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis (reprinted in Schindler and Toman, The 
Laws o f Armed Conflict (2nd Edition)).
1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (reprinted in Roberts and 
Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd Edition)).
1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (reprinted in 
Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd Edition)).
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1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd 
Edition)).
1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f  
War (3rd Edition))
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (reprinted in Ghandhi, Blackstone’s International 
Human Rights Documents).
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict and annexed Regulations (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, 
Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd Edition)).
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (reprinted in Ghandhi, 
Blackstone’s International Human Rights Documents).
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (reprinted in Brownlie, Basic 
Documents in International Law (4th Edition)).
1969 American Convention on Human Rights (reprinted in Ghandhi,
Blackstone’s International Human Rights Documents).
1977 Protocol I Additional to die Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War (3rd 
Edition)).
1977 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f War 
(3 rd Edition)).
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1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
• 1980 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
• 1980 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
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